

Bmit. 551 ml
/ 6

<36642158420013

S

<36642158420013

Bayer. Staatsbibliothek

DESPATCHES,
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MEMORANDA
OF
FIELD MARSHAL
ARTHUR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

EDITED BY HIS SON,
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

[IN CONTINUATION OF THE FORMER SERIES.]

VOLUME THE SIXTH.

[JULY, 1829, TO APRIL, 1830.]

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

MDCCCLXXVII.

The right of Translation is reserved.

Brit. 551 ¹⁰⁸ (6)



LONDON:

PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

25 Har.

CONTENTS OF VOLUME SIX.

- Abercrombie*, Mr. J.; appointed Chief Baron of Scotland, 523.
- Aberdeen*, Earl of; correspondence with Mr. Stratford Canning on the limits of Greece, 10-12; correspondence with the Duke of Wellington, 13, 17, 28, 29, 33, 34, 36, 39, 42, 54, 56; letter of, to Mr. Dawkins, on Greek affairs, 61; correspondence, 63, 66, 73, 76, 79, 91, 95, 97, 98, 102, 104, 106-108, 111-120, 128, 129, 148-150, 161; memorandum of note by the Duke, Treaty 6th July, 166; correspondence with, 170, 171, 174, 175, 177, 183, 185, 186; appointment of his brother to the Order of the Bath, 192; correspondence, 192, 205, 211, 219, 225; choice of a Prince for Greece, 243, 248; *projet* for Protocol, 249; retreat of Russian troops, 250; correspondence, 287, 289, 290; extract of letter to Lord S. de Rothesay: candidature for throne of Greece, 298, 302, 305; foreign affairs, 306, 307; choice of a King for Greece, 308, 309, 313, 352; monarchy for Bolivia, 315; correspondence, 315; Duke of Cumberland at Windsor, conduct of the King, 317, 318; letter on the position of Prince Leopold and his pension, 326; correspondence, 327, 347, 351; nomination of Prince Leopold, 353; correspondence, 355, 356, 362; nomination of Prince Leopold, 364, 375; Eastern question, French propositions, 372, 385; correspondence, 373, 390, 391, 422; Prince Leopold, 515 (2), 519; letters to, 516, 531 (2), 557, 561, 562; English ships as French transports, 566; loan to Prince Leopold as King of Greece, 566; Terceira, 578; Algerine affair, 579.
- Addington*, Mr.; Minister at Madrid, 321.
- Adrianople*; Treaty of, 212.
- Akerman*; Treaty of, 81.
- Alava*, General; on the Russo-Turkish affair, letter to the Duke, 210.
- Albani*, Cardinal; letter to Lord Burghersh, on appointment of an Irish Bishop, 387-390.

- Alexander*, Mr.; dentist to the King, 126.
- Algiers*; affair of; conduct of the French, 576.
- Althorpe*, Lord; his views on political questions, 198.
- America*; boundary question, 347-351; (South), political state of, 427-432.
- Anapa and Poti*; cession of, 57, 100.
- Anonymous* letter; enquiring into, 556.
- Arabin*, Mr.; appointment as Deputy Recorder, 293.
- Arbuthnot*, Right Hon. Charles; conversation with Lord Althorpe, 198; correspondence with, 222; hesitating policy towards Russia, avoidance of the Canning party, 265.
- Army*; Brevet rank in Bengal, 123; knighthood for services in Ava, 124, 142; Household Brigade, suspected irregularity in, 153; rank of officers for services in Bhurtpoor, 160; batta for army of Bengal, 162; attendance of Protestant soldiers at Catholic ceremonies, 310, 311; punishments of soldiers, 343 (memorandum by the Duke).
- Ava*; rewards for service in, 124, 142; the Burmese territories, plan of operations, 158.
- Bagot*, Mr. J.; stamp-duty on government debentures as a source of revenue, 468.
- Bailey*, Lieut.-Col.; trial of, and admonition to, 196.
- Baker*, Colonel; mention of, 158, 161, 163.
- Baldwin*, Mr. W.; society for insurance, 449.
- Bankes*, Mr.; mention of, 461.
- Bath*, the Grand Cross of; state of the Order, 365.
- Bathurst*, Earl; correspondence with, 198, 401 (2).
- Baynes*, Sir Christopher; proposes to tax undertakers, 420.
- Beresford*, Lord; extract of letter upon effects of Catholic Relief Bill, 7; correspondence with Mr. Dawson, 71; correspondence with, 247, 321; O'Connell's failure at Waterford, 450; letter to, 512.
- Bernstorff*, Count; mention of, 79, 353.
- Birnie*, Sir Richard; letter to, 225, 525.
- Blanks* in names, 200, 244, 266, 287, 293, 322, 563.
- Blütte*, Mr.; affair of, 28.
- Bowles*, Lieut.-Col.; plans for a screw steam-vessel, 397.
- Broadwood*, Mr.; his wish to obtain a baronetcy, 345.

- Buccleugh*, Duke of; letter to, 399; the Duke's wish that he should move the address, his letter, 403.
- Buckingham*, Duke of; his wish to be Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, and determination to support the government, 320; O'Connell and the Irish Catholics, 346; correspondence, 355, 436; thanks for his son's appointment, 440.
- Buenos Ayres*, and the Falkland Islands, 49.
- Bülöw*, Baron; letter from, on the Ottoman Porte, 280.
- Burghersh*, Lord; correspondence with, 241; letter and enclosures on appointment of Catholic Bishop of Waterford, 387-390; letter from the Duke on the same, 425.
- Butler*, Mr. R. E.; insincerity of the Greeks, 459.
- Byng*, Sir J.; mention of, 93, 110.
- Cahill*, Mr.; his appointment as magistrate, 345.
- Campbell*, Sir Archibald; mention of, 160.
- Canada, Lower*; representation of, 26, 50.
- Candia*; blockade of, 29.
- Canning*, Mr. Stratford; correspondence with, on the limits of Greece, 10; to the Earl of Aberdeen, 11, 12; correspondence with, 14; investiture of the red ribband, 289; his jealousy of the French in the matter of Samos, 316.
- Canterbury*, Archbishop of (Right Hon. W. Howley); correspondence, 256.
- Capo D'Istria*, Count V.; his revolutionary conduct, 77; his hostility, 177, 183; his conduct, 423, 498.
- Chancellor*, The Lord (Lyndhurst); conduct of the Duke of Cumberland, 39, 43; disorder in the King's eyes, 126.
- Chandos*, Marquis of; sugar and rum duties, 418; letter from the Duke, 419; his appointment to the Privy Council, 436, 437; letter of thanks, 441.
- Charles*, Prince of Bavaria; named as candidate for Greece, 244, 358.
- Charles*, Prince of Mecklenburg: named as candidate for Greece, 361.
- Charles X.*, King; mention of, 187.
- Chateaubriand*, Mons. de; mention of, 187.
- Chater*, Mr. N.; distress of the country, 486.
- Chesney*, F. R., Captain, R.A.; observations on the campaign in Turkey, 472-485.
- Clancarty*, Earl of; reclamation of waste lands in Ireland, 9; conduct of Irish landed proprietors, 18; Irish affairs, 29.

- Clanwilliam*, Lord ; to second the address, 458.
- Clare* ; county of ; see *Ireland*.
- Clarence*, Duke of ; letter to, 181, 462 ; letter from, 462 ; from the Duke on the King's health, 571.
- Clarkson*, Mr. T. ; letter to, 527.
- Clinton*, General Sir W. H. ; his grievance, 165.
- Columbia* ; government of, 28.
- Colville*, General Sir C. ; slave protectors in the Mauritius, 51, 57.
- Combermere*, Lord ; appointed Colonel of the 1st Life Guards, 162.
- Compigne*, Mr. A. ; reduction of the Four per Cents., National Debt, 383-385.
- Comyn*, Mr. ; his case, 553, 554 (2), 560 (2), 564-570, 577.
- Connor*, Mr. George ; proposed property tax in Ireland, 375.
- Conyngham*, Lord Albert ; as Secretary of Legation at Berlin, 13.
- Conyngham*, Lady, and the Lievens, 57 ; illness of, 301.
- Conyngham*, Lord ; appointed Constable of the Round Tower at Windsor, 162 ; letters from and to, 443, 528, 531.
- Cowell*, Mr. G. ; state of the country, 502.
- Cowley*, Lord, Eastern question, 68, 74.
- Croker*, Right Hon. J. W. ; letter to, 463.
- Cuba* ; possession of, by Spain, 66 ; see *Spain*.
- Cumberland*, Duke of ; intentions of, 17 ; his motives and conduct, 42, 43 ; his intrigues, 55 ; his attempts to control the military affairs of the country, 300 ; his petition, 303 ; his interference through influence over the King in the government of the country, 323 ; his opposition to the government in the Greek question, 371 ; the Duke's letter to the King on his conduct, 455.
- Dalhousie*, Lord ; his acts regarding Canada, 155.
- Daly*, Rev. Mr. ; mention of, 263.
- Daly*, Mr. ; his peerage, 2.
- Dance*, Mr. C. W. ; Mr. Gurney's steam-carriage, 59.
- Danube*, the ; Russian designs on the islands of, 201.
- Dardanelles* ; blockade of, 74 ; navigation of, 268.
- Davis*, Mr. Hart ; petition of West India planters, 387.
- Dawkins*, Mr. ; mention of, 33.
- Dawson*, Mr. G. ; the Beresford interest, 71.
- D'Arcy*, Major ; mention of, 47.

Deputy Speaker ; House of Lords ; salary of ; see *Lord Wynford*.

Devereux, Mr. J. E. ; letter to the Duke, affairs in France ; diplomatic vacillation ; the Russo-liberal faction, state of politics, 273-279.

De Vesci, Lord ; candidate for representative peerage, 282.

Devonshire, Duke of ; letter to, 555.

Diebitsch, General ; his demand for pecuniary compensation, 183 ; mention of 188-191, 151, 159.

Dissection ; subjects for, 561.

Distress of the country, 486.

Dogherty, Mr. ; mention of, 123.

Doneraile, Lord ; candidate for representative peerage, 282.

Donoughmore, Earl of ; his politics, 532.

Douglas, Sir Howard ; formation of United Service Museum, 433.

Downshire, Lord ; letter to, 534.

Dudley, Earl of ; extract of letter to Prince Lieven on affairs in the East, 80.

Eastern or Russo-Greek and Turkish question ; limits of Greece, 11, 14 ; Russian demands, 13 ; remarks by Prince Metternich, 68 ; Russia and Turkey ; blockade of the Dardanelles, position in England, 74-77 ; memorandum by the Duke to the Earl of Aberdeen on the state of affairs, 79 ; discussion of Protocol for the 22nd of March ; Conference, 16th November, 91, 95, 101 ; position of England, 97 ; project of a Protocol of the last Conference, 98 ; advance of Russia, 100 ; joint action of France and England ; designs, intrigues, and misrepresentations of Prince and Princess de Lieven, 102 ; Russians within eight or ten easy marches of Constantinople ; advance of the Turks, 105 ; power of the Emperor, position of France and England, conduct of the latter, 111 ; negotiations at Constantinople, 112 ; Greek question, 113, 117, 120 ; affairs of Greece, 128 ; the armistice, 129 ; memorandum upon, by the Duke, 142 ; France, 150 ; and Turkey and Greece, 151 ; armistice at Adrianople, 29th August, and proposed treaty, 166 ; articles to be pressed upon the Conference, 170, 173 ; the French in the Morea, 171 ; the Conference, letter from Earl of Aberdeen, 174-177 ; conditions of peace, 179 ; proceedings of Russia in settling the conditions of peace, 183 ; the

Greek affair, 185 ; opinion of the King, letter from St. Petersburg, 187 ; letter from Müffling, 188 ; Turkish power in Europe, the Greek affair, 192 ; choice of a prince, 192 ; designs of Russia in 1826 ; islands on the Danube ; supply of corn at Constantinople, 201-203 ; reports of peace, 205 ; Treaty of Adrianople, the Duke's opinion, 212-219 ; letter on same from Earl of Aberdeen, 219 ; the Eubœan question, 225, 232 ; remonstrance to Russia, 227 ; *projet* of letter to Lord Heytesbury, 228-231 ; Persia and the Turkish peace, 235 ; treaty between Russia and the Porte, a letter from Lient.-Colonel C. de Villerot, 258-262 ; Treaty of Adrianople ; Duke's memorandum on the 7th Article, 268, 286 ; Baron Müffling on the Treaty of Adrianople, 284 ; treaty of peace, 324 ; Russian movements on the Caspian, 327 ; French propositions, 372 ; passage of the Bosphorus, 441.

Egypt, negotiations with the Pasha, 561 ; our policy in ; appointment of Resident, 582.

Ellenborough, Lord ; correspondence with, 5, 83, 96, 100, 123, 124, 127, 128, 138, 142, 150, 158, 160, 161, 163, 211, 221, 227 ; letter to the Duke on proposed remonstrance to Russia, 227 ; the Eubœan question, 232 ; correspondence, 233-235, 238, 239, 246, 251-253, 272 ; Russian movements on the Caspian, 327 ; steam navigation to India and on the Ganges, 330-343 ; batta question, 347 ; rate of exchange, India, 353, 396 ; Supreme Court, monopoly on tea, 580.

Elley, Sir John ; appointment of, 301.

England, Bank of ; Duke's letter to the Governor, 513.

Eynard, M. ; his pecuniary demand for Prince Leopold, 536.

Falkland Islands ; formation of an establishment at, 41 ; question as to the sovereignty of, 48.

Farquhar, Sir Robert ; letter to, on currency, 146.

Farren, Mr. J. ; opinions upon Greece and Turkey, 506.

Fingall, Earl of ; the Duke's inability to support him, 240, 262.

Fitzgerald, Right Hon. M. ; the approaching crisis in Ireland, 41 ; letter to, 424 ; letter from, 468.

Fitzgerald, Right Hon. W. V. ; his retirement, 435.

Flint, Sir Charles ; letter from Yorkshire, 462.

Foran, Mr. ; recommended as Bishop of Waterford, 241.

France ; joint action with England in Eastern affairs, 102 ;

- impending changes in, 104, and the Eastern question, 150 ; conduct of, in the Algerine affair, 576.
- Francis*, Mr. H. ; letter to the Duke ; state of the country ; distress ; system of rating, 378-383.
- Frederick*, Prince of Orange ; named as candidate for Greece, 249.
- Ganges*, the ; steam navigation of, 330.
- Garth*, General ; death of, military appointments consequent on, 300.
- George IV.*, King ; the Duke's objection to his visit to Paris, 109 ; the disorder in his eyes, 126 ; his conversation with Lord Aberdeen on the Eastern question, 187 ; expresses his surprise at the Duke's suggestion regarding the Recorder's report ; appointment of Mr. Arabin as Deputy Recorder, 293 ; the King's interference with the military arrangements consequent on the death of General Garth ; letter to Lord Hill, 302 ; the Duke of Cumberland's petition, 304 ; his conduct, 317 ; regrets the selection of Prince Leopold, 426 ; topics for speech of, 433 ; his interposition in the case of Mr. Comyn ; letter to the Duke of Northumberland, 568 ; illness of, 569, 571.
- Gibraltar*, fever at, 93 ; proposed sanitary measures, 93.
- Gleig*, Rev. G. R. ; his Life of Sir Thomas Munro ; letter to the Duke, and the Duke's answer, 416.
- Going*, Rev. Mr. ; murder of, 257.
- Gordon*, Right Hon. Sir R. ; Ambassador at Constantinople, 14 ; forwarding Captain Chesney's paper on the campaign in Turkey, 472.
- Gordon*, Lieut.-General Sir Willoughby ; the new steam-carriage, 45, 48, 59, 64.
- Goulburn*, Right Hon. Henry ; correspondence with, 1, 7, 38, 44, 124, 125, 155, 171 (2), 392 ; joint letter with the Duke on the banking system, 513.
- Gower*, Lord Francis L. ; correspondence with, 1, 6, 7-9, 27, 36, 88, 90, 93, 110, 121, 239, 322 ; to Mr. Peel, suppression of meetings in Ireland, 31 ; the Duke's estimation of him, 36 ; Mr. Cahill's magistracy, 345 ; his resignation, 534.
- Greece* ; her limits, 11, 14, 185 ; sovereignty of, 29 ; cessation of blockade ; Müffling's mission, 33, 73 ; action of France and Russia, 33 ; English declaration against the blockades, 61 ; choice of a prince, 192, 243, 249 ;

- limits of the Greek sovereignty, 248; *projet* of Protocol, 249; choice of a king, mention of Prince Leopold, intrigues of the Lievens, opinions of Count Matuscewitz, 290-293; candidature for the throne, 298, 302, 305; choice of a King, 308, 309, 312-315, 320, 352, 355, 356; memorandum by the Duke on Prince Leopold, 358-362; Protocol 22nd March, letter from the Duke, 362; French proposals, 385; insincerity of the Greeks, 459; the Duke's memorandum on the final settlement of the new state, 518; the loan to Prince Leopold, 566.
- Gregory*, Captain, memorandum of his visits to Russian headquarters, 193.
- Gumont*, Port; restoration of, to Great Britain, 48.
- Gunning*, Mr. D.; plan to amend the poor laws, 393; state of the country, 507.
- Gurney*, Mr.; his steam-carriage, 45.
- Halford*, Sir Henry; condition of the King, 182; Lady Conyngham's illness, 301, correspondence, 422; illness of the King, 569, 571.
- Hardinge*, Sir Henry; pensions to soldiers, 23, 78, 100.
- Hart*, Major; his scheme for military settlers in Persia, 251.
- Hay*, Mr.; memorandum on the Order of the Bath, 304.
- Head*, Major F. B.; political state of South America, 427.
- Henchy*, Mr.; on public distress and emigration, 403-406.
- Herries*, Right Hon. J. C.; letter to, on the West Indies, 572.
- Heytesbury*, Lord; correspondence with, 145, 324; letter from, on Eastern question, 187; *projet* of letter to, for Count Nesselrode, 228-231; passage of the Bosphorus, 441.
- Hill*, Lord; negociations consequent on the death of General Garth, 300; appointment of Sir John Elley, 301.
- Hill*, Right Hon. Sir G.; offer of a Governorship, 421.
- Hodgson*, Colonel; mention of, 273.
- Hogg*, Mr.; poor rates, Kettering Division, 509-512.
- Hoseason*, Mr. T.; on agricultural distress and proposed remedies, 445-448.
- Hunt*, Mr., on repeal of malt and beer tax, 407.
- India*; extra regiments for, 5; the Tenasserim Provinces, 83; disbandment of regiments, 127, 128, 211; officers of the army of; apprehensions of mutiny; measures to prevent discontent, 138-142; conduct of Colonel

Baker, 151, 158, 161, 163 ; Bengal army, batta for, 163, 227, 234, 253, 347 ; allowances to army of, 221 ; pay of, 236 ; building expenses in, 246, 252 ; communication between India and Europe, 330-343 ; rate of exchange, 353 ; difficulties of government, 538 ; Sir W. Rumbold's case, 539-553, 555.

Ireland ; appointment of Colonel to the City of Cork Militia ; state of counties Clare, Waterford, and Galway, 1 ; result of government measures, 6 ; conduct of gentry, 7 ; Mr. Mahoney and Mr. O'Connell, 8 ; stipendiary magistrates, purchase of waste lands, 9 ; meetings in Dublin ; quarrels of O'Connell and Shiel, 12 ; O'Connell's election, 16 ; terrorism in Clare, 16 ; conduct of landlords ; effect of recent legislation ; precautionary measures ; suppression of seditious meetings, 18-23 ; discussion of affairs, 29 ; issue of proclamation, 31 ; Orange and Ribbon processions, 23 ; action of the Duke of Northumberland, 36 ; the Duke's objections to the proclamation ; conduct of Lord Enniskillen, 37 ; approaching crisis, 41 ; expense of the police, 52 ; excitement in Ulster and state of Tipperary, 53 ; party meetings, 56 ; apprehended resistance to the proclamation, 60 ; meetings of Orangemen, 62 ; state of the country, 64, 70 ; Clare election, 68 ; the proclamation, 78 ; remedies for Ireland ; state of the country, 87 ; disposal of the military forces, 89 ; vindication of justice, 105 ; outrages in, 111 ; Irish yeomanry, 122 ; justice in, 123 ; bank of, 171, 172 ; Archbishop Trench on education, 203 ; position of affairs ; vacancies in the peerage ; appointment of a bishop, 239 ; the poor law ; letter from the Duke of Northumberland, 244 ; Shiel and O'Connell ; privileges to Roman Catholic barristers, 253 ; lawless state of Tipperary, 256 ; employment of the military, and distress in the country, 264 ; outrage in Tipperary, 268 ; search for arms, 280-282 ; state of the country, 288 ; respite of prisoners, 295 ; death of Lord Headfort ; Knights of St. Patrick ; opposition of Catholic Peers, 296 ; appointment of a bankrupt shopkeeper as Justice of the Peace for County Clare, 322 ; O'Connell and the Catholics, 346 ; O'Connell's influence, 355 ; proposed property tax, 375 ; appointment of a Bishop of Waterford, 387-390 ; condition of the country, 463-466 ; salary of Lord Lieutenant, 517 ; the coal duties, 534.

- Kelly*, Mr. Thomas ; state of Ireland, 463-466.
- Kerrison*, Major-Gen. Sir E. ; appointment to 17th Lancers, 300.
- Killeen*, Lord ; for representation of Meath, 283.
- King*, the ; see *George IV.*
- Knightley*, Sir Charles ; Duke's opinion of him, 222.
- Knighton*, Sir W. ; proposed expenditure in Windsor Park, 85 ;
expenditure in the Lord Steward's Department, 154 ;
correspondence, 293 ; illness of Lady Conyngham, 301.
- Lace* ; wearing of, at Court, 527.
- Langridge*, Mr. ; agricultural distress, 417.
- Langton*, Mr. J. S. ; proposes a voluntary property tax, 467.
- Lauderdale*, Lord ; letter to, 529.
- Laval*, Duc de ; difficulties of the government aggravated by, 371.
- Lawless*, Mr. J. ; soliciting an interview, 2 ; the Duke's answer, 3 ;
prosecution of, 312.
- Leech*, Sir John ; Master of the Rolls, 499.
- Leopold*, Prince ; candidate for throne of Greece, 298 ; con-
sent of France ; his religion, 307 ; his connection
by marriage with the King, 327 ; his nomination, 353,
355, 356, 364, 370, 375 ; letter to the Duke, 395 ;
ditto from, 399 ; letter to the Duke, 402, 407 ; ditto
from, 408 ; letter from the Duke, 420 ; his remarks
upon the probable effect of the Protocol of the 3rd
February, 489 ; the Duke's memorandum in reply,
492, 498 ; his acknowledgment, 498 ; accepts, 523 ;
offers to resign, 524 ; transfer of Claremont and
Marlborough House, 525 ; Mons. Eynard's demand for
£700,000, 536 ; letter from Lord Aberdeen on the
same, 566.
- Lethbridge*, Sir Thomas B. ; on the state of the country, 471.
- Lewis*, Mr. W. C. ; taxation, 426.
- Lieven*, Madame de ; her influence, 34 ; her intrigues, 40, 55 ; her
use of the Duke of Cumberland, 42 ; her denial, 55 ;
her attempts with Mons. de Lieven to break down the
administration ; her motives and unscrupulousness,
57, 103 ; Duke's letter regarding their conduct to
Lord Heytesbury, 145 ; their intrigues in the Greek
affair, 292.
- Limond*, Colonel ; mention of, 273.
- Lloyd*, Mr. ; deficiency of silver coin, 44.
- London*, Bishop of ; places of worship for troops in London, 84.
- Lord Mayor*, the ; claim to be made a baronet, 43.
- Lowther*, Lord ; mention of, 85.

- Mackenzie*, Sir G.; encouragement of manufactures, 377.
- Macleane*, Mr.; his proposal on the West Indies, 355, 557.
- Madagascar*; the French in, 289, 297.
- Madeira*; conduct of the Governor of, 39.
- Magrath*, Mr.; suggestions for supporting an efficient army, 409-416.
- Mahoney*, Mr.; question of his employment by government, 9.
- Malcolm*, Sir John; extract on the batta question and the discontent excited in Bengal, 235; Indian affairs; difficulties in governing, 538 (2).
- Malcolm*, Admiral Sir P.; on Russian opinion; forwards memorandum to the Duke from Captain Gregory on the state of the Russian army, 193.
- Malta*; appointment of Roman Catholic Bishop, 73.
- Matuscewitz*, Count; conversations with the Duke on the Greek affair, 130-138, 290-293.
- Maximilian*, Prince d'Este; named as candidate for Greece, 359.
- Meath*, Lord; candidate for representative peer, 282.
- Mecklenburg*, Grand Duke of; canvasses the King for his vote for Prince Charles, 319.
- Melville*, Viscount; on the Grand Cross of the Bath; death of Admiral Sir G. Montague, 365.
- Memoranda*; by the Duke of Wellington:—
- pensions to soldiers, 24.
 - appointment of a Roman Catholic Bishop at Malta, 73.
 - to the Earl of Aberdeen on the state of affairs in the East, 79.
 - sanitary measures for Gibraltar, 93.
 - of a conversation between the Duke, Lord Aberdeen, Prince Lieven, and Comte de Matuscewitz on England and Russia, 4th September, 1829, 130-138.
 - on state of affairs in the East; treaty, 6th July, 142.
 - to the Earl of Aberdeen; execution of treaty, 6th July 166-170.
 - on the proposed slave laws, 208.
 - to Lord Aberdeen; memorandum upon the Russo-Turkish affair and Treaty of Adrianople, containing the Duke's opinion of the whole case, 212-219.
 - on 7th Article of the Treaty of Adrianople, 268, 286.
 - the Order of the Bath, 304.
 - for Sir G. Murray; Protestant soldiers and Catholic ceremonies, 310.
 - punishment of soldiers (Sir H. Taylor's circular), 343.
 - on the course of the St. Croix River and American boundary question, 347-351.
 - officers holding the Gold Stick since 1760, 357.

Memoranda ; by the Duke of Wellington—continued.

- of a conversation with the King respecting Prince Leopold, 358-362.
- on the Irish post-office, 396.
- topics for the King's speech, 433.
- of a conversation with the French ambassador on the intended attack on Algiers, 437-439.
- scrap for a Protocol, 439.
- on the Greek Protocol ; answers to questions by Prince Leopold, 492-498.
- upon the course to be taken on Prince Leopold's demands, 500.
- on the proposed French attack on Algiers, 501.
- on the final settlement of the New Greek State, 518.
- on M. Eynard's demand for Prince Leopold, 536-538.
- amnesty for Portuguese subjects, 535.
- inquiries to be made respecting an anonymous letter, 556.
- upon the intercourse between the West Indies and the United States, 557-560.
- appointment of a Resident in Egypt, 582.

Memoranda ; by various writers:—

- from Captain Gregory ; state of the Russian army, 193-196.
- from the King ; disapproves of Prince Leopold, 426.
- from Major F. B. Head ; on the political state of South America, 427-432.

Metternich, Prince de ; remarks on the Eastern question, 68.

Mexico ; expedition against, 63.

Miguel, Don ; mention of, 29, 54 ; question of recognition by France, 161.

Modena, Prince of ; named as candidate for Greece, 298.

Morea ; the French in the, 171, 185.

Mount Charles, Lord ; his resignation, 440, 443.

Muffling, le Général ; his mission, trickery in ; an agent of Russia, 57 ; letter to the Duke on the position of Turkey, 188 ; letter from the Duke, conditions of peace with the Porte, Treaty of Adrianople, 284.

Munro, Sir Thomas ; Gleig's Life of, 416.

Murray, Sir G. ; the Falkland Islands, 41, 48 ; representation in Canada, 49, 58 ; slave population in the Mauritius, 51, 59 ; position in Canada, taxation, 155 ; correspondence with, 200 ; French in Madagascar, 289 ; correspondence, 297, 444, 498.

Museum ; United Service ; formation of, 433.

Napper, Mr.; for representation of Meath, 283.

Nash, Mr. John; suggests sculptures for a palace, 3, 155; the Duke's reply, 4; King's wish to create him a baronet, 44.

Nesselrode, Count; on affairs in the East, 80; *projet* of letter to be communicated to, 228-231; correspondence, 294.

Newenham, Mr. T.; correspondence, 255.

Northumberland, Duke of; correspondence with, 19, 23, 53, 68, 70, 86, 87, 105; letter on the Irish poor law, 244; lawless state of Tipperary, 256; correspondence, 262, 264; representation of Meath, vacancies in the Order of St. Patrick, state of Ireland, 288; respite of Irish prisoners, 295; correspondence, 296, 532; letters on the Comyn case, 554 (2), 560, 568; from the King, 568; from the Duke, 577.

Nugent, General; his claim to the Earldom of Lennox, 186.

O'Connell, Mr.; his electioneering, 53; returned for Clare, 68; his influence, 355; failure at Waterford, 450.

Orange processions; see *Ireland*.

Palmella, M. de; mention of, 306.

Parry, Mr. John; on postage rates, 368.

Pedro, Don; mention of, 42, 54.

Peel, Mr.; correspondence with, 12, 16, 27, 31, 33, 37, 39, 43, 47, 52, 55, 60, 62, 64, 65, 78, 162, 164, 165, 181; parties in Ireland, 253; Mr. Shiel, 254; correspondence, 267; letter from, search for arms in Ireland, 280; correspondence, 282 (2); the success of the police in London, 283; on judicial appointments, is glad the Duke thinks well of the police, chief danger of failure, 287; Duke of Cumberland's petition, 303; prosecution of Mr. Lawless, 312; correspondence, 316, 318, 319; the King and the appointment of Roman Catholic sheriffs, interference of the Duke of Cumberland with the government, 323; bribe for a baronetcy, 345; correspondence, 362, 402; conversation with the King, 436; East India Committee, 461; correspondence, 553, 554, 560, 561, 569; on the King's interference in the Comyn case, 570; the King's health, 581.

Perkins, Mr.; his machine, 247, 321.

Perry, Mr. James; West Indian interests, 488.

Persia ; designs on, by Russia as a road to the Indus, 239 ; recommendatory measures for, 251.

Philip, Prince, of Hesse Homburg ; named as candidate for Greece, 192, 243, 249.

Planta, Mr. ; conduct of English and French fishermen, 250 ; correspondence, 329 ; the new administration, 395.

Plunket, Lord ; his proxy, 485.

Polignac, Prince de ; on the position of the Duke, Madame de Lieven and her influence, 34.

Pope, The ; his appointment of a Bishop of Waterford, 387.

Portugal ; affairs in, 54 ; Spain and, 148 ; Don Miguel, recognition of, 161 ; exceptions from amnesty, 307 ; memorandum from the Duke on same, 585.

Poti ; cession of ; see *Anapa and Poti*.

Pozzo di Borgo, Count ; his intrigues, 35, 68 ; mention of, 91 ; Eastern question, 101, 106.

Projectors and their plans, 529.

Prussia ; mission to Constantinople, 40, 57.

Radnor, Earl of, letter to, 164.

Richmond, Duke of ; his acts regarding Canada, 155.

Rolle, Lord ; tithe question in Devon, 279 ; Duke's reply, 283.

Roman Catholic question ; their aggressive conduct, 47 ; appointment of a Bishop at Malta, 73 ; relations of the government to, in Ireland, and appointment of a bishop, their political privileges, 241 ; their dissatisfaction with the measures of government, 263 ; Mr. Peel on the King's opposition to the appointment of sheriffs, 323.

Rothesay, Lord Stuart de ; letter to, 529.

Rumbold, Sir W. ; his case, 539-553, 555.

Russia ; limits of Greece, 11 ; Russia's demands, 13 ; extension of her power in Asia, 14 ; memorandum by the Duke to the Earl of Aberdeen on the state of affairs, 79 ; the Emperor's pretended desire for peace, his thirst for conquest, 99 ; advance of Russia in the East, 100 ; conduct of the Emperor of, 121 ; state of the army, 193-195 ; her policy respecting the islands in the Danube, supply of corn at Constantinople, 201-203 ; letter from General Alava, 210 ; Treaty of Adrianople, the Duke's opinion, 212-219 ; letter on same from Earl of Aberdeen, 219 ; proposed remonstrance to, 227 ; designs on Persia, instructions to Colonel Macdonald, 238 ; hesitating policy towards, 266 ; Captain Chesney's report on the campaign in Turkey, 472-485.

Salmond, Colonel; mention of; 158, 161, 234, 236.

Savings' Banks, 503.

Scarlett, Sir James; press libels on the Duke, 38; political party in England, 51.

Scotland, Bank of; ought to be allowed to increase its capital, 17.

Shiel, Mr.; and O'Connell, 12, 254.

Smythe, Major-General Sir Carmichael; his claims, 456.

Soldiers; pensions to, and discharges of, 24, 100.

Somerset, Lord E.; his removal from the 17th Lancers to the Royal Dragoons, 303.

Somerset, Lord F.; correspondence, 153, 180, 196, 248, 299.

Spain; possession of Cuba by, 66; Portugal and, 148; Don Miguel, recognition of, 161; conduct of certain Spaniards, letter to Generals Torrijos, Valdez, &c., 237.

St. Croix; river, course of, 347.

St. Patrick, Knights of; appointments of, 296.

St. Vincent's; government of, 256.

Steam-carriage, new, 45, 48, 59, 64.

Stevenson, Mr.; on agricultural prosperity, 451.

Strange, Sir Thomas; letter to, 400.

Strangford, Lord; Memoir on the designs of Russia, by a Wallachian in 1826, 201.

Stuart, Lord; regarding his despatches, 98.

Taylor, Right Hon. Sir Brook; mention of, 13.

Taylor, Sir Herbert; our military establishments, queries regarding by Russia, 233; the Duke's answer, 242, correspondence, 255, 258; his circular on the punishment of soldiers, 343.

Temple, Hon. W.; mention of, 98.

Thomond, Lord; named for the colonelcy of Cork militia, 1.

Thompson, Mr.; plan for land and assessed taxes, 366.

Tierney, Sir M.; attendance on the King, 570, 571.

Townshend, Colonel; his retirement, complimentary letter from the Duke, 459.

Transports, engagement of English ships as, in the French service 566.

Tuam, Archbishop of (Right Hon. Power le Poer Trench), on the education of the Irish population, 203, the Duke's answer, 206.

Vandeleur, General; mention of, 302.

Vigilant, *H.M.S.*; conduct of the commander, 28.

Villerot, Lieut.-Colonel de; letter on military forces of Egypt, and Eastern affairs, 258-262.

Wagner, Rev. H. M.; Brighton savings' banks, 504.

Watson, Sir F.; mention of, 299-301, 570; letter from, in the Comyn case, 553.

Weld, Monsignor; named for bishopric of Waterford, 241; the Pope's reasons for not appointing him, 387.

Wellington, Field-Marshal the Duke of; State of Ireland, 1, 3; sculptures for a palace, 4; extra regiments for India, 5; conduct of Irish gentry, 7; has no objection to Mr. Mahoney, 8; stipendiary magistrates, Ireland, 9; suppression of meetings in Dublin, 12; extension of Russian power in Asia, 14; limits of Greece, 14; terrorism at Irish elections, 16; conduct of Irish landlords, effect of recent legislation, precautionary measures, suppression of seditious meetings, 18-23; pensions to soldiers, 24; Russia and the principalities, conduct of an English officer, affair of Mr. Blütte, government of Columbia, 28; proclamation in Ireland, regrets the particular notice of the Orange processions in it, and the absence of all notice of the Ribbon processions, 33-36; the Greek blockade, 33; his estimation of Lord F. Gower, 36; Polignac quite right in visiting him; thinks the Duke of Northumberland has taken a false step in Ireland, 36; further objections to the proclamation; sees no reason for rewarding Lord Enniskillen, 37; press libels on the Duke, 38; the approaching crisis in Ireland, 41; conduct of the Duke of Cumberland and Madame de Lieven; appointment of Sir R. Farquhar's son to Vienna; Austrian plans in Italy, 42-43; dissuades the King from creating peers and baronets; city thoroughfares; deficiency in the circulation of silver, 44; aggression of the Roman Catholics, 47; new steam-carriage, 48, 64; Buenos Ayres and our right to the Falkland Islands, 49; representation in Canada, 49, 58; education of Prince George, political party in England, protectors of slaves in the Mauritius, 51; party meetings in Ireland, 55; object of Russia, 57; slave colonies, 59; meetings of Orangemen, 62; police in

Ireland. Spain and Cuba, 66 ; state of the country, 70 ; the Beresford interest, 71 ; Russia and Turkey, blockade of the Dardanelles, Eastern question, position of England, 74, 77 ; soldiers' pensions, 78 ; places of worship for troops in London, 84 ; proposed expenditure in Windsor Park, 85 ; state of Ireland, 87 ; distribution of troops in Ireland, 90-93 ; Conference 16th November, 91 ; attitude of England towards France, 92 ; East India officers, 96 ; position of England in the Eastern question, 97 ; war between Russia and Turkey ; the Emperor's pretended desire for peace, his thirst for conquest, 98 ; conduct of Prince and Princess de Lieven, their intrigues to deprive the Duke of his power, their misrepresentations of the conduct of the English government to the Emperor, the Duke's protest, joint action of France and England, 102 ; position of England, 106 ; his objections to the King's visit to Paris, 109 ; Greek and Russian intrigues in the Ionian Islands, 108 ; troops in Ireland, 110 ; negociations at Constantinople, 112 ; Greek question, 113 ; acceptance of the treaty of July, 115 ; attitude of England, 117, 118 ; conduct of the Emperor of Russia, 121 ; Irish yeomanry, 122 ; justice in Ireland, 123 ; funds for public works, 124 ; officers of the customs, 125 ; disorder in the King's eyes, 126 ; officers of the army of India, apprehensions of mutiny, measures to prevent discontent, 138-142 ; conduct of Prince and Princess Lieven, 145 ; currency, 147 ; suggestions to Lord Aberdeen, 149 ; Turkey and Greece, 151 ; expenses of Buckingham Palace, 155 ; the Canada question, 155 ; the Burmese territories, plan of operations, 158 ; rank of officers for service in Bhurtpoor, 160 ; recognition of Don Miguel, 161 ; Bengal army, 163 ; injury to Folkestone fishermen, his anxiety regarding, 164 ; transactions at Windsor, 165 ; reported armistice at Adrianople and proposed treaty, 166 ; points to be pressed upon the Conference, 170 ; conditions of peace, 179 ; police in Ireland, 180 ; our influence in Greece, 183 ; limits of Greece, 185 ; his opinion of the Turkish power, no substitute for it possible out of the Greek affair, choice of a prince, 192, 248 ; trial and admonition of Lieut.-Colonel Bailey, 196 ; the slave ordinance, the Duke's opinion and notes on it, 206 ; allowances to the Indian army, 221 ; distress in England, 222 ; the Eubœan question, 225, 233 ; Persia and the Turkish peace, 235 ; pay of the Indian army, 236 ;

conduct of certain Spaniards, 237 ; vacancies in the peerage, position of affairs, 239 ; appointment of an Irish bishop, 241 ; his objections to giving Russia information upon our military establishments, 242, 248, 255 ; Mr. Perkins' machine, 247 ; limits of the Greek sovereignty, 248 ; letter to Mr. Planta, conduct of the French and English fishermen, 250 ; commendatory measures for Persia, objects to military settlers in, 251 ; East Indian expenditure, 252 ; Mr. Shiel, his obstruction, the Duke's opinion that he and O'Connell should not be appointed King's Counsel, much concerned that Lord Francis is a little in dread of O'Connell, 254 ; Church of Ireland, 255 ; appointment of bishops, 256 ; cannot support Lord Fingall, proposed measures for Ireland, 262 ; employment of military in Ireland, and distress of the country, 264 ; outrages in Tipperary, 267 ; military boards, proposed supercession of, by Commissary-General, the Duke's objections, 271 ; execution of the Arms Act in Tipperary, meeting of Cabinet, selection of representative peer, 283 ; congratulates Mr. Peel on the success of the police in London, 283 ; his answer to Lord Rolle on the tithe question, 283 ; conversation with Matuscewitz on the Greek affair, intrigues of the Lievens, red ribband for Mr. Canning, 290-293 ; distressing scene with the King ; gives expression to the misery he has endured in his office as minister to the King, his trust in God that relief may come, 293 ; the Greek affair, 294 ; vacancy in the Knights of St. Patrick, conduct of Roman Catholics, hostility of Catholic peers, 296 ; French in Madagascar, 297 ; appointments to 17th Lancers and Royal Dragoons, 300 ; letter to the King, his opinion on the petition, advice to the King, 304 ; foreign affairs, exceptions from amnesty in Portugal, 306 ; Prince Leopold, his candidature for Greece, no objections on the part of France, his religion, 307 ; choice of a king for Greece, 312-315 ; prosecution of Mr. Lawless, nomination of justices of the peace for Ireland, 318 ; conversation with the King, 319 ; treaty of peace, 321 ; Mr. Perkins' machine, 321 ; appointment of magistrates, 322 ; treaty of peace, 324 ; lies in the 'Morning Journal' and 'Standard,' 329 ; Prince Leopold, 353 ; O'Connell's influence, 355 ; the Greek question, 362 ; nomination of Prince Leopold, 370 ; difficulties and critical position of the govern-

ment owing to the opposition of the King and intrigues of the Duke of Cumberland, 371; Greek question, Prince Lieven's ill-temper, 373; breach of official confidence, 390; Mediterranean fleet, 391; bank discounts, 392; cannot interfere with the Duke of York's debts, 393; the batta question, 396; preparations for the session, 399-401; letter to Prince Leopold, 399; on Hindoo Law, 400; Irish absentees, 402; conversation with the King, 408; colonial legislatures, 419; letter to Prince Leopold, 420; expects his Majesty's consent, 420; indisposition of the King; French and Russian protocols, 422; improvements of the country; a letter to the King on the sovereignty of Greece, 424; retirement of Mr. Fitzgerald, 435; letter to the King regarding Lord Mount Charles, 439; invited to Windsor, Cabinet Council, letter on the colonies, 443; letters to the King; Lord Chandos declines office, and Duke of Cumberland's opposition, 453-456; opening of parliament and addresses, 462; office of Treasurer of the Navy, 463; letter to the King, absence of members of Parliament, 470; letters to Prince Leopold on the Greek Protocol, 491-492; intercourse with the Greek government, 498; office of Deputy-Speaker, 499, 508, 520, 522, 523; objections to army reductions, 512; improvement of the banking system, 513; demands of Prince Leopold, 516; salary of Lord-Lieutenant, 517; transfer of Claremont and Marlborough House impracticable, 525; followed in the street, 525; Governorship of St. Vincent's, 526; the wearing of English-made lace, 527; the transaction of the King's business almost impossible, 528; plans of projectors, 529; recovery of the King, state of affairs, 530; regency at Terceira, 531, 578; hostile parties, 532; objects to domestic chaplains, his reason, 533; Irish coal duties, 534; Sir W. Rumbold's case, 555; Mr. Comyn's case, 560 (thinks the law should take its course); subjects for dissection, 561; negotiations with the Pasha of Egypt, 561; transport contracts, the laws regarding, 562; public honours and rewards, his rule, and the difficulties of his position regarding, 563; Mr. Comyn's case, interposition of the King, 567; the King's illness, 569-571 (2); complaints of the West Indies, 572; Prince Leopold's loans, 574; the Algerine affair, opinion of the conduct of the French; Polignac, 576,

579; the Comyn affair, the King's illness, manœuvres of the factions, 577; bulletins of, 581.

Western, Charles C., Esq.; the Duke acknowledges his letter, 459.

Williams, Mr. John; diminution of the circulating medium, 373.

Willock, Sir Henry; his recall from Persia, 251.

Windsor Castle, Constableship of, 153, 162, 181.

Wortley, Mr. S.; appointed to the Board of Control, 453.

Wright, Mr. Thomas; low price of manufactures, 469.

Wynford, Lord; his application to be appointed Deputy Speaker, 499, 508, 520; complimentary letter, 523.

DESPATCHES,
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MEMORANDA,
OF
F. M. THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

To Lord Francis Leveson Gower.

[1358.]

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS,

London, 1st July, 1829.

I have not written you an answer upon the subject on which you wrote to me before you left London, as well as when you were at Hatfield; as I wished to make some enquiries respecting Mr. Hutchinson.

We are rather inclined to think here that Lord Thomond would be the fittest man to be appointed Colonel of the City of Cork Militia, considering his rank and station, and his constant residence in the neighbourhood of that city. We are very much obliged to the Lord-Lieutenant for referring to us upon this subject.

Let me know what the Lord-Lieutenant proposes to do this year respecting pensions; and in general when there is any case whatever that requires the King's signature you should let me know the Lord-Lieutenant's wishes, that I may take the King's pleasure before the papers are laid before his Majesty.

I hope to-morrow to have a Cabinet upon the measures of the next session of Parliament, after which you will hear from Peel or me.

I am very anxious about the state of Clare in particular, and of the country in general. It will not answer to allow the system of terror to be continued, and to govern the country, now that all the admitted cause of grievance has been removed. If the system should be allowed to prevail, it must be made obvious that it is the fault of the gentry, and not of the government. I would recommend you therefore to fill with troops every county

which is, or is likely to become, the scene of such contests as are going on in Clare; and even to send there stipendiary magistrates to assist in keeping the peace, and render hopeless such efforts to disturb it.

I refer particularly now to the counties of Clare, of Waterford, and of Galway. We shall most probably have a contest in the latter county, as Daly will wish to have his peerage.

Would it not be possible for the law officers of the Crown in Ireland to take some steps to ascertain what sum there exists in rent? or at all events to prevent the indecency of public debates in Dublin upon the application of that rent?

Are they still collecting rent? We must not sit quiet and see the same practices prevail in Ireland as did last year, and in the preceding years. We shall lay the ground for much mischief hereafter, if we do not act with temperate firmness and vigour; besides losing our own characters, and the confidence of the well-disposed in both countries, and all the benefits which might be expected as the consequence of our late measures.

I entreat you to endeavour to make the law officers in Ireland feel the new position in which we and they are placed, and how desirable it is that they should attend to all that is going on, and check the illegal proceedings of the agitators with a firm and vigorous hand. I much prefer to be responsible for the failures, to having to justify their omissions. Indeed I will not attempt such justification, and they must see the consequence of continuing to sit by quietly while the law is violated with impunity.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. John Lawless to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Tavistock Hotel, Covent Garden, 1st July, 1829.

From your Lordship's note of the 30th ultimo I fear I have been guilty of a very unintentional irregularity in soliciting a personal interview. I was encouraged to hope for this interview from the very polite and kind communication with which I was honoured by Mr. Peel, to whom I went on the same subject I should have had the honour to submit to your Lordship's consideration. The subject I allude to is the Crown prosecution continued against me by the law officers of the Crown in Ireland. I was anxious to impress on your Lordship's mind that such a proceeding might be as injurious to the well-merited popularity of your Lordship's

administration as it would be a source of great inconvenience to myself. From the admirable display of talent and spirit and firmness during the entire progress of the Catholic Relief Bill, I always looked forward to the natural result that the most zealous of the Irish agitators would become the most sincere and enthusiastic supporters of your Grace's administration; but this prosecution I fear will destroy such hopes, and go far to diminish a popularity which would be otherwise unequalled for the last 150 years. This was my reason, my Lord, for presuming to think that my own personal convenience was not a little connected with the character of your administration in Ireland. I shall ever acknowledge, under any circumstances, the deep and everlasting obligations the Irish nation are under to you and Mr. Peel for the Catholic Relief Bill; and I confess I am most anxious that nothing should be done which would tend to take one single leaf from so enviable a laurel. This was the motive that prompted me to see your Grace, and which now urges me to occupy your time in reading these lines.

I have the honour to remain, with sincere respect,

Your Lordship's obedient servant,

JOHN LAWLESS.

To Mr. John Lawless.

[1359.]

SIR,

London, 1st July, 1829.

I have received your letter, and as the matter to which you refer concerns especially the Irish government, I must decline to have any conversation with you upon it.

I am very sensible of your goodwill in expressing an anxiety respecting what you call my popularity.

I assure you that I do everything which I think ought to ensure for me the respect and esteem of the world; and I regret very much if I or the world should err in judgment respecting my actions.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. John Nash to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

14, Regent Street, 2nd July, 1829.

The design of this entrance to the Palace is that of a triumphal arch, a plagiarism of the Arch of Constantine. One side and one end dedicated to the Army, and the other side and end to the Navy. The east front and north end to be a record of the Battle of Waterloo, and the west front and south end a record of the Battle of Trafalgar. The description of the former, to which I beg to call your Grace's attention, is as follows:—On

the summit is an equestrian statue of the King (executed by Chantrey). On the pedestal under the King is the bust of your Grace, between two figures representing Asia and Europe, the theatres of your Grace's actions. At the corners of the pedestals are winged Victories. Over each of the smaller arches is a basso-relievo; the one representing the King's approbation of the plan of the campaign, the other rewarding your Grace after the victory. Those figures will be portraits. The long panel over the columns represents the Battle of Waterloo (but the sculpture in the model is not an exact representation of the sculpture as it is executing by Westmacot, as the design was altered immediately after your Grace had seen the model at my house). On the four columns it was intended to place statues of the officers, and it is the selection of these which requires to be determined. His Majesty desired me to consult your Grace; and it is proper that I should state that his Majesty appeared to me to feel some difficulty on the subject, and to think that some other description of statues, such as Minerva, Mars, &c., would be preferable. His Majesty, however, did not decide; and I own I shall very much regret, as it will detract, as far as it goes, from the intention of its being altogether a national monument. But should it be determined otherwise, I should recommend that military trophies be substituted, as there is no classical authority for putting the gods of the ancients in such situations. On all triumphal columns the statue placed upon them is the person intended to be honoured.

The subject of the sculpture on the north end is the Genius of England showing to two youths of different ages the names of the heroes they should imitate; and below the sculpture are three wreaths of laurel, and under the wreaths columns of the names of the officers in the actions, which names it will also be necessary that I should have. Of those names the number required will be seen on the model; and perhaps the monument would be still more complete if on the middle column were the names of the several victories of your Grace, and the column on each side to contain the names of the officers.

I have the honour to be, with the utmost respect,

My Lord Duke, your Grace's faithful servant,

JOHN NASH.

[1360.]

To Mr. John Nash.

DEAR SIR,

London, 2nd July, 1829.

I have received your letter. Before I proceed to give you my opinion of the names of the officers whose statues should be placed on the four columns, it is desirable that his Majesty should decide whether he will have the statues of officers or antique statues. The next question, which is applicable equally to the list of names which you desire me to give you, is whether, as I understand in your letter, the triumphal arch is intended to be dedicated to commemorate the services of the

army and navy in the late war *generally*, or only the battles of Trafalgar and Waterloo.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Ellenborough.

[1361.]

[In answer to a Memorandum upon the raising of six extra regiments by the government in India contrary to the orders of the Court of Directors.]

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

3rd July, 1829.

As I understand the result of this case it is this.

The Bengal government, after various acts of disobedience of the orders of the government at home, remains with six extra battalions in its service more than have been authorised by the government at home.

The Court of Directors ought to send them peremptory orders to discharge these six battalions from the service forthwith, and to declare their determination not to allow of the charge in the accounts for their maintenance for more than * months after the date of the receipt of the order, and the Governor-General in Council should be ordered to report immediately, and by every occasion, the steps taken to effect this reduction till it will be completed.

They might likewise point out in strong but moderate terms to the supreme government the course adopted on this occasion ; and declare their determination to consider the Governor-General, Commander-in-Chief, and members of the Council, responsible for obedience to their orders respecting diminution of expense in their allowances respectively, at least till the Court of Directors shall have declared themselves satisfied with the reasons given for suspending the execution of such orders.

The Court might desire to have made out between June and October in every year a detailed estimate of the military force intended to be maintained, and the expenditure expected to be incurred in the twelve ensuing months beginning in October. The numbers and expenditure so estimated are not on any account to be exceeded, excepting in a case of emergency, to be fully stated not only at the moment the additional numbers

* Blank in manuscript.

or additional expenditure are ordered, but subsequently at the close of the year.

I am aware that all this has been already done in the general letter. But I am afraid that nobody ever reads the general letters now, and it is quite clear that they are not sufficiently attended to.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Francis Leveson Gower to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Dublin, 4th July, 1829.

I received your letter of the 1st yesterday, and lost no time in discussing with the law officers the part of it which concerned them. I did not, I must say, feel quite certain that Joy's* political feelings with regard to recent measures might not have caused him to take a desponding and sullen tone which would have prevented him from entering, as cordially as I could wish, into the spirit of your instructions and views. It is only justice to him to say that I found exactly the reverse; and in conversation it would be impossible for the warmest advocate of the measures of your government to enter more fully into the views which you have explained to me by letter and in conversation with respect to the change of our position incident to those measures. You may depend upon my doing my best to encourage this spirit, and I shall watch closely for the opportunity of affording proof of it.

I feel convinced, that in spite of O'Connell's exercise of his power of mischief, in spite of the revival of the old spirit of turbulence in Tipperary, or anything else, your measures are working well. They have in the first place separated the Roman Catholic gentry to a man from the seditious faction. I send you, as an example of this, a copy of parts of a letter which I have received this morning from Waterford from Lord Beresford. Kelly, the Roman Catholic bishop, is a furious radical, bigot, and anti-unionist; and, I am told, is raving about the defection of the Roman Catholic gentry from his cause, and calling Shiel a traitor.

I think the Court here is doing very well. It is impossible that the Duchess should not become very popular, and the household appears to me to be on a very eligible footing. Your friend at St. James's contrives to keep up an expectation among the Saurins and others that the Relief Bill may yet be repealed, &c.

You will see by the papers which will be sent to Mr. Peel, that Warburton and Sir Edward Blakeney have recommended stipendiary magistrates in Clare. I own I doubt whether it would be advisable to take this step immediately, unless there be a contest. We have made a strong military demonstration there, of which I am happy to see the liberals are complaining; and I think it would be advisable to see whether this proof of

* The Right Hon. Henry Joy, then Attorney-General.

our readiness to meet disturbance may not encourage the resident gentry to exertion before we take a step which always operates as an excuse to them for supineness. I do not speak of economy, for that is at present a subordinate consideration. If you see reason to differ from this opinion, it is a step which can be taken at a moment's notice. I think it will be advisable to take it in the case of Galway.

Believe me, my dear Duke, very faithfully yours,

F. LEVESON GOWER.

[ENCLOSURE.]

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM LORD BERESFORD.

Curraghmore, 3rd July, 1829.

I have delayed writing to your Lordship until I could venture some opinion upon the state of this country as regards the general feelings, considering what they had lately been, and consequently what the effect has been here, of the passing of the Roman Catholic Bill; and our present position is well calculated to show what that effect is. I am glad to be able to say, that the violent feelings which so recently existed appear to be nearly subsided, and that we find the Roman Catholic gentry of this part of the country most willing to forget past differences, and to meet us with kindly feelings, and with a desire to bury in oblivion the unpleasantness of the late events.

Lord George Beresford has met with the kindest attention, and so far, with no refusal from the Roman Catholic gentlemen. Whether this feeling extends to the west of the county we have not yet had the opportunity to judge; but neither have we any reason to doubt it from what we hear, or from appearances, as every attempt made there, by very active unfriendly individuals, to induce an opposing candidate to appear, has failed; and though it is impossible to know what the long interval of eight months may produce, most certainly if the election could now come on, there would be no opposition; and the general opinion is, that there will be none, which we desire, as much for ourselves as for the peace and tranquillity of the country; and we shall adopt every conciliatory measure to ensure the latter.

To Lord Francis Leveson Gower.

[1362.]

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS,

London, 5th July, 1829.

I have just now seen your letter of the 2nd to Peel.

The Irish gentry are about to repeat the conduct which brought us to the state in which we were last year. But we must remember that we cannot again concede. We have nothing to concede excepting what is vital to the State, or the lives and properties of the proprietors of the soil. The people of Ireland must therefore be kept in a state of tranquillity and obedience to the law, if not by the gentlemen of the country, by stipendiary magistrates; and I should think it deserving of attention whether the names of some of those who refuse or

omit to act in such cases, as are unfortunately of daily occurrence, ought not to be struck out of the commission of the peace.

Now that the government have conceded everything that was deemed necessary to secure the peace of Ireland, the *cant* is that government leave the gentry to themselves and do nothing for their protection. Whether there is or not a contest in Clare we must preserve the peace in that county, and that by force if necessary. If we do not do so, we shall be told that we turned Mr. O'Connell out of Parliament, and that having done so, we would not protect the King's loyal subjects in electing freely another candidate. I beg you to have a particular return made of the force in the county of Clare, and in the neighbourhood of that county since the decision in Parliament on Mr. O'Connell's seat. We may rely upon it that all this will come seriously under discussion in the next session of Parliament, and I am anxious that it should be made quite clear that the state of disturbance of the county, and the success of Mr. O'Connell, are to be attributed to the gentlemen of the county of Clare, and not to the supineness of government or to the defects of the constituency established by the Act of last session.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1363.]

To Lord Francis Leveson Gower.

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS,

London, 6th July, 1829.

Mr. Mahoney has never come under my view in any way excepting as the attorney of Mr. O'Connell. I knew that others communicated with him. But I did not think that such communications ought to induce me to consider of him as Solicitor of the Excise in Ireland, and most particularly not at the present moment. I most probably answered him as I do others from my country, in clear and positive terms; because I know that they are too ready to construe a civil expression even of regret into a promise. I think that is the cause of Mr. Mahoney's dissatisfaction with my answer, and of his desire to know how he stands with the government.

I have no objection to any man on account of his Roman Catholic politics. Before, however, we take a man into the

King's service, and particularly one who, whatever may be the case in Ireland, is known in this town only as being Mr. O'Connell's attorney, we ought to consider well our situation.

I would accordingly recommend you to be very civil to Mr. Mahoney, to assure him that I feel no prejudice against him, that on the contrary I am sensible of his capacity and desire to serve the government, but do not hold out to him hopes of specific or of early employment.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Francis Leveson Gower.

[1364.]

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS,

London, 6th July, 1829.

Your letter of the 4th is very satisfactory, and I am very much obliged to you for it.

I am very anxious that we should begin by putting matters in Ireland on a good footing. They will go on of themselves afterwards.

We must take care to make everybody feel the difference between what existed heretofore and what exists now.

I wish you would look at Peel's Act and Goulburn's amendment respecting stipendiary magistrates; and hint to Warburton and others that if the gentlemen of the country, supported as they are by the government and the troops, will not execute the laws and maintain the peace and good order of the society in which they live, and if they call upon government to perform this duty for them, the county must pay for it; and they must insist, as required by the Act, that it should be put into execution.

I think this would induce them to exert themselves.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Garbally, 7th July, 1829,
Ballinasloe, Ireland.

MY DEAR DUKE,

I am no friend to the starting up of governments within this island—the natural consequence, however, of its entire dereliction by its legitimate government.

Although no Orangeman, I have been this morning applied to from that body, by a printed circular, herewith transmitted, to subscribe towards a fund, to be managed by the institution, as therein mentioned, for the purchase of waste lands, thereon to settle *Protestant* families.

I think a measure of this sort, so extensive as this is sought to be made with respect to territory, and so confined as to its operation on the description of settler, should not be undertaken except under the sanction and superintendence of his Majesty's government; but if this country is (at it has been) banished from the consideration of administration, doubtless its best proprietors will again (as they have already felt themselves compelled to do) endeavour to find adequate superintendence and protection in themselves.

As one of the best means of accomplishing your prediction—alas! how far from being verified—that the passing of a late measure would tranquillise Ireland, I took the liberty, when lately in London, of suggesting to your Grace the expediency of endeavouring to divert the public mind from religious feud, and at the same time affording immediate employment to the wretched peasantry of the country, and adding to the welfare of the empire, by this very measure of reclaiming waste lands, and referred you to Grantham's survey and reports, made under the orders of his Majesty's Government in December, 1822, to show the facility of effecting this upon a scale well worthy of the object, and at a reasonable and moderate expense. I also referred your Grace to a Memorial addressed by me in May or June, 1825, to the then Lords of the Treasury in conjunction with another noble peer more immediately interested in the object, and at that time of greater interest than I could boast with his Majesty's then Ministers, for the purpose of showing that the great object in view could be accomplished without the loss ultimately of a single farthing to the public purse, but at the sole ultimate cost of the several proprietors.

These documents you told me you would look into; whether this has been the case or otherwise, I know not; but if not, might it not be well, unless you should approve of the enclosed, to meet it by the more enlarged measures flowing from the Reports of the Bog Commissioners, and from Mr. Grantham's report, as suggested by the Memorial?

I have scarcely any interest *privately* in the determination of this matter, as I possess, comparatively, very little bog; but as a resident proprietor anxious for the re-establishment of some legitimate government over us, and for the real peace, welfare and happiness of the Empire, the interest I take is great.

Yours, my dear Duke, most sincerely,

CLANCARTY.

The Right Hon. Stratford Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Berkeley Square, 10th July, 1829.

Having seen Lord Aberdeen this morning, I send the papers to which I referred in conversation the day before yesterday, as calculated to bear me out in the impression under which I then said that I had acted. I should have taken them to Downing Street myself had I not been un-

willing to trespass on your Grace's valuable time a moment more than is necessary. I shall of course be happy to wait on your Grace if you wish to see me.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord Duke, very sincerely yours,

STRATFORD CANNING.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

The Right Hon. Stratford Canning to the Earl of Aberdeen.

[Extract.]

“ Naples, 21st February, 1829.

“ If the three Powers can agree upon the limits of Greece, and issue instructions accordingly, the three Courts to their respective ambassadors, or France and England to theirs on behalf of Russia also, I do not foresee any insuperable difficulty. If otherwise, it is clear that there would be a difference between the ostensible and reserved views of the several parties; and as England would in that case be for the most contracted limits, not only should I have to hold a language at variance with my known sentiments, but the struggle would rest in a great measure personally with me, under circumstances disadvantageous to my character and to the success of your Lordship's views.” * * * * *

“ On the whole, my Lord, however, I may regret the rejection of our suggestions I should not despair of being able to discharge my duty towards government, provided there were a thorough declared understanding as to limits, and positive instructions, provided the armistice be duly declared; and, that it be also the determination of the Allies to maintain the complete exclusion of the Turks, as residents, from what is to be called Greece, with liberty for the Greek inhabitants of the other disturbed districts to pass over into it after disposing of their property within a certain time; and that the whole arrangement be finally placed under the safeguard of a convention guaranteed according to the Treaty.”

II.

The Earl of Aberdeen to the Right Hon. Stratford Canning.

[Extract.]

“ Foreign Office, 28th March, 1829.

“ The two ambassadors are charged to make certain propositions to the Porte, founded upon the terms agreed to at Poros, but with an injunction to weigh and examine the objections which may be urged by the Turkish government. No agreement whatever exists between the three Powers respecting the limits which they think desirable for Greece, even if such limits could be obtained; while the opinion of the British government is strongly expressed, and is annexed to the same Protocol, that the terms proposed as the basis of the negotiation are in the highest degree improper and unjust. It is obvious, therefore, that any objections made by the Porte will be admitted as valid by the British government; but it would undoubtedly be too much to expect from you that you should labour with zeal to destroy at Constantinople what you had constructed with so much pains at Poros. Yet this will be the main object of the British minister, so far as the question of limits is concerned. But this subject is still more delicate when we consider the situation of France. We have good reason to believe that the French government still entertain

the same feelings which they have formerly professed, and that their apparent agreement with Russia is only temporary. It is obvious, however, that if they return to their former opinions, it must be in consequence of the decision of the British government; and that the British minister at Constantinople must take the lead in every question connected with the restriction of the limits of Greece."

III.

The Right Hon. Stratford Canning to the Earl of Aberdeen.

[Extract.]

"Naples, 11th April, 1829.

"With equal cheerfulness and unabated zeal I should have been ready to return to Constantinople in execution of the Protocol of the 22nd, if it had been the intention of government to press the substance of its stipulations firmly and fully on the acceptance of the Porte. But your Lordship has touched the true point of my objection by stating that, notwithstanding the apparent agreement in the Protocol, the efforts of the British plenipotentiary will be directed to the accomplishment of the separate views indicated in the British Memorandum annexed to it."

[1365.]

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 11th July, 1829.

I quite concur in your letter to the Lord-Lieutenant, and I trust that it will do good.

Could not the Crown lawyers do something to prevent or to put down these aggregate meetings in Dublin? Might not the Lord-Lieutenant prevent their meeting or dissolve the meeting under the Association Act?

Lord Francis appears to rely upon the old recourse of O'Connell and Shiel quarrelling. They quarrel and reconcile their quarrels as frequently as children. In the mean time they may separate the two countries.

I think that the time has come for the government to take a decided tone and line upon all these subjects, which will be the best mode of dividing the loyal and well-disposed of all sects from the disloyal, and will show us where we really stand in Ireland and what we ought to propose in the next session of Parliament.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 13th July, 1829.

The King sent for me this morning, and after some talk, began upon the subject of the diplomatic appointments. He is very desirous for Lord Albert* to go to Berlin as Secretary of Legation, in order that he may be with Taylor.† He pressed this very strongly; and as Lord Albert has been Secretary of Legation at Florence for a year and a half, he may be moved without any impropriety. I shall be able to settle Bligh's‡ appointment more agreeably to Lord Darnley than if he were to go to Berlin.

The King then gave me a sort of negotiation with the two French Duchesses. He seemed very unwilling to see them at Windsor, and it ended in his determining to come to town for the Recorder's Report on Thursday. I am to appoint M^{me} d'Escars on that day; and it will depend on circumstances whether he sees M^{me} du Cayla or not.

He talked a good deal about Don Pedro's marriage, and of Barbacena's plans; but agreed at once to the proposal of not seeing Itabayana before he left England.

He kept me for near an hour, and was perfectly friendly, and even cordial the whole time.

The Duke of Cumberland's departure seems to be as doubtful as ever. At the Lodge they knew nothing about it, and seemed to think it might very possibly be delayed until after the 12th of August. I am to meet him to-day at Lord Chesterfield's at dinner, and I dare say he will tell me himself what his present intentions are.

Despatches have come to-day from St. Petersburg and Berlin. You will see in Nesselrode's private letter to Lord Heytesbury the first effect of their victory, which is rather ominous. He hopes that it will turn our propositions to the Porte, which had been made as the maximum of our desires, into an ultimatum. Here is another proof how impossible it is to separate entirely the Greek affair from the Russian war. The observation in the letter is probably thrown out not very seriously; and on the other hand, the opinion of M. d'Ancillon, that the Emperor would come into our view of the proper limits of Greece, is very likely to be formed upon good grounds.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1366.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Walmer Castle, 14th July, 1829.

We must expect that this victory will raise the Russian demands, and I can't say that the Porte has any means of resistance.

* Lord Albert Conyngham.

† Right Hon. Sir Brook Taylor, G.C.H.

‡ The Hon. John D. Bligh (afterwards Sir John Bligh) was appointed Secretary of Legation at the Tuscan Court.

We are certainly interested in preventing the extension of the Russian power in Asia, and particularly in preventing their having possession of Poti and Anapa. They feel that this is the case, and therefore keep secret from us this intended departure on their part from the letter and spirit of their engagement to the world when they commenced the war.

I quite agree with Lord Heytesbury respecting the nature of their power. But observe that they are harmless only when single-handed. If united with France or either of the great German Powers they are very formidable, and having the desire not only as a nation, but as individuals, to mix themselves up as principals in every concern, and having a real interest in none, I am not quite certain that they are not the most inconvenient for us to deal with on friendly terms of any Power of Europe. Whatever may be the course which the Greek question takes we have behind us a very difficult and important question, that is the guarantee.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1367.]

To the Right Hon. Stratford Canning.

MY DEAR SIR,

Walmer Castle, 14th July, 1829.

I have received your letter of the 10th instant, and think it right to make the following observations to you upon it.

You are aware that we were always of opinion that the Greek frontier ought not to be extended much, if at all, beyond the isthmus of Corinth. The ambassadors at Poros decided otherwise, and the two other contracting parties to the Treaty having thought proper to adopt their recommendation, we agreed to make propositions to the Porte on the basis of the scheme recommended by the ambassadors, having stated however at the Conference, and having placed on the Protocol our opinion of what the limits of the Greek State ought to be, which opinion is in conformity with everything that has been stated by this government on the subject, since the year 1826.

Mr. Gordon* then was sent to Constantinople, as you would

* The Right Hon. Sir Robert Gordon, G.C.B., brother of the Earl of Aberdeen. He was formerly British Minister to the Court of Ferdinand VII., and was at this time appointed Ambassador at Constantinople.

have been, with instructions in conformity with the opinion of the three contracting parties to the Treaty, viz., to make propositions to the Porte on the basis of the recommendation of the ambassadors. These propositions are not considered by any party as an ultimatum; on the contrary, it is stated in the Protocol that the objections of the Porte are to be fairly considered, and the objections and propositions of the Porte are to be sent to the Conference in London. These propositions of the Porte cannot be adopted by the plenipotentiaries at Constantinople. All that can be done by them is to consider fairly and to forward to London whatever the Porte may propose.

I have thought it right to make this statement to you because it appeared to me, when I saw you, that you were impressed with the idea that the proposals to be made by Mr. Gordon, jointly with his colleagues, were not to be pressed *bonâ fide* in the first instance upon the Porte. Such however is distinctly the fact.

It was possible, though it is not now probable, that the Porte might reject the propositions which the English and French ambassadors are authorised to make. A new state of things would then arise. In the discussions consequent upon that rejection of the propositions of the contracting parties to the Treaty, and in the consideration to be given to any counter proposition of the Porte, the opinion formed and acted upon by you might be inconvenient to you, as well as to your government. It was this consideration and the prospect that in the progress of these negotiations the British ambassador might in your person be called upon to urge opinions at variance with his own, which induced Lord Aberdeen to accept your conditional resignation, a decision in the propriety of which it appears that you acquiesced.

I am quite convinced that nothing but an impression of what was due to your own character and opinions could have induced you to retire from your embassy at the moment you did.

Believe me, my dear Sir, your obedient faithful servant,

WELLINGTON.

[1368.]

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR PEEL,

Walmer Castle, 14th July, 1829.

I return Lord Francis's letter in the box. He is quite mistaken in thinking that it is not necessary to send stipendiary magistrates into Clare till after the election. That measure would be considered in Ireland as something like closing the stable-door when the steed has been stolen. The magistrate is required now because a system of terror has been established in Clare which prevents the gentlemen of the county from acting as magistrates. This has been done with a view to the election, and it most probably has had the effect, not only of discouraging the loyal from coming forward or from bringing forward a candidate, but likewise of encouraging the disloyal to support O'Connell.

I think O'Connell's election a great misfortune to the public interests, and a very bad symptom of the temper existing in Ireland; and I would do much to prevent it. But at all events government ought to step forward *before the election* to prevent the county from being terrified into electing Mr. O'Connell; or indeed at all by those disposed to act by terror.

I cannot express how strongly I feel that the credit of the government depends upon their exerting vigorously the means at their disposition to keep Ireland in a state of tranquillity. We must prevail upon the Irish government to exert themselves a little. If they omit or decline to do what is necessary, I confess that I think that they will deserve our confidence less even than those who preceded them.

Lord Francis should judge for himself of the facts stated, and not according to Sir John Byng's representation of them.

I don't doubt that commanding officers of regiments do dislike the separation of their men, and their being billeted in the country. But this dislike does not signify; at all events there are remedies; and if it is once discovered that the government are determined to put down this system of terror, and to enforce the law, we shall hear of no difficulties on the part of the military. The difficulties are a symptom of the disposition of the local authorities. They are brought forward because the language about Dublin is that it is best to let matters take their course.

In the mean time, however, we shall lose all the advantage of the sacrifices which we have made, and, deservedly, the confidence of the public.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Goulburn.

[1369.]

MY DEAR GOULBURN,

Walmer Castle, 14th July, 1829.

I return the papers on the Bank of Scotland. I quite agree with you in thinking that they ought to be allowed to increase their capital, but not to purchase or hold land, and that they ought to be required to state periodically to the Treasury the amount of their notes in circulation.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 14th July, 1829.

In case you should not hear it from other quarters, I write a few words to say that we are now put out of all doubt about the intention of the Duke of Cumberland. He remains in England. He sent his aide-de-camp to Berlin yesterday, with instructions to bring the Duchess and Prince George to Wiesbaden. It is not quite certain whether he means to join them at Wiesbaden, and return with them here; or whether they are to come here direct. In the latter case, he will only go to meet them at Calais; and if this should be in question, it will be with the view of arriving in England by the King's birthday. The Duke has kept the whole of this arrangement secret from Bülow, who was with me to-day, and to whom he sent his aide-de-camp for a Prussian passport. Colonel Poten told Bülow that he was forbidden to apply here.

I forgot to mention that the Duke of Clarence was at Windsor yesterday, as well as Munster. The Duke of Cumberland asked me many questions about the Duke of Clarence's visit, and seemed much interested about it. He arrived a few minutes after the Duke of Cumberland had left the Lodge; but I heard nothing respecting it, and I did not see him when there.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[1370.]

To the Earl of Clancarty.

MY DEAR CLANCARTY,

London, 16th July, 1829.

I have received your letter of the 7th instant, to which I have been prevented from sending a reply by the pressure of other matters.

On the same day that your letter reached me I received two other schemes from other parties in Ireland, founded in like manner on the principles of the scheme adopted in the Netherlands for the employment of the beggars. These are subjects more properly for the consideration of individuals or of private societies than for government, and I here leave them. Government have plenty to consider and to do in relation to Ireland without attending to schemes of this description, which can have only a partial operation. I will not trouble you, therefore, with any discussion upon the scheme in question.

I cannot but think that you do not use the government very well in your sweeping mode of writing of it.

We are told that we are conspirators against the Church and State. Was Lord Castlereagh a conspirator in that cause? Was Lord Clancarty in his early votes upon the Roman Catholic question? We are then told that we banish Ireland from our consideration! When and where has Ireland been neglected? It is not the government that neglects Ireland; it is the men possessing property in Ireland who neglect that country from which they draw their resources. The government can do no more than carry into execution the law by the means placed at its disposition; and this is what we are endeavouring to do.

If the law is not carried into execution I will know the reason; and the advantage of what we have done is this. We have a right to call upon Parliament to support us in preserving the public peace, and in adopting measures to enable us to secure it if those which exist are not sufficient.

But the Irish gentlemen will not see this. They will not confide in us. They believe all the absurd falsehoods and calumnies circulated respecting the manner in which the late measures were carried. They join themselves to the party called the *King's friends* against his ministers, believing that is the way to save themselves, and to serve their country; and then they cry out that Ireland is *banished from the consideration*

of government. To this I shall give no answer, but proceed in my own course to do the best I can for the prosperity and peace of so important a portion of his Majesty's dominions.

WELLINGTON.

To the Duke of Northumberland.

[1371.]

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 16th July, 1829.

I have long intended to write to you, but I have had much to do, and but little to say which Mr. Peel had not written to you, or which I had not mentioned or written to Lord Francis.

You will have seen how we passed our Irish measures. We certainly lost the support of many of our friends, of some I am afraid permanently; and there has been much of misrepresentation and calumny, not only during the discussion of our measures, but since. But I believe that the good sense of this country has commenced to have its effect, and that men are convinced that we have adopted the measures most likely to contribute to the strength of the empire, and particularly to the maintenance of the Protestant interest in Ireland.

I must observe to you, however, that it is absolutely necessary that the expectations held out in respect to the tranquillity of Ireland should be verified. We have very strong laws for preventing the assembly of seditious meetings. The public have a right to expect that they should be carried into execution; that these assemblies should be prevented if the law will allow of it, and that they should know why they are not prevented if the law is not sufficiently strong to put them down.

In the same manner we have in Ireland magistrates, an armed police, an army, and the Lord-Lieutenant has, moreover, the power of appointing stipendiary magistrates to administer the law in those parts of the country in which such assistance is necessary. The public will expect from us that the peace should be preserved, that the lives and properties of the King's subjects should be protected, and that no man should be intimidated in the exercise of his rights or duties, whatever they may be. They will expect from us that we should use all the power entrusted to the government for these purposes; and that if unfortunately we should not be successful, we should be able to state distinctly the reason, in order that Parliament may judge

whether or not it is proper to entrust the government with further power in order to preserve tranquillity in Ireland.

This is in few words the real state in which the last session of Parliament has left us. There can be no speculative political opinions respecting Ireland. We can make no further concessions. We have nothing to concede excepting the property of the Church or of individuals.

That country must be tranquil, or we must be able to give an account why it is not so ; why rights, property, security of person, &c., are not in the same state as in England ; why men are intimidated ; why the law is not executed ; and we must propose measures to remedy the evil, if evil exists. But before we can propose such measures we must be able to show what we have done already, and that every effort has been made.

To tell you the truth, it is the consideration that this would be the state of things as between the government and the British public and Parliament which was the strongest inducement to me to be a party to propose to Parliament the measures which we carried last session. I knew that Parliament would be prepared to expect that Ireland should be kept in tranquillity, and would support us in all reasonable measures to effect that purpose. If I had not had that expectation I should have doubted the expediency of incurring the risks which we did incur.

From this statement I draw this inference. We must, contrary to the usual practice in Ireland, examine closely every transaction which is in itself, or tends to, a breach of the peace or the intimidation of individuals. We must prosecute everything of that description, and do everything in our power, and use all the force and other means at our disposition to protect the lives, properties, and rights of the King's subjects against every attempt, whether of injury or intimidation.

I would recommend precautionary measures of the strongest description wherever any mischief is apprehended ; and the use of rewards for the discovery of criminals, of those posting threatening notices, and of that secret machinery of the Roman Catholic priesthood, of which the Irish have so long been the victims and the dupes. We may be convinced that every step that we take in this direction will not only have some effect, but that it will reconcile to the government, and also secure for it the applause of the well-thinking and loyal of all sects and

descriptions, as well in Ireland as in this country. In Ireland it will complete the division between the loyal and the disturbers of the public peace, and will thus give additional strength and effect to the measures of government, while in this country it will secure for us the support and approbation of all good men.

On the other hand, if we allow matters to go on as they are we shall lay the foundation for a continuance of that state of agitation and disturbance in which the country has been kept for years, and for which the only remedy will then be a civil war and reconquest of the country. We shall strengthen the force of the disloyal by all the timid, all the disappointed, all the ambitious, all those who will have a right to think that Great Britain is not equal to the task of governing and keeping Ireland in tranquillity. We shall lose our credit in England, and with our credit the confidence of the public. They will have a right to tell us, "you promised to carry into execution the laws; you promised to keep Ireland quiet. We adopted the measures which you proposed contrary to our own conviction after long consideration; and we now find that you leave matters to take their own course, and that the measure which has been adopted has been one of pure concession without return, because you have not exerted the powers with which the Parliament have entrusted you."

In this letter I have stated the principles on which I have been a party to what Mr. Peel has written to you, and upon which I have spoken and written to Lord Francis; and I earnestly entreat your consideration of the contents of this letter. I was glad to hear of your convalescence. I beg you to remember me kindly to the Duchess, and to believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Northumberland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Phoenix Park, July 18, 1829.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Grace's letter of the 16th instant, and the best reply I can make to it is, thus frankly and immediately to declare to you my entire acquiescence in every sentiment which it contains.

Before its arrival I had summoned a Council for the purpose of sanctioning a Proclamation which should denounce at once all Meetings calculated to disturb the peace of the country either by the insolence of provocation

or by the vengeance of illegal opposition. This sanction has been obtained, and the Proclamation will be printed in the course of the night.

In order, however, to give a practical efficiency to this instrument, I have directed a regiment of cavalry to move from Dublin into the northern district, for the dispersion of any bodies of men which may still be collected, and to reassure the peaceable inhabitants, who have been greatly alarmed by the recent conflicts.

It is also my intention forthwith to station a stipendiary magistrate at Swanlinbar in Cavan, which has been recently the scene of party barbarities, and from its own position, and proximity to the wildest parts of Leitrim, requires a civil as well as a military superintendence.

I shall press upon the law officers the necessity of prosecuting such persons of either party as have been prominent in these disturbances, and your Grace may depend upon it that, so far as I am concerned, no pains shall be spared in bringing them to punishment.

We are about to despatch stipendiary magistrates to Tipperary ; and the Solicitor-General, who has been sent specially into that county, is aware that any suggestion he may make for the better government of that extraordinary district will receive immediate attention.

The next object of our anxiety is the probable journey of Mr. O'Connell into Clare. The route by which it is supposed that he will pass is well supplied with troops, and we have a regiment of Hussars at Newbridge, ready for an immediate reinforcement in that district, should circumstances require it.

It is not unlikely that from vanity or mischief he may collect large assemblages of people on his way. He will be narrowly watched, and should it appear that reasonable fears are entertained by reasonable men, beyond the accredited license of electioneering, we shall not hesitate to disperse the mob, and arrest the leader of it.

It is to be hoped, however, that this may be avoided, and that the Clare representation, with all its unfortunate excitement, will be speedily forgotten.

Permit me to renew to your Grace what I have lately written to Mr. Peel. I am by no means disheartened as to the state of Ireland from these untoward circumstances. It is impossible not to see that a general and daily increasing benefit has resulted from the great measure of the last session ; but great and efficacious as it is, it could not be expected at once to civilise an ignorant population, and miraculously to assuage those religious animosities which have existed for centuries. It has already united all good men in one common interest for the preservation of the public peace ; and our struggle is with the remnants of disappointed factions or the habitual assassin and marauder.

Reposing, as I do, an unlimited confidence in the zeal and talents of Lord Francis Leveson Gower, I should infinitely regret his approaching departure for London, did it not give him an opportunity of imparting to your Grace my feelings and opinions, and of bringing back to me in return those valuable suggestions which your Grace's experience can so well supply.

I have the honour to remain, my dear Duke, with great truth and regard,

Yours very sincerely,

NORTHUMBERLAND.

[ENCLOSURE.]

By the Lord-Lieutenant and Council of Ireland.

A PROCLAMATION.

NORTHUMBERLAND.

WHEREAS in certain counties of this part of the United Kingdom meetings of large numbers of his Majesty's subjects have lately been held, for the avowed purpose of commemorating political events, or for the manifestation of particular opinions, political or religious; as also for the purpose of resisting, by violent and illegal means, such commemoration or manifestation, to the great danger of the public peace, and the well-founded terror and dread of his Majesty's peaceable and well-disposed subjects:

And whereas such meetings have, in recent instances, been attended with loss of life to some, and personal injury to other individuals attending them:

And whereas we have reason to apprehend a recurrence of similar assemblages:

And whereas many well affected, but unwary persons may be seduced by divers pretences to attend the same:

We, therefore, the Lord-Lieutenant and Council, being resolved to put down and suppress such meetings, and to prevent the recurrence thereof, have thought fit to issue this Proclamation, solemnly and strictly warning all his Majesty's liege subjects from henceforth to discontinue the assembling, either for the purpose of assisting in such meetings or assemblies as aforesaid, or for illegally resisting the same: And do charge, and earnestly exhort them, to the utmost of their power, to effect the discontinuance of all such meetings and assemblies, and thereby to prevent the dangers and mischief consequent on the same: And being determined strictly to enforce the law and the penalties thereof against persons offending in the premises: Do charge and command all sheriffs, mayors, justices of the peace, and all other magistrates, officers, and others whom it may concern, to be aiding and assisting in the execution of the law, in preventing such meetings and assemblies from being held, and in the effectual dispersion and suppression of the same, and in the detection and prosecution of those who shall offend in the respects aforesaid.

Given at the Lodge in his Majesty's Park, the Phoenix, the 18th day of July, 1829.

Ant. Hart, C. W. Dublin. Gort. Plunket. Wm. M'Mahon. G. F. Hill.
John Radcliff. H. Joy. F. Leveson Gower. John Byng.

To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Hardinge.

[1372.]

MY DEAR HARDINGE,

Walmer Castle, 18th July, 1829.

I enclose a Memorandum upon your papers which I have perused. I don't know whether you will agree with my principles and recommendation.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

[1373.]

MEMORANDUM. PENSIONS TO SOLDIERS.

18th July, 1829.

It appears to me to be absolutely necessary to adopt some measures to put an end to the abuses which exist in respect to the pensions of soldiers. I was always aware of the existence of these abuses. It is difficult to find a remedy.

The system of *pensions* pervades the whole society in England ; everybody looks to a pension ; or, in other words, a provision from the public without doing anything for it ; and men in general are but too ready to grant favours of this description without adverting to the ground of claim for them whenever any individual asks for them, more particularly when not responsible for their acts, and when the expense is to be defrayed by the public Treasury, by a parish, &c., &c.

We must first look at the principle on which we are to proceed in discussing and deciding on this question.

We consider that when we enlist a soldier the King has a right to his services for life. Accordingly, we make him pay for his discharge ; and I approve of those proposed regulations which *enable* the Commander-in-Chief to order the discharge of soldiers at certain periods of service, making each pay for the same up to * years' service, and granting it to him afterwards with certain donations at certain other periods.

These principles and this measure are applicable to every soldier in the service at the present moment, inasmuch as the acceptance of the discharge upon these principles is voluntary by the soldier if he is capable of performing his service. If a soldier enlisted previous to this time does not choose to accept these terms, he will be entitled to the advantages which he may derive under the existing warrants.

It is quite clear, however, that no soldier is entitled to his discharge as long as the Crown may think proper to detain him in the service. If he is to be discharged on account of disabilities, it must be at the will of the Crown. The Crown has accordingly fixed in different warrants the terms on which the claims for disabilities shall be considered ; but the principle that the soldier has no right to his discharge is clearly the foundation on which all these warrants turn.

* Blank in manuscript.

The first question then is this. The grant of a discharge (with or without pension is not now the question) being a favour to a soldier, ought it to be granted to a soldier disabled in the service by sickness, or anything but wounds received in action for which particular provision is made?

We know that soldiers *malinger*. We are aware of the tricks of which they are guilty in order to disable themselves. We are aware of the effect upon their health of their own irregular habits. Are we to make a regulation to favour those who we have ground to suspect may have produced their disability in this manner?

It may be very proper to discharge from the service men disabled from rendering service; and it may be very proper for the Crown to provide for those disabled by service who cannot provide for themselves by their own labour and exertions.

But the rule should be for the regulation of the conduct of the officers of the Crown in regulating these matters; and not be considered as matter of engagement from the Crown to the man who enlists; who enlists for his life unless the King should think proper to release him from his engagement.

The principle of the soldier-service should be clearly laid down in the regulation, which should be formed only for those who are to administer this branch of the service.

The first question is this: Is a man disabled by the service (otherwise than by wounds) to be discharged? That must depend upon the nature of the disability. If it is permanent, and likely to affect him permanently, the convenience of the Crown would require his discharge. Is he to be pensioned? If not discharged he must receive pay or pension. I should say then that from the moment at which the soldier discontinues his service in his regiment on account of *disability*, his term of service ought to cease to be counted, but he ought to receive some allowance in the way of pension or pay till the officers of the Crown shall decide whether he is to be discharged on account of a disability.

The next question to be considered is whether a man discharged from the service on account of a disability ought to receive a pension.

That must depend upon the nature and degree of the disability, how and where acquired; the character and conduct of

the soldier. But this I must say, that no soldier discharged on account of disability after a period of service of less than twenty-one years ought to have a pension granted to him for a longer term than one or two years.

Such grant cannot be made without a violation of the principle on which soldiers are enlisted for life, and are allowed their discharges, paying for the same a different price at different periods of their service.

The next point to be examined is the mode of enquiring into the nature and degree of these *disabilities of soldiers* which have proved so expensive to the public, so as to prevent the frauds and mischief which have existed.

First, where a man is recommended for his discharge on account of a disability, the commanding officer of the regiment should order a court-martial to assemble on his case, which court should enquire into his state of health, the cause of the disability, the conduct and character of the man, his length of service, age, &c., and every circumstance which can throw light upon the case. This enquiry should be upon oath.

The Chelsea Board having these proceedings before them could determine what should be done with this soldier, whether to be discharged immediately without pension, to be retained in the service at Chatham or elsewhere, or at large upon diminished pay, and to appear again in a limited time, or to be discharged with pension for a limited time, at the expiration of which the man is to appear again to undergo a similar enquiry.

According to this system, which it must be observed can be applied to the cases under the warrant of 1826, the Board of Chelsea will always have the means of ascertaining exactly the state of the soldier; and there is every reason to believe that no frauds could be practised.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 18th July, 1829.

I have been desired by Murray to forward the accompanying papers to you. I have read the whole of them attentively. The subject of them is of greater importance than I thought it to be. Time presses; but I almost doubt whether the whole Cabinet ought not to see the papers before

decisive instructions are sent to Sir James Kempt* either to reject or to pass the Bill for a change in the Representation of the province of Lower Canada.

Ever most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

I have seen Holmes to-day, who gives an account of Ireland satisfactory so far as the upper classes of society are concerned.

Lord Francis Leveson Gower to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Dublin, 19th July, 1829.

I wish to address myself directly to you with reference to some reports which I hear are abroad of a reluctance on my part to continue in office. I wish it to be understood, that as long as I am so far unconvicted of incapacity as to be able to be of even the slightest service to any administration conducted by yourself and Mr. Peel, I should think myself just as much disgraced in shrinking from my present or any other post, as I should if the case were a military and not a civil one. I certainly believe that I depend less than many people on politics for excitement or amusement; and if political events should *turn me out*, that I should feel less personal regret for the loss of occupation, of power, or, which I need scarcely name, emolument, than many. But these are not times for personal considerations. I am not the least desponding with regard either to the country or myself. In the important matter of Parliament, I must candidly state my opinion that the peculiar course which the last session took afforded me no fair opportunity of showing that I was competent to my duties there. I never think the success of any man certain there till it is won; and I am not at all certain that my abilities, which I have no disposition to underrate, peculiarly fit me for the rough warfare of that assembly. But such as they are, they shall be exerted there or anywhere else. With regard to Ireland itself, I think the best proof that I have done my duty here is that I have never had my health drunk at a Liberal dinner, nor been abused, to my knowledge, even by the 'Star of Brunswick' or the 'Mail.' I know how much remains to be achieved if I stay here, but I am not dissatisfied or intimidated by my commencement. When I first took to politics, it was from no preference of the *métier* over twenty other pursuits, but because I thought that if people do not avail themselves of the accidental advantages of birth and station to interfere in the affairs of the country, they run the risk of losing those advantages by a revolution. This is a good reason for exertion; but the course of events has superadded one more imperative on myself individually, in the obligation, private and public, which I feel myself under to you and Mr. Peel.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours faithfully,

F. LEVESON GOWER.

* Then Governor-General of Lower Canada.

[1374.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Walmer Castle, 19th July, 1829.

I quite concur in the instructions which you have given to Lord Cowley respecting Mr. Blütte. I believe that the Greeks ought to have been given over to Mr. Blütte. But the Russian government now exercises in the Principalities the powers of the government of the Porte; and if the Russian generals declared by proclamation that they would govern the Principalities by means of the usual authorities, they are bound by the treaties between the Porte and the several *, and should carry into execution these stipulations in the usual manner.

I have not read Colonel Campbell's despatches. He should be desired to report everything, and to say nothing excepting that the King does not look to any aggrandisement either for himself or his family; and that his Majesty will consider any arrangement which shall tend to connect Columbia with any European Power excepting Spain, as an object of serious attention for him and his government. This might safely be written, unless indeed it should be thought desirable to prevail upon the Duke of Cumberland to take upon himself the government of Columbia!!!

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I asked Polignac to call here as he should pass to France. It is, however, probably better that he should not do so.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have read the last despatches from Lisbon and Madeira. I recommend you to speak to Lord Melville respecting the conduct of the commander of the *Vigilant*. Our officers dare not violate the laws of their own country; but they are too ready to violate those of foreign countries, and all the rules by which the intercourse between nations is regulated. He ought to have hoisted his flag when the flag of the fort was displayed; and he ought to have made the Packet signal.

On the other hand, we must make a serious complaint of the conduct of the Commanding officer of Madeira. We shall have

* Blank in manuscript.

to strike a blow against Don Miguel yet, the consequences of which he will not like. You had better speak to Asseca, as well as write to Mathews.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 19th July, 1829.

You will receive by to-day's post despatches both from my brother, and from Dawkins. The first are not yet dated from Constantinople; nor are they of much importance. The declaration to the Dutch consul at Smyrna respecting the blockade of Candia, appears to have been rendered quite necessary by the conduct of the French. Altogether, this question of Greek blockades may perhaps be properly brought forward at our next Conference, which I suppose must take place after the arrival of the next despatches.

You will observe the report of the assertion of Colonel Fabvier, made to Dawkins, respecting the limits of Greece; and the motives by which he succeeded in influencing the French government. This perfectly tallies with the declarations of the Duc de Mortemart; and, I think, of the Duc de Laval also. It is so far fortunate, that these motives, being founded on the most unreasonable suspicion, admit of a change more easily than if the French ministers had acted from any fixed principle.

The fact mentioned by Dawkins of the intention of Capo d'Istria to offer the sovereignty to Prince Charles of Bavaria is probably correct. I am rather inclined to think that this question of sovereignty will require more consideration. Fortunately the necessary concurrence of the Porte will give us the opportunity of doing so.

In the event of our being finally compelled to go beyond the Morea, what do you think of making the Northern State under a separate government? This would be more agreeable to the Porte; it would be more in unison with the declamations of the classical dreamers; but, above all, it would operate as a check upon the encroaching and restless spirit of Greek ambition, which we must expect to see in any State to be established, especially under one head. Should we be driven out of our own boundary, this notion is worth consideration.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever most truly yours,

ABERDEEN.

The Duke of Cumberland told Bülow yesterday that he expected the Duchess and Prince George in England about the 5th or 6th of August.

The Earl of Clancarty to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Garbally, 20th July, 1829.

I received yours of the 16th instant in answer to mine of the 7th yesterday, and can well assure you that I had no other view in the recommendation of my *scheme*, as you term it, than that of endeavouring, by the

diversion of the public mind, to verify your own prediction, and to procure employment, present and future, with a permanent increase of productive territory to the country, and this at no ultimate cost to the State. This *scheme* it would be impossible, from its extent, to have executed by individual exertion, or by private societies however numerous.

If, in my letter of the 7th, I stated Ireland to be derelicted—banished from the consideration of his Majesty's ministers (and this was all that was therein alleged against the government)—I thought I had done so upon the very best authority, viz., that of the Duke of Wellington himself; for, when in the little which fell from me in the House of Lords, I averred that since my continued residence in Ireland for the last *five* years, and consequently speaking from personal observation, there had been no legitimate government in Ireland, I was in his answer corrected by his Grace, and assured that for the last *ten* years there had been no government in Ireland. Let the Duke of Wellington therefore answer his own *query*, "When and where has Ireland been neglected?"

I am not aware of having ever said or insinuated that you were *conspirators*; if I had done either I should have acted in direct opposition to my own persuasions. To you I have always considered not only the British empire, but the whole civilized world, more indebted than to any other mortal that ever existed; this does not well accord with the charge of having affixed upon you the character of a *conspirator*. Lord Castlereagh was no conspirator; Lord Clancarty was no conspirator in looking favourably to the extension of Roman Catholic privilege under proper regulation and at a proper time; but I believe Lord Castlereagh would not, and certainly Lord Clancarty did not (as he stated on his legs), conceive that he individually could support the recent measure, at the time especially when it was produced, with a usurping Popish government lording it over the land, and thus, apparently through intimidation, laying King, Lords, and Commons at the feet of a set of restless demagogues, to the encouragement of treason and sedition, in a country which stands in need of no such stimulants. Such was my view—it has not yet been proved to be an erroneous one.

The only vote I ever gave in either House upon the question to which you allude, prior to the last session, was upon Lord Wellesley's motion for a committee of enquiry in the year 1812. Enquiry, though recommended from the Throne, was not the line pursued in the last Session; I however freely confess that, if it had been, I should have thought it mistimed. Upon this subject, however, let no more be said—the question, whatever its attendant circumstances, has passed—it is the duty of all to make the best of it. It was with this view that I ventured the suggestion conveyed in mine of the 7th.

Perhaps I do not much differ with you in opinion, that the great landed proprietors of Ireland are responsible for much of its evils; but then the proper distinction must be drawn between the *absentee* and the *resident*. The latter, I believe, and with very few exceptions, really to conduce much by the employment of the people, to the prosperity of the country, and beneficially to uphold the influence of the civil power towards the execution of the laws.

Would that the government would give them fair countenance! The

free pardon of Mr. Æneas McDonnell upon an *insufficient* medical certificate (call for it and see), without bail or mainprize; and, in local instances, the more recent appointment of a member of the Popish Association as assistant barrister of this county;—and the return of the same indolent and inefficient judge now for the TENTH time consecutively on the circuit of this province, by which the whole efficacy of the criminal law is paralyzed in every county wherein (as in this) he always sits in the Crown Court—both matters frequently remonstrated against without effect;—these furnish sufficient instances that this is not the case.

Be assured, my dear Duke, that I have no wish now so near my heart, as well for my own interest as a resident Irish landed proprietor as from bygone relations still dear to me, as that YOUR government should prosper, and to the utmost, in all its parts.

I never heard of its existence till apprised of it by your letter, of the party called *the King's friends*. Most certainly I do not belong to it, or to any other party whatsoever. Retired altogether from public life, I have no other political interest than that all should work well, and most especially that it should do so in your hands, and in those of some of your colleagues, with whom I was formerly accustomed to act in strict confidence. A most sincere, and I hope not culpable, desire to promote this prompted the contents of my letter of the 7th instant, and of this reply to yours of the 16th. They shall not be repeated. That your administration may prosper, I anxiously hope and pray.

Most sincerely and faithfully yours,

CLANCARTY.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 20th July, 1829.

You will see by the enclosed that the Irish government has issued a Proclamation, imperatively called for, as it appears to me, by the state of affairs in the North of Ireland.

Ever most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Lord Francis Leveson Gower to the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR MR. PEEL,

Dublin, 18th July, 1829.

I have ventured to obtain the concurrence of the Lord-Lieutenant in a measure to which, if time had permitted, I should have been most anxious to have acquired your previous sanction. Upon a full review of the details of the lamentable occurrences in the North, I yesterday suggested to the Lord-Lieutenant the expediency of issuing, without further delay, a Proclamation for the prevention and suppression of any further meetings or processions. The Lord-Lieutenant concurred most strongly with my opinion, and directed me to summon a Council for this day for the purpose of framing the Proclamation. The reasons which appeared to me to be valid against a measure of this

nature previous to the 12th of July, appear to me now to have lost their weight. I thought with Gregory that a Proclamation for the prevention of Orange processions at that period would have defeated its own purpose, that it would in many instances have been disobeyed, and that it would have afforded a pretext to the Catholics to resist by violence what would have amounted, if not to a violation of the law, to a violation of the construction put upon the law by the government of the country. I am of opinion that this advantage arises out of the recent outrages that the legal right of suppression of political meetings is placed beyond doubt. It is impossible that any Orange or Ribbon procession should take place now in the province of Ulster, which will not bear the mark of illegality stamped upon it in legible characters, by the well-founded terror and apprehension with which it must be viewed by all impartial spectators. There is reason to suppose that an intention exists of organizing processions for the 1st or 12th of August, and I think it imperative upon Government to prevent such a proceeding. I feel strongly that a construction will be put upon this proceeding by the opponents of Roman Catholic Emancipation in support of their assertions as to the failure of that measure, and on this, as on every other ground, I should have been anxious to have submitted this measure to your previous consideration, but I see no choice between the postponement of it and a declaration of martial law in Cavan, Fermanagh, and Tyrone, at the least. After what has occurred, I feel that a Proclamation, such as I enclose, ought to receive the support of every well disposed man in the country. There is, I am happy to say, no difference of opinion among the members of government here on the subject. The Primate, who arrived yesterday, had a conversation with Gregory on the subject, and stated objections to the measure which will induce him not to attend the Council. I am sorry to lose the benefit of his name and assistance. Sir John Byng has arrived in Dublin. I have not yet seen him, but am happy to have learned that he now entirely acquiesces in the expediency of the military movements directed by the Lord-Lieutenant in his absence. I shall consult with him forthwith on the propriety of detaching a part of the garrison here to the North.

I have nothing of consequence by my own post this morning.

Believe me, &c.,

F. LEVESON GOWER.

II.

PROCLAMATION.

Whereas in certain counties of this part of the United Kingdom meetings of large numbers of his Majesty's subjects have lately been held for the avowed purpose of celebrating the anniversaries of political events, or for the manifestation of particular opinions, political or religious, as also for the purpose of resisting by illegal means such celebration, or manifestation, to the great danger of the public peace, and the well-founded terror and dread of his Majesty's peaceable and well-disposed subjects :

And whereas, such meetings have in recent instances been attended with loss of life and personal injury to individuals attending them, and others ; and whereas, we have reason to apprehend a recurrence of similar assemblages ; and whereas, many well-affected but unwary persons may be seduced by divers pretences to attend the same :

We therefore, the Lord-Lieutenant, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, being resolved to put down and suppress such meetings, and to prevent the recurrence thereof, have thought fit to issue this Proclamation,

solemnly and strictly warning all his Majesty's liege subjects from henceforth to discontinue the holding or attending all such meetings or assemblies as aforesaid, and do charge and earnestly exhort them, to the utmost of their power, to effect the discontinuance of all such meetings and assemblies, and thereby to prevent the dangers and mischief consequent on the same. And being determined strictly to enforce the law, and the penalties thereof, against persons offending in the premises, do charge and command all sheriffs, mayors, justices of the peace, and all other magistrates, officers and others whom it may concern, to be aiding and assisting in the execution of the law, in preventing such meetings and assemblies from being held, and in the effectual dispersion and suppression of the same, and in the detection and prosecution of those who shall offend in the respects aforesaid.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

[1375.]

MY DEAR PEEL,

Walmer Castle, 21st July, 1829.

I have not seen any details of proceedings in the north of Ireland, and I cannot, therefore, judge of what has passed there; but it is necessary to put an end to such proceedings in Ireland, and that without loss of time.

I shall regret, however, the particular notice of the Orange processions in the Proclamation, and the absence of all notice of the Ribbon processions, of which we had so much reason to complain, and have complained so frequently lately.

I wish that Lord Francis had stated what the objections of the Archbishop were to the Proclamation. There can be no doubt of its necessity. Are they to the pointing of it particularly to the Orange processions? If they are to the measure itself the Archbishop is in the wrong.

Lord Francis should have recollected that our Proclamation of last year was pointed at all meetings of the same description.

I see that matters are in a very bad state in the south of Ireland.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1376.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Walmer Castle, 21st July, 1829.

I return the despatches from your brother and Mr. Dawkins.

I think that you ought to have a conference about the Greek blockade and the notion of Guilleminot that the cessation of hostilities does not mean cessation of blockade. It does mean

cessation of blockade entirely; unless the blockading party should, in the instrument by which it is agreed to cease hostilities, limit the cessation of blockade to certain times, seasons, or certain articles, and certain quantities of such articles.

Favier is the original *Habit bleu*! There is no such enemy to this country and to all that belongs to it. We must not conceal from ourselves that that party are endeavouring to drive the two countries to war. The moderate people in both countries must endeavour to prevent it. But we in this country must take care to have no joint concern with France that shall last for more than a few days. Yet how we are to get out of this Greek concern without being joint guarantees with France and Russia, or leaving France and Russia joined in a common interest, is more than I can tell. Mr. Canning and Madame de Lieven have much to answer for!

I see that Lord Stuart gives a different version to Müffling's mission from that given by Baron Bülow. It would be very desirable to get to the bottom of this affair at Paris. My opinion is, that Lord Stuart has mistaken Monsieur de Portalis. It is impossible that the Prussian government should have written one version to London and another to Paris. If they have, they ought to be exposed.

If Lord Stuart has mistaken Monsieur de Portalis, it would be a good opportunity of giving him a little warning respecting the mode in which he transacts business; that is to say, not being certain whether what he communicates to the French Minister is understood by him, or that he understands correctly what is communicated to him by the French Minister for the information of his government.

Your brother has been quite right respecting his communications with the Dutch consul at Smyrna.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 21st July, 1829.

Polignac leaves town to-morrow or the next day, but he has given up the intention of going to Walmer. In consequence of the observation in your letter, I recommended him to consider what the effect might be, and

he determined immediately to go at once to Dover. He did not conceal that it depended entirely upon himself whether he should be at the head of the ministry or not; but he said that he should not make up his mind until he arrived at Paris, and saw with whom he could act, and what was to be done. He seemed to think the greatest difficulty consisted in bringing the government to a determination to act with the necessary firmness against the revolutionary spirit which had grown up in the Chamber of Deputies and in the country, but which he felt confident might easily be controled. He requested us to wait a few days, in case any important intelligence arrived from Constantinople, before we thought of having a conference, as he wished first to ascertain his own position. He gave me clearly to understand that we should have no great difficulty in agreeing upon the Greek question if he remained at the head of affairs.

After a good deal of general discussion about the state of France, and other matters, he said that one of his greatest objections to having any concern with the administration in France arose from a cause which he could hardly state, and which he could not expect me fully to enter into. In consequence, however, of the confidential footing upon which he stood with us, he must say that your being at the head of the government in this country would be the greatest inducement for him to accept office in his own; and that if the reports were true which circulated on all sides respecting changes intended, and of the weakness of the present government, he should prefer, in the event of any alteration of principle and system in this country, either to remain at his post as ambassador or to quit public life altogether. This was certainly delicate ground to get upon, but, believing him to be sincere and friendly, I saw no reason to be silent. I told him that in my opinion your strength in the country was not only unimpaired but greatly increased, and that if the people were fairly polled, five-sixths would, without hesitation, declare in your favour. I admitted that the state of parties was singular and not very intelligible, but that there was no reason to apprehend any want of efficient support in Parliament. With respect to the King's intentions, of which he expressed much apprehension, it was of course impossible to answer with certainty; but it was my belief, that whatever he might have heard of his displeasure, or angry speeches, there existed nothing to make it the least likely that he should ever think of taking any step of the kind, so long as you preserved the confidence of the country and of Parliament.

He dwelt very strongly upon the proceedings of the Duke of Cumberland, and their effect. He thinks Madame de Lieven is intimately concerned in the whole of his plans; and that his stay in this country, and the arrival of the Duchess, are concerted with her. He thinks that Madame de Lieven's influence with the King himself is very great; and repeated a speech of his respecting her, which he (Polignac) had heard within these very few days (I take for granted from Madame d'Escars), "*qu'elle était la tête la plus forte en politique en ce pays-ci.*" I succeeded in undeceiving him respecting Madame de Lieven and her influence.

He entirely approved of our having determined not to meddle in any manner at Paris in the formation of a ministry, and was aware of the intrigues of Pozzo, which however were of so little consequence to him, that, as he had already given me to understand, the acceptance of office depended entirely upon himself.

He took leave of me very cordially, and desired his kindest remembrances to you ; professing at the same time the greatest possible satisfaction at the account which I had given him of your position.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,
ABERDEEN.

[1377.]

To Lord Francis Leveson Gower.

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS, Walmer Castle, 22nd July, 1829.

I have received your letter of the 19th, and I cannot express to you what satisfaction and relief it has given me. From my own feelings respecting office, I can easily judge what yours are. But you are of that time of life, of that station in society, you have already filled such high offices, and I don't flatter you when I add that you are endowed with such qualities and talents, and have already been so successful, that you can no more withdraw from the public service without good reason than I can. In saying that you cannot withdraw from the public service, I don't advert to the opinion of the world upon such withdrawal ; but to that which is much more important, your own satisfaction with yourself.

You may rely upon it that you would never forgive yourself.

Believe me, &c.,
WELLINGTON.

[1378.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Walmer Castle, 22nd July, 1829.

Polignac is quite right in not coming here. I will not go to Dover to see him for the same reason.

I agree in all that you have said to him. I am afraid, however, that the Duke of Northumberland has taken a false step, which may be followed by important consequences : not in issuing his Proclamation, but in directing it, as he does, against Orange processions ; whereas there were plenty of Ribbon processions on foot at the same time.

I hope that the Duke of Cumberland's conduct will have the effect of destroying the little influence that he has.

Believe me, &c.,
WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

[1379.]

MY DEAR PEEL,

Walmer Castle, 22nd July, 1829.

I return Lord Francis's letter to you, and the newspaper. I have not yet seen any account of the transaction referred to in the Proclamation, nor of the conduct of Lord Enniskillen. I quite agree with you that there is no reason for rewarding him.

I see that Lord Francis anticipates the objection which I felt to the proposed Proclamation; or rather those objections have been made by others on the spot.

I don't think that he successfully justifies the course which he has taken.

Meetings for the avowed purpose of commemorating political events; or for the manifestation of particular opinions, political or religious; may be legal meetings. Their numbers or their conduct may render them illegal, because other bodies assemble to oppose such commemoration or manifestation of opinion.

The conduct of these other bodies is certainly illegal. But the Proclamation makes no distinction between meetings of the several descriptions, excepting rather to point at the first.

There is another class of meeting, certainly illegal; not occasioned by meetings to commemorate events, or to manifest opinions; such as those recently held in Clare and Limerick, of which the Proclamation takes no notice. I quite approve of a Proclamation, and of its including every description of illegal meeting. But I think that this Proclamation is pointed in an unfortunate manner, and that we shall hear of it again.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 22nd July, 1829.

I agree in your opinion that the Proclamation might have been more happily worded. If there had been the opportunity I would have suggested some alterations; but as of course I did not see it until it was actually put forth, I have thought it best not to hint any disapprobation of the terms. You will see that the Proclamation is signed by the Archbishop of Dublin, and by Joy, the Attorney-General, both eager Protestants; by Lord Gort also.

I suppose that the rumours to which the enclosed letter from Lord Francis alludes are rumours put forth by that party which is circulating so

many others equally unfounded. Some of the members of that party are indiscreet enough to disclose the plan on which they are acting. I had not heard of this particular rumour, but I hope you will assure Lord Francis that he has our entire confidence. I am quite satisfied that no man can have better intentions than he has. He did the business which he had to do in Parliament perfectly well. What he observes with respect to the parliamentary business of Ireland in the last session is quite true. The three bills absorbed all the interest, and of course I was obliged to take them out of his hands.

We should find it very difficult, in my opinion, to replace him; and a few encouraging words from you will be a great comfort and a great service to him.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

[1380.]

To the Right Hon. Henry Goulburn.

MY DEAR GOULBURN,

Walmer Castle, 22nd July, 1829.

I enclose a paper received from the Editor of the 'Parliamentary Mirror.' I see that your name is down as a subscriber to the loan to be made to this editor.

I put this case to you. Somebody speaks a libel. The Editor of the 'Parliamentary Mirror' publishes the said libel. Is not each of the subscribers to the loan responsible for this libel, and liable to be prosecuted for it? Is not this the case of Boswell in Scotland?

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1381.]

*To Sir James Scarlett.**

MY DEAR SIR,

Walmer Castle, 23rd July, 1829.

I have requested my solicitor, Mr. Parkinson, to lay before you and Mr. Gurney certain libels, recently published against me in the 'Morning Journal' and 'Standard.' I am particularly anxious to prosecute that in the 'Standard,' because it charges me with improper views, in relation to the office of Regent, inconsistent with my duty as a loyal subject of his Majesty; and because I know the quarter from which this libel

* Sir James Scarlett was then Attorney-General, to which office he was appointed upon the *retirement* of Sir Charles Wetherell. He became Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer in December, 1834, and was created, in 1835, Lord Abinger, of Abinger, County Surrey.

proceeds. You will see that this subject was originally discussed in the 'Morning Journal;' but, as well as I can recollect, the 'Standard' goes a step further.

I am quite certain that my forbearance in the commencement of the summer is the cause of the subsequent insolence of these papers, and I am convinced that there is no remedy but to prosecute them.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 23rd July, 1829.

I have received the enclosed from Lord Francis, who had meditated a visit to London, which I think he has wisely abandoned.

I have asked him whether any proof can be had of the interference of which he speaks. If it can, I think we ought to consider the Duke of Cumberland in the capacity of a Privy Councillor, and that his relation to Windsor is only an additional reason for insisting that he shall not foment disorder for which others are held responsible.

That manifesto to the Orangemen, issued just before the 12th July, deserves serious consideration. The advice to the Orangemen to continue united, but to avoid processions, is a servile imitation of the Proclamations of the Roman Catholic Association. Their advice was the same to the Roman Catholics, "Continue organised and disciplined, but do not break the peace."

I doubt whether it ought to be permitted, without serious remonstrance, that in the present state of Ireland a Prince of the Blood, known to possess the confidence of the King, should place himself at the head of an organised body of the King's subjects, and tell them that the continuance of that organisation is necessary for the maintenance of their religion. We must not estimate the effects of these manifestos in Ireland by the effects which they produce in London, or among men in public life. We can speak further on this subject on your return to London.

Ever most truly yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 23rd July, 1829.

I do not quite understand what you mean in alluding to the conduct of the Governor of Madeira, unless you refer to his having placed a soldier as well as a Custom-House officer on board English vessels in the harbour. I enclose what has been already sent to Mr. Mathews upon this subject; and it is proposed to approve of the vice-consul at Madeira by the next

packet, as well as to caution him respecting other matters. The fact is, that more provocation has been given at Madeira by the English than anywhere. Persons pursued by the government have been received into English houses, from the windows of which they insult people in the street, and especially soldiers, with impunity. I am certainly not surprised that under these circumstances the Governor should say that he could not be responsible for the conduct of the troops. The reception of these persons is perfectly illegal, and they are quite mistaken in thinking that it is authorised by our Treaty. I have an opinion from the King's Advocate upon this subject, which has been sent to the consul some time ago, in which he distinctly says that the local authorities have full power to search for and to take any man accused of treason from an Englishman's house. The *Seringapatam* and the *Pallas* have both been directed to call at Madeira, and remain there for four-and-twenty hours; and I have requested the Admiralty to order one of the cruisers stationed off the Western Islands to make a run to Madeira occasionally. This is better than having a frigate constantly there, as our people are apt to take a part, and to get themselves and us into difficulty. Murdoch assures me that the Madeira merchants will be quite as well pleased with this arrangement, and even prefer it.

I will write to Stuart about Müffling's mission; but I see they have the same notion of it at Vienna as at Paris. Indeed, the more one reflects upon it, the less likely it appears that the King of Prussia should immediately have followed up the arrival of his regular minister at Constantinople by a special mission of this sort, for no other purpose than to repeat his opinion of the Emperor's intentions, which he must already have expressed fifty times. I think, therefore, that it must have been undertaken in concert with the Emperor. Bülow evidently knows no more than he has told us, but thinks this origin of the mission very probable. May he not be sent to watch the proceedings of our ambassadors, as well as to make declarations himself? Our arrivals to-day from Constantinople throw no additional light upon the decisions of the Porte; but the next arrival must enable us to conjecture with some certainty. Perhaps, in consequence of Polignac's request, it may be as well to delay any conference upon the subject of Greek blockades. They are not now likely to have any practical effect; and we can bring forward the principle, whenever it may be thought right for us to meet, upon the whole affair.

I am going to-night to Tunbridge Wells, but shall return to town on Monday morning. Madame de Lieven may show a little more of her game; and from all I hear there can be no doubt of her having counselled the proceedings of the Duke of Cumberland, and the visit of the Duchess. Leopold told me yesterday that the Duke of Cumberland's stay was the King's doing; that he knew the Duke's baggage was ready, and that his intention was to leave England immediately; but that he stayed at the King's request, and that the Duchess was also sent for by his desire. There was a paragraph yesterday in the 'Morning Journal,' stating this from authority; and this, therefore, is the received version of the affair.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

I have no sort of objection to appoint Sir Robert Farquhar's son to the

embassy at Vienna, but you must settle it with Lord Cowley. He is full, and I think it hard to quarter too great a number of attachés upon him. The truth is, there are too many for the chances of future employment in the profession. If you like I will write to Lord Cowley and mention your wish; or, if you prefer it, you can send him a line yourself.

The Right Hon. Sir G. Murray to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Downing Street, 23rd July, 1829.

I should be very glad if you would have the kindness to look over the accompanying papers respecting the Falkland Islands, and consider of the propriety of some step being taken towards the formation of an establishment there. It appears to me that the interval between the cessation of the power of Old Spain and the consolidation of that of the new governments in South America would be the best time for our resuming our former possession of the Falkland Islands.

I have not spoken with Lord Melville on the subject; but I believe he is very sensible of the importance, in a naval point of view, of the occupation of those islands.

Faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

To the Right Hon. Maurice Fitzgerald.

[1382.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Walmer Castle, 23rd July, 1829.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter.

Matters appear to be drawing to a crisis in Ireland; but I hope it may yet be avoided. I understand that the gentlemen in the north, as well as elsewhere, are sound, and well disposed to preserve the peace; and the measure of last session has produced this effect, that the better classes all over the country are sensible of the advantages of peace, and of the misfortunes and dangers of civil disturbance. I think this sense is so strong as to prevent any number of the better class from listening to those of whatever rank and station, instigated by the desire of mischief, who wish to goad the people to civil war.

On the other hand, I shall certainly suggest such measures as I may think necessary for the preservation of the public peace, with a full confidence that they will be supported by Parliament.

I have been a good deal accustomed to wars of all descriptions; and I confess that I have no apprehension of any army not doing its duty that is in an efficient state of discipline, be the nature of the war or the question at issue what it may. I

am very confident upon this point ; but if I were not so, I should not hesitate upon turning out the militia, notwithstanding the inconveniences and evils which must attend that measure.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1383.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Walmer Castle, 24th July, 1829.

Your note to Mr. Mathews will answer the purpose perfectly. The British merchants, and their agents and factors in the Portuguese and Brazilian territories, are as unreasonable, and even more so than Miguel and Pedro and their ministers and officers.

It is impossible to form an opinion of the motives of the Duke of Cumberland ; nor can I understand the King's having advised him to bring over the Duchess and his son, excepting it be to lay the ground for the grant of the allowance for his son. I conclude that this was done as soon as the King heard that the Duke of Cambridge did not intend to resign his government of Hanover.

I intended to write to the Lord Chancellor upon this subject, and I will now lose no time in doing so. We must be prepared upon it.

I am astonished that Madame de Lieven should think it worth her while to make use of such an instrument as the Duke of Cumberland. I suppose it is to keep her hand in ! She must feel the most unbounded confidence either in our blindness in respect to her proceedings or in our forbearance !

It is a matter of indifference to me to what court Sir Robert Farquhar's son is appointed. I mentioned Vienna, because he mentioned that court to me ; and I know that he is a friend of Lord Cowley's. I am very unfortunate in having a very numerous acquaintance of gentlemen in Parliament who have served in their different lines ; and whom I cannot convince that, although the Minister of the country, I can do nothing to forward their views or those of their friends and relations. However, the records of my secretary's office will show that every form of refusal has been made use of without mercy.

I am astonished to see that the Austrian government are not

satisfied with the tone of our denial of all knowledge of any of their supposed plans in Italy. Prince de Polignac spoke to me privately upon the subject of these plans; and I told him that I had no knowledge of such, and did not believe that they were in contemplation. I believe you told him the same. I don't know what we could say more.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Lord Chancellor.

[1384.]

MY DEAR LORD CHANCELLOR, Walmer Castle, 24th July, 1829.

You will have seen in the newspapers a report that the Duchess of Cumberland was coming to England with her son Prince George. The object of this visit is, of course, to obtain the grant to the Duke of Cumberland of the allowance for his education. It is very desirable that you should look at the Act of Parliament of 6 Geo. IV. cap. 61, in order to be prepared with the Letters Patent, and the clause respecting the King's license of absence for Prince George. I send for the parliamentary debates of that session, as I believe that Lord Goderich said something in the House to which we must attend.

Have you done anything yet respecting the enquiry into the Ecclesiastical Courts? Before you send it down either you or I must write to the King and explain the nature and objects of the enquiry, and that it is entered upon in concert with the Archbishop, &c. &c. The King will then send for the Archbishop, to enquire. If we don't explain beforehand, he will decline to sign the Commission; and the explanation and enquiry from the Archbishop will then be awkward.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

[1385.]

MY DEAR PEEL, Walmer Castle, 24th July, 1829.

I return Lord Lowther's letter, and I quite agree with you and him in thinking that the Lord Mayor has a claim to be created a baronet.

The question is, whether such creation can be made without taking other claims into consideration; in some instances as strong as the Lord Mayor's in reality, in all as strong in the opinion of the claimants themselves.

I have urged the King to abstain from creating peers and baronets, and have with difficulty prevented him from creating any. You are aware of his desire to create one, Mr. Nash; and I don't think it is desirable to involve myself in a discussion with his Majesty at the present moment in order to create the Lord Mayor a baronet, however desirable it may be to gratify that gentleman.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1386.]

To the Right Hon. Henry Goulburn.

MY DEAR GOULBURN,

Walmer Castle, 24th July, 1829.

A wide communication with Gracechurch Street may be very important for the City, but it is not important for the bridge.

I confess likewise that I don't think Eastcheap will be more crowded than it has been up to this moment. It is now the great communication with London Bridge from St. Paul's. It will continue to be so as far as the entrance of the new Bridge Street.

The communication from Gracechurch Street to the bridge will be either by the east end of Eastcheap or down Fish Street Hill, and by the new street running west from the Monument.

In neither case will there be any extraordinary pressure upon Eastcheap. Besides we shall eventually have another opening by Miles Lane.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1387.]

To Mr. Lloyd.

SIR,

Walmer Castle, 24th July, 1829.

I received your letter of the 19th instant only this morning, and I lose no time in intimating to the Directors of the Bank the expediency of caution in sending silver coin into the country.

It has been certainly stated to the government that there existed a deficiency of circulating medium in the country, and

particularly of silver coin. Indeed I have myself felt inconvenience in travelling from the want of silver coin; and I have in my possession a Report from Birmingham stating that manufacturers were under the necessity of paying their workmen in goods from the want of specie. I rather believe that the first of these inconveniences is to be attributed to the disinclination of every man to load his pockets with silver coin, and the last to the fact that the manufacturers in question had manufactured a greater quantity of these particular descriptions of goods than the public required.

The circumstances however which you mention, which clearly demonstrate that there is more silver coin in circulation in the part of the country to which you refer than is necessary, likewise show that, notwithstanding that the law has prohibited the issue of one pound notes, there is no want of circulating medium. If such want existed silver coin would not be useless and inconvenient to the degree that you describe it to be.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lieutenant-General Sir Willoughby Gordon to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

24th July, 1829.

Lord Hill requested me to go with him to look at this machine.

It is an invariable rule with me not to believe one word I hear from a projector, but to examine the principle of his invention and the evidence he adduces in its support.

Your Grace may therefore, perhaps, attach some weight to these remarks.

J. W. GORDON.

MEMORANDUM.

Horse-Guards, 23rd July, 1829.

The following observations occurred upon an inspection of the steam-carriage of Mr. Gurney, at Sir C. Dance's, near Watford, July 22nd, 1829:—

This carriage is not intended for the conveyance of passengers or baggage; but it is intended exclusively as a drag, by means of which a carriage with passengers is to be drawn along the road at a rate of from 8 to 10 miles an hour.

This steam-carriage has four wheels, and contains besides the engine a seat for two persons, the one being the engineer, the other the steersman.

The engine is upon the principle of high pressure, and the piston works horizontally under the bed of the carriage. The motion is given by means

* Quartermaster-General.

of a crank attached to the axle of the hind-wheels, and is so managed that the power may be communicated to one hind-wheel exclusively, or be extended equally to both, if required.

The mode of action is therefore thus far different from that which governs an ordinary carriage, as, instead of being drawn forwards by a power in front, this machine is pushed forwards from behind, by means of power impressed upon the axle of the hind-wheels.

The machine is steered by means of an horizontal wheel, fixed in front of the seat and communicating with the axle of the fore-wheels in such manner that the carriage may be directed with greater precision than can any carriage drawn by horses, under the direction of a coachman.

The machine can be stopped instantly.

The length of the machine is the same as that of a four-wheeled carriage without the pole, about 10 feet, so that when a carriage with passengers shall be affixed to it, the whole length of the two carriages, taken together, will not exceed the length of one four-wheeled carriage with one pair of horses.

The friction of this upon the road will be that of a carriage with eight wheels; but it is presumed that the number of wheels may be easily reduced to six.

This engine moved upon the turnpike-road, up a hill of more than ordinary steepness, and round several turnings, for at least half an hour, at the rate of from eight to ten miles an hour.

A barouche containing four people (of whom the writer of this article was one) was then attached to it, and was drawn along with great facility upon the same road, and round the same turnings, avoiding the steepness of the hill, at the same rate.

The engine being of high pressure, and therefore expending its steam, necessarily consumes a large quantity of water and of fuel, which renders a supply of water indispensable at every half-hour, and a supply of coke at every hour, so that depôts of each must be established at proportionate distances of 4 and 8 or 5 and 10 miles, according to the rate of speed to be determined upon.

The noise of the steam-carriage with the passenger carriage attached to it is not so great as the noise of a travelling carriage with two horses.

There is very little or no smoke from the burning of the coke.

The eight wheels of the two carriages cause less dust than would a carriage with four wheels and two horses.

The danger to be apprehended from an engine upon the principle of high pressure appears to be altogether obviated by the manner in which the boiler is made, not in one capacious cavity, but formed of a series of tubes, communicating with each other.

The expense at which this apparatus can be plied upon the road is stated not to amount to threepence per mile.*

* The distance between London and Southampton is about 80 miles, and the inside fare by coach is 1*l.* 12*s.* If it be true that the steam-carriage will work this distance with ease in 10 hours at the latest, the cost to the proprietors will be exactly 1*l.* Now if this machine can convey 20 passengers, and if each passenger should pay only 6*s.* or about one-fifth of the present sum, there would be a clear profit to the proprietors of 500 per cent.

It is evident that before this mode of conveyance can be brought into use for public convenience, depôts of water and coke must be established at fixed stations along the line of road which it is intended to travel, and that its use must be confined to that line, and to that exclusively.

It should seem that each fresh supply of water and coke need not occupy above two minutes of time.

One very serious difficulty will be opposed to the general use of this mode of conveyance, in the danger which will attend its unusual appearance and rapid movement along a public road, in frightening horses, both saddle and draught.

Upon the whole, the impression which this inspection has left upon my mind, and giving due weight to the many difficulties and accidents which must unavoidably attend the introduction and first trial of such a novel and extraordinary vehicle, it certainly appears to me that it will eventually, and at no distant period, force itself into very extensive use; and I do not see any other objections to it than such as may be overcome by time, practice, and ingenuity.

J. W. GORDON.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

[1388.]

MY DEAR PEEL,

Walmer Castle, 25th July, 1829.

I return Lord Francis Gower's and Mr. Gregory's letters of the 21st July.

I don't now see what occurred to induce the Lord-Lieutenant to issue his Proclamation of the 18th. But I conclude that there are some accounts of the affair near Enniskillen which I have not seen. As far as I can form an opinion from what appears in these papers, the Roman Catholics have in every instance been the aggressors.

However the Proclamation cannot now be recalled or altered.

It would be very desirable, however, that the Irish government should take some steps to manifest their determination to put down the Roman Catholic as well as the Protestant party. Could not a large reward be offered by proclamation for the discovery and conviction of those concerned in the affair mentioned by Major D'Arcy in his Report of the 16th?

I entertain a much more unfavourable opinion of the state of affairs in Ireland since I have read these papers. We shall not get the better of the mischief without stronger measures than any yet adopted.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1389.]

To Lieutenant-General Sir Willoughby Gordon.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Walmer Castle, 25th July, 1829.

I am very much obliged to you for your memorandum upon the steam carriage. It is impossible to say that such a machine will not answer the purpose. But there is a very nice calculation to be attended to in the use of these drag carriages. That is the weight with which each of them must be loaded, in proportion to the weight which it can draw. I understand that upon a good railroad the drag carriage must be loaded with twenty times the weight it can draw. The reason is very simple. If it is not loaded with weight the wheels would turn round without advancing upon the road. The weight upon the drag carriage is necessary in order to give the wheels force to move the weight behind. Twenty times the weight drawn is the proportion calculated upon a good railroad.

Only conceive the wear and tear of such weight upon the road.

The weight required on a macadamised road would be less in proportion to the weight drawn than upon a railroad. It would still however be very considerable ; and would greatly wear the roads.

They doubt much the advantage of the use of these drag carriages in the collieries in the north of England.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1390.]

To the Right Hon. Sir George Murray.

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Walmer Castle, 25th July, 1829.

I have perused the enclosed papers respecting the Falkland Islands. It is not clear to me that we have ever possessed the sovereignty of all these islands. The Convention certainly goes no further than to restore to us Port Gumont, which we abandoned nearly sixty years ago.

If our right to the Falkland Islands had been undisputed at that time, and indisputable, I confess that I should doubt the expediency of now taking possession of them. We have possession of nearly every valuable post and colony in the world, and I confess that I am anxious to avoid exciting the attention and jealousy of other Powers by extending our

possessions and setting the example of the gratification of a desire to seize upon new territories. But in this case, in which our right to possess more than Port Gumont is disputed, and at least doubtful, it is very desirable to avoid such acts.

I am at the same time very sensible of the inconvenience which may be felt by this country, and of the injury which will be done to us if either the French or Americans should settle upon these Islands, the former in virtue of any claim from former occupancy, the latter, or both, from any claim derived by purchase or cession from the government of Buenos Ayres.

That which I would recommend is that the government of Buenos Ayres should be very quietly, but very distinctly, informed that his Majesty has claims upon the Falkland Islands, and that his Majesty will not allow of any settlement upon, or any cession to individuals or foreign nations of these Islands by Buenos Ayres, which shall be inconsistent with the King's acknowledged right of sovereignty.

I think that this is all that can be done at present. It will have the effect of impeding any settlement or cession by Buenos Ayres, and as we may suppose that the French and Americans will hear of this communication they will not be disposed to act in contravention to it unless determined upon a quarrel with this country.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Sir George Murray.

[1391.]

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Walmer Castle, 26th July, 1829.

I return Lord Bathurst's letter, &c., which you had better show to Peel. I should think that it would not be necessary for Lord Bathurst to come up. But I don't know exactly what Peel's view is of the question which we are to consider; and you had better speak to him.

I have here the Acts of the 14th and 31st Geo. III. By the 14th Geo. III. chap. 83, Parliament gave a legislative power to a Council in Canada. By the Act of 31 Geo. III. chap. 31, Parliament divided the province into two, and appointed a legislature for each, empowered to make laws for the peace, welfare, and good government thereof, such laws not being

repugnant to that Act. I should have doubted the power of the Crown to order a system of representation in Canada under the Law of 1774. I should think it impossible under the Act of 1791, after the period of the limitation adverted to in the 14th clause, that is the 31st December, 1792, for the Crown to alter the division into counties as settled under the 14th clause unless by Act of the legislature of Canada. If this doctrine be correct it follows that the only powers which can alter the system established in Lower Canada under the Act of 1791, are the Parliament of Great Britain or the legislature of Lower Canada.

I agree with Lord Bathurst in thinking it advisable not to go to Parliament. We can resort then only to the legislature of Lower Canada.

It is quite obvious that no act of the Canadian legislature is legal which is repugnant to the Act of 1791. The legislature of Canada cannot alter the qualifications of electors as fixed by the 20th clause. To increase the qualifications, or to exempt those claiming to vote from the qualification thereby required, would be repugnant to the Act of 1791. But it is not repugnant to the Act to alter the counties, districts, and townships, which are to return members; and to alter or increase the number of members to be returned by each according either to the total population of each or according to the number of qualified voters which it might contain. The Act of 1791 leaves these matters to the legislature of Canada after the period limited.

From this statement you will see that I concur with Lord Bathurst in thinking that the Royal Assent ought to be given to this bill. But as I will attend the Cabinet which is to meet upon it, I do not wish to be understood as having formed a conclusive opinion. I should like to hear what others think.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1392.]

To the Lord Chancellor.

MY DEAR LORD CHANCELLOR, Walmer Castle, 26th July, 1829.

Since I wrote to you last I have looked at the Debates in the House of Commons on the Duke of Cumberland's Bill.

You will see that it is over and over again declared that the education of the young Prince must be in England.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Attorney-General.**

[1393.]

MY DEAR SIR,

Walmer Castle, 27th July, 1829.

I am very much obliged to you for your note which I have received, and I will proceed accordingly.

I believe that the political party to which you refer is very small indeed if it exists at all as yet. But there is a personage in England who has little to fear, and nothing to lose, who possesses the means of mischief, who is very hostile to the government; very bitter and very active, and who misleads the editors of these newspapers by the communication, as from authority, of falsehoods and calumnies. The extent of the mischief done in this way is inconceivable; and it is really necessary to incur some risk and inconvenience in order to deprive this personage of the instruments which he applies to such bad purposes.

I always thought that we ought to have adopted this measure at an earlier period; but it is essential to adopt it now.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Sir George Murray.

[1394.]

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Walmer Castle, 27th July, 1829.

I judge from what I see in the newspapers that Colville† has been a little indiscreet in respect to the conduct of the protectors of slaves in the Mauritius. There is a large European population in that island, as well as in the Island of Bourbon which is contiguous to it. Our garrison in Mauritius is only three battalions and some artillery; and it is very desirable to avoid pushing measures of this description to extremities at once, and particularly the allowing abuses, by inferior autho-

* Sir James Scarlett.

† General the Hon. Sir Charles Colville, G.C.B., G.C.H., then Governor of the Island of Mauritius, and afterwards Lord Colville of Culross.

rities, of the Orders in Council, in a colony situated as the Island of Mauritius is, and so weakly garrisoned.

Any resistance to our authority, if successful, might lead to the most important political results. If not successful it must be owing to our making use of the assistance of the negroes; which would be a misfortune greater even than would be the consequence of the successful resistance to our government of the colonists of the Island of Mauritius aided by those of the Island of Bourbon.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 27th July, 1829.

I have already written to Lord Francis on the subject of Major d'Arcy's letter; earnestly calling his attention, and that of the Lord-Lieutenant, to the scandalous and unprovoked outrage which it details; and strongly urging the policy of proving, by a severe example, that the Roman Catholic party is not to undertake the task of suppressing Orange processions.

I agree with you that we must take some decided steps for the settlement of Ireland; but I doubt whether we can take any effectually that have not the consent of Parliament. We may, no doubt, repress any actual violence by military force; but I think some severe discipline must be permanently administered, and discipline for which Ireland ought to pay.

I doubt the policy of taking so large a proportion of the expense of the police upon the public funds. The police is very unpopular, chiefly for two reasons: because it is expensive, and because it does its duty. But for every purpose, excepting the resistance to physical force or the actual dispersion of organised assemblages, the police is much more efficient, I conceive, than the military. Whatever laws of coercion we may pass, we must, I conceive, trust for their effectual execution for many years to come to an armed stipendiary police, acting, in most cases, under stipendiary magistrates.

If the people overpower this police by their superior numbers, I see no alternative but making that police strong enough by establishing stations, where necessary, in lawless parts of the country, by which regular communications may be kept up and from which support may be derived.

Why should England pay the charge of civilizing Ireland, either by direct pecuniary advances, or indirectly by maintaining a great military force? My impression still is, that we may dispense with a great military force in Ireland for the purpose of defending her against military aggression; that the foreign Powers which might have taken part with the whole Roman Catholic population, discontented on account of exclusion and disabilities, will not take part with a set of lawless ruffians who set all control at defiance.

That they must be repressed there can be no doubt; and let Ireland, as is but just, pay the penalty: pay the charge of suppressing her own disorders, and have, therefore, an inducement to keep the peace.

It appears to me that we ought to consider the policy of greatly extending the police system, and levying the expense of it on the land of Ireland.

Ever most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

The Duke of Northumberland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Phoenix Park, 27th July, 1829.

I am happy to inform your Grace that the excitement in Ulster is gradually subsiding, and that we have no longer reports of outrages in that province.

The Proclamation has been well received by the public: better, indeed, than could have been expected, considering that it denounces the violence of either party. The common objection to it is, the tardiness of its appearance, "which" (say the objectors) "should have been before, and not after, the 12th of July." Circumstances, however, have not altered my opinion that it would have been unwise and unfair to have prejudged the Orangemen of the north—many of whom are well-disposed persons, and who would not, I verily believe, have taken the part they did, had it not been for the officious or wicked interference of persons in and out of Ireland, who should have known better. Moreover, the illegality of a mere procession, unattended with circumstances calculated to create a reasonable alarm, might have been very questionable. Whereas now and henceforward our course is plain. Public notifications have been given that these processions will be renewed on the 1st and 12th of August; and, with the experience of the last fortnight, no man can hesitate to say that they must inspire terror amongst all classes of the King's subjects, and that they call for an immediate, and, if necessary, a forcible suppression. For this we are fully prepared; but I believe the display of our abundant means, civil and military, will ensure the public peace without the painful expedient of an armed intervention.

In Tipperary, too, things have assumed a better aspect; but there is a lawless, unquiet temper in that county which requires a constant attention and control. To account for this I can hear of no peculiar cause of excitement, no scarcity of employment, no distress of circumstances; but simply a wanton hostility to the law and a fearful recklessness of life, whether it be another's or their own. Indeed, the peasantry of Tipperary are represented to me as the finest in all Ireland; as having better clothes, better habitations, more of the conveniences of society, than those of the same class in the other counties; but they have a fierce and vindictive temper, and a barbarous union for mischief and revenge which it seems impossible to account for.

The only remedy for this is an unceasing endeavour to bring all offenders, great and small, to justice by diligence, by reward, and, above all, by the full indemnification of witnesses who give evidence against delinquents at the imminent hazard of their lives.

In Leitrim I have called for an increase of the police. In Roscommon I have given directions for placing a stipendiary magistrate; and in Clare, without reference to the pending election, the revenue department has been required to suppress with a strong arm all illicit distillation, not merely on professional grounds, but especially that the people in the wildest districts may be made to feel that there is a law which can and will overtake them. Mr. O'Connell went yesterday from Dublin towards Clare: and, so far as I have yet heard, commenced his journey without any circumstances of offence. How he may demean himself when further removed from the capital, I know not; but if he should exceed the *fair and ordinary pageant of an electioneering candidate* (which I hope he will not), we shall show the northern Orangemen that our prohibitions are not partially directed.

I have the honour to be, my dear Duke, with great truth and regard,

Yours very sincerely,

NORTHUMBERLAND.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 28th July, 1829.

I have extended that part of the despatch to Lord Ponsonby* which you thought obscure; and which, from endeavouring to be concise, really was so. It is very important to make this statement clearly intelligible; for it will form the strong part of our case. I take it that we are thus situated: Portugal is satisfied, or at least quiet, under Don Miguel; and we cannot, therefore, look for any alteration from within. All change in the present situation of the government must be produced by foreign means, and these can only be forcible or conciliatory. Don Pedro has declared that he will never compromise with the usurpation, and he has at the same time announced his intention not to go to war. What, then, does he propose, and how are the interests of his daughter to be advanced? How long are we to acquiesce in a state of things which, as long as it lasts, cannot possibly lead to any settlement?

Some time ago I expressed a wish to Esterhazy that Metternich would try his hand at a *projet* of arrangement, and it appears that he construed this as a request to do so. He has accordingly given me a sort of plan, which I will send you; but which, in truth, gets rid of none of our difficulties, and only repeats our own propositions made long ago.

I enclose a despatch upon the subject of Müffling's mission, which may produce some explanation from Stuart.

I returned yesterday from Tunbridge. It strikes me that Lieven and Madame de Lieven both look to the arrival of the Russians at Constantinople as a probable event. They talked of the necessity of confidence; and when I asked if they expected us to confide while Constantinople was burning, they both said that it was precisely the time when it was most required and would do most good. There is a good deal of uneasiness about the chance of Polignac's appointment to the ministry.

With respect to domestic matters, I am inclined to think that we give

* Then British Minister to the Brazilian Court.

the Princess credit for more activity than she deserves. That she would do us all the mischief in her power, is most certain; but the knowledge of this makes us apt to fancy her at the bottom of every intrigue. In this respect she is like our friend Metternich in the eyes of some of the continental governments. Madame de Lieven denied so strenuously all share in the Duke of Cumberland's plans, and so strongly professed her entire ignorance of what he proposed to do; she so naturally and earnestly described the annoyance of listening to his often-repeated grievances and his unmeaning declarations of hostility; that I am disposed to believe that she does not act at all in concert with him, although she might not be sorry to take advantage of his success. She truly observed, however, that if his success were possible, it would be fatal to anything like a favourable feeling towards Russia in this country. There is a Cumberland administration in the paper to-day, which is a curious exhibition of what that party can produce; and Madame de Lieven is much too clever not to know the worth of such persons. Her wishes are all in another direction.

It is now reported that there is some doubt about the arrival of the Duchess of Cumberland; but I have not had an opportunity of ascertaining what is the truth.

I have made some change in the diplomatic arrangements lately submitted to the King. You appeared to think that Frankfort was a place where we ought to have a good man; and as Chad was willing to descend to the inferior mission, in order to remain in Europe, I accepted his offer. Turner, who is Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople, and whom the Duke of Rutland has strongly supported, will go to Columbia; and Seymour to Constantinople. All this will be more regular, as it would scarcely have been right to give Seymour two steps at once. The King expressed his highest approbation in a remarkably civil note.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

I enclose a private letter from Lord Ponsonby. No despatches are come.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

[1395.]

MY DEAR PEEL,

Walmer Castle, 28th July, 1829.

I think the enclosed is as foolish a production as ever I read; and it certainly aggravates the mischief done by the Proclamation. It points more directly at the Orangemen as its object, and moreover directs the magistrates to be lenient towards those who, whatever the Orangemen may do, are the immediate cause of, and the principal actors in, the mischief.

You and I are travelling upon the same road; but I think that I have gone a little farther than you have; probably too fast. I quite agree with you in thinking that we ought to render the police in Ireland as efficient as possible, and this at

the expense of Ireland. We cannot effect this measure excepting with the consent of Parliament. But I look to the necessity of earlier, nay, of immediate measures. I think it most probable that in August there will be Orange meetings and processions; and that whether there are or not, there will be Ribbon meetings in the north, in expectation of the Orange meetings and processions, and to oppose them; and that, at all events, the state of ferment which exists in Limerick, Clare, Tipperary, and parts of Waterford and Cork, will continue throughout the autumn and winter.

Are we to sit by and see this system continue? My opinion is that, if this state of things continues, we ought to issue a Proclamation to forbid all meetings of more than twelve persons, under pain of trial by court-martial. All removal from home by night by individuals under the same pain. We might extend this system over the whole country, or confine it to particular counties or places, as might be thought proper. But I would recommend that the measure should be made effectual, and should manifest our determination to keep the country quiet. If we should be under the necessity of adopting these or similar measures, we must of course call Parliament at the earliest moment that may be possible afterwards. I am aware that we shall require force to carry such a system into execution. But I have in contemplation a measure for calling out the northern yeomanry, which will enable us to ensure their discipline and obedience to order, and will render them harmless.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I hear that a mob in Clare has interrupted the proceedings of Mr. Major, the assistant-barrister; that he has in consequence been under the necessity of discontinuing them, and has quitted the country.

[1396.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Walmer Castle, 29th July, 1829.

Esterhazy, who is here, showed me the paper from Metternich to which you refer. It is the plan of a *faiseur*. It does not meet or provide for any one of the difficulties of the case. In truth, we shall not get the better of them till we shall be

driven to extremities by Spain, unless the two brothers shall previously have the sense to discover that their disputes, however injurious to each other, do no mischief to anybody else. We may be driven by the alarms of Spain, whether well founded, or suggested by others in order to involve us in difficulties, to be under the necessity of deciding to take part in these disputes, or to withdraw entirely from all concern in Portuguese affairs, before these wise men discover the truth above referred to.

There is some trickery in "Müffling's" mission. I think that Seymour's account does not exactly agree with Bülow's, and certainly not with Trautmannsdorff's. I believe the truth to be that Müffling is an agent of the Emperor of Russia, but sent by the King of Prussia in order to save appearances. This fact is, I believe, known to the French government. Then he is to propose the cession of Anapa and Poti. This will be kept from us specially. It is believed that we object to any Russian aggrandisement in Asia, and particularly to the cession of these places; and that is true.

But the cession of these places, however important in itself, and however increased in importance by the manner adopted of obtaining it, is a trifle in comparison with the risk attending the continuance of the Turkish war. We ought not, we cannot advise the Turks not to cede Anapa and Poti without promising and giving them assistance; and Anapa and Poti are not sufficiently well known, nor, indeed, are they so important to our interests, as to induce us to incur the risk of involving ourselves and all Europe in war, in order to prevent these places from falling into the hands of the Russians. But the Emperor of Russia ought to be told a little of our mind upon this subject when the Turks shall be out of the scrape.

There is one thing which delights me in all this, and that is the proof afforded every day of that which I told Mr. Canning in April, 1826, viz., that the Emperor did not care one pin about the Greeks, and that all that he cared about was his affairs with the Turks, and these very points Anapa and Poti.

In respect to Madame de Lieven, she and M. de Lieven have knocked at every door, viz., the King, Lady Conyngham, both repeatedly, and every description of faction and party, in order to break down the existing administration. To attain this object all is fish that comes to her net. She wants to attain this

object not from any personal dislike to me or any of its members, not because we entertain any notions hostile to the Russian government, but because we are an *English* administration, and because she knows that we have the discernment to see what they are about, and the will to oppose them if necessary, and the firmness to execute our purpose. The fall of this administration, if only for a day, would give them time to do much which they cannot do at present; and she would drown us for that day if she had the power. I know that she has been concerned with the Duke of Cumberland, as well as with everybody else. Not that she wishes what he wishes, but because he afforded a chance to pull us down. The person to whom she looks is Lord Grey! Why? Because Lord Grey entertains some old opposition opinions of Mr. Fox's that the Turks ought to be driven out of Europe.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1397.]

To the Right Hon. Sir George Murray.

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Walmer Castle, 29th July, 1829.

There is one consideration arising out of the bill of the Canadian Legislature which it appeared to me that the Cabinet might as well look at, and that is the method proposed of fixing the number of members from each district. According to the Canada Act the King delineated the districts, and the number of members to be returned from each. This bill might have done both, and those proposing it must of course have referred to population as one of the bases on which they should found the number of members for each county or district.

But here is a legislative Act referring to population, as the basis on which the representation of Lower Canada is to be founded, limited, it is true, to two members for each district, providing that the numbers for each county or district are not to be increased in consequence of any increase of the population in such particular district.

You will not get a better bill from Canada; and I do not think that you ought to withhold the Royal Assent from this bill. But it is right that you in the House of Commons at least should have your eyes open to the fact that it is founded upon

one of the principles on which the Reformers urge you to agree to give representatives to Birmingham, Manchester, &c.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Sir George Murray.

[1398.]

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Walmer Castle, 29th July, 1829.

As far as I can judge of Colville, I should say that, unless he has been excited upon the particular subject of slaves by your predecessor in office, he is not likely to act imprudently upon it. There is certainly no part of the world in which the exercise of prudence and discretion is so necessary as it is in the Mauritius, and most particularly upon the subject of slaves. Indeed, I am astonished that we should have been so indiscreet as to put our slave colonies in the West Indies and the Mauritius upon the same footing, without considering the difference of the circumstances of the one from the other, and the danger resulting from any dissatisfaction of the white population at the Mauritius. However, this is done. What we must now take care of is the execution of the measures adopted.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lieutenant-General Sir Willoughby Gordon to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

29th July, 1829.

The subject of your Grace's remarks was not unknown to me, and it was attended to in my examination. The *actual amount* of weight can only be *accurately* determined by experiment; and it is the experiments of this description that cost so much money to projectors at first starting.

The enclosed is the first operation, which will both interest and amuse your Grace.

I shall duly report progress.

Twenty-six miles in four hours and ten minutes, *including the encounter with his Majesty's mail*, is pretty well to begin with.

J. W. GORDON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Mr. C. W. Dance to

DEAR SIR,

Reading, 28th July, half past 8 o'clock A.M.

We left Cranford Bridge at ten minutes after four o'clock this morning. A light barouche, containing four persons, attached to the steamer. We went on

rapidly, and without the slightest accident or difficulty, till we arrived at Longford, where they are rebuilding the bridge over the Coln, about one mile and a half the London side of Colnbrook. On the bridge is piled a large stack of bricks, so high as to impede the view, from the nature of the road, which winds up to the top of the bridge. Just as we arrived at this point, a broad-wheeled waggon was approaching the bridge in the same direction as ourselves. In advance of the steamer was our advanced phaeton, and behind the steamer a carriage containing our coke and some of the engineers. At the moment our leading carriage had passed the waggon, the steamer following close, the mail from Bath appeared on the top of the bridge, coming on rapidly. We called out to the coachman to pull up; but he, not being aware of the unusual carriage he was about to meet, kept on, till we all became entangled and *nearly* jammed together. The leaders of the mail, being high-couraged, and their heads close to the steamer, bolted round and broke the mail-traces. Mr. Gurney, anxious to avoid mischief, forced the steamer up against the stack of bricks, by which he did some slight injury to the steamer, but of no consequence beyond the delay of a *quarter* of an hour. The mail put on a new bar and traces, and we both proceeded on our respective journeys. We have had no other accident whatever but a fracture of the iron of one of the wheels, and are going forward immediately.

We came from Cranford Bridge to this place in four hours and ten minutes including all stoppages for water, coke, turnpikes, &c., which, of course, in our first attempt, cannot be expected to be managed with the celerity we may calculate on hereafter. We met and passed on the road between Cranford Bridge and this place, 21 carts, 7 waggons, 2 post-chaises, 4 mail-coaches, 7 stage ditto, 1 dray with two horses, drove of cart-horses, 3 gigs, 6 horses: of which I can assure you not one started or was by any means disturbed by the steamer, except the *mail* horses *on the bridge* at Longford.

If it should be said in London that we endangered the mail, I beg to assure you that I have strictly represented the facts; and I am convinced that a carriage with horses in such circumstances might have occasioned an equal, if not much more serious, mischief. I have written this hasty account, fearing we may not be in Bath in time for my giving you a more extended account of our proceedings by this night's post, and to prevent your being deceived by any unfair representations that may be made in London by the mail coachman or passengers who met us on the bridge.

The regular, easy pace seems about ten miles an hour whilst moving; and everything goes on so satisfactorily that we all feel the fullest confidence of complete success.

I remain, dear Sir, your faithful and obedient servant,

C. W. DANCE.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 29th July, 1829.

The day on which resistance to the Proclamation is most to be apprehended is the 12th August. It is at hand; and I doubt whether we ought not to have some conversation in Cabinet, on this point and on the state of Ireland generally, *without delay*.

I enclose three letters from Lord Francis, and the copies of two which I have written to him. The Irish government must bear in mind that any extraordinary authority not sanctioned by law, given to military authorities,

or assumed by the civil, would necessitate the immediate assembling of Parliament. I am not stating this as an objection to the most decisive measures, but only as an immediate consequence of them for which we must be prepared.

Ever most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

P.S.—Since I wrote the above I have got your letter of the 28th July from Walmer. The story of the assistant barrister being driven out of the Court by a tumultuous mob is, I apprehend, quite unfounded. There was an obstruction offered to the witnesses in some ejectment cases, in the streets, and one of the rioters was apprehended and instantly sentenced by the Court then sitting to a year's imprisonment. Depend upon it that the same system of wilful falsehood and fabrication of false rumours is at work in Ireland as well as here. To be sure, there is not much need for fabricating accounts of disturbance and outrage in Ireland.

There was a story confidently told of Lord Dunalley's house having been attacked. It was totally unfounded. When do you think of being in town? We ought to have a Cabinet on Irish affairs at a very early period.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 29th July, 1829.

I enclose a few lines which I have written to Dawkins in consequence of an appearance of some inactivity on the part of Malcolm. I find, from the Admiralty, that they have no knowledge of any measures being taken for the protection of commerce; but, on the contrary, it is to be presumed that the whole squadron was absent from those stations where certainly a part of it would be most useful.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Earl of Aberdeen to Mr. Dawkins.

MY DEAR SIR,

Foreign Office, 29th July, 1829.

I cannot hear what Sir Pulteney Malcolm is doing, or what he has done in consequence of our declaration that the Greek blockades shall not be respected. From the German papers I see that a French and Austrian ship of war are stationed off Candia to protect the commerce of these nations with the island; and at the same time it is mentioned that an English ship was chased by a Greek privateer, and narrowly escaped being captured. I hope that measures have been taken to give full security to our commerce, both with Candia and with every part of Greece north of the Isthmus. I wish you would communicate with the Admiral upon this subject, and strongly impress upon him the anxiety of the government that this protection should be effectual.

The refusal of Capo d'Istria to comply with the requisition of the three Powers to withdraw his troops and declare an armistice, as well as his perseverance in the blockade which he has established, will make it necessary for

the Conference to consider what steps it may be proper to take. I am unable to furnish you with instructions at present, but as soon as any decision shall be adopted you may expect to be informed.

Believe, &c.,

ABERDEEN.

[1399.]

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR PEEL,

Walmer Castle, 30th July, 1829.

If you will be so kind as to appoint a Cabinet for Sunday, at four o'clock, I shall be in town.

I enclose a letter from the Duke of Northumberland which promises very fairly. But we must be prepared for strong measures. Lord Francis appears to me to labour under two palpable errors. The first, that the mischief in Ireland originates with the Orangemen. And he directs all his artillery of proclamations, measures under the Association Act, &c., against that class. He is now going to observe the Orangemen of Derry, in order to carry into execution the Association Act. This is very right if the people of Derry are guilty of any acts in contravention of the Association Act. But he would probably have prevented much, if not all, of the mischief by the Orangemen, and likewise the Proclamation, if he had put into execution the Association Act against the demagogues who assembled in Dublin so frequently notwithstanding its enactment. Secondly. Lord Francis appears to imagine that a meeting of Orangemen will be hereafter illegal, because the Lord-Lieutenant has in his Proclamation declared it to be so. That is certainly not the case.

A meeting of Orangemen may be illegal because its numbers inspire terror, or because its acts may be illegal. It is because a meeting of Orangemen is or may be illegal that the Lord-Lieutenant may be justified in having pointed his Proclamation against such meetings. But the Lord-Lieutenant's Proclamation cannot make a meeting of Orangemen illegal, as Lord Francis will find if he endeavours to disperse one by force, which does not consist of such numbers as in itself to occasion terror, or which does not commit any illegal act.

I think that is the worst of the Proclamation. We must adopt further measures to support it, which will be illegal; and it brings us into collision in support of illegal acts with the best and only loyal part of the population of Ireland.

However, support it we must. But we must support it with real fairness to both parties. This can be done only by preventing meetings of all kinds; and you will have seen that I concur with you in thinking that whatever is done in this way must be attended by our calling Parliament.

Ever, my dear Peel, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 30th July, 1829.

The expedition from the Havannah against Mexico appears certain, and has taken place, in all probability, before this time. It is extraordinary that the Spaniards, who have shown so much prudence and caution, should at last make such an attempt with five or six thousand men. It would appear that they must have some reason to expect assistance in the territory which they invade; yet every account, without exception, which I have received from those who know the country agrees in stating that, however they may differ among themselves, all parties will unite to oppose a Spanish invasion. I have had a deputation with me this morning from the British merchants interested in Mexico, who, as usual, are very much alarmed and very unreasonable. I promised that we would give them all the protection which the law of nations permitted us to afford in the case of a country which was the theatre of war. There is another question, to which I declined to give any answer, but which fairly deserves consideration. We have for some time prevented any attack being made upon Cuba by the Mexican or Columbian government. This was reasonable so long as no active hostilities existed; but, if the Spaniards undertake military operations against Mexico, ought we not to remove our interdict against any attack upon Cuba? I merely told the deputation that we would consider this question, but gave no intimation of what was likely to be our decision. They will press me again upon this, so that you can consider the matter.

We may make any use of Spain we please in the settlement of the Portuguese affair; and I think they will propose to Miguel whatever we think right. There is no danger whatever, so long as the present government in Portugal maintains itself, that Spain should be impatient or give us any uneasiness. The triumph of the Queen or of the Constitution might produce a different effect. Their confidence in this country, or rather in you, is unbounded. Zea has a letter for you from the King, which he assured me was written without advice from any one, and entirely from his own desire to tell you how completely he trusts to your government.

I return to Tunbridge to-night, and shall be in town again on Monday morning. I have no doubt your view of the policy of the Lievens is perfectly correct. Indeed, when she disclaimed all participation in the Duke of Cumberland's projects, I told her that to paralyse the government, if only for a fortnight, was with her a sufficient motive to account for the most strange alliance.

I am very glad to see what you say about Anapa and Poti. They may be important ; but we could never be justified in allowing the Turks, if we could help it, to continue the war for these objects. How many people know of the existence of these places ? and of those who do, how many know their situation and importance ?

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

I have requested the Admiralty to direct that a ship of war should be stationed at Vera Cruz, in case of any real necessity for the protection of persons and property in Mexico.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 30th July, 1829.

Mr. McDonnell (who married Lady Antrim) was with me this morning, and read a letter from a gentleman of the name of Davison, whom he described as a most trustworthy and respectable magistrate in the county of Antrim. The purport of it was, that in that part of Ireland, wherever there had been processions and affrays, the Orangemen had been the aggressors ; that the old Orange party had wished to prove that the Relief Bill would not produce tranquillity ; and that they, the Orangemen, were not put down.

He added, that in the whole barony of Glenarn, from Larne to Ballycastle, there had been no processions ; and that since the passing of the Relief Bill the Protestants and Roman Catholics had been living on the best footing.

He thinks the present ferment will very soon subside.

The above is the general purport of his letter.

Ever yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

P.S.—I enclose two letters, which Holmes has had from Sir James Stronge. I think it pretty evident that in some parts of Ireland great pains were taken to excite the lower classes of the Orangemen.

[1400.]

To Lieutenant-General Sir Willoughby Gordon.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Walmer Castle, 30th July, 1829.

This looks well. But it must be observed that four persons would not pay the expense of a steam-carriage to Bath. It must move forty or fifty, with their luggage, &c., or horses would work cheaper. When the steam-carriage will move that number, it must carry weight in proportion to the weight it will draw. It must be strong in proportion ; and then comes

the consideration of the wear and tear of carriage, machinery, and roads.

In short, the resistance to the motion of the steam-carriage must be increased in proportion to the weight it is to draw after it.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

[1401.]

MY DEAR PEEL,

Walmer Castle, 31st July, 1829.

I quite agree with your letter to Lord Francis Gower. The police in Ireland must have the countenance and protection of the troops till tranquillity will be established.

I don't think it necessary to delay this measure till the survey of Ireland shall be completed. The burthen will not be equally borne by all. But the Grand Juries will levy this additional expense as they will any other.

I think that Lord Francis has done quite right about the 9th Regiment.

I believe that it will be necessary to enquire into the affair at Manor Hamilton.

It appears to me that the good which a man in the situation of Captain Dobbyn or a body of police can do in a particular station, is deteriorated by the practice so common in Ireland of removing from their stations those who happen to conduct themselves well or successfully. The removal is well intended certainly; but it is, in fact, an encouragement to the disloyal and the disturbers of the public peace, and a discouragement, and frequently a disgrace, to those removed who have performed their duty. I must add that the chance of such removal and disgrace must prevent many men from performing their duty in scenes such as occur too frequently in Ireland. I would infinitely prefer to make them remain on the spot, and to incur the inconvenience of protecting them.

I likewise return the letters received from Holmes. I entertain no doubt that pains are taken to keep up this spirit of disturbance in Ireland.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1402.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Walmer Castle, 31st July, 1829.

I have repeatedly urged the Spanish government, by means of all its agents, not to think of making war upon Mexico, or any of its ancient dominions on the continent of South America ; to remain satisfied with Cuba and Porto Rico ; and to secure those colonies not only from foreign attack, but from the danger of internal insurrection, by the maintenance, in the former in particular, of a well-paid and well-disciplined force. I particularly pointed out the advantage, on the one hand, which the King derived from having in the island of Cuba the capitalists and their capitals by which the prosperity of Mexico had been occasioned and maintained ; that this advantage, and the local position of the island of Cuba, would give him great influence over Mexico and Columbia, and all the commercial advantages which he could enjoy under any circumstances ; and that, on the other hand, the result of any attack upon Mexico or Columbia was very doubtful. That failure was certain unless the attack was made in concert with a powerful party in the country. That even with the assistance of such party all the force then reported to be in Cuba would not be too much ; because I reminded those to whom I spoke that in war (in civil war in particular) those engaged in it had allies only in proportion as they were strong.

That the consequence of a failure would shake the monarchy of Spain to its centre. That it was obvious that the loss of Cuba was risked by the diminution, if not by the destruction, of the force now employed in its defence and protection ; but that the loss of reputation which would be the consequence of a failure, which was the most probable event, would alone be sufficient to occasion the loss to Spain of that valuable colony.

If you will read this to Monsieur Zea de Bermudez he will tell you that it is exactly what I said to him ; and before to Ofalia and the other minister who was with him. They acquiesced in all these opinions. If they have gone to Mexico they are mad ; and I conclude that they have been induced to take this step by the impatient importunities of Mexican emigrants in Cuba ; who probably defray the expense of the expedition. We must look to the consequences.

You are quite right to have sent a vessel to Vera Cruz. You

should likewise write to Madrid to recommend to the Spanish government our merchants who are residing in Mexico.

I am not aware of our having prevented the attack of the island of Cuba. Did we do this in concert with Spain? or make any communication to Spain upon the subject? If we did it may be necessary to say something to Spain upon the subject of this attack upon Mexico. Did we say anything to France or the United States regarding the attack of the governments of South America upon the island of Cuba?

But, whatever may be the result of these enquiries, I don't see what right our merchants have to question the Foreign Office respecting the intentions of the King's government in the event of one foreign government making an attack upon the dominions of another foreign government. This is the course which these gentry adopt. They protect a foreign government, that is to say, the insurgent governments in South America; and then they think they have a right to require the King's servants to inform them whether the King will allow their protégés to attack Spain in the island of Cuba.

The possession of the island of Cuba by Spain is a material object to us. We cannot allow Cuba to be revolutionised and a black or coloured dominion established there, as it would be if rendered independent of Spain, or it should pass to the dominion of Columbia or of Mexico; nor can we allow that colony to be taken possession of by the United States or by France. As long as Cuba belongs to Spain, and particularly if Spain should use that colony as she ought, for the purpose of maintaining an influence over her former dominions on the continent, England is the natural ally of Spain; and we shall always be upon friendly terms with that country. It is not probably necessary to declare that sentiment now; but, whatever may be the follies committed by Spain in this attack upon Mexico, the policy of this country requires that its measures should still be directed to prevent any hostile attack by other Powers on the island of Cuba.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Cowley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Vienna, 31st July, 1829.

I took down the enclosed from Prince Metternich's own words ; and of course he expects that no kind of use should be made of his disclosure to me. I think it right, however, that you should be apprised of the manner in which a conversation which you are reported to have had with Prince Lieven is represented by M. Pozzo to M. de Tatistcheff.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

COWLEY.

I will take another opportunity of writing to you about Henry.

[ENCLOSURE.]

M. de Pozenpohl est arrivé ici comme courrier expédié à M. de Tatistcheff par M. de Pozzo.

Par cette occasion M. Pozzo a écrit à M. de Tatistcheff sur la position des affaires en France, et sur l'affaire orientale.

Quant à la première, il semble assez satisfait. Il ne parle pas d'un changement dans le ministère, mais de la décision du gouvernement de se préparer à confondre les révolutionnaires dans la session de 1830.

Quant aux affaires orientales, M. Pozzo blâme fortement la démarche pacifique faite par l'envoi de M. Fonton. Il dit que l'Empereur aurait absolument dû attendre que l'initiative dans les demandes aurait été prise par le Sultan.

Il rend compte ensuite des derniers résultats des pourparlers entre M. le Prince de Lieven et le Duc de Wellington. Il dit que le dernier avait eu le verbe fort haut relativement à l'affaire du blocus, et des arrangements à faire en faveur des Grecs. Que M. de Lieven cependant avait gagné le procès ; qu'après avoir été jusqu'à déclarer à sa Grâce que la Russie savait bien ce que valait la guerre avec l'Angleterre, mais que s'il le fallait elle saurait néanmoins ne pas la craindre, le Duc de Wellington avait modifié son langage en déclarant que ce qu'il avait dit n'était que sa manière de voir personnelle, mais pas une décision prise par le gouvernement.

M. Pozzo ajoute qu'avec l'assentiment complet de la France à toutes les idées de la Russie celle-ci pouvait être tranquille.

The Duke of Northumberland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Phoenix Park, 1st August, 1829.

As I am aware how anxious your Grace must feel with reference to our state and proceedings here, I take the earliest opportunity of acquainting you with the close of the Clare election, and the undisputed return of Mr. O'Connell.

The whole of this transaction has passed over in perfect tranquillity, and the Sheriff has officially informed Lord Francis Leveson Gower that he has no further occasion for the services of the troops within his county. I could have wished that I could have persuaded myself that this specious quiet had arisen from an habitual reverence for the law in the minds of the people, rather than from that blind devotion with which they submit to the blind dictation of their priests. But, after all, the conduct of these latter can only be accounted for by the satisfactory alternative of their wish

to propitiate the government, or their fear to encounter the powers with which it had armed itself against the refractory.

Mr. O'Connell made but little display on his road; and at Killaloe, where his adherents would have forced their political adversaries to take a part in the proposed triumph of his entry, the civil and military authorities interfered, dispersed the crowd, and removed the flags and arches which were prepared for his reception.

By so doing, they have given a proof to the Orangemen of the north of the impartiality with which we intend to act; and have furnished Mr. O'Connell with materials for a long paragraph in a long speech filled with abuse of Sir James Scarlett and Sir Edward Sugden;* with praises of Mr. Vesey Fitzgerald, and a very unexpected patronage of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland!!

On the other hand, the problem of the efficacy of the Proclamation in the northern province remains to be proved. It is however certain that the magistracy, the gentry, and the clergy, generally speaking, are sincerely inclined to abide by the tenor of it; and although I have heard of some childish quibbles, by which it is proposed to evade the determination of government, or to embarrass it in the enforcement of its views, I am not at all alarmed for the result.

I think, then, that I may safely tell your Grace that things are working here as they ought to work; and that there is, in spite of many obstacles, a better spirit arising and pervading the country.

It is not to be denied that false and exaggerated statements, on either side of the water, must eventually diminish the confidence of the well-intentioned; in addition to which, all sorts of attempts are made to persuade the people that changes are meditated and approaching either in the persons or character of the King's government, by which they who have so recently received the boon of emancipation are taught to believe that it will be retracted or rendered nugatory; and they who have opposed concession confirm themselves in their opposition, under the idea that a change is to take place under which they may claim the reward of consistency and party attachment.

There is another and more deep-rooted evil, which appears to me to retard our settlement. I mean the difficulty of giving a fair trial where the jurors are notoriously sworn from one side or the other. I believe this to be almost an irremediable evil; because the popular idea of forming a jury "*de medietate*," Catholic and Protestant, would be to fix for ever the strongest line of demarcation between the two great classes of his Majesty's subjects in this island.

I do not remember that I have anything further to detail; and I shall conclude with claiming from the friendship of your Grace an unreserved communication of any hints for my guidance which your better experience may suggest.

I have the honour to remain, my dear Duke, with unfeigned truth and regard,

Yours very faithfully,

NORTHUMBERLAND.

* Created Lord St. Leonards in 1852.

[1403.]

To the Duke of Northumberland.

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 4th August, 1829.

I have received your several letters to the 1st August, for which I should have made my acknowledgments at an earlier period, only that I was aware that you and Lord Francis heard constantly from Mr. Peel; and I was anxious to know the exact state of affairs in Ireland before I should write to you, which knowledge I could obtain only after my return to town from Walmer Castle.

I have heard of the resolutions of the gentlemen of the county of Fermanagh with the greatest satisfaction. The greatest evil experienced for some years in Ireland has been the division between the government and the resident gentry of the country. The approach towards a better feeling, of which we have now the prospect, affords the best ground for hope that we shall see the tranquillity of the country established on its best foundations, viz., the confidence of the gentry of the country in the executive government, in its protection of their rights and property, and in its encouragement and protection of their efforts to preserve peace and good order in their several capacities of magistrates, &c. If this confidence should be generally felt we may bid defiance to the ambition of great names in this country and to the sedition of Ireland. We shall preserve tranquillity in spite of all their efforts. I earnestly recommend to you to cultivate the disposition thus manifested by the gentlemen of Fermanagh.

Calumny has, as usual, been very busy here. Every effort was made at the close of the session of Parliament to convince the government, Parliament, and the public that the administration were too weak to go on; that we must reunite with our old friends, and that this object could be attained only by giving them the security which they would have only by becoming a part of the government. I admit that I was, and am, most anxious to have the confidence of the old friends of the government, and I believe that I possess that advantage to a greater degree than many are disposed to admit. But I did not, nor do not now think that I am in a situation to require that I should treat with any party, as a party; and most particularly not with that party which had quarrelled with me upon every subject because they differed with me upon one on which they had equally differed with Mr. Pitt and others.

Then, when it was found that I made no advances towards this party, it has been thought expedient to say, nay almost to swear, that I had, and to name individuals to whom the most urgent importunities had been made ; which individuals, it must be observed, are probably the very last for whose assistance in government any man in his senses would ask.

Then, attending upon these calumnies, those who circulate them have played a game in Ireland not nearly so innocent. Having encouraged the disposition, too prevalent in Ireland, of one party to triumph over the other, they have predicted the downfall of the existing administration, founding these predictions upon the calumnies of which they are themselves the authors ; and they have further held out hopes of the repeal of one of the laws of the last session as the consequence of this downfall. This is however a little manœuvre which will answer no purpose. If Ireland can be kept in tranquillity ; if the law is put in force in every case in which an attempt is made to commit a breach of it that comes to the knowledge of government ; if it is the government that governs, and not the demagogues, or the priests, or the Liberal clubs ; and, above all, if confidence is restored as between the government and the resident gentry, I will defy not only the party to which I have referred, but any party and all parties, to do any injury to the government.

Pray present my best respects to the Duchess,

And believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To George Dawson, Esq.

[1404.]

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 7th August, 1829.

I have read your correspondence with Lord Beresford. It appears to me that you have misunderstood Lord Beresford. He mentions the "line of conduct you adopted since the Parliament of last year" as the cause of the circumstances in which he supposes that you are placed in the county of Londonderry. You suppose that he means that the line of conduct which you adopted upon the Roman Catholic question in the last session is

the cause. I mention this circumstance because the two are very distinct, and must make a material difference in respect to the discussions upon this subject.

Lord Beresford was embarked with the government, and with a party, in carrying a certain measure. It would be very inconsistent in him to reject you because you concurred with the government in the support of the same measure with Lord Beresford and others.

Lord Beresford may think that your conduct last year was injudicious, and that it would be desirable for the sake of the interest of the Beresford family that their connexion with you in the county of Londonderry should cease. I think Lord Beresford's judgment is in this case erroneous. *Splitting hairs* in politics is never very judicious, and more particularly in election politics. And there is another observation which I would make to Lord Beresford upon this subject, and that is, that unless the Beresford interests are *now* prepared to put forward the candidate whom they intend *permanently* to support, they expose themselves to inconvenience by not supporting you. The county would not relish the recommendation of a second Beresford in a few years hence, after you should have made way for the first, on ground which, considering the line which the Beresford family in general took in the last session of Parliament, would not be very intelligible to the country at large.

At all events, we, as the government, have one distinct line to follow upon all cases of this description. We support the sitting member as long as he retains his seat; and you may rely upon it that you shall have every support that we can give you.

I don't know that anything that I can say to Lord Beresford would do you any good. The line which he has taken appears to have been adopted in concert with the Primate, and nothing that I could say would alter it. You are at full liberty, however, to make what use you please of this letter.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM RELATIVE TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A SUC- [1405.]
CESSOR TO THE DECEASED ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
MALTA.

7th August, 1829.

Señor Mattei, the Bishop of Malta, is dead ; and the Lieutenant-Governor* has recommended that the Archdeacon Carmana should be his successor.

This recommendation is quite unobjectionable.

The question is, how he should be appointed.

It was the opinion of the Crown lawyers that the Act of the 1st of Elizabeth, chapter 1, prevented the nomination by the King of a Bishop of Quebec in the year 1826.

The Maltese case has been referred for their consideration, and it is probable that the opinion will be the same.

Under these circumstances it appears that the best measure to be adopted is to desire the Lieutenant-Governor of Malta to give charge of the diocese to the Archdeacon Carmana, and to give him possession of the temporalities ; and to desire Lord Burghersh to intimate *privately* to the Cardinal Secretary of State that his Majesty will not allow of the appointment of any other person.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Tunbridge Wells, 8th August, 1829.

I have had a conversation this morning with Lieven upon the subject of the mission of General Müffling ; and of the negotiations for peace with reference to the present state of the campaign. He has no direct information respecting the mission, but believes that the Emperor may verbally have explained to General Müffling his views, and even the conditions upon which he might be disposed to make peace ; but that it is impossible he should be authorised to act as a Russian plenipotentiary. He fully confirms the disinclination which the Emperor is supposed to have to trust anything to M. de Royer. This, therefore, may in some degree account for the special mission, even if the Prussian General should not have officially what may be called full powers from the Emperor.

I spoke to him in the same tone upon the subject of the terms of peace in which I had written to Lord Heytesbury ; and mentioned, with some kind of complaint, the fact of our hearing from all quarters an account of these conditions, but without receiving anything from him, or indeed anything official anywhere. He repeated the old story of the necessity of con-

* General Sir George Don, K.G.H.

fidence ; and declared over and over again that the Emperor would never give us any just cause of complaint. He was too desirous to keep on good terms with England, and knew too well what we might reasonably object to, ever to run the risk, even if he were disposed to do so. Although professing a knowledge of the proposed terms of peace, as they had been mentioned in different quarters, I did not think it necessary to repeat them to him in detail. He did not affect to know them, and Anapa and Poti were not mentioned by either of us.

I should say there was a more than usually earnest endeavour on his part to impress me with the desire of the Emperor not to give us just ground of offence ; with some appearance of uneasiness at the serious manner in which we were disposed to view the present crisis.

I could not help telling him that, if General Diebitsch arrived at Constantinople, we should not feel much better satisfied, even if he made a fresh protestation of moderation and peace at every step ; and that we were in the habit of looking to the performance rather than to the professions of persons with whom we had to deal.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[1406.]

To Lord Cowley.

MY DEAR HENRY,

London, 10th August, 1829.

About six weeks or two months ago Prince Lieven and Monsieur Le Comte de Matuscewitz, having had some conversation with Lord Aberdeen respecting an order which they had received to notify an extension of the blockade of the Dardanelles to the bay of Enos, desired to speak to me upon the subject.

Their proposition was this :—We will notify the blockade ; but we will not carry it into execution. They went so far in conversation with Lord Aberdeen as to offer to pay for any vessels belonging to the King's subjects which might be captured.

We had not had a Cabinet upon the subject.

The Russian plenipotentiaries began by reading to me the orders which they had received. I remonstrated against the carrying them into execution. I reminded them of all that had passed respecting the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean ; the deposition of its belligerent character ; the resumption of the belligerent character ; the blockade of Candia ; and at last the blockade of Enos. I observed that this blockade of Enos was not a blockade of the Dardanelles, but that of the mouth of a river communicating with Adrianople. That this

blockade would be perfectly understood in this country, and would be discussed in every mode and by every society ; and I entreated them to avoid drawing the attention of the public in England prematurely to the design of carrying on operations in the plain of Adrianople, which this blockade evidently indicated.

These observations drew from Prince Lieven the usual reproaches of a want of confidence in the honour of the Emperor ; to which I answered, that I did not sit there to manifest confidence in his Sovereign or in any Sovereign, but to watch over the interests of this country, for the preservation of which I was held severely responsible ; and I pointed out that the Emperor had never declared himself to this country upon any one point, concerning the termination of the war, in such terms as to conciliate our confidence at the same time that it was so loudly called for. I repeated the wish that the blockade of Enos should not be announced.

Prince Lieven was very warm in his reply, and said that if the Emperor was threatened he must take measures for his own defence. I answered very quietly that I had made no threat ; that I had no authority to threaten, as I spoke to them only on my own part, not having consulted my colleagues ; and, moreover, that I had done no more than entreat them not to notify a blockade which if notified would certainly be respected by this country. But that they must take the consequences of a premature discussion in this country of the intentions indicated by this blockade.

The conversation ended by their withdrawal of Enos from the notification.

This is certainly the conversation to which Pozzo di Borgo refers. You will see from the result that it was not I, but the Russian plenipotentiaries, who made the concession.

It is perfectly true that we have conceded our opinion very much in all these discussions to that of France. We have done so because we knew that the French government could not answer for its own proceedings. We were aware that those who guided its measures would have desired nothing better than to see the two countries involved in a contest upon a point of honour ; and I confess that up to this moment I have heard of no question of which the decision in one way or the other was worth the risk of a discussion with France, much less that of a

contest. I believe that the sound part of the French government and public have viewed all these questions as we have; and we have reason to believe that they equally with ourselves desire to bring all these complicated questions in the East to a reasonable termination.

It appears to me that they are now coming to a crisis, and if peace is not made soon I suspect that before long more than one Power will be under the necessity of declaring itself.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1407.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 10th August, 1829.

I have read the despatches from Constantinople, and I conceive that you ought to lose no time in calling a Conference upon two points: the Turkish answer, and Capo d'Istria's refusal to attend to the advice of the contracting parties to the Treaty.

You should let Lord Stuart know what you intend to propose at the Conference, and get the consent of the French government. After the decision of the Conference we must make use of the agency of Lord Heytesbury to obtain the concurrence of the Russian government, and not trust solely to Prince Lieven.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1408.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 10th August, 1829.

I have read the despatches and papers from Sir Frederick Adam, which contain nothing that can be brought forward as fact; yet it is quite evident that everything in Greece, as well as in Turkey, is going on as badly as possible for the interests of this country.

The affair of Greece was taken up in 1826 in order to prevent war between Russia and the Porte, which our interference has since occasioned; and to prevent the establishment in Greece of an exclusive Russian influence, which has been established

there under French as well as Russian protection, in a form, under circumstances, and by agency likely to occasion discontent, revolutionary notions, and possibly insurrection against our authority in the Ionian Islands. Then the only chance of terminating this war in Turkey is by concessions on the part of the Porte of territory, the demand of which is inconsistent with the promises and engagements made by the Emperor to all Europe; and the concession of the particular territory is, and is known by all Europe to be, injurious to the interests of Great Britain alone. Then if this or some such concession is not made, we must expect, in very few weeks possibly, to see a Russian army in Constantinople.

This is not a bright prospect, but it is not the less a true one.

There is very little use in making complaints upon any subject, unless one is prepared to strike a blow. But I think that it would be desirable that you should make Lord Heytesbury sensible of this state of things; and point out to him to what object he ought to direct his attention in the discussions with Count Nesselrode, viz., first, the necessity of the contracting parties to the Treaty forcing Capo d'Istria to attend to the advice given to him by the Conference; and secondly, that he should call the attention of the Emperor's government to the revolutionary conduct of Capo d'Istria. We are not one of those governments that need be afraid of modern revolutionary doctrines or action. We have resisted both successfully against means much more powerful than can now be brought against us. The Emperor of Russia's government must judge whether it is fitting that such a system should be acted upon anywhere under their protection and with their assistance.

We must call upon the King of France distinctly to perform his promise to withdraw his troops from the Morea. Having done that, and again reinforced our squadron in the Mediterranean, upon which I will speak to Lord Melville, we may wait the result of the Conference which we are to have after you will hear from Paris.

Matters are however in such a state that we cannot delay any longer to speak out.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1409.]

To the Right Hon. Sir Henry Hardinge.

MY DEAR HARDINGE,

London, 11th August, 1829.

I return your warrant. The difference between you and me is only in the principle: in practice we don't differ. We both start from the principle that a soldier shall not have a pension till after twenty-one years' service. We both say that a soldier disabled in the service shall have a pension after certain terms of service. I say that the pension for disability ought not to be permanent till the man shall have served twenty-one years; you say that after fourteen years the pension may be permanent if the disability should be permanent.

I contend for it that disability on account of disease is not merit. It may more probably be demerit. I would not therefore put the man disabled upon a better footing than the man who serves the full time. I don't say do not take care of the disabled man. But I do say let him serve if the disability should cease previous to the termination of the term of his service.

I also observe that the warrant does not provide for the enquiry by court-martial into the cases of disability which may occur among men enlisted prior to its date. You cannot touch the claim to pensions of those men disabled; but you have a right to ascertain with strictness the nature of that claim.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 11th August, 1829.

I am glad to see the enclosed. You recollect the attack to which it refers. I wish the Irish government would do these things of themselves, without the necessity of constantly suggesting them from this side of the water.

Ever yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

IRELAND.

The following Proclamation has been issued:—

Dublin Castle, 5th August.

“Whereas it hath been represented to the Lord-Lieutenant, that a party of persons called Orangemen, on their return home after dining together in the

vicinity of Arneybridge, were attacked by a large assemblage of persons called Ribandmen (who had been previously dislodged from a position which they had taken on the mountain between Florence Court and Swadlinbar), when one man of the Orange party was piked to death, and six others wounded, three of whom have since died.

“Now, we, the Lord-Lieutenant, for the better apprehending and bringing to justice the person or persons concerned in this barbarous murder, are pleased hereby to offer a reward of 200*l.* to any person or persons (except those actually concerned in the commission of the murder) who shall give such information as may lead to the apprehension and conviction of the persons concerned, not already apprehended.

“By his Grace’s command,

“F. LEVESON GOWER.”

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EARL OF ABERDEEN.—STATE OF [1410.]
AFFAIRS IN THE EAST.

London, 12th August, 1829.

I see that Count Bernstorff in his communications with the Austrian minister at Berlin has made the same complaints of the coldness and want of exertion of this government to prevail upon the Porte to make peace, which Baron Bülow made to Lord Aberdeen; and I see the same complaints repeated in other papers from the same quarter.

It is admitted that the Porte might reasonably entertain doubts of the sincerity of the wishes of the Emperor of Russia for peace, or even of the expediency of complying with his Imperial Majesty’s terms. We are required to remove those doubts, and moreover to convince the Ottoman Porte that no assistance will be given by us to enable her to resist the invasion of her territories by the Emperor of Russia.

Before I consider of these propositions, I must point out on what ground we have stood since we were first informed that the Emperor of Russia intended to make war upon the Porte.

We declined to engage in or sanction hostilities which we declared that we did not think necessary; and we foresaw and foretold the risk incurred of overthrowing an empire, and of disturbing the peace of Europe.

We never doubted the result of this unequal contest, more particularly as two of the Powers interested in the conservation of the Porte as a Power in Europe were engaged in a Treaty with the Emperor for the settlement of Greece; but we foresaw that his Imperial Majesty was about to destroy the work nearly

accomplished by seven years of the joint care, anxiety, and negotiations of all the Powers of Europe, including his own august predecessor and brother, and particularly of that very measure which has laid the Porte at his mercy in this contest. We foretold in the following words the consequences of the invasion of the Ottoman empire:—

The Earl of Dudley to Prince Lieven.

“London, 7th March, 1828.

“The Ottoman Empire is not a country like some of those whose example we could cite within our own times, which, after having been invaded, resume their domestic tranquillity and their political existence upon the retreat of the invaders; once broken up, its capital taken, and its provinces in rebellion, the recomposition of it as an independent State would be a work scarcely within the reach of human integrity or human skill. A new order of things must arise in those countries of which it now consists. What that order would be it is vain to conjecture; but we may venture to foretell that a final adjustment would not take place till after a series of troubles and disasters, for which the greatest benefits that could be supposed to arise from it could not for many years afford a sufficient compensation.”

Notwithstanding this disapprobation on our parts of the measures adopted by his Imperial Majesty, we have never ceased from that moment to this to make sacrifices in order to continue to act in the Greek affair with those Powers with which we were engaged in a Treaty, and to bring that question to a settlement, from the conviction that the solution of the difficulties attending that affair would bring the war in the East to a termination.

The advice which we have given has been invariably directed to that object; and the delay in the termination of that affair must not be attributed to us.

To the paper from which we have extracted what is above stated Count Nesselrode answered:—

“Ni la chute de ce gouvernement, ni des conquêtes n'entrent dans nos vues, parce qu'elles nous seraient plus nuisibles qu'utiles. Au reste, quand même, malgré nos intentions et nos efforts, les décrets de la Divine Providence nous auraient prédestinés à être témoins du dernier jour de l'empire Ottoman, les idées de sa Majesté quant aux agrandissements de la Russie, seraient encore les mêmes. L'Empereur ne reculerait pas les bornes de son territoire, et ne demanderait à ses Alliés que cette absence d'ambition et de pensées exclusives, dont il donnerait le premier l'exemple.”

But we are now to remove the doubts of the Porte of the sincerity of his Imperial Majesty's wishes for peace, and to

convince the Porte of the moderation of his demands, and of the expediency of complying with them.

The difficulty of this question has always consisted in its having been made a personal one. We are told that the Emperor of Russia is a highly honourable individual. He says that he wishes for peace; and we must not only give credit to his assertions, but we must urge the Porte to give credit to them.

I put the honour of the individual out of the question, and I look at the case only as it relates to the powerful monarch of a great empire. When such a one wishes for peace, and is desirous that other Powers should make known his wishes to his enemy, he explains himself to them frankly; and he commits no act which can render the negotiation of a Treaty of Peace more difficult. Let us view the conduct of the Emperor of Russia, and see how far it will bear this test. In his Imperial Majesty's manifesto at the commencement of the war he declared that he desired and should demand no increase of territory; that he should require from the Porte compensation for the losses in commerce of his Imperial Majesty's subjects, and for the expenses of the war; the due execution of the Treaties with Russia, particularly the Treaty of Akermann, and security for their due execution in future.

These demands are admitted by the Prussian minister to be vague. Has his Imperial Majesty ever explained their meaning, particularly as far as regarded the amount of compensation for the expenses of the war, the nature of that compensation, or the nature of the security to be given for the performance of the Treaties with Russia in future? Everybody sees the disproportion of the forces and resources engaged on the two sides in the contest, particularly adverting to the fact that two of the Powers to which the Porte might look for aid in her contest with Russia are engaged in an alliance with the Emperor against the Porte; and on this ground of want of means to contend with the Emperor, every Power may advise the Porte to submit. But no Power can honestly give that advice to the Porte, founding it upon any political knowledge of the Emperor's intentions, or upon any knowledge whatever which could induce one individual to advise another in any important transaction of life. Then let us look at the acts of the Emperor of Russia.

His Imperial Majesty and the Porte stand towards each other in a relation of great delicacy in the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, of which his Imperial Majesty has had the military possession since the commencement of the war. I have already adverted to the negotiations in which, in concert with the late Emperor, all the Powers of Europe were more or less engaged, respecting the government of these provinces, from the year 1820 till the negotiations at Akermann in 1826. If his Imperial Majesty intends to restore these provinces to the Porte, it must be to be governed as heretofore under the ancient Treaties between the two Powers. Yet within these few days, since the battle in the neighbourhood of Schumla and the surrender of Silistria, his Imperial Majesty has taken measures for altering the constitution of the government of these Principalities; measures which it is impossible that the Porte can adopt and carry into execution, and which must therefore impede the negotiation of a Treaty of Peace on any other terms excepting those of positive surrender. I would here observe that there are few, if any, instances of alteration in the constitution of the government of provinces held, as these Principalities are, by conquest, without formal diplomatic cession, excepting in the wars of the French revolution.

These alterations were not necessary; and we must suppose that they were intended, as they will be found to be, impediments in the way of peace.

But we are told that notwithstanding all this his Imperial Majesty intends to make peace; a peace which the Porte can accept, preserving its independent situation and power in Europe; that the King of Prussia is convinced that that is his Imperial Majesty's intention; and we are called upon to assure the Porte that the Sultan can expect no assistance from us, and that he ought to accept peace upon the terms offered to him. Such a demand is in itself an insinuation against us. We do wish the Porte to make peace, because it is obvious that she is incapable of carrying on war; because her destruction would entail on Europe fresh misfortunes, and because the unfortunate policy of former years has deprived her of the assistance which she ought to have expected in the circumstances in which she is placed. We are, besides, engaged in a Treaty with the Emperor of Russia, the objects of which have not been accomplished.

But before we can take a more active part in any negotiations

for peace, we must know the objects of the peace, and the terms, and the situation in which it will leave the parties.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

India Board, 14th August, 1829.

When Sir Archibald Campbell called upon me I communicated to him the secret instructions sent to the Bengal government relative to the question of retaining the Tenasserim provinces, and I requested him to give me his observations upon it.

I enclose his letter to me, and the correspondence which passed between the government and him before he left Calcutta upon this subject.

I likewise enclose the secret instructions for reference.

The result upon my mind is increased regret that we ever took the Tenasserim provinces at all, and an increased desire to get rid of them if we can.

The opinions of Sir Archibald Campbell are upon one point a little contradictory, and his statement upon another point is at variance with other information, and must, I think, be at least exaggerated.

He says our giving back Pegu excited sentiments of great respect for us in the Court of Ava; but he thinks our giving back the Tenasserim provinces would excite sentiments of a very different nature. It is not clear why this should be.

He represents the Burmese as having acted vindictively towards those who assisted our army on its march up the Irrawaddy. This is entirely at variance with other information; and it seems that of the ten thousand emigrants from Ava to the provinces ceded to us many have returned, and have been unmolested. I believe the chiefs of the emigrants have lived ever since the emigration upon pensions, and have done nothing at all for themselves. The Burmese government does not molest the poor, who alone would remain. There is one point upon which I think it very important that your opinion should be communicated to the Bengal government, to remain on record in the secret department, that is, on the best plan of operations to be adopted against Ava, in the event of a war, which God avert. You will find questions upon this subject addressed by the government to Sir A. Campbell. Shall any further questions, suggested by you, be put to him, and communicated with the answers to the Bengal government?

The thing which excites my alarm is the evident leaning of the Bengal government to a *diversion* in the event of war, by occupying Rangoon. I have no doubt all the circumstances connected with Rangoon are fresh in your recollection, and therefore I will not advert to them. The impression upon my mind is, that the main attack being made from Arracan, by the Irrawaddy, the occupation of Rangoon would divert no part of the force which could be employed against the main army; that it would require almost half an army to hold it against the militia of the neighbouring provinces, that the cost would be enormous, everything as before being brought from Madras or Bengal, and that we should lose by the unchanged

climate half or more than half the troops employed, of which a great proportion must be Europeans.

Sir A. Campbell talks of threatening Rangoon by a few cruisers. He does not suggest the occupation of it, which seems to be Lord William's own notion.

As the question of the ultimate disposal of these provinces is now under the consideration of the Bengal government, it may be right to notice the correspondence between them and Sir A. Campbell in a secret letter. My idea is that by holding out to the Court of Ava that we might cede these provinces to Siam, we might bring it into our own terms.

The emigrants, if they chose to leave the continent, might just as well break up new ground in the islands as where they are.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

[1411.]

To the Lord Bishop of London.

MY LORD BISHOP,

Walmer Castle, 14th August, 1829.

Since I saw your Lordship I have made particular enquiries regarding the places of worship which his Majesty's troops in London attend ; not including the Tower.

Your Lordship will see that the two regiments of cavalry have divine services performed in the riding-houses attached to their several barracks. That two battalions of Foot Guards attend divine service in their cooking-houses, while the cooking is going on ; and that two battalions and the recruits quartered in the recruit house attend in Whitehall Chapel. I do not now recollect whether there is a cooking house in the barracks in the mews. I believe there is not, and the cooking goes on in the soldiers' rooms. If there is a cooking-house the battalion in the mews might do as those do in Portman Street and Knightsbridge. But there would still be a battalion in quarters in Westminster, and the recruits from the recruit house who must attend divine service in the banqueting room.

There is no room for any in the chapel of the Military Asylum, and to build a chapel for the service of the military in London would cost a sum of money much larger than could be justified ; more particularly as it would be laid out for the purpose of accommodating persons of rank and fortune in the banqueting room. This is in fact the appropriate chapel for the King's Guards. The military trophies are hung up in it ; and I understand that the Guards have frequented it ever since the Revolution, when the chapel with the palace was burnt down.

I would beg leave to observe to your Lordship that although divine service in a riding-house or a cooking-house, or out of doors, is better than none at all, it is not a very satisfactory mode of having it performed ; and as an officer I would certainly wish that as many should be permitted to attend the service in the banqueting room as it can hold.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Sir William Knighton, Bart.

[1412.]

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

Walmer Castle, 14th August, 1829.

I enclose a letter from Lord Lowther on the subject of the road in Windsor Park on which you spoke to me, and I wrote to Lord Lowther as I told you I would.

It appears now that the road in question is not that which the King was to pay for, but another new one, of which I never heard a word. It appears however that the Treasury, knowing that the revenue of the Woods and Forests was appropriated exclusively to the building of Buckingham Palace, in which the King as well as everybody else is interested, desired that the road in question should be postponed.

We got this affair of Buckingham Palace very successfully through Parliament in the last session. But Parliament is aware that the revenues of the Woods and Forests were exclusively appropriated to this palace ; and this with the King's positive consent signified to me by letter. Surely the King will be very much displeased if he finds the money fail for Buckingham Palace in consequence of its being applied to other purposes.

Since I saw you we have received the estimate for the foundation of the statue of the late King on Snow Hill, which amounts to 16,000*l*. I have not an idea where we are to get the money for this work, which I see that the King expects to have completed by this time next year.

I don't think that the Commissioners for Windsor Castle will like to consider this expense as a repair of the castle ; and as far as I can learn we have not a shilling anywhere else.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Northumberland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Phoenix Park, 12th August, 1829.

We are still in some little anxiety about the result of the menaced processions in Ulster on this day, but I have every reasonable ground to believe that by the admonitions of the more influential gentry, and by the presence of a commanding force, the two rival bodies will be prevented from coming to any dangerous collision.

My more constant and less hopeful attention is, however, mainly directed to Tipperary and the contiguous districts, taking a line from Athlone to Mallow. Here it is that the evil and hitherto untamed spirit of plunder and insubordination is daily and nightly at work, and when I add to these habitual symptoms the general excitement likely to arise from the trials of the Borrisokane and other party rioters, I own I am prepared to expect a considerable degree of local confusion.

We are doing our best to guard against any unpleasant results, but I have upon due reflection come to this conclusion, that we must no longer be content to act in this district by temporary palliatives and the mere expedients of the moment, but that it has become our duty forthwith to devise a systematic and regular remedy for disorders which do away with all security in life and property, and will drive from the country all persons who have the power of living elsewhere on the means that they draw from Ireland, or by investing their convertible capital in some more tranquil part of the world.

I am not inclined to ask for any measure of so novel a character as may require a parliamentary sanction for *its commencement*, because I believe that the alarm resulting from the necessary discussion would do more harm than any law which might be passed could remedy for years. My views go to the immediate appointment of a stipendiary magistrate of approved talents, impartiality and courage, to reside in every barony within the limits to which I have alluded; to the doubling the police force; and the placing the whole of this district under an Inspector-General of its own.

For the present I apprehend the Secret Service Money would go far to meet this novel expenditure; but I should hope that most of it might ultimately be thrown upon the occupiers of land within the counties, who would thus feel an immediate and cogent interest in the establishment or restoration of that social peace which many of them are now so inclined to disturb; and should any, even a large part of it, fall upon the public, I persuade myself it is an expenditure of the least questionable sort to which the subject can be called upon to contribute.

It has moreover been proposed to place some of the higher military officers in the commission of the peace where they may happen to serve.

So far as concerns the Major-General commanding the military districts, I think I can see much convenience as likely to arise from the adoption of the measure; whilst perhaps, as to the lower grades, something may be alleged against it. But at all events we must provide ourselves in some way or another with that, which I believe no county in Ireland can furnish; a magistracy indefatigable, conscious of their own responsibility, and removed from all those suspicions with which, be they true or be they

false, it is the misfortune of the lower and middle orders to look upon their natural magistrates.

It is not that I differ from the opinion expressed by your Grace in your last letter, as to the expediency of bringing forward the country gentlemen to take their proper and active part in the furtherance of the public welfare, but you are well aware that this fortunate circumstance can be but of rare occurrence, from the paucity of educated gentry in most counties, and from their subserviency to party or electioneering interests in all.

I have deemed it right to intrude upon you with this short statement of my opinions, having left to Lord F. L. Gower, who is so thoroughly competent to it, the task of communicating officially with Mr. Peel on the different subjects and speculations which I have noticed.

In the mean time I am happy to report most favourably of the exertions of the Munster police. Major Miller has recently had the satisfaction to detail the capture of some notorious outlaws in the neighbourhood of Doneraile, with the assistance of Lords Kingston, Doneraile, and Mount Cashell; and above all by the intrepid personal exertions of Mr. Lowe; and however disgraceful the number of capital crimes may appear with reference to the population, it is no small credit to the police establishment that between April and the end of July, they have in the province of Munster brought one hundred and five serious offenders to trial.

I shall feel obliged if your Grace would give me the benefit of your advice on the general purport of this letter.

I have the honour to subscribe myself, my dear Duke,

Yours very faithfully and sincerely,

NORTHUMBERLAND.

To the Duke of Northumberland.

[1413.]

MY DEAR DUKE,

Walmer Castle, 15th August, 1829.

I have just now received your letter of the 12th, and I return by the same post to Mr. Peel a copy of a letter to Lord Francis Gower of the 14th upon the same subject, with my unqualified concurrence in all that it contains. You cannot render a more important service than to tranquillise Tipperary, and I conceive that the measures which you propose to adopt are the best calculated to attain that desirable object.

There can be no objection to your employing General officers of regiments and of the troops in certain parts in the commission of the peace in the peculiar circumstances of the country. But the employment in this manner of any officer must depend not only upon the necessity of the case, but likewise upon the character of the officer, and his having shown in the country that he has discretion to inspire confidence, and an inclination and

activity to render himself useful. I know the gentlemen of my profession well. They all mean well; but I don't think that all of any rank could be trusted to act as magistrates.

I quite concur with you that, in many parts of Ireland, the measures which are now proposed must precede the entrusting the tranquillity of the country to the gentry acting as magistrates. But the last must be our object. I believe that we shall not find it unattainable, and that when the gentlemen of the country find the government active and energetic in preserving the peace, in punishing every infraction of the law by whomsoever committed, and in protecting their lives and properties and themselves in the performance of their duties, and in the exercise of their rights, they will not be backward in taking their natural station in carrying into execution such a system, and that there will be found many well disposed, able, and fit for such purposes.

We must not conceal from ourselves that Ireland has not been governed for many years; and that we must not be surprised to find the gentlemen of the country now indisposed to come forward and incur the risks attending the re-establishment of order and of the government of the law in the country. But you are on the right road, and I am convinced that we shall soon see a remarkable improvement.

Pray present my best respects to the Duchess, and

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Francis Leveson Gower to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Dublin, 15th August, 1829.

As far as my information at present extends the north of Ireland appears to have returned to a temporary tranquillity. You will learn, however, from the various reports transmitted to the Home Office, that the state of Tipperary is such as to occasion much anxiety to the government here. The state of society there is such as cannot be paralleled in any country which has any pretensions to civilization. A document which I have called for from Major Miller, and have transmitted to Mr. Peel, will prove to you that this state of things cannot be ascribed to inactivity or incapacity on the part of the police, for, it appears that in the course of two months 105 persons have been arrested for offences not bailable in that county alone. I am under serious apprehensions that the evil of this state of things will be aggravated by the result of the trials of the policemen for the affair of Borrisokane. I cannot say what view of their conduct

may be taken by the jury or the judge, but if they should be condemned the Crown must interfere to prevent the consequence of an iniquitous sentence, and I know that the populace are taught to thirst for their blood, and will endeavour to wreak their vengeance elsewhere. The question which I wish to submit to your judgment is this—in what manner can we most effectually avail ourselves of the very powerful military force which is now at our disposal in that county, for the suppression of this system of Rockite outrage? With the view of placing this question in a distinct form under your consideration, I have directed copies of some recent correspondence with Major Carter and Sir John Byng to be transmitted to you, but I fear I shall not be able to forward it by this post. I directed Major Carter, who has been recently stationed at Borrisokane, to put me distinctly in possession of his views as to the best mode of meeting the danger which I apprehend. He has accordingly pointed out the stations at which he thinks it would be desirable to station troops. Sir John Byng has objected to these suggestions most decidedly, for reasons which appear to me on his explanation to have great weight, and of course with respect to any specific arrangement I cannot but defer at once to reasons stated by such an authority. I must fairly own, however, that I am not satisfied that it will be possible to give proper support and encouragement to the magistracy, and assistance to the police without separating and harassing the troops to a certain extent, and for a limited period. I am aware that great exertions were made last year for the concentration of the troops, and no one would regret more than I should do the adoption of a system of scattering them in small detachments, subalterns' and sergeants' parties, &c. I also know by my own experience how unreasonable the views of the resident gentry are on this subject. I think, nevertheless, that there are reasons of *haute politique*, as well as of the police, of the moment for making a strong military demonstration at present in Tipperary. If outrage cannot be suppressed, the gentry will not remain in the country till the winter. If there was any question of insurrection, invasion, or rebellion, I should decline altogether offering any observations upon Sir John Byng's arrangements, but the present question appears to me one of a totally different nature. I do not believe the peasantry have any means or notion of acting *en masse*. I wish they would show a front to a company of infantry; I am sure the example which would be made of them would be of great service. The question seems to me to be whether the troops can or can not with any real advantage, be detached to a certain extent, for the purpose of performing duties which, under ordinary circumstances, more particularly belong to the police. If they really could perform this service, I am sure the advantage would be cheaply purchased even by encamping them. I think the correspondence I have alluded to will put the subject in a very tangible shape before you. I may say at *this moment*, and without expressing any reliance on the permanence of tranquillity, that Tipperary is the only part of the country in a serious state of disturbance, and I am consequently most anxious on the subject of it. I have told Sir John Byng that I should write to you on these matters as I am most anxious that he should put you in possession of his views. I think also that the interposition of your advice and opinion would prevent the possibility of anything like a continued difference of opinion arising between the Lord-Lieutenant and the Commander of the

Forces. Anything of this nature between the civil and military authorities would be most prejudicial to the public service. I have been always disposed, since my accession to office here, to place much reliance on the reports of officers in command in the provinces. They are always uninfluenced by personal fears and political partialities, and are a most useful check on the exaggerated accounts of the magistrates, clergy, and others. With respect to Tipperary I must say that this confidence has been a little diminished on recent occasions. I think some of the Field officers have treated matters of importance too lightly, and spoken of them with a kind of military contempt, which I can easily understand may exist in their minds, but which I am sure those who are ministers as well as military commanders would not entertain. I do not apply this observation in the least to Sir John Byng, whose experience in the north of England makes him a much more competent judge of such matters than I can be myself, but to some of the officers in command in the country. I shall send the papers in question as soon as I can get them prepared.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours very faithfully,

F. LEVESON GOWER.

[1414.]

To Lord Francis Leveson Gower.

Royal Lodge, Windsor,

17th August, 1829.

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS,

I received in London this morning your letter of the 15th, and I of course postpone to enter into details upon the subject to which it relates till I shall have received your detailed statements. But my opinion in general is that the army is kept for use and not for show; and that we must lose it if necessary; much more incur the risk of injuring the discipline and good order of parts of it for a time.

The question is, is it necessary to post the army in such manner as will injure its discipline and order? Who is to judge of this necessity? The Lord-Lieutenant certainly. Of course the Lord-Lieutenant will be disposed to alter a disposition of the troops which is injurious to the army, as soon as the necessity for such disposition has been overcome; or at any time that the commander of the forces can show him that another which he will think less injurious would equally answer the purpose of the government.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Argyll House, 18th August, 1829.

I enclose the letter which I propose to send to Polignac. There is still time for you to add, or to alter anything you may think proper. I do not feel *quite certain* whether, abating some of the civilities, it might not be made a despatch to Stuart; for if Polignac should take it into his head to communicate it to Pozzo, we should have a sort of repetition of the famous Austrian Mémoire. In some respects, however, it is better as it is. Ought the letter to be sent to the King?

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

I also enclose a private letter from Stuart, giving an account of the manner in which Polignac feels respecting his present situation.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1415.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 18th August, 1829.

I have considered since yesterday what should be done in the Conference fixed for this day.

In the Conference of the 16th November we said, “*que par suite de ces considérations et comme une condition nécessaire de la garantie qu’on proposait à l’Alliance de donner, le gouvernement provisoire de la Grèce devrait être requis de rappeler les troupes qui continuent les hostilités au nord de l’isthme de Corinthe.*”

In discussing the Protocol of the 22nd March, I stated that we would not negotiate for the Alliance unless hostilities ceased on the part of the Greeks; and the following paragraph was inserted in the Protocol of the 22nd March, “*Il est néanmoins entendu, dès à présent, que la garantie en question assurera la Porte ottomane contre toute entreprise ou acte hostile de la part des Grecs.*”

This was preceded by a paragraph stating that the three courts “*réclament que les Grecs cessent immédiatement les hostilités sur tous les points, et que le gouvernement provisoire de la Grèce fasse rentrer dans les limites du territoire garanti par l’Alliance les troupes grecques qui en sont sorties.*”

There is besides an engagement on the part of the French government that the French troops should be withdrawn from the Morea. None of the conditions or engagements above referred to have been performed, and we are to enter into new ones, leaving the old ones unnoticed.

I had written thus far when I received the box with your letter to Prince de Polignac, and I have read it and Lord Stuart's private letter to you, and his despatches of the 14th. The latter refer to no question of pacification, excepting to that respecting Greece, which must be settled in the Conference after the French and Russian ministers will have been instructed by their governments respectively. Lord Stuart's private letter shows that I formed a correct judgment of Prince de Polignac's course. His object will be to lean upon Russia. He will appeal to our friendly kindness for him and his master to induce us to connive at his subserviency to Russia. The halt upon the *versants* of Mount Hæmus will be of the same avail as that upon the Danube in 1828; and we shall be led on to disgrace. After reading what Lord Stuart says, I don't think that your private appeal to Prince de Polignac will produce any effect; nor will an official appeal. Both will be communicated to Russia, as the proof of the sincerity of the intention of the existing French government to act with Russia.

The Cabinet however have determined, and I think wisely, that this appeal should be made to the French government; and I think that it ought to be made in a despatch very cautiously drawn, pointing out the risk to all Europe of the Emperor's position, that the risk was the greater because it possibly was not in the power of the Emperor in his palace of St. Petersburg to control the consequences. We might say that we do not know whether any or what terms of peace, if any, have been offered; and instead of expressing our readiness to act in concert with France upon this subject, we ought to ask confidentially the communication of their intentions in case certain events should occur as detailed in your letter. We might assure the French government at the same time that we had had no communication with any other Power upon this subject.

In respect to the Conference of this day I cannot but think that you should do no more than communicate the correspondence, and desire the ambassadors to lose no time in demanding instructions. We must avoid giving any opinion. We ought however to require from both governments the performance of their former promises and engagements. We shall be lost deservedly if we go to Parliament with a lost cause, and having to confess that engagements made to us have not been performed.

I would therefore recommend to you to inform Lord Stuart of the result of this Conference, and to desire him to remind Prince de Polignac how frequently we have told him that the only thing which we could not bear was that a promise or engagement should not be performed.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Francis Leveson Gower.

[1416.]

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS,

Walmer Castle, 19th August, 1829.

Since I wrote to you from Windsor I have received Greville's letter of the 16th, with one from Sir John Byng. In ordinary circumstances Sir John Byng would be quite right. But you are now, as I understand, about to undertake a regular operation in Tipperary, with a view to prevent disturbance. Rules which are excellent as applied to ordinary circumstances will not answer and cannot be applied to cases which must be exceptions. I don't understand that what you propose is a permanent distribution of the army, but one made for the purposes of a particular time and particular circumstances; and I can only say that I for one shall consider this large army in Ireland *useless*, and that it ought to be disbanded and replaced by some force that will be *useful*, if there is any difficulty on the part of General officers, officers or soldiers, in doing whatever may be thought necessary for the restoration and preservation of the peace in Ireland.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM ON THE PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE FEVER AT [1417]
GIBRALTAR IN 1828.

[Let this, with the papers in the War-Office portfolio, be sent to Mr. Goulburn.]

19th August, 1829.

After the perusal of these proceedings I cannot consider myself accurately informed of the cause of the late disease at Gibraltar. We are so however generally. There can be no doubt that this fever is contagious and epidemic. That it prevails in

warm climates with greater violence, for a longer period of time, and it affects a larger number of individuals than in those which are more temperate or colder; and that it prevails particularly in those seasons in which the weather is warmest and the winds most moderate, and that it disappears as the winter approaches.

Whatever may be the cause, it is our duty to apply a remedy as far as may be possible. First, the Master-General of the Ordnance should be desired to order the chief Engineer at Gibraltar to consider of the means of forming reservoirs of salt water in the rock, or higher parts of the town, for the purpose of scouring the drains and sewers of the town at proper seasons of the year. It may be necessary to pump the water into these reservoirs by a steam-engine; and the communication between these reservoirs and the sewers and drains will be expensive.

The fort and town of Gibraltar was formerly only a military post, and a point of communication between his Majesty's fleets in the Mediterranean and this country. Gibraltar is now a military, a naval, a political, a commercial, and above all, a smuggling station. In its former state it appears that the yellow fever, and, even the common fever of the neighbouring country were never heard of. The crowded population and the trade have brought the yellow fever.

It is impossible but that the governor of the garrison, or at all events that the King in Council must have the power of regulating this population; of preventing useless persons from residing at Gibraltar, of forcing them to quit when they have no business or occupation, and of regulating the spots of ground which ought to be occupied by houses; in what manner, whether in streets, squares, or otherwise, and by what description of houses, how ventilated, &c. If these powers of police exist they ought to be exercised by degrees, and temperately and moderately. If they do not exist, they ought to be given to the Crown, as it must be observed that Gibraltar is not like other towns even enclosed by fortified walls.

Gibraltar is at a distance from the mother country, and held only as a military post. There is no territory under its protection to which the superabundant population can resort if not required in the garrison. Even if there were such territory it could not be permitted that it should be so occupied. If such a misfortune as occurred in 1828 had occurred in time of war,

the whole population, and probably the garrison and the place itself, would have been lost. It is absolutely necessary then to lose no time in taking this subject into consideration; and in adopting every measure that may tend to apply a remedy.

These measures may be attended by expense, besides that of providing water for scouring the drains as above suggested.

But among the points to be considered must be the possibility of providing the expense of them, for that for a supply of wholesome water for the inhabitants, the opening of streets, and the detailed management of the police of the place, ought not to be defrayed by a local tax on the inhabitants.

There is one more point referred to in these papers, to which I should think a remedy could be applied without additional expense, and that is the execution of the quarantine laws. These laws are very inconvenient to trade, particularly to that branch of it which we *so laudably* pursue at Gibraltar, the smuggling trade. But it appears to me that as the lives of the community and garrison, and the safety of the place itself, as a possession of the Crown of England, are at stake, we ought to order a strict execution of the quarantine laws at Gibraltar; and to commence by a strict enquiry into the circumstance of communication stated to have taken place with ships actually *in pratique* in 1828; and to punish those guilty of having by their negligence suffered or corruptly connived at such an abuse.

By all these measures we should give Gibraltar a chance in future.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 19th August, 1829.

I enclose a despatch to Stuart upon the state of the East. Should you approve of it, and will return it to-morrow, it may go to Paris on Friday.

We held our Conference yesterday. Upon the recommendation of the ambassadors I was very cautious, and confined myself to a declaration of being ready to discuss the subject whenever the other plenipotentiaries were provided with instructions. Lieven gave no opinion at all; and Roth said he was ordered to approve of the proposition, but to say nothing respecting the limits to which it was to be applied.

I then urged the compulsion of the Greeks to an observance of the armistice, which subject we discussed for an hour. They both professed to have no instructions upon the subject, but Lieven positively denied that he ever engaged to force the Greeks to comply with our request. He

thought the reasons given by Capo d'Istria for declining were good and valid; but upon this point he is to get instructions also. Roth supported all my arguments, but said he had no instructions upon the point at issue. I am to prepare a Protocol of the Conference, which shall be sent to you before signature. Having written some time ago to Lord Stuart upon this subject, I shall probably know to-morrow the opinion of the French government. Should it be favourable it may be as well to let Roth state it upon the Protocol before it is signed. I intended, as Lieven agreed to ask for instructions, not to enter at length upon the question, but very shortly to state the reasons for recommending the adoption of the measure. Should Lieven think proper to argue the matter upon the Protocol, the statement may be enlarged accordingly.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[1418.]

To Lord Ellenborough.

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

Walmer Castle,
20th August, 1829.

I beg you to send me the names of the officers to be created knights by patent. Likewise the Christian names of Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald, that I may put the promotion of each in the official course of being completed.

I have perused and returned the Persian despatches. They are very curious and interesting. I have made two notes on the despatch herewith returned.

I spoke to you at Windsor respecting Sir J. P. Grant.

I think your instruction respecting Mirza Shah Abbas very sufficient. I don't see upon what points he can require further instructions.

I perfectly understand Sir A. Campbell's disinclination to re-cede anything ceded to him in consequence of the war and the negotiations at Yandaboo, and I feel the difference made by him respecting the cession of Pegu during the negotiations, and the retrocession at present of the Tenasserim Coast.

I will look at the question of the operations in the Burmese empire if you will send me a map. I agree with Sir A. Campbell. Indeed I suggested that line of operations in the first campaign, in a Memorandum sent to Lord Amherst by Mr. Wynn.

I don't like the landing at Ramsee and then again at Aeng. But I must look again at the whole case before I give a final opinion.

Believe me, my dear Lord Ellenborough,

Very sincerely yours,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1419.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Walmer Castle, 20th August, 1829.

I return your despatch with the suggestion of one or two alterations. The King should see it. But it will produce no effect, and we must seriously consider our position.

The result of the Conference was better than I expected. I think that Roth will not give the opinion of his Court upon the Protocol before you prepare it. You had better not delay to prepare it. Adverting to what passed in the Conference of November, as well as in that of March, and to what is in the Protocol of the last date, I cannot understand the meaning which Prince Lieven gives to the word *réclament*.

I believe you wrote to Lord Heytesbury respecting the conduct of the President of Greece and of Monsieur Bulgary. I recommend to you to communicate this Protocol to Lord Heytesbury, and to point out to him what passed in the Conferences of November and March; that we have done all that we promised; and that we now desire the fulfilment of the word *réclament*. That this word *réclament* could not mean that the Emperor should ask and be refused. But that as we had taken a decided step in the negotiation contrary to our opinions and principles, in order to avoid injuring the objects of the Alliance, so the other contracting parties to the Treaty were bound to give effect to the engagement made to us.

I would recommend to you to send a copy of this and of the former despatch to Mr. Seymour, to be communicated to the King of Prussia. I don't know whether you have read the despatches from Persia, but they contain some curious passages respecting an intention to make war upon the Emperor. It would be very desirable to send these to Lord Heytesbury, and, at the same time, to communicate to him the advice given by Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald to the Persian government. He must take care, however, to use this last document with reserve, as it might betray the inclination of the King of Persia to renew the war.

Believe me, my dear Lord Aberdeen,

Yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 20th August, 1829.

I enclose the *projet* of a Protocol of the last Conference. I do not know what Lieven may answer to the last proposition; should he refer it to his Court for instructions, without entering into arguments against it, perhaps it will be sufficient that it should thus be announced. Should he combat the proposition by any reasoning, I shall reserve the right to enter upon the Protocol the motives at length upon which the proposition was made.

I yesterday saw Mr. Temple,* who has just arrived from St. Petersburg. Of course his persuasion is the same as that of Lord Heytesbury, with respect to the Emperor's desire of peace; but what was more material in his statement, was the account which he gave of the internal condition of Russia; especially as affecting the Emperor's disposition upon this subject. He says that the Emperor makes no secret of the difficulties of his situation at home. There is a great deal of discontent, perhaps without any very definite object, but likely to lead to mischief. The proprietors are becoming rapidly more distressed, and especially among the owners of land poverty is increasing. The war had been almost universally unpopular, although the recent successes have begun to change those feelings. Mr. Temple says that it is impossible to form a notion of the degree to which the hatred of foreigners employed in the army is carried among the true Russians. He is convinced that the complete failure of the campaign would have been comparatively little felt, in consequence of the number of foreigners possessing command. All these reasons persuade him that the Emperor is desirous of turning his attention to domestic affairs.

This is all very well, but on the other hand, even if inclined, it may now be very difficult for him to stop. The conquest of Constantinople, realising the dreams of a century, may well restore popularity to his measures at home, if he can make up his mind to risk the effect which it may produce upon other Powers. It does not appear likely that he has much to apprehend at present from French displeasure.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[1420.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Walmer Castle, 21st August, 1829.

I return the draft of the Protocol with some notes of mine upon it.

I have read Lord Stuart's despatches Nos. †, which I confess I don't understand; and I don't think that Lord Stuart himself understands the subject on which he writes. It is very clear, however, that the existing French government is as much in the hands of Russia as the last was. The person

* The Hon. William Temple, then Secretary to the British Embassy at St. Petersburg.

† Blank in manuscript.

at the head of it has more capacity than any others who have been there; and he knows better than others the desire of this country to keep upon good terms with France; and the sacrifices that we would make to secure that object. I would make many sacrifices, indeed any sacrifices excepting our honour. I have warned Polignac upon this point. They must not cheat us in the performance of an engagement. We cannot stand that. But I will go further, and say that whatever the French may do, the Emperor of Russia dares not in the existing temper of his country break faith with this. I am therefore very anxious that we should push vigorously this affair of the Greek operations. We lost our ground by the Protocol of the 22nd March. They now think they can drive us to any extremity; and the French are taking extra liberties everywhere. For instance, at Buenos Ayres and at Terceira. We must set them right respecting our feelings and intentions. I don't doubt that it will be found that they are at least as desirous of keeping on good terms with us as we are of being on good terms with them. But they choose to submit to their liberal party, and bully; whilst we remain quiet.

I would recommend to you to desire Lord Heytesbury particularly to advert to the manner in which this reasonable requisition of ours is treated by Prince Lieven.

I confess that it makes me sick when I hear of the Emperor's desire for peace. If he desires peace, why does he not make it? Can the Turks resist him for a moment? He knows that they cannot. Why not state in conciliatory language his desire for peace, and reasonable terms to which the Porte can accede? This would give him peace to-morrow. He is looking to conquest; and by-the-bye, the plunder of Constantinople, if nothing else, would satisfy more than one starving claimant upon his bounty, besides what it would give to the public treasury.

The wisest thing that Metternich ever did was to arm Austria as soon as the Turkish war commenced.

If he had not done so, Austria would have been attacked as soon as the Turkish war should be brought to a conclusion. I don't believe one word of the desire for peace of a young Emperor at the head of a million of men, who has never drawn his sword.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

India Board, 22nd August, 1829.

The Court of Directors have decided on petitioning against Sir J. P. Grant.

I omitted to tell you that they have at my suggestion made Sir Sidney Beckwith provisional successor to Sir John Malcolm. Sir John Malcolm was by no means well when the last accounts came away. I should like to have an opportunity of full communication with you and Lord Melville before the Indian question is brought before the Cabinet. There should be no great delay in bringing it before the Cabinet, for a negotiation, if any should be necessary with the Court of Directors, will take a long time, and it is desirable to know as early as possible what line is to be taken upon so important a matter. The further papers which are in preparation will not be ready for six weeks, but they do not in any degree affect the principle upon which the future management of India and of the commerce of China is to rest.

I was aware of the nature of the advantage Russia derives from the possession of Anapa and Poti. I wanted full information as to the communications from those ports to the interior, and I find on referring to the letter I have certainly not been specific enough in stating what I desire. The passage shall be altered accordingly; and that permitting the envoy to receive an assignment of revenue arising from particular districts for the payment of troops, shall be omitted. I feel very anxious on the subject of the progress of the Russians in that quarter. I feel a presentiment that, step by step as the Persian monarchy is broken up, they will extend their influence and advance their troops, more especially under such a man as Paskewitch, till, without quarrelling with us, they have crept on to Cabul, where they may at their leisure prepare a force for the invasion of India. I was obliged to send to the India House for the Christian names of Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe. I now enclose the proper descriptions of all the officers who are to be knighted, and that of Colonel Macdonald.

I have got together all the maps we have of the frontiers of the Burmese empire, and sent them to the Treasury to remain there for you. Shall I send the report of the officer who marched across the mountains from the valley of the Irrawaddy to Aeng?

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

Sir Henry Hardinge to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Worthing, 22nd August, 1829.

I am much obliged to your Grace for the suggestion contained in your letter of the 11th, which I have adopted, of bringing every man's case *henceforward* for discharge before a court-martial, the report to be made upon oath and the commanding officer held responsible that no case is unnecessarily brought before such courts.

We have proved that undue credit for length of service has been in some regiments *intentionally* given to bad men in order (by turning a period) to

get rid of them; thus making vice and irregularity the readiest military qualifications for a discharge and a pension. In short, the investigations are exposing a mass of fraud and laxity in the management of the interior of regiments as astonishing as it is disgraceful.

The Irish regiments which we have disposed of have given an annual saving of 7000*l.* a year in pension; 12,000*l.* to be refunded, and nearly as much more in the frauds which these discoveries have strangled in their birth.

Upon the whole army, taking the average of the regiments which have been sifted, there will be an immediate annual saving of 30,000*l.* a year by putting down fraud and forgery; a great future saving, exclusive of the diminution of expense which the new regiments will gradually obtain when they are brought into operation.

With regard to the permanent pension *after* fourteen years, I have limited it to cases of disability so decidedly permanent that no future or periodical re-examination could alter the first decision, such as total blindness, distortions of the spine, or loss of limbs, &c. All other cases are to be *temporary* and *conditional*, according to your Grace's view of the question.

Two or three Whigs here profess to be in great good humour with your Grace and your government; however the natural desire of a stronger infusion of Whig ingredients is occasionally displayed; but as to our ultra friends, they are very generally convinced that their *bullying* tone must be unsuccessful.

Hitherto the weather here has done little mischief to the harvest. About half the wheat is down, the crops rather better than an average season.

Your Grace's very devoted servant,

H. HARDINGE.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Tunbridge Wells, 22nd August, 1829.

You will have observed from Stuart's despatch the great change which has taken place in the language of Pozzo. He writes so obscurely that it is not easy to understand him; but it would certainly appear that some considerable sacrifice must have been made to produce so great a change. Not knowing exactly what had happened, I thought it prudent to caution him with respect to the despatch which I had addressed to him upon the progress of the Russians. This was before I received your letter of the 20th; but the despatch may still be communicated to the King if you think proper, especially as I have made some parts of it more civil towards the Emperor than before. My letter to Stuart is enclosed.

I have not written to Heytesbury upon the conduct of Capo d'Istria and of Count Bulgary, but have only complained to Lieven, by whom it will no doubt be reported. I told him at the same time that Heytesbury would be instructed to represent the matter at St. Petersburg. This shall be done immediately. I enclose an answer to his enquiries respecting the desired recall of the Lievens.

I have not seen the despatches from Persia, but will enquire for them on

my return to town the day after to-morrow, and will make the use of them which you desire.

The despatch, founded upon engagements in the Protocol, to induce a compliance on the part of the Greeks with our demand to abstain from hostilities, was addressed to Stuart. A copy of this, with the Protocol, shall be sent to Heytesbury, with such addition as may be necessary.

Ever, my dear Duke, yours most sincerely,

ABERDEEN.

I have just received your letter of yesterday, with the Protocol enclosed. I shall know to-morrow in what manner Lieven thinks proper to treat the proposition to force the compliance of the Greeks. He may insert in the Protocol what he pleases for himself, and what I add will depend upon his statement; but the matter should be pressed by all means.

[1421.]¹

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Walmer Castle, 24th August, 1829.

I return the copies of the letters which you have sent me. I am inclined to think that Lord Stuart ought to communicate to Prince de Polignac the contents of your despatch respecting the state of the war, even though he should be certain that they will be communicated to Russia. I think that this course is consistent with the intention of the Cabinet. They wished that we should make an effort to save the Turkish empire in concert with France; and that we should be able to prove to the world that we had endeavoured to prevail upon France to act with us. We preferred the mode of a private letter from you to the Prince de Polignac, because we thought that that mode was most likely to conciliate his co-operation. I proposed to you the mode of a public despatch, because I saw in one of Lord Stuart's despatches reason to be of opinion that the Prince de Polignac was under the necessity of adopting the policy of his predecessors; but the confirmation of the justness of that opinion ought not to induce us to deprive ourselves of any of the advantages which the measure was intended to produce.

The step which we are taking is in exact conformity with what we stated to Russia more than once in the commencement of the contest. It is quite consistent with what has frequently passed in discussion with the late French ambassador; and even called for by his own assurances and declarations.

It pledges us to nothing; and as nobody can expect us to go to war single-handed to prevent Russia from taking possession

of Constantinople, while all Europe look on and take no step, we are not bound to follow up this overture by any measure, if France should decline to listen to us. Upon the whole then I think that Lord Stuart should read to Prince de Polignac the despatch ; and again read to him his answer.

I recommend to you always to write to Lord Heytesbury that which you wish should be communicated to the Emperor. The omission to do so is an injustice to the Emperor and his government. We may rely upon it that the object of Prince Lieven is not to keep this country on good terms with the Emperor, excepting by the humiliation of this country. I can't believe that the Emperor will refuse anything that we have a right to ask ; and we ought to ask nothing which we have not a right to require. But Prince Lieven by delays, misrepresentations, &c. &c., defeats the objects of all our requisitions ; and forces us to the point of concession or quarrel upon every trifling matter. The only mode of getting the better of this system is to ask nothing through him. Do all your business through Lord Heytesbury.

I concur in your letter to Lord Heytesbury about Prince and Princess Lieven. They have played an English party game instead of doing the business of their sovereign since I have been in office. I have the best authority for asserting that both have been engaged (as principals) in intrigues to deprive my colleagues and me of power since January, 1828 ; that they have misrepresented our conduct and views to their sovereign ; and that they are the sole cause of the coolness which exists between the two governments at the present moment. I positively deny that there exists any reason to complain of us. We took our view at first of the Russian war. We have always considered it in the same light ; but we have never said one word upon the subject either in Parliament, to any other government, or even in private, that Prince Lieven has not heard from us more than once. Then in private life it is impossible to treat anybody with more deference and respect than we all have Prince and Princess Lieven. Therefore, as ambassadors they have no right to complain of us. Still less as private individuals.

I lament the existence of this state of things. It is very injurious to the interests of both countries ; but there is no remedy for us excepting to employ Lord Heytesbury in every

thing. In another country, in Russia itself or France, or with another sovereign, or in a different state of society, the circumstances which I have above detailed, which I know are true, would amply justify our interference to have Prince Lieven recalled. But it is my opinion that this measure would do us more harm than good. Possibly they might not be recalled; and their triumph would be great. But whether recalled or not the measure of suggesting their recall would be very odious even to those who are now the loudest in their complaints of their conduct, as well as of ours in not having them recalled. I must besides observe that we must take the King's pleasure upon this step; and that although his Majesty says now and then, and thinks more frequently, that they have been here too long, he would very probably object to the measure of having them recalled.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 24th August, 1829.

It seems that Lord Stuart's despatch respecting the opinions of Pozzo was entirely erroneous. His statement must have originated in some unaccountable blunder; probably a casual expression, misinterpreted. I took an opportunity of hinting to Lieven that I understood Pozzo had become better satisfied with the new ministry. In answer to this he assured me that he had just received a letter from him, in which the very opposite feeling appeared in every word. He considers it utterly impossible that the administration can stand a moment after the meeting of the Chambers; and in this case a set of ministers would be forced upon the King who would be the cause of alarm throughout Europe. Should the ministers, conscious of their weakness in the Chambers, attempt to govern by Ordonnances and by force, he considers the revolution as certain. Indeed, from his account it would appear that the principal persons among the liberals are prepared for this, and that they are ready to act. The change of dynasty will be effected he thinks without difficulty or bloodshed. He informed Lieven that he had seen both the King and Polignac, and from both had received the most satisfactory assurances of the course of policy to be observed towards foreign Powers, and that as Russian minister he had nothing whatever to complain of. He added, however, that as a Frenchman he thought it the most fatal measure which it was possible for the King to have adopted.

Had Stuart been correct, the change must have been wonderful indeed; and I thought it prudent to put him on his guard. He will probably have

communicated the despatch, as it was left to his discretion to do so; but in case he should not, I will write to-morrow to desire that it may be done.

Stuart's public despatch to-day respecting Polignac's opinion on the Greek affair is nearly as unintelligible as the former, and at all events is in contradiction apparently with his private letter, which I enclose.

The arrivals to-day from Constantinople are of the 30th. The Turks are at last really alarmed; and if it be true that the Reis Effendi was about to be dismissed, if peace can be obtained by submission it will be made by his successor. Whether it can be had on any terms may perhaps be doubtful. The last intelligence left the Russians within eight or ten easy marches of Constantinople. It is quite clear, and has been for some time that, be its fate what it may, it cannot be affected by anything now to be done here; nor indeed, according to the principle upon which we have acted from the commencement of the war, could it properly have been so, from that moment up to the present time. A new epoch is about to arrive when the whole question will assume another character, and of course will demand the most serious consideration.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

I have left Tunbridge, to return no more; and was sorry not to catch you this morning during your short appearance in town.

The Duke of Northumberland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Phoenix Park, 24th August, 1829.

I think it right to acquaint you that the trials in County Tipperary connected with the unfortunate transactions at Borrisokane have hitherto terminated in a satisfactory manner so far as regards the police and the individual who defended his house against the mob.

When I use the epithet "satisfactory," I refer only to the feelings of honest and dispassionate men; for it is to me very evident that there was a malicious and perjured conspiracy against the lives of the accused. This horrid attempt was defeated in the first instance by the admirable firmness of the Solicitor-General, who although prosecuting for the imputed murder, nobly refused to suppress the truth, and called for a Dr. Heisse, a German I believe by birth, but settled in the town, who accidentally saw from his own window the violence and ferocity with which the police were attacked.

In the second case, that of Ledger (who had fired from his house on the funeral procession of a man killed in the original affray with the police), his life was saved by the casual presence of three or four (English) soldiers of the 62nd Regiment, who deposed in the clearest and fairest manner to an attack made by the persons following this funeral upon Ledger's house before a single shot was fired by those who occupied it, although the contrary was sworn to by the Roman Catholic priest and by those who must be considered under his influence.

On the other hand several convictions have taken place of persons tried for assaults on the police; and in several cases of murder and systematic outrage the supremacy of the law has been vindicated in spite (to say the best of him) of a very timid judge, Moore.

By these results the people will learn that they cannot offend with impunity ; the police will be encouraged in their duty ; individuals will not shrink from defending themselves and their houses against those who may assail them ; and the manner in which the soldiers gave their evidence will prove that they are uncontaminated by the spirit of party or unseduced by the blandishments of popularity.

Major Miller's police is daily successful in the capture of notorious characters, and the new arrangements for the better ordering of Tipperary are advancing towards completion.

I have the honour to be, my dear Duke, with great truth and regard,

Yours very faithfully,

NORTHUMBERLAND.

[1422.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Walmer Castle, 25th August, 1829.

I return Lord Stuart's letter. I understood his despatch as conveying the opinion that the Russian minister was satisfied with the French government as far as regarded their foreign policy, which of course meant the Greek affair, and the war in the East ; and being satisfied with them upon these points, he endeavoured to mitigate the hostility against them, of which he had by his complaints been the original cause. Lieven now says that he is displeased with them as a Frenchman. That may be the case ; and as a Russian he may hereafter find Prince de Polignac a less willing instrument than those who preceded him and others. But I confess that I doubt the truth of Pozzo di Borgo talking so lightly, as he appears to do, of the change of dynasty in France. This is more like the language of one, not half so well informed of antecedent transactions, and more likely to consider of the effect in this country of the facts which he relates, and particularly at the moment at which he relates them.

I think you received from Madame de Lieven some days ago the same opinions which Prince Lieven told you that he had just received from Pozzo di Borgo. The Russian diplomatic agents are kind friends to the Courts at which they are accredited.

We are certainly in a bad way ; and nobody can see a creditable road out of our difficulties. We have made the greatest sacrifices of opinions, principles, and national pride and prejudice to our Allies. In return they have not performed

their promises. This must be set right in the first instance. Without this we can make no concession. We can talk of nothing excepting in the tone and quality of a Power that is degraded. What I see is that Russia will dictate to the Porte the Protocol of March last. She there has us bound. We cannot get out of the difficulty of having consented to make that proposition to the Porte. If our Protocol of the other day reaches her in time, Russia will probably stipulate for an independent Greece with the limits of March last. This will be a step beyond the Protocol of March and beyond that of the other day. This supposes that the Porte will treat, and that Russia will treat at the present moment.

Since writing the above, I have read Lord Stuart's and Mr. Gordon's despatches. I understand that the defeat of the Turks mentioned by Mr. Gordon in his of the 30th is that mentioned by Lord Stuart of which the account was received from Strasbourg by telegraph on the 20th.

I don't recollect the arrangement proposed by Mr. Gordon to satisfy the Turks as a counter *projet* to their proposal to continue to occupy the fortresses in the Morea.

It would be very desirable to suggest to Prince de Polignac to avail himself of the sickness of the French troops in the Morea to withdraw them altogether. It is really necessary to do this.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Have you ever thought of the King's desire that Monsieur Juste de Noailles should be the ambassador here? Monsieur de Caraman is certainly a very good man.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 25th August, 1829.

I enclose two drafts of despatches to Lord Heytesbury upon the subjects respecting which we lately talked. They can go if you approve of them; and, if I have time, I should like to say a few words upon another matter also.

Esterhazy came to me after he had seen you yesterday, and was very inquisitive about our opinions and intentions under the present crisis. He truly said that we might be comparatively at ease, but that it might be a question of life or death to them. Of course, I said nothing to him of consequence, and rather declined entering upon the subject at present.

M. Roth came to me this morning. He says that Polignac writes in good spirits, and feels confident that all this clamour will produce no effect, or at least none which he need fear. He had the story of your correspondence with the King of France, which, although he did not believe a word of, still had obtained some credit, from having been confidently asserted by the Duke of Cumberland. I took the opportunity of giving it a direct contradiction; which I recollect now to have done some time since to the Duke of Cumberland himself, who mentioned the report, without appearing to attach much importance to it.

M. Roth mentioned that Polignac had given instructions to the Duc de Mortemart, which, while they were calculated to do away any unfounded apprehensions, were at the same time such as to show the serious view which the French government took of the state of affairs in the East. He was preparing a memorandum to be submitted to a future Conference, upon the proposition of the ambassadors respecting Greece, and as far as I could collect from him (Roth), it was with a view of justifying a restriction of the limits. He seemed to be but imperfectly informed.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[1423.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Walmer Castle, 26th August, 1829.

You appear to have done with Esterhazy nearly what I did. I expressed, what I really feel, great anxiety; but told him that we could say nothing at present. He appeared to feel that their own situation was peculiar; and very difficult. Ours is the same. But till we shall know the result of our reference to the French government, we must say nothing to them.

Sir William Knighton told you of the object which brought him to Walmer this morning. I have sent him back with a letter calculated to put an extinguisher upon it. This object was certainly suggested by the Duke of Cumberland to disgrace us if we should consent; and to give us a fresh bone of contention, if we should not. But I don't mind such cases as this. The ground on which I stand is sound; and the case is important; I hate a dispute about little affairs.

I return your despatches to Lord Heytesbury. I quite agree in that respecting the Greek and Russian intrigues in the Ionian Islands. I do not recollect the despatch to France adverted to in the other. Would you not give them a hint respecting the operations of the Greeks being carried on by the aid of Russian and French money, and Russian and French

money having obtained their success, while both Powers engaged to England, that the three should claim from Greece a suspension of all hostilities and the withdrawal into the Morea of all the Greek forces! Is this the performance of an engagement?

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the King.

[1424.]

Walmer Castle, 26th August, 1829.

Sir William Knighton has communicated to me your Majesty's wish to go to Paris; and I assure your Majesty that nothing would gratify me more than to promote any wish of your Majesty.

It is needless to discuss the state of the law upon the subject of the King quitting this country; as what I am now about to submit to your Majesty turns upon the circumstances of the time.

There is no doubt that it is important that all the friendly relations between your Majesty and the King of France should be cultivated as much as possible; and particularly those of a personal nature. The happiness and prosperity of your Majesty's kingdom, and the peace of the world, depend in a great degree upon these relations.

But I am confident that your Majesty's presence at Paris at the present moment is not calculated to improve those relations. The King of France has lately made a change in his ministry which, whether beneficial or otherwise, is very unpopular at Paris; and is most falsely attributed to the influence of your Majesty's servants. Nothing would be more false than to state that the cause of your Majesty's visit to Paris at this moment, unexpected as it is, is the desire to countenance, support, and establish the administration recently formed by the King of France. But however unfounded such an assertion, it would be openly made by some, and believed by others, to the great inconvenience of the King of France and his government.

It will be impossible for your Majesty to visit Paris assuming any title or in any character which can conceal that which belongs to you; and I consider it to be essentially necessary that your Majesty should be received upon your arrival at Paris, not only by the King and his Court and his servants, but by

the public at large, with the attention, respect, and affection which are due to you. If I have not mistaken the state of the public opinion at Paris at the present moment, I cannot doubt that you would not be received as the King of this country, whatever his title and character, and particularly your Majesty ought to be. I believe that the King of France would not have the power to protect your Majesty from those effects of the public temper occasioned by the late changes in his ministry falsely attributed to your Majesty's counsels.

It is not fit that your Majesty should be placed in the way of risking such events; which would be equally disagreeable to your Majesty's feelings and to those of your people, as they would be undeserved, and as they would eventually prove detrimental to the friendly relations between the two countries.

I beg that your Majesty will believe that, in writing upon this subject, I have been guided solely by my desire to prevent the occurrence of circumstances which will hurt your Majesty's feelings, and will make you very uncomfortable; and will for that reason greatly irritate all your people.

All of which is humbly submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[1425.]

To Lord Francis Leveson Gower.

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS,

Walmer Castle, 26th August, 1829.

I have received your letter of the 23rd, and Lord FitzRoy Somerset has sent me Sir John Byng's answer to the letter written to him by desire of Lord Hill. I have requested Lord Hill to express to Sir John Byng that he, as well as the governments of both countries, are well satisfied with the proofs which they have uniformly received of his desire to co-operate with them for the preservation of the public peace. In perusing Sir John Byng's letter to Lord Hill, it appears that in some of the stations proposed for the troops there was no magistrate. This would be a case for making the officer a magistrate. That which is essential is to preserve the peace; and to give security to life, property, and the exercise of rights, and confidence to the gentry of the country and the middle classes. The troops and police must be so posted as to attain those objects. If

there are not magistrates to direct, regulate, and be responsible for the efforts and conduct of the troops, and stipendiary magistrates cannot be found, this would be a case for appointing the officer commanding at the post to be a justice of the peace; taking care to instruct him well as to his conduct.

I recommend to you to be liberal in the use of rewards upon conviction. For instance, I lately saw the report of a gentleman in the county of Tipperary, who complained of an outrage by a mob at the head of, or among which, was a noted character whom he named. A reward ought to be offered for his apprehension; and for the discovery of the names and the conviction of any of the parties.

An attempt was made to burn the house of a clergyman in the North, I think near Manor Hamilton, by the name of King. Some of the persons are named. A reward ought to be offered for their apprehension, and conviction of those named, or of any of the parties. Supposing these proclamations to produce no other effect than to shake the confidence in each other of the disturbers of the public peace, and to show the well disposed that government are willing to exert themselves for their protection, they produce a good effect, and everything which can tend to restore confidence in government is of importance.

It is most probable that these measures may have occurred to you; but as I was writing I have thought it as well to mention them.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 26th August, 1829.

We have no arrival to-day, and although there are vague reports of the taking of Constantinople, as yet they appear to have no foundation. It seems to me that we are in a bad way, principally because we are at the mercy of the Emperor. He can insult us if he pleases, and it is for him to judge how far he may venture to do so with impunity. Our position, that is the position of France and England, is more dependent upon the conduct of the Emperor, because we have in some manner guaranteed his sincerity by accepting his promises, and have thus given all Europe reason to believe that they might be satisfied with his assurances. Events have turned out in his favour, and we can no longer expect the same conclusion as if the Turks had held their ground. But if the Emperor should think it to be his interest to act upon the principles which he has professed, and especially

to avoid anything like humiliation of this country, we may still come out of our difficulties with credit. This, with him, will be an affair of calculation. There is certainly much anxiety to know what is likely to be the line we shall take, after the catastrophe. Bülow was with me to-day, probably for the purpose of endeavouring to find out; but said that his Court would continue to expect the fulfilment of the Emperor's promises. I spoke to him in general terms, and only said that, above all things, we must preserve our honour and credit. Any settlement which really injured our national character would never be tolerated in this country.

Seven o'clock.

I have this instant received despatches from Constantinople, which I send with this letter. As the hour of the post is arrived, they will be copied and sent by messenger to you. I enclose a private letter. The sanguine view taken by my brother seems to be entirely founded on the contents of Guilleminot's instructions, and seems scarcely to be justified since the arrival of Müffling at Constantinople. However, the French government is committed by this step of their ambassador; although it is most extraordinary that they should have been in a condition to specify terms of peace which were unknown to Müffling. If it be true that Diebitsch has no authority to suspend hostilities during negotiation, the farce of moderation is at an end.

After the sacrifices which the Emperor has made, can he dare to be moderate?

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

I desired Stuart to take an opportunity, if possible, of letting it be known that M. de Noailles *would be agreeable* as ambassador here; but to take great care and to make no application. The nomination will probably have taken place before he receives my letter, unless the offer should have been made in the first instance to La Ferronnays.

[1426.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Walmer Castle, 27th August, 1829.

I return the despatches and your brother's private letter, and I sincerely congratulate you upon his success.

I recommend to you to call together the Conference, and record his despatch No. 16; and call upon the Conference to deliberate upon it. Send a copy of it to Lord Heytesbury as well as a copy or extract of No. 19. There are parts of this last which ought not to be shown to the Russian government.

You might likewise let Lord Heytesbury know what Müffling says respecting the suspension of hostilities. Lord Heytesbury should remind Count Nesselrode of all the promises made by the Emperor, as well verbal as in writing, since the year 1826 up to the present moment regarding the integrity of the Turkish

Empire, and should point out to him the absolute necessity of performing those promises.

The Emperor has professed that it is not his interest to destroy the Turkish Power; it now remains for him to show that he was sincere in making that profession, and that he will carry into execution the intention which in making it he wished the other Powers of Europe to believe that he entertained.

I should think that we must have a Cabinet. I am ready to go to London at a moment's notice, if you want me, and will let me know on what day.

The present state of the negotiations at Constantinople renders the concert between France and us more important than ever. Parts of No. 19 should be shown to Prince de Polignac. He will see that our ambassador has come forward at the desire of his French colleague upon the faith that the French government were authorised to offer certain terms. The difficulty will become very complicated, if the French government, having made that offer of negotiation on the part of Russia either with or without authority, now desire to slip out of it. We must not allow of this. I see nothing more of the battle reported from Constantinople on the 30th July, and from Strasbourg by telegraph on the 19th August. I hope therefore that the reports of it are not well founded, and that there may still be time.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 27th August, 1829.

Lieven had agreed to the Protocol as it was proposed, and referred to his Court for instructions. I informed him generally of the nature of the intelligence received last night from Constantinople, and he and Matuscewitz have been with me for a couple of hours to-day. In the first place, they deny the possibility of any communication having been made to the French government which could put them in a condition to instruct their ambassador to make any overture to the Porte. I did not think it necessary to enter into the particulars at present, but told them that I understood the basis upon which the Porte was ready to treat did not materially differ from the demands made by M. Fonton to the Grand Vizier; and in fact, so far as I was informed, they were virtually the same, including the settlement of the Greek question.

Matuscewitz was full of professions of the Emperor's desire to do every-

thing with a full concert and understanding with us, in case the fate of the Turkish empire should render such concert necessary. He said that we should see how much he desired to pay the utmost deference and respect to our wishes. I took occasion to say that we must look to our own character and honour, and see how they would be affected by future events and arrangements to be proposed. I said that, however well inclined, the Emperor might not perhaps be able to enter into our situation ; and I instanced the blockade of the Dardanelles as a case in which, if the Emperor had fairly considered our position, and had been actuated by a wish to respect it, he never would have adopted the measure. Matuscewitz at once admitted the truth of this, and said it was a lesson by which they would take care to profit in future. After a great deal of general assurance of cordiality he adverted to the Greek Treaty, and proposed that we should at once put this difficulty out of the way, and prevent any cause of future discussion by finally settling the question at this moment, without any reference to the events of the war or to whatever might be doing at Constantinople. He wished by this to show that this question was settled by the three Powers in the Conference where it first originated ; and he wished to bind his government irrevocably to what we should settle here, whatever might be the issue of the war and the fate of Constantinople. For this purpose he proposed that we should at once apply the principle suggested by the ambassadors to the limits contained in our propositions of the 22nd of March, and thus end the affair. I told him that we would give much to end it ; that we had already sacrificed much, and might possibly have to sacrifice more ; but that it seemed to me to be quite out of the question to convert our propositions into an ultimatum and to deprive the Porte of all the advantages held out by the Treaty, at the very moment the Turks were prepared to treat with us upon the basis of the Treaty itself. The only inducement we had to listen to the suggestion of the ambassadors was the facility which it afforded of speedily concluding the business, and also the argument it afforded for restricting the territory, at the time we were about to place it in a much more advantageous situation in a political view. We had a very long discussion upon the merits of the respective limits proposed, in which much was not gained on either side. I endeavoured to persuade them that they might consistently recede from their opinion of the best limits, in consideration of obtaining greater political advantages for Greece ; and they enforced on me the advantage, in the present state of Turkey, of finally settling the question and preventing all future discussion. They denied at the same time that Russia obtained any greater benefit from the extended limits than the other Powers. I told them that whatever agreement we came to must be in the spirit of mutual concession ; and that it was quite impossible for us to sacrifice our own consistency and sense of justice, even for the sake of terminating this business. I added that we might be tempted for such an object to go beyond the Morea, but that I could not hold out the slightest prospect of our agreeing to their proposition. We ended by agreeing to consider the matter for a day or two, and to see if reflection should make any change in our opinions.

Here, then, are certainly the means of ending the whole affair of the Treaty ; and it cannot be denied that in the present state of the East it would be desirable to have the Emperor positively bound to a definitive

arrangement of Greece. I think they may in some degree give way upon the question of limits; but I am by no means certain. My notion would be to propose the addition of Attica, with the connecting ground north of the Isthmus, to be added to the Morea; and if accepted, to proceed at once to acknowledge this State. Whatever limits are agreed upon, they are ready to compel the Greeks to retire within them. They are equally prepared to give a double guarantee both to Greeks and Turks. I presume there could be no doubt of the proposition I have mentioned being supported by France and preferred by the French government; although they would probably make no great opposition to the Russian proposal, if we were to show the least inclination to yield.

I presume this late acquiescence of the Porte to treat upon the basis of the Treaty of London need not prevent us from proceeding, should the transaction be in other respects desirable. They have delayed so long, that other modes of settlement are actually in progress; and independently of the overwhelming pressure of Russian power in any other negotiation, I believe this would be the most favourable for the Porte.

Matuscewitz very strongly pressed upon me the conviction that he wished to prove the good disposition of his government by his offer to bind them to observe a transaction which should meet with our approbation, and which should endure even if the Sultan, at the moment of signing it, was no longer in existence.

I am desirous of hearing from you upon this subject. If your opinions are decided, and if you can trace out a clear course to follow, pray do so. If you think there can be any good in discussion, you had perhaps better come and share it.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

I enclose a private letter from Stuart, who has properly decided upon communicating my despatch to Polignac, but gives no account of having done so.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1427.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Walmer Castle, 28th August, 1829.

I received this morning your letter of the 27th instant. You cannot do otherwise than assemble the Cabinet on the existing state of affairs. The Chancellor is here. Lord Rosslyn will be here this day. If you will send me down a messenger to-morrow as soon as you will have decided upon the time for the Cabinet, we can attend on Sunday or Monday. If you should fix it for Sunday let it be not earlier than four o'clock. It is very desirable that no time should be lost in considering of and determining upon these questions.

This is the way in which the case appears to me. The Porte having in a certain degree complied with the terms of the

Treaty, we sent our ambassador to Constantinople charged to make certain propositions for executing the Treaty of London. The Porte made a counter proposition which was deemed inadmissible, of which we did not receive the written statement till the day before yesterday. But upon receiving the verbal statement of the proposition of the Porte being deemed inadmissible, the ambassadors at Constantinople proposed in concert to their several Courts, that the three Courts should recognise and guarantee the independence of the Morea, and should leave the Porte without any of the advantages proposed under the Treaty and by the Protocol of the 22nd March.

As soon as we received this proposal from Mr. Gordon, the Conference was assembled, and a proposal was made by you to deliberate upon the proposition suggested by the English and French ambassadors. The French minister concurred in the principle of the proposition, but was not prepared with instructions respecting the limits. The Russian minister and our minister gave no opinion.

On the day before yesterday the objectionable proposition of the Porte was received, which by-the-bye ought to have been before the Conference, before they deliberated upon the suggestion of the ambassadors; and at the same time the report of a Conference between the ambassadors at Constantinople and the Reis Effendi, from which it appears that the Porte have consented to treat under the terms of the Treaty of July, 1827, and that they are prepared to consent to terms, which we at least have always been ready to agree to.

As soon as the Russian ministers in London hear of this transaction at Constantinople, they come to you to propose that we should return to that proposition, on which they had given no opinion a few days before; and that an arrangement should be made of Greece by the three parties to the Treaty without the consent of the Porte.

This is the form in which this transaction comes before us.

In respect to the thing itself, I am of opinion that even if the Russian minister had not declined to discuss the suggestion of the ambassadors, even if the three Courts had gone so far as to agree to and sign a Protocol to carry that suggestion into execution, we could not have executed it (if not communicated to either party) after we should have received the consent of the Porte to treat upon the basis of the Treaty of July, 1827.

This is the way in which I view the case at present, subject always to the decision which the Cabinet may think proper to come to upon it.

But if we look a little further at the case, we shall see still stronger reason for adhering to our Treaty. We mean to maintain the power of the Porte; and although we were ready to agree to the adoption of a mode of executing our purpose in Greece, consistent with the respect due to that Power, our concurrence in that mode was founded upon the necessity of coming to some settlement in Greece for the sake of the Porte itself. It besides appeared that the Porte wished that we should take upon ourselves the settlement. But when the Porte adopts the Treaty of the 6th July and declares a readiness to negotiate upon it, we cannot deprive her of her dominions upon any other terms than those offered and agreed to.

I am aware that this decision may lead to greater difficulties respecting limits, and I see that as usual the Russian ministers have taken especial care to give no opinion about limits, be the nature of the arrangements what it may.

In respect to other matters regarding the East, I think this is the time to remind the Russian ministers of what we told them at the commencement of the contest, and of their repeated promises and professions not only to us, but to all Europe, since the commencement of last year. It is impossible to believe that the Emperor will break his word, or that he will pursue a course which will force him to break his word, as soon as he is informed that the Porte have substantially accepted of the propositions made to the Grand Vizier by Monsieur Fonton. This is the language which ought to be held by our ministers everywhere.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 28th August, 1829.

I have sent the despatches from Constantinople to Lord Heytesbury, and have instructed him how to use them with the Emperor. Lord Stuart will also have sufficient to enable him to communicate to Polignac the state of the negotiation.

I propose to summon a Conference for to-morrow, at three o'clock. The accession of the Porte may be made known and the despatch inserted in the

Protocol; but I suppose we shall not advance much further. The question still remains whether, if we can obtain our own limits, we shall not act more advantageously for the Porte by concluding the matter at once in the Conference. If this be not done, there is some chance of Diebitsch settling it "selon ses intérêts et ses convenances." Any propositions of ours in application of the Treaty will of course be referred to Petersburg, and all the dangers of delay will be incurred during the present most critical state of the Turkish empire. The last battle does not appear to be confirmed; but my brother's account of the universal discouragement and growing disaffection is worse than a defeat. I do not know that we have any proposition at the present moment to submit to the Cabinet; but before anything shall be decided in the Conference, which has not previously been approved of, it will naturally be right to call them together. I rather think, however, that some advantage would arise in the present state of affairs if we were to have a Conference at which you should be present; or what perhaps would be better, if you were to meet Lieven and Matuscewitz, in order to follow up the discussion with them, which I have commenced, upon our relations with Russia at this moment.

I enclose a private letter received to-day from Lord Heytesbury, containing an important declaration by the King of Prussia, although it is one upon which he probably would not act. I send also a letter from Seymour, which shows the view which the Prussian government is determined to take of our conduct at Constantinople.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

I enclose a letter to Lord Stuart upon the recall of the French troops from the Morea.

[1428.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Walmer Castle, 29th August, 1829.

I return the papers which you sent down yesterday.

The continued remonstrances of the Prussian minister are too bad. I recommend that you should write a despatch to Mr. Seymour, enclose that from your brother on the negotiation with the Reis Effendi, and that respecting General Müffling. Point out to Mr. Seymour that we have done exactly what the Prussian government recommended, that we did advise the Reis Effendi to make peace upon the terms on which the French ambassador was instructed by his Court to say that the Emperor was willing to conclude.

That the Porte was willing to negotiate upon those terms, and that then the ambassadors were informed by General Müffling that General Diebitsch had no authority to suspend his hostilities.

After this transaction we hope that we shall hear no more of such reproaches. I would show this despatch to Bülow, and would desire that it should be laid before the King of Prussia.

It appears to me that we cannot do otherwise than have a Cabinet to decide whether you will proceed to settle Greece according to the Treaty or by recognition of its independence.

The last is a fresh act of hostility against the Porte, which I would earnestly recommend should be avoided ; particularly as it appears that the Porte is now anxious to settle the question according to the Treaty.

I am perfectly ready to do what is necessary. But I confess that I don't think any discussion between the Russian ministers and me will tend to improve our relations.

They misconstrue and misrepresent everything that I can say.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 29th August, 1829.

I will summon the Cabinet for Monday, at half-past three o'clock.

We have had a Conference to-day, at which I produced the despatch of my brother, announcing the accession of the Porte to the Treaty of London ; and, with some explanations and additions, their acceptance of the Protocol of the 16th of November. I invited them to deliberate upon the contents of this despatch ; but as the official accession of the Porte had not been received, and as Guilleminot's report also had not arrived, we agreed to adjourn the Conference to another day, in order to give time for consideration, as well as in the hope that we may be in possession of the report of the French ambassador. In the mean time I have furnished M. Roth with a copy of the despatch to be sent to Paris this day ; so that he may still receive instructions, if his government should not think it necessary to wait for the report of their ambassador. I took the opportunity of urging the necessity which the accession of the Porte had imposed on us to establish the armistice, and to enforce a suspension of hostilities between Greeks and Turks. Lieven was disposed to object to this, and to contend that under no circumstances could the Turks now pretend to these conditions ; but Matuscewitz admitted at once that if the Porte had adhered to the Treaty, without specially excepting an armistice, they were entitled to have it established. They refused, however, to make any order upon my communication alone, and insisted upon waiting for Guilleminot's report and the Turkish declaration.

I did not return to the subject of the former suggestion of the ambassadors, as entered upon the last Protocol, and proposed to be acted upon by the Russian ministers. I must, however, observe that some of your observa-

tions upon this subject in your letter of yesterday are founded in misapprehension. Lieven considers himself as acceding to the suggestion of the ambassadors, and only referring to his Court for instructions respecting its execution. I must also say that the proposition of the Russian ministers was not made in consequence of the information of the accession of the Porte to the Treaty of London—for of this disposition they were only vaguely informed by me—but in the belief of the battle of Kirk Kilissia having taken place; that Diebitsch was advancing without opposition to the capital; and that propositions of peace had been made in which the Greek affair was included. Now, as we had always protested against the connection of the two questions, they offered to separate them here; and without reference to whatever might have been done at Constantinople, they offered to bind the Emperor definitively upon the Greek question by an arrangement entered into now, and which therefore could have no connection with the Russian peace. Very likely they may have some underhand view in making the proposal; but if we could agree upon the terms I do not think that it would be without its advantages. Will it be wise not to take into account the actual state of Turkey and of the government? as well as the general spirit of submission to the enemy and disaffection among the people? Should the Sultan and the Turkish government be utterly destroyed, I presume the Greek Treaty can no longer exist; although we shall still have on our hands the disposal of these, as well as the other provinces of the empire. On the other hand, if General Diebitsch should dictate terms of peace in which the Greek question should be settled, and settled in a way not conformable to our wishes and opinions, our credit and influence would suffer materially, and yet it is not very easy to see how we could help ourselves.

A great deal must depend upon what we are prepared to do, in the event of the Emperor choosing to interpret his promises in his own way. But happen what may, it must be considered as a great temptation to settle the Greek affair according to our own views of what is most desirable; and most consistent, too, with the interests of the Porte, in case that government should continue to have any existence.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

Here is the last news from the army:—On the 29th of July, according to Matuscewitz, the advanced guard was *at Faki*.

[1429.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Walmer Castle, 30th August, 1829.

I understood that the Russians had given no opinion upon the proposal to recognise an independent Greece. Indeed my first recollection of your letter when I wrote to you on Friday, and the draft of the Protocol was, that Lieven had objected, but had taken the proposition *ad referendum*. Upon referring to your letter however I found that he gave no opinion.

My opinion is that the whole case of the Porte has been altered by the consent of the Reis Effendi to negotiate on the Greek Treaty and on their dispute with Russia. It is possible that the Emperor may break his word. He may refuse (or his general for him) to make peace, or he may impose terms which he promised, or which he is engaged by Treaty, not to impose alone. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof. When these occurrences take place we must see what we ought, what we can, and what we will do. But that which it appears to me we cannot now do, is to take Greece from the Porte according to a mode to which the Porte does not agree, the Porte having declared their consent to negotiate upon another mode offered by our plenipotentiaries—viz., the Treaty of July, 1827.

The whole case appears to me to be so simplified by the submission of the Porte, that there is *now* no difficulty in it. The difficulty will come hereafter, if the Emperor should venture to refuse to treat; or, after consenting to treat break his word or his engagements, and all Europe should quietly submit.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Francis Leveson Gower.

[1430.]

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS,

London, 1st September, 1829.

I am induced to trouble you in consequence of some of your late letters to Peel, which I have seen. You may rely upon it, that your late discussions with Sir John Byng will have had a beneficial effect. They will show the officers at the hospital, as well as those in the country, that we here consider the riots in the county of Tipperary, and the suppression of those riots, as very important. I am much mistaken if the proof which these discussions afford of those truths do not stimulate their exertions. They can certainly do a great deal of good, each in his station.

I have considered what you say about the yeomanry in the north of Ireland. I observed what you wrote a few posts ago respecting a general conspiracy or combination among the Roman Catholics, of which the object is undoubtedly hostile to the British government, and probably separation from Great Britain. The more one reflects upon Ireland, its history, its present state, its absentees, its parties, its natural riches and productiveness, and the poverty, misery, excessive numbers, ignorance, and bigotry of the people, the more convinced one

is that this is the real object that the Roman Catholic clergy and demagogues are driving at. I always thought so; and their continuing to act with the same views does not at all alter my opinion of our measure of last Session.

Much time will elapse, and much labour, good will and good sense must be applied to the government of Ireland, before we can expect to alter men's views of this connexion. They must be made sensible by experience of the practical benefits resulting from the British connexion, before they can be driven from the pursuit of objects calculated to flatter their vanity and ambition, to gratify their desire to avenge former defeats and misfortunes, and to hold out hopes of ease, comfort, and riches.

Let us apply this state of things to the measure of disbanding the yeomanry, particularly in the north of Ireland. The yeomanry in that part of Ireland in particular are mostly the Protestants. They are the old English garrison in Ireland. Happen what may, they will fight for the connexion with Great Britain. They are very ill-behaved, very inconvenient, their discipline very imperfect and defective; but still, if we are right in our conjectures of the state of Ireland, they are our only friends there, and are necessary to us.

But there are other views of this case. Suppose that it is not true that there is such a combination or conspiracy as you and I believe there is, we cannot doubt that the animosity between Protestants and Catholics is most violent, and that the latter, even throughout the north of Ireland (excepting possibly the county of Antrim), are the most numerous. We see that the Roman Catholics attack the Protestants with pikes, even when the Protestants are armed. Would it be fair to leave this least numerous party without arms, discipline, connexion with each other, or organisation, at the mercy of their more numerous and barbarous enemy, armed with pikes and organised? Would it be possible to do so? Would not the Protestants either quit the country, or form armed associations without the authority of government, after the example of the volunteers in 1778 and 1779, which would be found much more dangerous and difficult to manage than the corps of yeomanry? Would not the discussions upon these subjects, and the partial contests to which they would give rise in Ireland, occasion an apprehension and ferment in this country and in Scotland, for the safety of the Protestants in Ireland, ten times worse even than that which

was the consequence of the discussion of the Roman Catholic relief and the measures of the last Session?

I earnestly recommend to you to turn your mind to the discipline of the yeomanry; to the care of their arms and ammunition; to the prevention of their using them excepting when legally placed on duty, and to the augmentation of their numbers thus reformed and rendered more useful and less inconvenient; rather than to the adoption of any measures for putting them down or disarming them.

I read with great pleasure Mr. Dogherty's account of his successful exertions at Clonmel to perform the real duty of the law officer of the Crown, that is, to see justice done to the subject. In perusing that letter it occurred to me that an opportunity offered of rendering to government, to justice, and to good order in Ireland, the most essential service that ever was rendered.

Could Mr. Spain, the priest, be prosecuted for perjury, or for a conspiracy to convict Ledger, or the policemen, of murder by perjured evidence? If either could be done (and I entreat you to have the case well considered), the Roman Catholic priests, the demagogues, and riotous peasantry, would receive a lesson such as they have not received for years; and more would be done to conciliate the public in this country, and the loyal and peaceable in Ireland, to the government, than I can describe.

I have troubled you more at length than I intended; and I feel confident that you will be sensible of my motive for doing so, and convinced of my confidence in whatever you and the Duke may determine upon after considering these suggestions.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

India Board, 1st September, 1829.

In a Memorandum of yours dated the 31st of July, 1828,* it is said that the Company's officers should have brevet rank for the siege of Bhurtpoor.

No application has, I believe, been made for brevet rank, as it could not be known that there was a chance of obtaining it.

Is not the service of the army in Ava such as to entitle some of the officers employed to the same favour of brevet rank? and in the event

* See vol. iv. of this Series, page 561.

of brevet rank being granted to the Bengal army, would it not be advisable to select some officers of the Madras Army for it?

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

India Board, 2nd September, 1829.

I received some time ago a very pressing application from Sir A. Campbell for knighthood for Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkinson, who commanded the artillery in all the battles in Ava, and for Dr. Heward, who was at the head of the medical Staff.

Sir Archibald shows in his letter a good deal of soreness, as if the services of the Bengal army had been much more highly rewarded for the siege of Bhurtpoor than those of the Madras army for the campaigns in Ava.

I find Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkinson has already been made a C.B. for his services in Ava, and that at the same time six other officers of the Madras army received the same honour, and sixteen of the Bengal army.

It seems rather unreasonable to ask for knighthood for a man who has already been made C.B., and for the same service; and I should think the Commandant of Artillery at the siege of Bhurtpoor would place his services higher than those of an officer who directed the guns attached to an army which never exceeded in the field 4000 men.

Of the Doctor I can find no mention, and I thought he had lost all his patients.

If you should be of opinion that the answer to both applications should be in the negative, I will take care to word it so as to gratify Sir Archibald.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

[1431.]

To the Right Hon. Henry Goulburn.

MY DEAR GOULBURN,

London, 3rd September, 1829.

I return your papers, in which I concur.

That which we shall have to provide for in the Ways and Means of the year is the interest upon two millions of Exchequer Bills, which we shall thus consent to lend out upon public works.

At the end of the twelve years, or whenever we please, we can discontinue the system. The annual charge will then cease, and the 4 per cent. interest upon the whole sum lent will be paid to the public until the whole sum lent will be repaid.

There cannot be a better and more economical scheme for the public. We shall do exactly what is required. We shall supply the means, at a comparatively small expense, of laying out a large sum annually in works of permanent improvement,

the execution of which will furnish employment immediately, as their completion and existence in the country will hereafter.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

This will do for England ; but we shall be under the necessity of doing something for Ireland.

To the Right Hon. Henry Goulburn.

[1432.]

MY DEAR GOULBURN,

London, 3rd September, 1829.

The first question respecting the disposal of the redundant officers of the Customs is, whether there are any in the Excise.

If there are none, we should put upon the Excise a proportion of all the officers of the Customs, become redundant ; if there are some, the proportion to be imposed upon the Excise should be smaller. But in either case we should insist upon the officers of the Customs being employed upon the first vacancy which may occur in their rank ; particularly if the Commissioners of Excise have the power of passing over an officer in order to employ another. If they have that power, it may as well be exercised for the convenience of the public service, as to gratify their own caprice or their own views for the service.

I have a very bad story against the Commissioners of Excise. If it is true, it proves that nothing can be more fallacious than these schemes to prevent the government from exercising patronage.

Something, however, must be done about patronage. I had yesterday a report from Planta of the vacancy of one stamper's place, for which applied Colonel Shawe, General Phipps, all the gentlemen of the Horse-Guards each for his own *protégé*, and not less than a dozen members of Parliament. I struck off all the former, and desired Planta to give it to whichever of the others he pleased.

I think there is a proof of neglect in the story which I read in the newspapers of the forgery in the Customs.

Surely the Receiver-General ought to receive some notice of the precept to pay money, besides the precept itself, if that instrument is carried to him by the person to whom the money

is to be paid. We shall have plenty of forgery if that practice is continued.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1433.]

To Lord Lyndhurst.

MY DEAR LORD CHANCELLOR,

London, 3rd September, 1829.

Since my return to London I have received an account of the state of the King's eyes, of which it is fit that you should be apprised. His Majesty has a cataract formed upon the left eye. He cannot see with that eye; and the cataract is in a state for the operation. A cataract is forming upon the right eye. This cataract may be formed and in a state for the operation in a short time. The time cannot be exactly stated. If the King should be heated, or feel any anxiety of mind or annoyance; or be out of temper; the formation of the cataract would be accelerated. In this case the cataract upon the right eye would be in a state for the operation in a fortnight.

The King can see but little with the right eye; and of course his power of seeing will decrease every day.

It is not proposed to attempt the operation upon the left eye till the cataract upon the right eye is in a state for the operation.

The operation is very common; not difficult or dangerous if the patient is in good habit of body, about which of course his physicians would take care. Its success is nearly certain.

I have given you the statement of all the details communicated to me with the King's consent. The oculist who has seen the King is Mr. Alexander.

We must consider of the certainty that the King will be deprived of sight for a time; and of the possibility that he may lose his sight altogether, which however I hope is not probable.

How is the business of the country to be carried on? The late King signed after he was blind. We could not prevail upon the present King to do so.

I hope that you found Lady Lyndhurst pretty well; and that you are comfortable at Walmer Castle. I beg you not to think of moving till she shall have recovered entirely.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

India Board, 4th September, 1829.

You will be surprised to hear again of the six extra regiments. Their history in India and in England affords a good practical illustration of the defects of the present system of government.

Immediately on having obtained your approval of the alterations I suggested in the "Previous Communication" I sent them to the India House. This was two months ago. I at the same time communicated privately to Lord Dalhousie, who had not then left Portsmouth, and to Lord W. Bentinck the intention of disbanding these regiments, every regard being had for the interests of the officers belonging to them. Week after week I mentioned the subject to the Chairs. I wrote to the chairman to say I should be very sorry to require them under the Act of Parliament to frame a despatch upon the subject, but I should be obliged to do so if they did not send up the letter in draft. At last they did, adopting some of the suggestions contained in the alterations sent to them, but not disbanding the regiments. I immediately altered the letter, introducing substantially the alterations approved of by you, and giving the reasons for those alterations according to the Act. A delay of a week occurred because Lord Ashley, who was out of town, and who had before expressed his dissent from the alterations inserted by me in the P. C., had left word that he desired to see the letter in draft. He repeated his objections to the whole style and tone of the letter, submitting to your judgment upon the policy of disbanding the regiments.

It so happened that the paragraph he particularly objected to was one written in consequence of a suggestion of yours. I sent the letter to Sir George Murray and Goulburn for their signatures.

After some days a long letter of representations came from the Court of Directors, agreed to by them unanimously. They requested the alterations might be withdrawn. These arguments had no effect upon the real question, as it seemed to me, and I immediately wrote back, expressing much regret that the Board could not concur in their judgment, declaring our opinion to be unaltered, and directing, in the terms of the Act of Parliament, that the letter should be sent as altered.

Yesterday the Chairs brought me another paper upon the subject, in which they rest the inexpediency of disbanding the regiments, upon the effect it may have on the temper of the army. This is really the only debatable ground.

I send you herewith this paper, and a memorandum which, I believe, states the whole case fairly.

Whatever your opinion may be upon a reconsideration of the question will, I have no doubt, be right, and I will carry it into effect; but I own my present opinion is that if the Home authorities yield to the local government, and the Board of Control to the Directors on this point, there is an end of all hope of making the Local government feel and act as subordinate to the authority at home. There is an end of all hope of effecting great reductions of expense; and India will be governed, as far as it can then be said to be governed at all from this country, not by the King's ministers, but by the Directors of the East India Company.

I believe the disbanding of the six regiments to be required by views of policy and of economy in India; and the insisting upon their being disbanded to be equally required by views of policy here. I have no fear of the responsibility of the measure, which may rest wholly with me; but, I repeat, whatever your final judgment may be, I will carry your opinion into effect in the best manner I can.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

[1434.]

To Lord Ellenborough.

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH, London, 4th September, 1829.

The case of the six regiments is becoming very serious. The Court of Directors threaten us with a mutiny in Bengal, and throw upon the King's servants the responsibility for it.

It may be very right to incur the risk; but I should wish to see all the papers again, and if we cannot agree with the Court it will be necessary that the Cabinet should consider the subject before we proceed farther. I beg you, then, to send me the papers, and I will write you immediately what I think.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 5th September, 1829.

I forward to you the despatches from Lord Cowley and my brother,* brought by Mr. Wellesley. The enclosure in my brother's despatch, drawn up by the Reis Effendi himself, and delivered to the ambassador,—the translation having been compared and certified by the interpreter of the embassy with the Turkish minister,—ought surely to afford sufficient ground for us to act upon, and to establish the armistice in Greece by an order from the Conference. If you think the present arrival will enable us to do anything at a Conference, I wish you would contrive to be present on Tuesday morning. You can send here, and have it summoned at any hour you please. I am going to-day to Windsor, where I remain until Monday, but I will meet you at any time on Tuesday morning which may be convenient, if you think we can meet to any good purpose.

I enclose a letter from Lord Cowley. The language of Tatistcheff is not new; he made the same remark after his return from Warsaw, respecting the Emperor's demands. Matuscewitz, however, has frequently assured me that Tatistcheff knew nothing whatever about the matter.

* The Right Hon. Sir Robert Gordon, British Ambassador at Constantinople.

If General Müffling has not imitated General Guilleminot, and acted without authority, his declaration, in writing, of the determination of the King of Prussia to interfere in case of unreasonable demands, is not without importance.

If any negotiation is to be entered into with Russia, and the empire is to be preserved by a peace of any sort, we must still presume that the Greek Treaty will be settled by the three Powers in Conference. At present our ambassadors have no discretion, nor have they any power to negotiate, except merely to force upon the Porte the acceptance of their propositions, and to turn their *projet* into an ultimatum. We ought, at all events, to come to some decision upon this subject, with the view of sending fresh instructions, and this can only be done by the Conference. Our chance of success will depend on France, and France will probably show her independence by adhering to the Russian terms. As it is, however, until they receive fresh instructions, our ambassador at Constantinople will be bound to do the same. It is tantalising to think that the Greek affair might now be reasonably settled, even according to the Treaty, without more difficulty; and yet that we should be compelled to doubt of success.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1435]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Stratfield Saye, 5th September, 1829.

I send you with this a Memorandum of our discussion of yesterday, which contains, as well as I recollect, what passed.

There is one point which, however, I forgot to advert to, and that is the injustice of which we are guilty in allowing the Greeks to continue their operations, considering that we destroyed the fleet of the Turks because they did not cease theirs. If I have not mistaken the character of the Emperor Alexander an appeal to his honour and justice would not have been made in vain in such a case, and I intended to have brought forward the subject in that view, and I regret that I forgot it. You might probably mention this view of the subject to Lord Heytesbury,* and desire him to urge it upon the Emperor's attention. He may tell the Emperor that we shall never think that we have been fairly dealt with unless these hostilities cease.

We do not ask the Emperor to be a party to the measures to be adopted, or to allow his fleet to co-operate in the measures of execution. What we desire is that the Conference should direct the English and French fleets under its orders to prevent these hostilities.

British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

I think that this Memorandum ought to be sent with a despatch to Lord Heytesbury, with an order to read it to Count Nesselrode and to the Emperor; but to give no copy. The same should be done at Berlin.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1436.]

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, LORD ABERDEEN, PRINCE LIEVEN, AND COMTE DE MATUSCEWITZ, ON FRIDAY, 4TH SEPTEMBER, 1829, AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

Count Matuscewitz stated the earnest desire of the Emperor to be upon the best terms, and to have the best understanding with this country.

The Duke of Wellington said that he could assure the Russian plenipotentiaries that the same desire was felt here to be upon the best terms with his Imperial Majesty, and that he was anxious to avail himself of an opportunity of saying a few words to them upon that subject, inasmuch as it appeared from two despatches from Lord Heytesbury that his Imperial Majesty complained to his Lordship twice of this government, and particularly of the Duke himself. That his conduct as an individual must be considered unworthy of his Imperial Majesty's attention, and out of the question. It was his conduct as the King's minister which was important, and that it was in this character that he wished to explain and discuss it. That it was perfectly true that the King's servants had (when his Imperial Majesty announced his intention to go to war with the Turks) endeavoured to prevail upon his Imperial Majesty not to carry that intention into execution. They stated the hope which they had entertained that the war might not be deemed necessary; and the danger to the peace of Europe which they foresaw would attend it; but they declared the intention of the King their master to wait for its result.* His Imperial Majesty did not attend to the counsel given to him. But the King never complained; and his servants never mentioned the subject in Par-

* *Note in the Margin.*—See note from Lord Dudley to Prince Lieven, March 25th, 1828; from Lord Aberdeen to Prince Lieven, of 6th June.

liament, nor ever uttered one disrespectful word of his Imperial Majesty or his designs; nor stated any opinion upon the war, even in private, to any but those to whom it was necessary to communicate the correspondence; which after all does not contain one word that is otherwise than friendly. The British government still adhere to the contents of those notes from Lord Dudley and Lord Aberdeen to Prince Lieven. "Yet," the Duke observed, "we hear from the best authority of his Imperial Majesty's dissatisfaction with this country," and particularly with him (the Duke); and of the intention of going to war in every country in Europe, excepting in England itself. The Duke said that he could not understand whence this dissatisfaction and these reports of war had originated.

The Duke said that he had negotiated the Protocol upon Greek affairs, and that upon that occasion, as well as upon every one since, everything that was possible had been done by the government of this country to conciliate his Imperial Majesty, and to promote a friendly understanding between the two countries; and that he could prove that in every question which had occurred since he had been appointed to the office which he fills, in which there was a difference of opinion between the two Powers, this country had given way. He was certain that this could not be considered as a proof of a hostile disposition towards Russia on the part of the government of this country.

When this administration undertook the conduct of the affairs of the country they found that, after the battle of Navarino the admirals had laid up at Malta, and had done nothing with a view to the further execution of the Treaty. Measures were immediately proposed by this government which had that object in view. The Russian plenipotentiaries proposed to amend those measures. They were amended accordingly; and thus amended and eventually carried into execution they certainly produced the evacuation of the Morea by Ibrahim Pacha.

It appeared likewise to this government that a more precise definition of the meaning of the Treaty of July, 1827, a defined limitation of the territory in which its stipulations were to be carried into execution, and explanations upon other points would have the effect of reconciling the Porte to our measure. A proposition for these purposes was accordingly submitted to his

Imperial Majesty. He objected, and this government gave up the proposition.

The next occurrence was that his Imperial Majesty announced to this government his intention to go to war; and he accompanied this announcement by a declaration regarding his intentions respecting the Treaty of July, 1827, which this government did not think consistent with the Treaty, or with what was due to the King their master, or to this country. All conferences under the Treaty were discontinued. This government thought that they should find it very difficult to co-operate at all with Russia in her character of belligerent. But that they could not consider even that question till his Imperial Majesty should have explained himself in respect to his pretension to settle the Greek affair himself.

There was nothing hostile in these views of the case. In whatever mode these views might be considered in Russia, they were adopted here by those individuals at that time belonging to the administration who had negotiated and signed the Treaty of the 6th July, 1827; and who it is supposed would be the most agreeable ministers to his Imperial Majesty.

But, the Duke said, his Imperial Majesty explained his meaning in respect to the Greek affair, and this government immediately consented to continue the Conferences. The difficulty for neutrals to carry on in concert with a belligerent the details of a transaction characterised as neutral, still remained for consideration; and the French ambassador having suggested in Conference a mode of overcoming that difficulty, according to a precedent in the Baltic in the Seven Years' War, this government readily acquiesced in it, on condition that his Imperial Majesty should lay aside his belligerent character in the Mediterranean Sea. Here again was another proof of the desire of this government to continue to execute the Treaty, and to be on cordial good terms with his Imperial Majesty.

No sooner had this matter been arranged, and the arrangement communicated to all parties interested, including the Porte, than his Imperial Majesty, without consulting this government, without even apprising the Conference, sent orders to the admiral commanding his squadron in the Mediterranean Sea, employed under the direction of the Conference, to commence belligerent operations against the Turks. The Duke observed

that there can be no doubt that if this government had been disposed to quarrel, this measure on the part of his Imperial Majesty would have afforded the opportunity. The country felt sorely what had been done; and it was so well known that the administration suffered in public opinion for having omitted to notice what had occurred with more vigour, that even Prince Lieven expressed his satisfaction with our conduct almost at the same moment that his Imperial Majesty complained of him (the Duke) to Lord Heytesbury. The Duke said that it was impossible for him to know on what his Imperial Majesty had founded his complaints; that in all that he had done he had been satisfied he was performing his duty, of which he considered an important part to be, to keep this country on good terms with his Imperial Majesty. The Duke then adverted to his conduct in the proposed blockade of Enos as another proof of his desire to avoid collision between this country and Russia. He reminded the Russian plenipotentiaries that he had told them that the blockade would be recognised if they should notify it. But he urged them not to notify it, as its existence would draw the attention of the public here prematurely to the Emperor's intention to carry his operations into the plains of Adrianople.

The Duke next adverted to the conduct of the minister in Persia on the part of the Governor-General of India. For the last two years this officer has had much more to do in Russian affairs than he has in British or in Indian affairs. It must have been an object with his Imperial Majesty, engaged as he has been in the war in Turkey, not to have on his hands a renewal of the war with the King of Persia. Yet it is the minister of England, the power complained of as being unfriendly to Russia, who by his influence, his negotiations, his persuasions, has prevailed upon the King of Persia to do justice to his Imperial Majesty, to give him satisfaction for the outrage committed upon his plenipotentiary, and to send a prince of his house to offer that satisfaction. This same minister had reason to believe from reports from Tiflis, General Paskewitch's headquarters, at the very moment that he was rendering these last services to his Imperial Majesty, that England was going to war with Russia. The Duke asked, where did these reports come from? From the British cabinet? No! The British Resident would have been the first to receive them. But from St.

Petersburg, and it remains to be ascertained how they came there.

Count Matuscewitz here interrupted the Duke, and said that his Imperial Majesty had certainly every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the British minister at Teheran. The Count added that he admitted the truth of all the Duke had stated in explanation of his conduct and that of his government, but that the Duke must likewise admit that the Emperor had always been prepared to meet this government half-way, and to do everything in his power to accommodate his course to our views. The Duke answered that at the same time that he gave his Imperial Majesty credit for very fair intentions, his acts had not been very considerate or friendly towards us. The Duke gave as an instance the case of the continuance of the war on the frontiers of the Morea.

The Duke said that this government had, upon the Protocol of the 16th November, 1828, stated the cessation of these hostilities as the condition of its guarantee of the Morea and the Cyclades. In the discussion of the Protocol of March, 1829, the cessation of hostilities was again desired by this government; and the Russian and French plenipotentiaries agreed to *claim* (*réclamer*) this cessation.

They have never claimed the cessation of hostilities. Count Matuscewitz said that they had, and that he had himself drawn the instructions to Count Bulgari, whose answers he had received reporting his conferences upon the subject with the President.

Lord Aberdeen observed that if that was the case the President had not stated the truth, and had acted very unfairly, as he had stated to the Greek Assembly that England had required the cessation of hostilities, omitting all mention of the other two Powers. The Duke observed that if the cessation of hostilities had been claimed it had been so to very little purpose, and with very little effect; while both governments continued to afford to the President the pecuniary means of carrying on the hostilities of which it now appeared that both had *claimed* the cessation.

Count Matuscewitz said that France and Russia had not considered the cessation of hostilities in the same light as the British government had. That Russia in particular had declined to force the cessation, or even to require it; and that his Imperial Majesty had not engaged to withhold his pecuniary assistance; that he, the Count, thought that the President

was in the right not to cease hostilities; and that the engagement of the Emperor went no farther than to *claim* (*réclamer*) the cessation of hostilities.

The Duke observed that this was just the difference in the mode in which the two countries performed their engagements. This country had performed theirs in relation to Greece, to the letter and in their spirit, and had done everything in the power of the government and its servants to prevent the extension of the war, in the full belief that the Emperor wished for peace; while those points in which this country had expressed an interest were neglected, the engagements were coldly performed, and the general belief was everywhere, excepting in this country, that England and Russia were going to war.

The Duke observed that he had already mentioned that the report upon that subject prevalent in Persia had come from Tiflis. That it likewise prevailed in Greece by the care of the President, and that we were all but at war with him on account of his endeavours to revolutionise the Ionian Islands.

Count Matuscewitz here repeated that the Emperor had always met us half-way, that he had done everything that we could require from him, and at last had given to this government and to France the strongest proof of his confidence in allowing us to negotiate the Greek affair for him at Constantinople. He challenged us to produce a stronger instance of confidence ever reposed in Allies by any powerful State.

The Duke said that he considered the whole of that transaction as another proof of the desire of this country to keep on good terms with the Emperor. That this government and France had, in November last, stated their opinion that the time was come when they considered that they ought to resume their diplomatic relations with the Porte, and make an effort to settle the Greek affair.

The Emperor objected to the renewal of the diplomatic intercourse, or to commence the negotiation without the presence of his ambassador, unless the terms of the settlement should be previously arranged in the Conference of London; and his Imperial Majesty particularly approved of the limits and other points proposed and reported upon by the ambassadors assembled at Paris.

The government of this country objected to the limits in those reports, but consented to adopt them as the basis of the nego-

tiation at Constantinople, on condition that the objections of the Porte should be fairly heard and considered; and that these propositions should not be considered as an *ultimatum*. The Duke observed that this government thus gave another proof of its desire to act with its Allies; of which the return has been that the condition attached by this government to its consent to undertake this negotiation by the cessation of hostilities on the frontiers of the Morea has not been performed, or if performed, has been performed in a manner so inefficient as that it may be stated that it has not been performed at all. Count Matuscewicz again asserted that the Emperor had performed all that they had ever engaged to do. The Duke then stated, as another instance of the uniform desire of this government to be upon the best terms with Russia, the recent conduct of Mr. Gordon at Constantinople.

The French ambassador had received from his government instructions containing the details of the terms on which his Imperial Majesty was disposed to make peace with the Porte. His Majesty's ambassador had no such instructions, as we knew nothing about those terms. The French ambassador asked Mr. Gordon to support him in urging those terms upon the Porte. Mr. Gordon acquiesced at once. He believed the French ambassador. He knew how desirous his government was of peace, and that the declared wishes of his Imperial Majesty in this respect should be accomplished; and he at once supported the French ambassador, and they succeeded in prevailing upon the Reis Effendi to negotiate upon the terms proposed. Prince Lieven said there might have been misrepresentations on both sides. That engaged as his Imperial Majesty was in a war of such importance, it was not surprising that he should look with jealousy at the conduct of this country, and that many occurrences, innocent in themselves, should have been magnified into importance. But that the Emperor could not but feel sensible of the value of the explanations which had been given; and that he would again assure us of his Imperial Majesty's sincere desire to be upon the best terms with this country.

The conversation then turned upon the proposal made by the English and French ambassadors at Constantinople, that the Powers parties to the Treaty should recognise the independence of the Morea, fixing its limits; and the Russian

plenipotentiaries proposed that this government should come to an understanding with them to adopt this proposition, and upon the limits to be thus given to the new State.

The Duke declined, as, since that proposition had been received from the ambassadors, the government had been informed that the Porte had consented to negotiate upon the terms of the Treaty of July, 1827; and that we did not think we could decline to give them all the advantages which that Treaty afforded them.

Count Matuscewitz concurred in the opinion, that if the Porte had agreed to negotiate under the Treaty of July, 1827, this government was morally bound not to depart from it. A question arose respecting limits to be assigned to the new State, and the Duke said that the opinion of this government was not altered upon that subject. Count Matuscewitz observed, "That is to say, as far as possible from the boundaries proposed by us."

The Duke replied that we had stated our reasons, and were more than ever convinced that the limits proposed by us were those best calculated to secure peace.

But, the Duke said, if we are to have the boundaries of the Protocol of March, 1829, we trust that we shall have its other conditions; and not Monsieur Capo d'Istria as the President.

The Duke stated that if we had, the King would have a revolutionary war in the Ionian Islands, and that it would be a curious circumstance if, having accepted the protectorate of those islands at the desire and for the convenience of the Emperor Alexander, as Prince Lieven well knew, his Majesty was obliged to sustain a revolutionary war against a Russian subject placed in Greece as President under the protection of the Powers parties to the Treaty.

The Duke observed that this country had probably as little to fear from revolutions and revolutionists as any other in Europe; yet he assured Prince Lieven and Count Matuscewitz, and he entreated them to assure the Emperor, that however much his Imperial Majesty might dislike him (the Duke) as the King's minister, he had at least the merit of being at open war with everything in the shape of a revolutionist.

He entreated them to warn the Emperor of the danger of establishing in Greece a focus of revolution. Such an establishment may give this country a little more or less of trouble.

But revolutionists in Greece will not limit their efforts to the Ionian Islands. They will turn their attention to other countries, and will lay the foundation of fresh wars and of misery for mankind.

Count Matuscewitz stated his assurance that they had no such intention, and that they would repeat to the Emperor what the Duke had said.

[1437.]

To Lord Ellenborough.

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

Stratfield Saye,
7th September, 1829.

I have considered the papers which you have sent me regarding the proposed orders to Fort William.

The apprehension of mutiny is a new feature in the case, which on that account requires reconsideration. Mutiny in the East India Company's army is not a novelty. In my time there have been three, of which two were of the European officers. There was another in the time of Lord Clive. There are some peculiarities in the situation of these officers, of which we must never lose sight in all discussions affecting their interests. The native army in India is and must always be, under all circumstances, a local army; and the officers belonging to it must be during their service local as well as the army to which they belong. This must be the case whatever may be the future constitution of the government, and whether the army be the King's or the Company's.

The officers of that local army are not and cannot be of the same description of men as those of the properly called British army. These are composed of all classes of the higher ranks of society, and they cannot long pursue a course that is not consistent with the public interests.

There are many excellent men among the officers of the East India Company's army. But they are all originally men without fortune. They go to India solely and exclusively that they may subsist as gentlemen; they are in general totally disconnected from any interest in their country, and their feeling for it is a desire and hope to find in it a healthy spot in which to pass the end of their lives at their ease and in comfort. They toil through the active part of their lives with no other object in view than that, and of course they become discontented

and disposed to mutiny if that object is removed to a greater distance from them, or rendered more difficult to be attained.

I don't mean to assert that they are all disposed to mutiny, but among such men many so disposed will be found, and these the most active and energetic of the whole; and but little experience is required to show that when men of this description are found to take the lead in such acts, others, however unwillingly and however lamenting every step they take, are too ready to follow the example. There are some circumstances in the times which are peculiarly calculated to excite the disposition of these officers to mutiny, and to render their perseverance in the mutiny more constant, and to increase the difficulty of overcoming it.

One of these is the hopelessness of promotion. The truth is that men live for many years after they are no longer capable of rendering service to the State, and such as these enjoy the honours and emoluments of the military profession in India as well as elsewhere, to enjoy which their juniors are eagerly and impatiently looking forward. These juniors do not reflect that their turn will eventually come. What they want, and want exclusively, is to possess riches and to enjoy honours.

Another excitement to mutiny among these officers is the absolute impossibility of their living in their own country at their ease, and in the respectable society in which they have been accustomed to live in India, upon the income which they can hope to possess upon their return to England. The increased expense of living and luxury in England is the cause of this circumstance.

Another excitement to mutiny, and I beg you to attend to it, will certainly be the colonization of India even to a moderate degree. That which brings these officers to England at the close of their service is that they cannot hope to retain their health and to educate their families in India. But if the country is colonised; if hundreds of European families established within it, exist with better or worse health as in the West Indies, rear and educate families better or worse, is it to be believed that the example will not have an effect upon the disposition of the European officers of the Native army?

Then there is another excitement to mutiny in the increasing disposition in this country to emigrate to the United States,

occasioned by the glowing descriptions of that country, and of its influence and power, by all writers upon it, even our own.

The officers would naturally look to retire to the United States if their disputes with their own country should be irreconcilable, and at all events to support and assistance from the United States during their mutinous struggle with their own country. I have written thus much just to show you that we must not look lightly at a question of mutiny in the East Indies.

In respect to the question itself I entertain no doubt that the government in India is in the wrong, and that in the abstract the Board of Control are in the right in every word of the despatch. The question is whether it is expedient to write it.

I put the government in India out of the consideration. The question turns upon the army, and the manner in which the decision will affect them.

First, I must observe that a reduction of establishment in India is a much more serious affair than it is in England. I think it much more serious in England than others do when we come to pass above twenty years in war. But in India it is an absolute breach of faith, and ruin. I have above pointed out the class from which the officer of the Company's service is selected; his service, his hopes, and his objects. If he is turned away because the establishment is altered he has no family to return to, no obscure station or village to which he can retire to conceal his poverty and live upon his half-pay without incurring debt, but he must find his way first to the Presidency, and then to England, at an expense more than equal probably to the fortune of his father.

But you will say that this is not the reduction of an establishment of this description. True, it is not so. Such reduction would be impossible. But I'll show the sort of reduction that it is, and in what manner it is peculiarly calculated to create ill-will on the part of the officers of the army.

Although there is no doubt that the Indian government are in the wrong for having made this augmentation to the establishment of the army, and in the wrong in this discussion, they were authorised by the Court of Directors to make an augmentation to the infantry of the Bengal army, which would have carried the numbered regiments from 68 to 74.

This is the point on which the officers of the army will always

hang their case. They will say, "Some of us were promoted and others sent out to form 74 regiments. It is not fair towards us to reduce the six last formed, particularly if the object in reducing them is not very clearly advantageous."

Now before I go farther I will show you how this reduction will affect the service, the position and prospects of the officers of the army, and we will then see whether it is worth while to create this discontent for such objects.

According to an arrangement which I made between the East India Company's service and the Horse-Guards, the rank of colonel of a regiment is now open to the officers of the East India Company's service. The officers at the head of the service in India can therefore look forward to its honours as well as its emoluments, of the former of which there had been a complete stagnation since the peace had put an end to the brevets granted to the King's army. These six regiments then have opened six channels to the rank of major-general for all the superior officers of the army; besides the 68 in the infantry which existed before. They have opened, besides six lieutenant-colonels, situations for all the majors of the army in addition to 68 already existing, as the general rise begins in India at the rank of lieutenant-colonel.

Your measure which, as I have above pointed out, will be deemed unjust, deprives the army of these acquired advantages.

The public will be injured by this arrangement in the same degree as the officers of the army. We read a great deal of nonsense about the Company's army. But on this point all men agree, viz., that it is necessary to have the means of bringing forward to honours and rewards those who are at the head of the Company's army in India, and those who command it. We shall deprive ourselves of one-twelfth of the means now at our disposition of attaining this salutary object.

Let us now examine for what purpose we do this. The expense of the Native officers and sepoys, whether in the 69 and others to the 74 regiments, or in extra battalions, or added in proportionate numbers to the other 68 regiments, will be nearly the same. The difference effected by this arrangement will be in the expense of the European officers and regiment establishments, which last may be discontinued if the men should be drafted into the 68 other regiments. This expense is trifling. The real difference is in the pay of the European officers which

cannot be struck off until these European officers shall die, or are absorbed in the other 68 regiments, the majors of the six regiments from No. 69 to No. 74 being promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in one of the senior regiments, and the vacancy in the junior rank being not filled up in the one of the six regiments from which the major will have been taken. In short the saving is distant, eventual, and contingent. The injury to the public and to individuals, and the consequent feeling of injury suffered, founded upon a sense, however erroneous, of injustice wantonly done without object, will be immediate.

Upon the whole then I would recommend to you to revise all the proceedings upon this subject, and to take a new view of it.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

India Board, 7th September, 1829.

I have had Sir Archibald Campbell with me, and he tells me the Commandants of Artillery and Engineers were both made not only Companions of the Bath, but Knights, for the siege of Bhurtpoor. They had under their direction 100 guns at a siege of a few weeks, and Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison commanded 30 or 40 guns for two years and a half; for it seems there were carried with the army by the river and on shore not less than this number.

In favour of Dr. Heward Sir Archibald says that many surgeons have been knighted, and certainly there are many in the list. Sir Archibald declares he could not have moved his army as he did without the services of this Dr. Heward, who seems to be now a member of the Medical Board. Sir Archibald is very anxious about it.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

[1438.] MEMORANDUM UPON THE EXISTING STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE EAST OF EUROPE, AND EXTRACTS FROM THE TREATY OF THE 6TH JULY.

September 8th, 1829.

The Porte having now acceded to the Treaty of the 6th July, having accepted the armistice, and being prepared to negotiate an arrangement in conformity with the Treaty, it is necessary for this Conference to look at the engagements into

which the Sovereigns whom they have the honour to represent have entered not only with each other but towards the world.

The words of the second section of the secret article of the Treaty of the 6th July are :—

“ Si, dans ce même terme d’un mois, la Porte n’acceptait pas l’armistice proposé dans l’article 1 du Traité patent, ou si les Grecs se refusaient à son exécution, les hautes Puissances contractantes déclareront à celle des deux parties contendantes qui voudrait continuer les hostilités, ou à toutes deux s’il devenait nécessaire, que les dites hautes Puissances vont s’efforcer, par tous les moyens que les circonstances suggéreront à leur prudence, d’obtenir les effets immédiats de l’armistice dont elles désirent l’exécution, en prévenant, autant qu’il sera en leur pouvoir, toute collision entre les parties contendantes ; et, en effet, aussitôt après la susdite déclaration, les hautes Puissances emploieront conjointement tous leurs moyens pour en accomplir l’objet, sans toutefois prendre part aux hostilités entre les deux parties contendantes.”

In the first instruction from this Conference to the ambassadors at the Porte, after discussing the measures to be adopted in case the Porte should not accept the armistice, these words are inserted :—

“ Qu’enfin, si le refus venait de la part des Grecs, les escadres réunies veilleraient au maintien de l’armistice, en s’abstenant également de toute hostilité.”

In case the Porte should accept the armistice and the Greeks should not accept the same, then the ambassadors are informed that orders as follows are given to the naval commanders :—

“ Enfin, Monsieur, si la Porte, ayant accepté, le refus venait de la part des Grecs, les commandants des forces navales ont l’ordre de maintenir envers eux un armistice de fait, ainsi qu’il est stipulé dans l’article additionnel et secret, sans néanmoins les empêcher de pourvoir à leur propre défense.”

The following instructions were given to the commanders of the squadrons at sea of the three Powers :—

“ Elles doivent donner connaissance de cette offre aux Grecs, et faire en même temps, à l’une et à l’autre des deux parties contendantes, la demande d’un armistice immédiat entre elles, comme condition préliminaire et indispensable, à l’ouverture de toute négociation.”

And the following is the form in which it was intended that this communication should be made :—

“ Afin de faciliter le succès de cette médiation, les soussignés ont reçu l’ordre de proposer à la commission du gouvernement provisoire Grec de suspendre, par un armistice, tout acte d’hostilité envers la Sublime Porte, à qui une proposition semblable est adressée en ce moment, et dont les déterminations devront être connues dans le délai d’un mois.

Enfin, ils s'attendent que la commission du gouvernement provisoire Grec donnera son consentement immédiat à la proposition qu'ils sont chargés de lui transmettre."

In another instruction to the admirals, dated likewise the 12th July, these are the words used, to which it is necessary to draw the attention of the Conference:—

"Il est un second cas, également prévu par les trois Cours; c'est celui où la Porte ayant consenti à un armistice, les Grecs le rejetteraient, ou le rompraient après l'avoir accepté. Il a été convenu qu'alors les escadres réunies veilleraient au maintien de l'armistice, sans prendre part aux hostilités entre les deux parties contendantes.

"C'est également sur les lieux mêmes que vous pourrez juger des meilleurs moyens de parvenir à ce but, si la chance prévue vient à se réaliser."

It was in reference to these intentions, which were not only stipulated, but positive orders were given in conformity thereto, that the minister of his Britannic Majesty, in the Conference of the 16th November, 1828, having come to the conclusion that the armistice in fact existed on the part of the Porte, and that the guarantee which it was then proposed to give of the Morea and the Cyclades would insure the Greeks from any attack by the Porte, inserted as a condition to the guarantee that the Greek troops which were engaged in hostilities to the northward of the Isthmus of Corinth should be withdrawn.

In the Protocol of the 22nd March, 1829, the ministers of the three Powers agreed as follows:—

"Les trois Cours réclameront également, en se fondant sur l'existence de ce même armistice, sur les démarches qu'elles font pour en assurer le maintien, et sur les négociations qui vont s'ouvrir à Constantinople dans le but de fixer le sort de la Grèce, que les Grecs cessent immédiatement les hostilités sur tous les points, et que le gouvernement provisoire de la Grèce fasse rentrer dans les limites du territoire garanti par l'Alliance les troupes Grecques qui en sont sorties; sans toutefois que cette dernière démarche préjuge aucunement sur la question de la délimitation du futur état Grec."

Notwithstanding this agreement, notwithstanding that the Porte has not only long ceased hostilities, but has now acceded to the Treaty of the 6th July, and its plenipotentiaries are actually engaged in negotiating the terms of an arrangement, the Greeks continue their hostilities; and an attack upon the island of Negropont is now organised.

His Britannic Majesty, considering that the terms of the Protocol of March, 1829, no longer authorised hostilities on the part of the Greeks, gave orders to the commanding officers of his ships in the Mediterranean to protect the commerce of his Majesty's subjects from all interruption by Greek cruizers.

His Most Christian Majesty adopted the same course.

It remains for the Conference to consider of the measures to be adopted to carry into execution the specific stipulations of the Treaty of the 6th July, its own resolutions and orders frequently promulgated, and lastly, that which is consistent with justice and with the objects in view when this subject was first considered.

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Heytesbury.

[1439.]

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 8th September, 1829.

Lord Aberdeen has shown me your several letters and despatches on the subject of the Emperor's displeasure with myself.

I have known that since the year 1826 Prince and Princess Lieven have taken pains to represent my conduct, whether in or out of government, in the most unfavourable manner at St. Petersburg. I believe their displeasure commenced in a conversation which I had with Prince Lieven in the end of 1826, upon the intention then in contemplation of turning the Protocol of April, 1826, into the Treaty of July, 1827, to which I stated my objections so strongly as to declare that as a member of the then administration I never would agree to the plan.

I was out of office from April, 1827 to the following January, during which time I know that the Prince and Princess wrote of me all the evil that they thought, and much more than they knew. From the time that I returned to office in January, 1828, the Prince and Princess Lieven have been what is called in regular opposition to the government. They have misrepresented to their Court all that we have done, and particularly that I have done; they have been parties to all the party intrigues against the administration; and really if I had not the very best authority for what I say, I could not have believed it possible that persons who have been so long employed in public office in this country would have committed the extraordinary indiscretions in this way of which they have been guilty.

However, I have never hinted a suspicion of such conduct. I have treated them both as I do all the other ambassadors, with the highest distinction. I have been always upon cordial terms with Madame de Lieven, but coldly with Monsieur de

Lieven since the scene about the Treaty in 1826. This is very much caused by his own manner towards me.

I thought it right to have with the Russian ministers the explanation which Lord Aberdeen will send you, in order to put an end to the perpetual suspicions and complaints of which we have heard, and to show the Emperor that we were not aware we had ever given cause of complaint.

I particularly request, however, to be understood as not making any complaint of Prince or Princess Lieven. I know that all I have stated to you in this letter is true; I know that their misrepresentations of things here, and particularly respecting me, have done all the mischief. But I can prove nothing, and I will not complain of any man so as to deprive him of his office without being able to prove that which I state against him. Besides that, to tell you the truth, I am perhaps vain enough to think that I am too strong for Prince and Princess Lieven, and that I prefer to suffer a little inconvenience to taking a step which might require from me some explanation.

However I have thought it as well to let you know how the matter really stands.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1440.]

To Sir Robert Farquhar, Bart.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR,

Woodford, 9th September, 1829.

I have received your letter and your paper. I don't know to what school you belong, but some of your notions are not orthodox, such as that an increase of price will discourage production, &c. &c. This must be wrong. If one man has a machine that nobody else has, which he must keep at work, or he will acquire no profit, and moreover his machine will deteriorate, he will work it for small price and low profit, or even no profit rather than lose the value of his machine. But this cannot last. He must in the end cease work altogether. Raise the price and increase the profit, and of course the proprietor of the machine will increase its produce. If he does not, somebody else will; either by the same machine or by some other, if the first is protected by a patent so similar as to perform the same work, although so different as to be protected from the law.

If this is true respecting machinery, how much more true is it in respect to work by hand. The first effect of increase of price is increase of profit; then increase of work; then increase of labourers' wages; then increase of profit to cover the expense of labourers' wages.

So that in all ways increase of price would be increase of produce. Now it happens that in these days the words of Scripture are not true. The man who makes two pairs of stockings where one pair was made before is not blessed. According to you he ought to have the Bank of England, or county banks, or some establishment or other in the country authorised to coin fictitious money, in order that people might be able to buy more stockings than they should require.

I say no—that remedy will not answer.

This country cannot go on, no country can go on, upon such principles. He who coins that money, coins it at my expense, at yours, at that of the banker and merchant who has capital, and even of the comparatively poor man; the farmer with 100*l.* capital, the widow, the orphan, or the half-pay officer.

It is possible that for some time none of these may suffer. There may be no false speculation, no dishonesty, no gambling in the funds or in hells, no extravagant living, no genteel or respectable appearances upon no money, no expensive and genteel education of children, and there may be no accident. But all this is very improbable. Allow me to tell you that the moment an accident happens it falls upon some innocent person who has something; and it is serious in proportion to its extent, and may involve in its consequences the State, and the fortune of every individual in it.

It is not true that there is a want of currency in the country. I positively deny the fact. There is more currency than there ever was before. But it is solid. A banker cannot make it; and therefore he will not lend upon any other than good security; because he knows that the loss, if there should be any, will fall upon himself, and that immediately. But if he coins the money himself the loss may fall upon anybody. The banker will take care that it shall not fall upon him. No country can bear this.

I have written more than I intended upon this subject. There is however one remark more that I must make upon your plan,

and that is, that you avow that it must drive our coin out of circulation, and that this is desirable.

I there drop the subject. We cannot make ourselves inhabitants of the moon! We must live with our neighbours, and if we do, we must have metal coin!

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 9th September, 1829.

Among the papers which I enclose is the opinion upon the Sponheim question, which I have now given to the Margrave of Baden. It is not materially different from the draft which you saw some time ago. The object has been to confine the opinion to a declaration of what was done, or intended to be done, by the Allies at Aix-la-Chapelle and Frankfort. In this respect, Lord Clancarty entirely agrees with the opinions expressed by Russia, Prussia, and France. I have discussed the subject, both previously and subsequent to the decision, with Esterhazy, who appears, on the whole, to be very well satisfied that the affair is concluded in this manner.

I have had M. de Zea with me this morning. I see that we shall not be able to prevent them much longer from acknowledging Don Miguel; and it may be well to consider what is the manner in which the Spanish government may proceed, so as to leave our position the most free, and to afford us the greatest facilities, whatever may ultimately be our decision. I gave him no reason to believe that we had made the slightest approach to the conclusion which he desired; and indeed for the present declined to discuss the question at all. He assured me, what is difficult to believe, that the accusations of the ultra-Royalists are such, in consequence of the state of things in Portugal, that the Spanish ministry will not be able to stand. He says that advantage is taken of the liberal and moderate conduct of government to accuse the ministers of wishing to prolong the difficulties of Portugal, in order to encourage constitutions and Freemasonry. If this were not the case, they say, the lawful king would be acknowledged at once. The present ministry have made themselves unpopular with a powerful party by their reforms and enlightened conduct, and the king requires all the support which can be obtained to enable him to continue in the same course.

By others, the Spanish government is accused of wishing to see the continuation of anarchy and convulsion in Portugal, from the hope of being able at the proper moment to bring forward with success the pretensions of Don Sebastian. M. de Zea says they will be able, by this moral support afforded by their recognition, to preserve Don Miguel and his new ministers in their change of conduct, and to strengthen the moderate system now adopted by the government. There is no necessity for dwelling longer at present upon this, as you will hear it all on some

future day, and as I have dismissed him now without any encouragement.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

I cannot obtain any confirmation of the intelligence, brought from Paris, of the entrance of the Russians into Adrianople. Perhaps the great probability of the event may have been the cause of the report.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1441.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Woodford, 10th September, 1829.

I return the despatches to Lord Heytesbury and Lord Stuart, and the note to the Grand Duke of Baden.

If the despatch to Lord Stuart is not gone, I should think that the words which I have marked at the end of the last paragraph might be omitted. They leave an opening of which the French government will avail themselves to allow the troops to remain long enough to do all the mischief that they can.

I wrote a private letter to Lord Heytesbury, which I desired might be sent to you open. I am afraid that it has not been so, as you do not mention it. I desire Greville to send you the copy of it.

I have likewise struck out a few words, and a paragraph of the note on Sponheim. The first is the words (of the great Powers) which are not necessary; and of which the use is not liked by those who do not take part in these decisions.

The second is of a paragraph which I do not exactly understand, and which, if it is not necessary for the case, is of a sweeping character, and had better be omitted. The last is of the words (and with as much validity) the meaning of which is comprehended in the former words *in the same manner*.

I am sorry that we cannot stop the Spaniards; that which appears most desirable is, that if they should take this course it should be independently of France. I see that Prince de Polignac is coming to very close quarters with the Portuguese gentleman at Paris on the part of Don Miguel.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I shall be in town on Saturday at two o'clock, unless I should previously hear from you that the Conference is postponed.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 10th September, 1829.

We have had very important arrivals to-day, which I forward to you. The intelligence from Constantinople will render our last Protocol unnecessary. The result of the proceedings of the ambassadors must for a short time still be doubtful; but whatever it may be, I shall be very glad to know from you that I am not partial in thinking that we have been well served there. The note of General Müffling gives a valuable pledge; and this, followed up by the mission of his aide-de-camp to the Russian headquarters, will commit the King of Prussia. You will see that the French government are now disposed, although late, to take the right course, and fairly to concert with us what is best to be done. This is the point which, until we meet, you can deliberately consider, for on this will depend the remedy, if any remedy be practicable under the circumstances.

It is extraordinary that Polignac, having taken advantage of the instructions sent to General Guilleminot by his predecessors, and fortified himself by their authority, should not now wish to take the initiative in the affair himself, and direct the course of future proceedings in case of necessity. Perhaps he may still be made to feel that this would be the most natural, the most dignified, and the most popular part for him to act. You will recollect that the proposition of a congress was formerly the notion of La Ferronnays; and from what I have collected in conversation with Polignac, it is the mode of proceeding which he will be disposed to advise. The occupation of Adrianople without resistance, and the deplorable condition of the country, with the absence, apparently, of all means of defence, offer temptations for an approach to the capital, which it will be difficult for General Diebitsch to resist.

Ever my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

Bülow has just been here, and tells me that he has seen the Secretary of Legation of M. Oriola, who left Berlin the day after Mr. Seymour's despatches. He is very intimate with M. Ancillon, whom he had seen the day of his departure, and who desired him to tell Bülow that he had just received from Petersburg precise answers to everything which was at all vague in the Russian declarations. He promised to send the particulars without delay to Bülow, and would only tell him (the Secretary of Legation) that they would be found very moderate and satisfactory.

As Lord Heytesbury had acknowledged the receipt of my despatch desiring to have these explanations, it is probable they may have been given to him at the same time.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

India Board, 10th September, 1829.

I send you a copy of the letter in which I backed the Board out of the case of the six regiments, and of the despatch as it will now go to India.

I have written a private letter to Lord W. Bentinck, which will have the effect of relieving his mind from any painful feeling which might otherwise have been produced by the strong censure on the Bengal government, to a very small portion of which he is personally liable, and of making him fully aware of the precise grounds on which the Board departs from the line I before told him it was our intention to take.

I have taken care in my letter to secure us against any misconduct on Lord William's part similar to that we have so much reason to censure in former governments.

I showed your letter to the Chairs.

I send the newspaper containing Colonel Baker's letter respecting half batta. He has written a most offensive private letter to Colonel Salmond, the military secretary. He is by all accounts a very troublesome, ill-conditioned man. In his letter he uses the knowledge he acquired in the confidential situation of Under Secretary to the Military Board.

The Chairs are ready to do anything you think right upon the subject. The letter is not yet come home officially.

Yours very faithfully,

ELLENBOROUGH.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1842.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Woodford, 11th September, 1829.

I return the box with the despatches from Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and Constantinople, and I assure you that I entirely concur in your opinion, that it is impossible for anybody to have fulfilled more completely the wishes and intentions of his employers than your brother has.

It appears to me that the Greek question is now exactly in the situation in which antecedent circumstances could reasonably give us ground to expect that it would be.

The Porte has acceded to the Treaty, but has objected to some of the terms proposed; and the grounds of the objections stated are very reasonable, and deserve consideration, even by those most determined to oppress the Porte by this arrangement.

It appears to me that we must have our Conference tomorrow; to consider, first, whether the adherence is an adherence; secondly, whether the Porte ought to have the benefit of the Treaty of the 6th July in armistice, &c.

Thirdly, what shall be the instructions of the three Powers in conference to the ambassadors charged with the negotiation at Constantinople.

One advantage resulting from the state of this negotiation at

Constantinople is that the ambassadors charged with it cannot now conclude without further orders from the Conference. Another is, that the Emperor cannot take upon himself to touch the Greek affair on his separate negotiation.

In respect to other matters, it appears to me that Diebitsch ought to halt and negotiate if it be true that the Emperor wishes for peace. If he is not sincere in that wish, the relative military position of the parties leaves Constantinople, in my opinion, at Diebitsch's mercy. There is nothing to oppose him in front. His rear is to the Black Sea, of which he commands the navigation ; and his communications with Burghas, &c., are secure. Even if the Grand Vizier, Hussein Pasha, and others could do anything from Schumla, they would not hurt General Diebitsch.

I think that the King of Prussia as well as the King of France are pledged to enforce peace upon the terms which General Müffling and General Guilleminot have encouraged the Porte to offer, if the Emperor or General Diebitsch should decline to accept them ; if there should be an opportunity for their interference and for such enforcement. But there will be no such opportunity. The whole case depends upon the construction he will give to the instructions which he will have received ; if he should have received any. If General Diebitsch should have halted and should treat, the whole case is safe. If he should not have halted, and should have got possession of Constantinople, and have brought Heyden's fleet into the Dardanelles, there is an end to the Greek affair, and to the Turkish empire in Europe ; and there will be no ground for Prussian or French interference on the score of either of the Emperor's promises, or of any former transaction. The world must then be reconstructed ; and there is no doubt that the best ground for a satisfactory reconstruction would be a cordial co-operation between England and France, that is to say, if the French government has a will of its own.

Upon such a subject it is not for me to give an opinion suddenly. My opinion is that the Power which has Constantinople, and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, ought to possess the mouth of the Danube ; and that the sovereign of these two ought not to have the Crimea and the Russian empire. We must reconstruct a Greek empire, and give it Prince Frederick of Orange, or Prince Charles of Prussia ; and no Power of

Europe ought to take anything for himself excepting the Emperor of Russia a sum for his expenses.

According to dates, I should suppose that the satisfactory intentions of the Emperor of Russia, adverted to by Mr. Seymour and by Oriola, might have been the 25th August at St. Petersburg. Instructions could not reach Diebitsch much before this time! A fearful number of events might have occurred in the mean time!

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Horse-Guards, 11th September, 1829, 4 P.M.

I have just ascertained that the account received by this morning's post at Harrington House stated that Lord Harrington occasionally took a little nourishment, retained his senses, and sometimes spoke a few words. I send you in another letter all the information I have been enabled to collect respecting the mode of filling the regiments of Life Guards. I learn from Sir Herbert Taylor, who is just returned from Windsor, that the King intends to give the 1st Life Guards to Lord Combermere. Sir Herbert ascertained this from the lady, who, however, did not tell him what his Majesty intended to do with the Constableship of Windsor Castle, though she mentioned that the value of the appointment was only 400*l.* a year. The pay of it however in the Army List is stated to be 3*l.* 1*s.* 5*d.* per day, which amounts to 1120*l.* a year; and I find by reference to a return in possession of the War Office, that the actual sum received by Lord Harrington is 1120*l.* 17*s.* 1*d.* This return is signed by Lord Harrington. From the lady's diminishing the value I am inclined to think that she intends the appointment for Lord C. I did not tell Sir Herbert Taylor that you had mentioned Lord Combermere. Sir Herbert, on his part, is anxious that what passed between Lady C. and himself relating to Windsor Castle should not go further than you.

I wish his Majesty could be prevailed upon to give the appointment to Lord Hill. I am, however, aware that it is open to his Majesty to appoint whom he pleases, whether civil or military.

Your most faithful and affectionate

FITZROY SOMERSET.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Horse-Guards, 11th September, 1829, 5 P.M.

I have just received your letter of 8 this morning. Sir Herbert returned this morning, having received his Majesty's commands to see the Duke of Cumberland, but having met his Royal Highness on the road, who was on his way to Windsor, he felt it necessary to communicate with him without

154 EXPENDITURE IN LORD STEWARD'S DEPARTMENT.

delay. He therefore wrote him the letter which I enclose, accompanied by the draft of one, which he proposes his Royal Highness should write to Lord Hill. If the Duke of Cumberland acts upon his suggestion, the General Commanding-in-Chief's authority is not invaded, and the Secretary at War can, as you justly observe, take care of himself.

There is an objection to the court being composed of officers of the Household Brigade, as they may be implicated in the irregularities complained of, and in fact will, I believe, prove to be so in some degree; that is to say, they are suspected of having allowed a man's service previous to his attaining the age of 18, and thus to have disregarded the King's regulations. If this suspicion be founded, and I have myself little doubt of it, these officers would be sitting in judgment upon themselves; and it is therefore very desirable that officers who are no parties to the discharges which have been given should form the court.

I am excessively obliged to you for so promptly replying to my letter. I thought the concern a very fishy one when I wrote yesterday.

Your most faithful and affectionate

FITZROY SOMERSET.

Sir William Knighton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Horndean, 12th September, 1829.

I came here yesterday and hope to remain a *week*; I shall therefore have no opportunity of seeing the King, in reference to your Grace's note. His Majesty, however, knows that poor Lord Harrington is near his end, and as Sir Herbert Taylor is with the King, and is in his Majesty's confidence, I should think some conversation would pass on the subject; if so, I take for granted that what you have mentioned to me will occur to him. It would to me, had I been present, even if I had heard nothing on the subject.

I thought my best plan on receiving your note, on Sunday last, relative to the expenditure of the Lord Steward's Department, was to beg Lord Conyngham to call a Board and to permit me to be present.

This was acquiesced in, and you will see by a copy of the enclosed minute some detail of the proceedings. But I have much to say to your Grace respecting this and other matters, when I have again the opportunity of seeing you.

I am very much struck with the increasing failure of his Majesty's eyes; the light after a time produces pain, which I attribute to the exertion of straining the eye with the view of endeavouring to see more clearly.

I think it will be desirable, by-and-bye, that you should see Mr. Alexander, the oculist, and hear what he has to say on this painful subject. It is an affair of great anxiety. The King bears it well, and I should say does not give way to much depression of spirits.

Ever yours very sincerely,

WILLIAM KNIGHTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Goulburn.

[1443.]

MY DEAR GOULBURN,

Woodford, 13th September, 1829.

Since I saw you yesterday I have been considering this question of the expenses at Buckingham House. It is obvious that some of them are necessary; such as bell-hanging, the baths, and even heating the house. Others are ornamental and unnecessary; and their commencement might have been postponed. But these have been commenced without authority; and part of this unauthorised expense has been paid. It must likewise be observed that Nash might have stated these additions to the building, particularly those of which he has incurred part of the expense, at the time you called upon him for an estimate to be laid before Parliament.

What I recommend is that you should make a "hash of Nash" in a minute of the Treasury for having omitted to make these statements, and for having incurred these unauthorised expenses. Then call upon him for an estimate for bells, baths, and warming the house. This will put the case in a shape for me to deal with it with the King; and the minute can go before Parliament with the estimates of those expenses which we shall find necessary, and shall think proper to authorise.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Sir George Murray.

[1444.]

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Woodford, 13th September, 1829.

I have received your letter of the 11th, and return the papers which you sent with it.

It appears to me that the difficulty in the Canada question grows out of our early departure from the principle on which government ought to have acted under the Act of the 14th George III. Sir John Sherbrook's estimate, and the proceedings of that time, laid the foundation for the pretensions of the colonial legislature. The acts of the Duke of Richmond, and of Lord Dalhousie, have given these pretensions a sort of constitutional justification, and the submission to them by Sir Francis Burton, and the report of the Canada Committee, have given those pretensions about the strength of positive decisions in their favour. It must be observed that Mr. Huskisson was

the person who moved for that Committee; and he and other ministers of the Crown were members of it. This followed the despatch from Lord Goderich mentioned in your papers.

We cannot consider that we have the question entirely in our hands to decide it as we please. We must consider all that has been done before by the government itself, its servants and Parliament, to occasion, to justify and to strengthen the pretensions of the Canadian legislature; and we must endeavour to make an arrangement to satisfy that body at the least sacrifice of the supremacy and honour of Parliament.

Although Sir James Kempt's consent to the Act of the last session is a fresh submission to the pretensions of the Canadian legislature, it appears to me quite right not to touch that question here. The Governor-General in Canada might follow the same course in the session of 1829-1830 as he did in 1828-1829; and I conclude that the Treasury here have made, and will continue to make, the appropriation of the sums at its disposition under the Act of the 14th George III., according to the Acts of the colonial legislature. The question will then come to be, what is to be done in Parliament here. We cannot say that doubts have arisen respecting the meaning of the Act of the 14th George III., for there is no such doubt. That which is true is that the expenses of the civil government and of the administration of justice in Lower Canada exceed the means provided for the payment of these expenses by the Act of the 14th George III.; and that the colonial legislature, feeling that those means are provided at the expense of the people of Canada, and that they are under the necessity of adding to those means in order to defray the excess of expense, claim a control over the whole.

The objection is not to the payment of a tax laid on by Parliament for the payment of the expenses of the civil government, but to the appropriation in detail of the sum levied by the officers of the Crown without the control of the colonial legislature; and this under the authority of a British Act of Parliament. We must bear this in mind in preparing the measure for Parliament, and we must take care not to leave behind us any ground on which can be founded a fresh dispute between the advocates for the supreme powers of Parliament and those for the constitutional powers of the colonial legislature.

I don't think your plan, No. 4, will answer your purpose. Parliament is either to appropriate certain parts of the produce of the duties to defray certain expenses; or it is to enable the Crown to place the produce of those duties at the disposition of the colonial legislature, on condition that the colonial legislature shall make provision for a period of time for certain expenses of the civil government. Either measure would be an interference by Parliament in the control over the expenditure of the produce of the taxes levied under the sanction of the 14th George III., which is exactly what the colonial legislature object to.

What I would recommend is that the measure to be proposed to Parliament should enable the King to appropriate the produce of these taxes according to the advice of the colonial legislature. The question with the colonial legislature would thus be simplified; it would be one between the Crown and the legislature; and the houses in Canada are much more likely to take a fair view of it when in this state than if they have a question with the British Parliament.

I confess that I am not astonished at their constitutional anxiety to obtain this control over the civil expenditure. They don't provide for their own defence; and they must be anxious to obtain power by means of a control over the only expenditure for which they do provide. But I think that if they have to deal with the Crown alone, and that the measure of Parliament does not place the King entirely in their hands, they will adopt permanently a reasonable arrangement which would put an end to these disputes.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I don't understand the distinction between the hereditary revenues and those raised under the Act of the 14th George III. Both were originally the property of the Crown; the latter having been granted instead of duties levied by the French government. Why should the hereditary revenues be retained at the exclusive disposition of the Crown?

[1445.]

To Lord Ellenborough.

Woodford, 13th September, 1829.

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

I return your drafts, in which you will see some observations in pencil. I have likewise perused the newspaper. The statement in Colonel Baker's letter is very strong indeed. I don't know what answer the Court of Directors can give to it.

Have you spoken to Salmond about it? If the statement respecting 1801 be true, this arrangement is not economical; but it does not appear that the grant of the full batta at that period in the Lower Provinces was connected with the discontinuance of double full batta to troops employed beyond the Caramnassa.

Ever, my dear Lord Ellenborough,

Yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[1446.]

To Lord Ellenborough.

Woodford, 14th September, 1829.

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

I return your maps and papers regarding the Burmese territories. There is in your office a Memorandum of mine written early in the war in Ava respecting the plan of operations. As well as I recollect, I therein stated that there must be a road from the Irrawaddy to the sea; I thought at Arracan. It appears that I was not mistaken. There is a road from the Irrawaddy to Aeng.

This must be the line of operations in all future wars with Ava. In proportion as it is made practicable and easy will the probability of the necessity of such war be decreased.

In order, however, that the government may enjoy the full advantage of this communication, and in order to decrease the expense of future wars with Ava, it is desirable that the communication between the seat of our resources and this road should be good. I cannot consider the island of Ramsee as a fit base for those operations. You can reach it only by sea. Conveyance by sea answers well for men, cannon, ammunition, stores, and provisions. But it must be recollected that these must all be moved forward from the base, viz., the island of Ramsee; that this movement can be effected only by the use of

animals; and that these animals and their attendants, and their forage for the voyage, must be brought to the base by sea at an enormous expense, unless there should be a land communication with the country in which our resources lay from the road leading from Aeng and Ramsee to the Irrawaddy.

These observations upon Ramsee will point out to you the causes of the immense expense of all our military operations in Europe, and of the enormous expense of the late war in Ava from the base at Rangoon. All the animals, &c., were to be transported by sea! It will likewise show you the reason why the Russians, having possession of Sizeboli, of other places upon the coast of the Black Sea, and lastly of Burghas, and having it in their power to pour thousands of troops into that part of the country close to Constantinople by sea, could do nothing till General Diebitsch with an army opened the communication with the Danube across Mount Hæmus. He brought with him means of movement and of conveyance, cavalry and horses for the artillery; and then his men at Sizeboli, Burghas, &c., became a movable army.

If then it be true that Arracan is so unhealthy as that it cannot be used even as a place of passage, Aeng must be formed into a dépôt; and there must be made a good road from the province of Chittagong to Aeng, with bridges upon the rivers, &c.

I don't think there is information enough upon the Munipoor district to enable me to say whether a line of operations could be carried on through or from that district.

But in general I would recommend the route from the sea across the mountains to the Irrawaddy as the great and principal line of operations. Light detachments might move into the country by Munipoor.

I cannot help thinking that in case of a contest with Ava it would be very important again to have possession of Rangoon, and to introduce vessels of war, steamboats, &c., into the Irrawaddy to co-operate with the army, which will find itself on that river from Aeng.

This operation might be carried on by a force not very large, particularly if its arrival is well-timed with the force moving from Aeng. It appears that the pagoda at Rangoon could be held by a small body of good troops. This operation should be carried on entirely from, and in concert with, the ships, and

would require none of the expense of transport service, which swelled so enormously the expenses of the late war.

The orders respecting the coast of Tenasserim are given, and there is an end of the question. But there is a great deal deserving of consideration in what Sir Archibald Campbell says upon this subject.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1447.]

To Lord Ellenborough.

Woodford, 14th September, 1829.

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

The Memorandum from me respecting rank for the officers for the service of Bhurtpoor was never acted upon, and was given up in the subsequent discussions with the Commander-in-Chief.

You are quite right about Sir Archibald Campbell's doctor, commanding officer of artillery, &c., and his arguments as stated in your note of the 7th must go for nothing.

It must be observed that Sir Archibald Campbell was a subordinate officer acting under the Indian government and the Commander-in-Chief of the army in India; and it will not answer to allow men in such situations to recommend candidates for honours.

I may safely say that when I was Commander-in-Chief in the Peninsula and in Flanders, I was in a higher situation in reference to his Majesty's government than Sir Archibald Campbell was in relation to the government of India. Yet I never recommended any officer for any honour excepting by the desire of government, nor any officer for any promotion excepting in the regular course, unless in consequence of an order from the Commander-in-Chief to send him names.

The recommendation for honours for services in India ought to come from the Governor-General or from the Commander-in-Chief in India.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1448.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Woodford, 14th September, 1829.

I see that Prince de Polignac has been holding some conferences with Don Miguel's gentleman at Paris, to which it is necessary that we should pay some attention.

The object of the conferences is obviously to obtain for Don Miguel the recognition of France. Prince de Polignac requires that all property confiscated in the contest shall be restored, and all persons pardoned. It is very right for Prince de Polignac to require this. It would be very right for Don Miguel to grant what is required without being asked. But if he agrees to an article with any Sovereign, I don't care with what Sovereign, engaging to restore properties to his subjects, to pardon his subjects, or to do any act, or to refrain from doing any act in relation to his subjects, he is no longer an independent Sovereign. He is as much in the hands of the Sovereign with whom he agrees upon such an article, as the Porte is in the hands of Russia respecting Servia, Wallachia, and Moldavia.

It might be as well to give Asseca and even Monsieur de Zea a hint upon this subject. But it is not necessary to draw the attention of either to the effect of such a stipulation upon our relations with Portugal, supposing we could be brought to recognise Don Miguel.

Would it not be desirable to point out to Lord Stuart how discreditable delay in deciding upon the Greek case will prove to France and this government if in consequence the Emperor should take upon himself to settle a Greek treaty with the Porte without reference to our ambassadors or to the opinion of the Conference?

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Worthing, 15th September, 1829.

I have not spoken to Colonel Salmond on the subject of the half batta question and Colonel Baker's statement, because when I lately communicated with him respecting the six regiments I had a long letter of representation from the Chairs, which they should not have written, for my only object in seeing their officer was to further the public service; but as I certainly have no authority to send for their officer, and Colonel Salmond

seemed much annoyed at the manner in which the Chairs spoke to him about it, I determined to struggle with the Act of Parliament as well as I could, and to keep clearly within it.

The question has been long battled between the Home authorities and the local government, which has often on various pretences suspended the execution of the Court's order.

Lord William Bentinck carried the order into effect at an unfortunate moment; just before the reliefs, so it has come unexpectedly upon fifteen regiments.

I have now begged the Chairs to send me confidentially their observations upon Colonel Baker's statement in the form of a reply to it, and I have desired the clerk in our military department to do the same thing.

I believe the Court are quite confident they are in the right.

If dissatisfaction be created in the Bengal army by the measure, it is prevented in the Madras and Bombay armies. At these Presidencies there are, however, still many more half batta stations than there are proportionally in Bengal; but the inequality is not so striking as when there were no half batta stations in Bengal.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

I shall be glad to know your decision respecting the honours asked for Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkinson and Dr. Heward.

I see by the Gazette Colonel McDonald is permitted to accept the order of the Lion and Sun. I never heard anything about it, and I do not know how or when the King's pleasure was taken.

[1449.]

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 18th September, 1829.

The King will have written to you to desire you to send him the usual papers for a patent to appoint Lord Conyngham Constable of the Round Tower at Windsor. He has likewise written to the Secretary at War to desire him to send his Majesty a commission appointing Lord Combermere Colonel of the 1st Life Guards. He had before desired Lord Hill to make both appointments. He has not even informed his minister of these arrangements.

I will not have a quarrel with the King about such trifles. I intended to have suggested Lord Combermere to him if he had spoken to me about the Life Guards.

But I think I ought to write to inform him that the Secretary of State and Secretary at War had informed me of his Majesty's commands; and that if his Majesty had made me acquainted with his wishes I should have had great satisfaction in carrying

them into execution; or something of that kind, in order to remind his Majesty that the mode adopted of making this arrangement is not the mode in which business of this description is done.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Ellenborough.

[1450.]

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH, London, 19th September, 1829.

If the Bengal government connected the grant of full batta in the Lower Provinces in 1801 with the withdrawal of double full batta in the countries beyond the Caramnassa, which I had always thought they did, they are then guilty of a breach of faith. They should put things back to the state in which they were settled in 1796.

If the grant of full batta in the Lower Provinces was as Colonel Baker states an insulated economical measure, then the government have a right to revise it, choosing prudently their time for any alteration. But I think that the economy of the measure ought to be very clear, which Colonel Baker says it is not.

The officers mentioned by you must not have the honours unless recommended by the Governor-General in India.

The grant and withdrawal of full batta in the armies of Madras and Bombay are much more simple than in that of Bengal. The rule of 1796 was half batta in garrison and cantonments everywhere. Full batta in the field, and no more anywhere. When the subsidiary force was sent to Hyderabad it received full batta, although in cantonments. That example was followed in other similar instances. The government could withdraw full batta from these troops without interfering with the arrangement of 1796. On the contrary the grant of full batta to any troops in cantonments, however justifiable on other grounds, was a departure from the rule of 1796.

I know nothing of the Lion and Sun. If we can manage nothing else we ought to manage the Gazette. I should like to know who ordered that the grant of this order should be inserted in the Gazette.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1451.]

To the Earl of Radnor.

MY LORD,

London, 19th September, 1829.

I have received your Lordship's letter with the memorial and the affidavits of the fishermen of Folkestone. If the facts had not been sworn to by so many individuals I should not have believed their existence possible. But I send your Lordship some short notes which I made upon perusing the affidavits which your Lordship enclosed. There is no proof of injury done in any case excepting by the affidavit of one individual. No time stated; the place in many instances not described; no names given of other vessels in sight, or of the vessels from which the injury complained of was done, or of names of those who did it. Yet all this would be necessary in order to prove that any injury had been done; much more to prove that it was done by particular individuals, so as to obtain compensation or punishment.

I assure your Lordship that I have given great attention to this subject. But that I cannot find any means of applying a remedy in the existing state of the fisheries excepting to recommend increased industry to the fishermen, and that they should go to sea in such numbers and act together in concert so as to prevent all injury on the part of their neighbours.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Stow Hall, 19th September, 1829.

The letter which I wrote to you yesterday will have shown you the view which I took of the mode in which the King's commands were signified respecting the appointment of Constable of Windsor Castle, and that I did not feel myself justified in obeying the King's directions for the transmission of the papers for signature, without your distinct consent to the transmission of them.

My opinion is that the arrangement with respect to this office, and to the Life Guards, ought to have been concerted with you, before any orders were given by the King for the preparation of the instruments of appointment.

It appears to me also that you take the correct view of the course to be pursued, and that although it may not be advisable to quarrel with the King on the subject of these appointments, it would be right to mention to his Majesty that the Secretary of State, and the Secretary at War had

apprised you of the commands which they had respectively received, and so on, according to the tenor of your letter to me.

Had the office in question been any other than it is, had it been a political office, or a church preferment, I think a stronger remonstrance on your part would have been advisable.

Believe me ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

I informed Sir Herbert Taylor in reply to his letter to me, that I should give directions for the *preparation* of the instruments. I did not add the transmission of them for the King's signature, in order that my communication to him might be consistent with that which I made to you.

To Lieutenant-General Sir W. H. Clinton.

[1452.]

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 20th September, 1829.

I beg pardon for having omitted to answer your letter immediately. But I was out of town.

You tell me that "the world cannot cease to look upon me as a general," yet you address me as the minister. You complain of the act which, as minister, I was under the necessity of adopting; and you ask for the reparation which I can give as minister alone.

I will not again enter upon this painful case. It is as the minister alone that I can justify it; and I can assure you that nothing but an imperious sense of duty would have induced me to act as I did. But I must likewise add that, as minister, I cannot apply the remedy which you desire that I should. I have already stated my reasons, and it is unnecessary here to repeat them.

I can only add that nothing has occurred to alter the respect and regard which I feel for you, for your talents, qualifications, and services; nor the desire to manifest those feelings whenever an opportunity may offer.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

[1453.]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 21st September, 1829.

I received your letter of the 18th on Saturday, and I saw that you took the same view of the recent transaction at

Windsor as I had in my letter to you of the same date; and this notion has been confirmed by your letter of this morning.

However, upon considering the subject in all its bearings, I am inclined to think that upon the whole the best course is to take no notice of what has passed.

I can state no objection to the persons selected. My objection must be to the mode adopted of making the appointments. The mode adopted, however unusual, however inconvenient, and although contrary to the spirit of the constitution, is not illegal.

However mildly I might make my representations, it would still be a complaint, and it must end by a pardon from me. The King might think that upon the whole he had not behaved very fairly by me; and he might forgive me. But he would never forgive you or Hardinge, upon whose report to me I must have founded my representations to his Majesty as to his having passed by his minister in this transaction.

It remained then to be considered whether any and what advantage would result from such representation. I entertain no doubt that the King would do the same next week if an opportunity should offer; and it is not worth while to create any fresh ill will to produce no result.

I have therefore determined not to write to the King, and to send forward the papers from your office and the Secretary at War's.

It remains to be considered whether it would not be proper to have some record in both offices that reference had been made to me before the papers had been sent down. I shall be obliged to you if you will speak to Hardinge upon this point.

We yesterday received accounts that an armistice between the Russians and Turks had been concluded at General Diebitsch's head-quarters at Adrianople on the 29th August, and that the Russian and Turkish plenipotentiaries were negotiating a Treaty of Peace.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1454.] MEMORANDUM OF NOTE SENT TO THE EARL OF ABERDEEN.

21st September, 1829.

Before the plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty proceeds to state the ground of the proposition which he had the honour

of submitting to the Conference on the * September, he considers it his duty to place on the Protocol some observations on the existing state of the negotiations for carrying into execution the Treaty of the 6th July.

Two of the Sovereigns parties to the Treaty, viz., his Britannic Majesty and his Most Christian Majesty, having been urgently entreated by the Greeks to interpose their mediation with the Porte, and the three Sovereigns feeling the most anxious desire to prevent the further effusion of blood, and to put an end to the evils of all descriptions which were the consequence of the state of affairs described in the Treaty as existing in the Levant, resolved to combine their efforts and to regulate those efforts by a Treaty of which the object should be to re-establish peace between the contending parties.

The three Powers then agreed to offer their mediation to the Porte; and to require an immediate armistice between that Power and the Greeks.

They further agreed upon the bases of the arrangement to be proposed to the contending parties; and they likewise agreed as follows:—

5th Article of the Treaty.—Les Puissances contractantes ne chercheront dans ces arrangements aucune augmentation de territoire, aucune influence exclusive, aucun avantage de commerce pour leurs sujets, que ceux de toute autre nation ne puissent également obtenir.

From this statement it is clear that the three Powers engaged in this Treaty are so engaged as mediators alone. That they have disclaimed any interest in the arrangement save and except their general interests detailed in the Treaty itself, which are those of peace for that part of the world.

It is well known that for some time the Porte refused to admit of the mediation of the Powers parties to the Treaty of the 6th July, or to consent to the armistice which was proposed by its 1st article.

At length, however, these difficulties were got the better of.

On the 16th November, 1828, the ministers plenipotentiary of the three Courts assembled in Conference in London, found means of making a fresh overture to the Porte for the purpose of negotiating a settlement of the Greek question without the previous formal recognition on the part of the Porte of an

* Blank in manuscript.

armistice ; and on the 22nd of March, 1829, the three Powers agreed upon instructions to be given to the ambassadors of his Britannic Majesty and of his Most Christian Majesty at the Porte, as the plenipotentiaries of the mediating Powers, to make certain propositions to the Porte as the basis of an arrangement of the differences between the Turks and Greeks.

The ambassadors having, upon their arrival at Constantinople, had reason to believe that the Turks accepted the mediation of the three Powers, submitted to the Reis Effendi in a Note of the 7th of July the propositions agreed to by the plenipotentiaries in Conference on the 20th March as the basis of an arrangement. The minister of the Porte, however, rejected these propositions ; and declared the intention of the government to settle the Greek affair by means of a *Hattisheriff*, and not by the mediation of the Sovereigns parties to the Treaty of 6th July, 1827.

At length, however, on the 15th of August, the Porte by an official Note first declares “qu'elle adhère au Traité de Londres ;” thus accepting the mediation of the Allied Powers ; and then accepts the propositions made by the plenipotentiary of the mediating Powers, “*comme étant fondées sur les bases du dit Traité aux conditions suivantes.*”

After stating the conditions, the Note ends by this “*Conclusion.*” “*Les articles ci-dessus ont été arrêtés par la Sublime Porte après avoir entendu et discuté les PROPOSITIONS de MM. les ambassadeurs.*”

It is stated first that the paper above extracted is not an unconditional admission of the mediation of the Powers contracting parties to the Treaty of the 6th July ; and that the conditions refer to the acceptance of the mediation, or rather, to take the words of the Note itself, to the adherence to the Treaty of the 6th July as well as to the *propositions* made by the plenipotentiaries of the mediating Powers on the 7th July, 1829.

It appears to his Britannic Majesty's plenipotentiary to be impossible to understand the Note of the Reis Effendi in this manner.

The Porte declares not only that she adheres to the Treaty, but that she accepts the propositions of the plenipotentiaries “*comme étant fondées sur les bases du dit Traité.*”

The Porte further declares in her *conclusion* that the

articles ci-dessus, that is the conditions, *ont été arrêtées après avoir entendu et discuté* (what? the Treaty of London? the claim of the mediating Powers to mediate? No! But) *les propositions de MM. les ambassadeurs*.

It is plain and obvious then that the Porte adheres unconditionally to the Treaty of London, admits and accepts the mediation; and likewise accepts the propositions made by the plenipotentiary of the mediating Powers, but states certain conditions of her acceptance of these propositions.

There is no instance upon record of a Power or Powers assuming the character of mediators who have ever objected to hear and deliberate upon the objections of either party to the arrangement which is the object of the mediation.

But in the case of the propositions submitted on the 7th July, 1829, to the Porte by the plenipotentiaries of the mediating Powers, the right of the Porte to object to these propositions is admitted; and the engagement is made to consider of the objections of the Porte; and further, to bring forward other propositions with a view to terminate this question.

Here are the words of the Protocol of the 22nd March, 1829:—

Les plénipotentiaires de l'Alliance, lecture faite des pièces annexées au Protocole sous les lettres A, B, C, D,* et après les avoir prises en considération, ont arrêté ce qui suit:—

Les ambassadeurs de France et de la Grande-Bretagne près la Porte Ottomane ouvriront à Constantinople, aussitôt qu'ils y seront arrivés, une négociation avec le gouvernement Turc, au nom des trois Cours signataires du Traité du 6 Juillet, 1827, sur la pacification et l'organisation future de la Grèce, conformément aux bases ci-après indiquées.

Il reste bien entendu toutefois que chacune des Cours Alliées se réserve le droit de peser le mérite des objections que ferait la Porte Ottomane aux propositions qui lui seront communiquées, en vertu du présent Protocole; et que, dans le cas où ces objections s'élèveraient, il pourrait être concerté entre les trois Puissances d'autres propositions, fondées sur le désir qui les animera toujours de terminer promptement la question dont elles s'occupent en ce moment.

It is impossible, then, for his Britannic Majesty's plenipotentiary to understand upon what ground it is desired that the mediating Powers should not proceed with their mediation.

If indeed the mediating Powers were of a different character, if they had not each disclaimed all exclusive advantages in the

* Papers relative to the affairs of Greece, laid before Parliament in May 1830.

arrangement which is the object of their mediation, the reason for delay might be found in the military and political circumstances of the times, and in the difficulties under which the Porte labours on other grounds.

But these circumstances, and the difficulties under which the Porte labours, are quite distinct from those which are the objects of the mediating Powers. It has been particularly agreed upon in the Conference of the 15th June, 1828, "*que l'objet des délibérations de la Conférence resterait étranger à la guerre.*"

His Britannic Majesty's minister plenipotentiary has therefore received the order of his Court to submit to the Conference of the plenipotentiaries of the mediating Powers sitting in London, that they should now take into consideration the *conditions* of the Porte specified in the Note of the Reis Effendi of the 15th August; and should send fresh instructions to the plenipotentiaries of the mediating Powers at Constantinople.

WELLINGTON.

[1455.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, London, 22nd September, 1829.

It will be very desirable to press the Conference for a decision upon the following points; instructions for the ambassadors; armistice between Greeks and Turks; withdrawal of the French troops from the Morea, if that question must be brought before the Conference.

Besides fixing the Prince, if the Protocol of the 22nd March is understood as finally regulating everything else, there is a very important point to be settled under the 6th article of the Treaty of the 6th July, 1827.

If there is to be any fairness in the arrangement, and the Turks are to be listened to, I should say that the 1st, 2nd, and 4th of the "*conditions*" in their paper of the 15th August ought to be admitted in a degree.

I should say that the 4th article was quite consistent with the original object of the Treaty.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Goulburn.

[1456.]

MY DEAR GOULBURN,

London, 22nd September, 1829.

I think that this will do if the Bank of Ireland will consent. But will they not, by making themselves the agents in Dublin for the Provincial Bank, give to the Provincial the support of their credit; and thereby give to the Provincial Bank increased facilities for circulating their notes in Dublin, and within fifty miles of that city? I should think that this will be their objection.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 22nd September, 1829.

As soon as I receive the Russian opinion, I will summon a Conference and press the subjects which you desire. The instructions to the ambassadors must depend upon the opinions of the plenipotentiaries in London with respect to the proposition made at the last Conference; but some instruction or other, I suppose they must agree to.

I send to-day what I have written to Stuart; and I think it will be as well not to bring forward, at present at least, in the Conference the question of the evacuation of the Morea by the French troops. We shall clearly gain nothing by it; and perhaps lose some advantage by making it a matter of discussion and doubt. We may return to the charge, in the Conference, should we think it necessary; but I am inclined to be of opinion that the best thing for us to do will be, when we are satisfied that the French government are determined not to comply with our remonstrances, simply to announce to the Conference our intention to prevent any maritime expedition of a hostile nature by the Greeks. We should ground this decision entirely on the fact of these expeditions being produced by the presence of the French troops in the Morea, contrary to the engagements of the Protocol. If therefore the King of France for his convenience pleases to keep his troops still in the Morea, we may certainly take care that, by so doing, he does not destroy the effect of his own and our engagements.

I also enclose what I have written to Stuart, in the hope of obtaining the means of acting against Capo d'Istria with effect, if we think it necessary.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

To the Right Hon. Henry Goulburn.

[1457.]

MY DEAR GOULBURN,

Walmer Castle, 23rd September, 1829.

Since I wrote to you yesterday morning I have turned over further in my mind your proposition to the Bank of Ireland. I think that it is impossible they should agree to it.

As I understand the case the Provincial Bank have no right to issue, reissue, or to receive, pay, send away and cancel their notes within fifty miles of Dublin. They pretend that Parliament intended to put them on the same footing as country banks in England in respect to paying and receiving in London.

There is no doubt that the power to receive and pay in Dublin, &c., would greatly increase and facilitate the circulation of their notes at the expense of the Bank of Ireland; with whose notes the notes of the Provincial Bank would come in competition even in the *preserve* of the Bank of Ireland.

The simple concession, then, would be a very great one; and one for which the Bank of Ireland would be entitled to compensation. But you give the Provincial Bank another and indeed an additional facility for circulating their notes, by proposing that the Bank of Ireland should be the agent for taking up the notes of the Provincial Bank. You, in fact, give the Provincial Bank the additional security for their notes of the engagement of the Bank of Ireland to take them up in Dublin.

Then there is another view of this case. The gold in the coffers of the Bank of Ireland must be calculated upon their own circulation. If they are to take up the notes in Dublin of the Provincial Bank, they must have in their coffers so much more gold, unless indeed the Provincial Bank should, besides the Bank of Ireland as agents, have other agents on the spot with the means in their hands to pay the Bank of Ireland daily for the notes which that Bank may have taken up.

Would not a more simple plan be for the Provincial Bank to pay the Bank of Ireland a certain amount for the privilege of establishing a house in Dublin to receive and pay their notes, sending to the Bank of Ireland daily a register of the notes paid.

The Bank of Ireland would then have compensation for any loss or inconvenience from competition, and security against abuse.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1458.]

Walmer Castle,
23rd September, 1829.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

I am very much obliged to you for the perusal of the enclosed, which I return.

I understand that the first proposition in the Conference was to put a stop to Greek hostilities. Upon this the French plenipotentiary put in his paper. We discussed the question whether the Turkish adherence *was* an adherence; and the discussion ended by your proposing that instructions should be sent to the ambassador. This proposition stands in my paper.

Of course the Conference will decide upon this proposition. In the commencement of my paper I postponed the discussion of the Greek hostilities.

In respect to the withdrawal of the French troops, I send back this day the copy of a letter from Prince de Polignac to Monsieur de Roth. From this the matter appears more serious than it did from the letter of Prince de Polignac to Lord Stuart, in answer to his note.

Prince de Polignac, in both, says that his engagement was made to the Conference. It is for the Conference alone to require the performance of the engagement, of which Conference the French plenipotentiary is a party. It appears that the French plenipotentiary, at least, will be of opinion that the King of France ought not to withdraw his troops till after the winter.

I don't know whether we have anything in writing; but Prince de Polignac pledged his own word to me as a gentleman, and told me that he was authorised to pledge the word of his Sovereign, that the French troops would be withdrawn as soon as the Morea should be evacuated by the Turkish troops. I believe that he did the same to you. It would be as well to look through Lord Stuart's despatches to see whether we have anything in writing upon this subject.

The affair is of importance, because, if I am not mistaken, we have twice announced to Parliament that the French troops were coming away; besides the importance that an engagement made to this country should be performed.

I think it better to avoid its coming into the Conference, or its going further than private remonstrance, until we make Prince de Polignac feel as a man of honour ought upon this subject; and particularly that our difficulty is aggravated by

our having trusted to his word. I would recommend to you to see Roth upon the subject, and tell him what passed with me as well as with you; and to desire Stuart, in a private letter, to remind Prince de Polignac of it. Indeed, if the object cannot be attained otherwise, I would recommend that Stuart should see the King.

He should read to Polignac all his own despatches, stating what passed between the French ministers and him.

Everything should be done that can be done to bring Prince de Polignac into the right road.

In the mean time I would recommend to you to agree to nothing in the Conference, excepting what you may propose yourself, till this engagement shall be performed. It will be for the Cabinet to determine what they will ultimately do upon the subject. In the mean time, nothing should be done to create irritation; or to pledge us to anything. That which is important, is the intention of Prince de Polignac to keep his troops in the Morea till after the winter, notwithstanding his repeated promises, and our demands that they should be performed.

I like the proposition to give orders to our fleet not to allow the Greeks to carry on any operation; to which, if the Cabinet agree, I shall have no objection. But we must first exhaust all means of settling this affair amicably with Prince de Polignac, which will require time; and during that time I would consent to nothing that was not proposed by myself.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I have not by me the papers. But, as well as I recollect, something passed respecting the French troops in the Conference of November, 1828. This affair is becoming so serious, that we must look minutely at everything that has passed upon it.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 24th September, 1829.

We have had a stormy discussion of two hours. They were outrageous at the Memorandum which I read, and to which they desired to put in rejoinders. They said that their notes turned entirely upon the question of whether the accession of the Porte was complete or not; whereas my paper entered into the whole history of the Treaty, and the subsequent negotiations. After a great deal of talk I agreed to consider the matter,

and let them know in what manner, and to what extent, the paper might be modified. I now send you the opinion, as I have altered it, which they probably may agree to. I have preserved your principle of mediation, as regulating our intervention ; and I think also, all that is material in making out the true construction of the Turkish note. I think too that it perfectly answers the statements contained in the French and Russian opinions, which is after all the essential point. I send them to you also.

I observe that you did not press the establishment of the armistice, as a *sine quâ non* for taking into consideration the Turkish "conditions." I suppose you did not mean to do so ; and I have therefore concluded by repeating the proposal to consider them. This they are prepared to do ; although it is very clear with what result. As Roth still speaks of some deficiency in his instructions, I have not summoned them for to-morrow, which will give you time to return the paper. I will then call them together on Monday, and if they make no objection to receiving it on the Protocol, we can proceed to discuss the Turkish propositions.

In addition to the article of these conditions, claiming the restoration of the military stores of the ceded fortresses ; I think we ought to reject that, forbidding the emigration of any Greek from the Turkish territory.

The mischief of the delay in establishing the armistice is, that we shall lose very shortly the only advantage we can obtain by its existence. Eubœa cannot long resist, and the terror which the events at Constantinople must inspire, will perhaps render our efforts fruitless even if we were to succeed in the Conference. It is this consideration which makes me impatient, either to proceed upon the *uti possidetis*, or upon some basis likely to lead to a conclusion.

The same effect of delay will arise during the discussion respecting the return of the French troops. By the time we have fully satisfied ourselves that there is no chance of their being recalled, the Greeks will probably have taken the island of Eubœa ; and therefore we shall have no expedition to put a stop to which can influence the question of limits, as Candia has already been taken out of the future State.

The news from Constantinople of the 29th of August does not bring anything important, except that, if they allow him, the Sultan appears to be strong enough to keep the peace of his own capital. It does not appear either, that the Russians had advanced to Enos and Rodosto, as we had been informed, but had halted on the road to both these places.

We must hope for the best ; but there are some ominous expressions at the conclusion of the answer of Diebitsch to General Müffling.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

Madame de Lieven was honest enough to tell me the day before yesterday, that the news of the armistice had prevented her sleep.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 24th September, 1829.

Upon the subject of the French troops I have already anticipated your wishes by speaking to M. Roth, whom I accidentally met last night, and

who gave me an opportunity by adverting to it himself. Preserving the same friendly tone of my despatch to Stuart, I spoke to him in still stronger terms; and exhausted all the reasons which induced us to insist upon the demand, and which ought to make them comply with it. I told him that we would not bring it before the Conference, for the Conference had already decided; and that it was only our reliance upon the word of Prince de Polignac, and upon the King, which had prevented a day from being fixed for their return. He fully admitted the engagement; and said that we were morally right, but that M. de Polignac had hoped we did not attach so much importance to the precise time. He is to write, and I have no doubt will do so very seriously. I concluded by telling him that if the troops did not return, it would be impossible for this government not to mark its sense of the proceeding in some way or other: I could not now say in what manner; but I felt satisfied that it would be necessary to do something.

I have summoned a Conference for to-morrow, when the opinions of the plenipotentiaries will be settled, and recorded on the Protocol. I have not yet seen Lieven's, but he says that he shall be ready with it for the Conference. I do not propose to put prominently forward the proposition for establishing the armistice; but rather to press for the necessity of instructions to the plenipotentiary at Constantinople, which must be admitted as indispensable, whether the Turkish answer is an accession to the Treaty, or not. These instructions will enable us to recognise the existence of the negotiation, which when fully established will give us a right to demand the armistice. I have reason to know that the proposition for sending fresh instructions will be at once agreed to; but the question will arise respecting what these instructions should be. We may propose to approve of the Turkish conditions, which we know will be objected to by the Russians, and probably not supported by the French. Here we are then, at a dead stand; unless we agree to reject the Turkish propositions, and to convert those already made by the ambassadors into an ultimatum. This will be too extravagant even for the Russians to think of. But after all, the question is, how to agree upon such instructions as may render it possible for the ambassadors to conclude. It has struck me that we might make two propositions to the Porte, conditionally in some respects. We might propose to take the *uti possidetis*, as the foundation of the settlement, giving them all the advantages of the Treaty, such as suzerainté, tribute, and indemnity. This would leave the Turks in possession of Eubœa; and as they occupy Athens and Thebes, these might be exchanged against Scio and Samos, which are in the hands of the Greeks. I think this would not be objected to by Russia; and in the present state of matters, I doubt if acting under the Treaty we shall get more favourable terms. Should the Turkish Power be ever good for anything, the possession of Candia and Eubœa ought effectually to control Greece.

We might as an alternative propose, should it be preferred by the Porte, as undoubtedly it ought to be, the contraction of the limits to the Morea and Attica; with the establishment of an absolute independence, and freedom from tribute. This will surely remove all appearance of harshness towards the Porte; and it will keep us strictly within the Treaty unless the Turks should wish to take us out of it. Whether our colleagues will agree

to either proposition is more than I can tell, but it is by no means impossible.

My intention to-morrow is merely to propose the sending of instructions. I think the argument of your paper so clear and so convincing, upon the ground of our character as mediators, that I shall introduce nothing else to prove the justice of our accepting the Turkish adherence. I hope its force and effect will not suffer by a little compression, and verbal alterations.

I shall then propose to meet on Saturday, for the purpose of concerting the instructions to the ambassadors. On that day I hope to hear from you, unless you have any fancy not to make your appearance. But, subject to your approbation, what appears to me the best course to pursue, is this : first to propose that we should agree to the Turkish conditions according to the paper transmitted by the ambassadors, with the exception perhaps, of restoring the artillery taken in the fortresses.

On the failure of this, then to propose the alternative as I have already described it, to be communicated to the Porte by the two ambassadors.

I have no intention of saying a word about the Prince ; and indeed this is a subject about which we might think a little, as the decision does not press, and it might possibly be connected with other arrangements.

I shall be very glad to have your opinion on Saturday morning relative to the course of proceeding on that day.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

I have seen a letter from Adam, which mentions the determination of Capo d'Istria to send three ministers to Europe. Mavrocordato to Paris, Colletti to St. Petersburg, and we are to be favoured with Count Viaco Capo d'Istria. I can scarcely suppose this to be true ; for Greece, not being an independent State, probably could have no right to send any minister. At all events the notion of sending a person so notoriously hostile to us as Count Viaco Capo d'Istria, and our own subject into the bargain, is scarcely credible. Of course I presume that we shall decline his company.

P. S.—I enclose a despatch and letter this instant arrived from Lord Heytesbury. Probably I shall hear more from Lieven upon the subject to-morrow.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1459.]

Walmer Castle,

25th September, 1829.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

I have received your letter of yesterday, and as I am obliged to stay here to-morrow, and at all events my attendance at the Conference would be quite useless, I trouble you with this letter.

I have read the despatches from Paris of the 21st, as well as the despatch and the private letter from Lord Heytesbury. I think that Lord Stuart, as usual, misunderstood your despatch

(No. 61) to him. The answer, however, in his despatch (No. 362) shows exactly what the French government are driving at. They have us bound by the Protocol of March 1829. They expect (it has been probably settled) that the Turks will receive a hint from the head-quarters of Adrianople, that that Protocol is to be accepted; and they will agree to nothing in London which shall alter the state of things at Constantinople. Neither will the Emperor of Russia. His plenipotentiaries will press to make the Protocol of March, 1829, an ultimatum; for this reason, that every day's delay is now important to them, as rendering necessary the delay of their army within the Turkish territories. If the French ambassador does anything, it will be to agree with his Russian colleague in pressing that the proposition of March, 1829, should be made an ultimatum; and that the Conference should proceed to settle the other points which remain unsettled.

If either should press that view of the case, we must decline to agree, founding our refusal as well upon the unreasonableness of the propositions themselves, even in the existing state of the contest between Greeks and Turks, as upon the continuance of the war in Greece, and the refusal of the King of France to withdraw his troops. The plenipotentiaries of France and Russia may then call upon us to propose the instructions to the ambassadors, as it is our proposition that they should be further instructed.

If they should take this course, either after having desired to make the proposition of March, 1829, an ultimatum, or without expressing such desire, I would then recommend to you to tell them that our view of the obligations imposed upon the Allies by the Treaty, as mediators between the parties, and by their engagements towards each other, required that further hostilities should be prevented on the part of the Greeks; and that the King of France should withdraw his troops from the Morea. That in respect to the settlement we take the propositions of March, 1829, as the basis; fixing as the limit of Greece the province of Attica, in addition to the Turkish counter proposition. That we are aware the Greeks have not possession of Attica; but that they have possession of parts of Western Greece, and that it might be proposed to the Turks to give up Attica in exchange for all other parts of Continental Greece, in which the Greeks might be established. That we besides pro-

pose the adoption of the other *conditions* stated by the Turks in their Note of the 15th August ; enumerated in my note to you written on the day I left town. That we particularly recommend to their attention the *condition* proposed respecting the maintenance of ships of war and a military force by the Greeks. That this condition is entirely consistent with the relation between suzerain and dependency, however governed ; more particularly such dependency being guaranteed and protected by foreign Powers in its relations with the suzerain. That the dependency will be protected against foreign attack by its suzerain. That this condition appears not only reasonable, but necessary between Greeks and Turks. The Turks will not venture to attack the Greeks, protected as they will be by foreign Powers. But seeing all that is going on, who will venture to guarantee the Turks against the attacks of the Greeks, if the Greeks should have an army ?

If the Allies are in earnest, they will insist upon this condition.

I can't say much for the moderation displayed in Count Nesselrode's conversation with Lord Heytesbury, as reported in his despatch.

The question is whether the freedom of the navigation of the Bosphorus means by ships of war ?

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1460.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Walmer Castle,
26th September, 1829.

I should say that your paper was perfect. I don't recollect the difference between your paper and mine. The only objection I have to withdraw what I wrote is that the French and Russian ministers desire it. I am quite certain that the only way of dealing with them is to make them listen to the truth in plain terms. They cannot stand such statements when they come to be published ; particularly not the Emperor of Russia.

It is very difficult to give any opinion upon such subjects without being accurately informed. In your letter of yesterday you talked of missions to be sent by the President of Greece to the three Courts. In that of this day you mention the probable

loss of Eubœa. Both are important; the latter very much so, in the consideration and decision of the questions of the day; but I have seen nothing of either.

I shall be in town to-morrow early, and will look over my paper and see the difference between that and yours. I will likewise endeavour to obtain the perusal of the last accounts from Corfu, and you shall hear from me in the afternoon.

General Diebitsch's letter is very curious. But Madame de Lieven shows how very wrong we were in not sleeping comfortably during this Russian war, in full reliance upon the assurances of the magnanimous Nicholas that he wished for peace and to preserve in independence the Turkish empire!

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1461.]

To Lord FitzRoy Somerset.

MY DEAR LORD FITZROY, Walmer Castle, 26th September, 1829.

I have perused the enclosed. It will be very desirable that Lord Hill should compare this paper with General Sir John Byng's letters upon the distribution of the troops.

The police are in truth soldiers badly disciplined, officered, and commanded; and under the directions of the civil powers, that is to say, the Justices of the Peace. These are the gentlemen of property of the country.

Can the country be governed without their assistance and intervention? Would such government be consistent with the British Constitution? Even if it would, does General Egerton believe it possible that an army of 20,000 men could be distributed in Ireland, to perform the civil government of the country?

If it cannot, which is the truth, can the army, officers and all, be placed at the disposition of the civil government, that is to say, at the disposition of the magistrates of the country, for all the purposes for which they require and now use constables of the police?

We are trying the measure of appointing military officers to be Justices of the Peace in parts where that measure is necessary. The truth is that the police are disliked, because however ill-disciplined, officered, and commanded, they are efficient for

the performance of the service entrusted to them. The army are liked, because there is much of that service which they could not perform.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 26th September, 1829.

I dare say that you have decided for the best in the case of Windsor Castle and the regiment, but I shall not object at any time, in case the same thing should again occur, to have it stated or to state myself to the King, that I do not think the Secretary of State ought to forward instruments conferring appointments to his Majesty for his signature without previously communicating with the First Lord of the Treasury, and ascertaining that he is acting with his sanction and consent.

I will leave in the office of the Home Department a memorandum to this effect:—

That the King's commands were signified directly to the Secretary of State to make out and transmit to the King for his Majesty's signature the instrument of appointment for the office of Constable of Windsor Castle in favour of the Marquess of Conyngham; but that the papers were not transmitted to the King without a previous communication from the Secretary of State to the First Lord of the Treasury, and without the sanction of the latter.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

To the Duke of Clarence.

[1462.]

SIR,

London, 28th September, 1829.

Having perused in the newspaper of this morning that your Royal Highness and her Royal Highness the Duchess had gone to Dieppe in the steam-packet, and having enquired at the Admiralty, I found that there had been no intimation of your Royal Highness's intention to go abroad. I conclude that your Royal Highness did not give this intimation because you thought that your employing one of his Majesty's yachts or steam-vessels might be inconvenient to the public service. I am certain, however, that your Royal Highness will feel that it is not fit that her Royal Highness the Duchess should be in a French port otherwise than properly attended by one of his Majesty's yachts, although your Royal Highness personally as

an officer may do as you please ; and your Royal Highness will not be surprised that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty should have sent over to attend your Royal Highness the Admiralty yacht and one of his Majesty's steam-vessels as soon as it was made known to them that your Royal Highness had left England.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Sir Henry Halford, Bart., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Tuesday night, 28th September, 1829.

I found the King very well this morning, and with three newspapers on the bed, and no spectacles. I cannot therefore think the condition of the eyes so bad as it is thought to be. I looked again with all my own power of sight, and could observe only a muddiness in the left eye, which *may end* in cataract, but probably not for some time.

His Majesty was very good humoured and talked of Brighton not sooner than the first week of November. There seemed to be peace in the house, and if this continue, I should not wonder if his Majesty did not go to Brighton at all. In confirmation of my notion of peace in the house, the lady, with whom I had a good half-hour's conversation, spoke of the King's temper as being now quite perfect, and continually so. She did not acquiesce in my notion of *no Brighton at all*, under certain circumstances, yet I thought she gave no good reasons for a different view.

I asked if your Grace had been at the Lodge lately. She replied, no, but that she had not heard a word of ill-humour on State affairs, or personally. She admitted that the Duke of Cumberland had still great influence, but that he was not there so often as he had used to be before the Duchess came ; but repeated that he had great weight, and used it very adroitly.

Not a word of the Duke of Clarence and the stage coach till I expressed some surprise at the kind of conveyance, and when I added that I *had understood* your Grace had desired the Admiralty to dispatch a government steamer, and a yacht, this was *acknowledged* to be very proper, attentive, and kind.

I do not find my spirit equal to a longer stay here, and therefore I return to Wistow on Thursday.

I beg your Grace to continue to believe me to be your devoted respectfully attached servant,

HENRY HALFORD.

Lord Aberdeen was sent for, to come to-morrow to the Royal Lodge.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1463.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

29th September, 1829.

Since I saw you yesterday I have read through all the correspondence with Corfu received for the last two months. It is quite clear to me that we shall have no influence in Greece, nor indeed safety in the neighbourhood of Greece, till the French troops come away.

They give Capo d'Istria strength and insolence, and we must get them out as soon as possible.

The pretext that it is not possible to bring them away in this season is ridiculous. They went there last year at a period but little earlier. The battle of Navarino was fought a month later. The desire to go to the Ionian Islands is still more foolish. Get them out we must.

I think that Diebitsch has augmented his demand of pecuniary compensation. His first demand was ten millions, taking the places as part payment. His last is of the places *and* ten millions. If this is not the case, I doubt the Turks having convinced Müffling and the ambassadors, and Major Hunter, that they had consented to all the preliminary demands of Russia.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 29th September, 1829.

The Russians have just left me ; and I proceed to give you some account of our interview. I began by informing them of the substance of our intelligence received yesterday ; and particularly dwelt in very strong terms upon the effect which might be produced by General Diebitsch taking upon himself to enforce the acceptance of the Protocol of the 22nd of March, without giving the Conference the means of examining and deciding upon the Turkish *contre-projet*. I insisted, that if General Diebitsch made this an article of his treaty with the Porte, one of the Powers would manifestly usurp the province of the three ; and it would be so obviously a breach of their engagement to us, that they must expect to find we should consider ourselves free to act in the Greek affair, without reference to their opinion, and "*selon nos convenances*." We had some rather warm discussion, of which the tendency was, on my part, to intimate that they had always determined to make the propositions of the 22nd of March, an *ultimatum* in reality ; and on theirs, that we had agreed to the proposi-

tions, without meaning strongly to support them. However, they appeared to feel the awkwardness of our whole position, should the report be confirmed of the intention of General Diebitsch ; and professed a desire to do anything which was possible to remove the bad effects of such a proceeding. This therefore was a favorable opportunity for opening the proposal of fixing the limits, by taking a middle term between our propositions of the 22nd of March, and the Turkish propositions of the 15th of August, by founding it upon the basis of the *uti possidetis*, with suitable exchanges on the continent. I accordingly did so ; but we had not gone far, before they assured me that any proposal which restricted the limits according to the Protocol of the 22nd of March, they could only take *ad referendum*, as they had no powers to do otherwise. I understood Matuscewitz to say that he had informed you of this at Doncaster. Here then, we were for some time at a stand ; when they returned to the charge upon the subject of absolute independence with restricted limits. I repeated our objections, which were not so much against the arrangement itself, as because another had been laid down in the Treaty ; that the only thing which could make it practicable, would be the preference expressed by the Porte, should such be the case. I had thrown out on a former occasion, the idea of giving a choice to the Porte upon the subject, but only in conversation, and declined to make any proposal of the kind to the Conference. They seem to think that it would give them the means of coming to an agreement, although they cannot propose it to the Conference themselves without going beyond their powers. They hope that the French government may be induced to propose it, in which case they would be ready to agree, should it be supported by us. For my part, I see no good reason why we should not propose the alternative ourselves, should it be necessary. It would be in the shape of a reply to the Turkish *contre-projet*. The Turkish conditions would be rejected, and we should then offer restricted limits, with absolute independence, if they preferred it to our Protocol of the 22nd of March. They (the Russians) seem disposed to be easy about the limits so constituted. There can be no doubt that if adopted by the Porte, it would be a great advantage for all parties concerned ; and as much for the Turks as any. It would come also, as an alleviation of our former propositions ; and we should still be consistent, and acting under the Treaty, because we should still adhere to the propositions, in case the Porte did not prefer this arrangement, and consider it as greatly more beneficial.

In my mind the great recommendation of this, or of any other settlement here, would be, that we should escape from the sort of disgrace of having the affair taken out of our hands by General Diebitsch, and consequently from the necessity of resenting it. For the Russians propose, if we prefer it, to date the agreement to offer this alternative to the Porte, on this day ; or if we please they will do it after the arrival of General Diebitsch's treaty, whatever it may contain. At all events, should such a proposal come from France, we shall have the whole question before us in Conference, at which I hope you may be present. In the mean time, they requested me, should the treaty arrive, and should it contain such an article as I had given them reason to expect, to come to no immediate decision ; but hoped that we would suspend our indignation for a few days, in order to give them time to consider by what means we might be best appeased.

Probably, if you thought fit, it might then be a proper time to summon the Cabinet, as a new state of things would have arisen.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

I omitted to mention the subject to you yesterday, but without knowing your opinion I have not chosen to write to Stuart to-day respecting the notion thrown out by Polignac of withdrawing the French troops from Greece, and in case of necessity, placing them in the Ionian Islands, until they could be conveniently brought to France. In some respects, the effect of such a measure would be very good, and would hold out a pledge of future concert. There may be local or other objections of which I am not aware; and after all, there can be no real difficulty of importance in bringing the troops to France at any season of the year.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1464.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Apthorpe, 30th September, 1829.

My letter of yesterday answers your postscript.

The French have more troops in the Morea than we have in the Ionian Islands. It requires more confidence than I confess I feel in any modern Frenchman to allow these troops to winter in our islands; for which I confess that I see no reason whatever.

If it is intended to settle the Greek affair, I don't see how it is possible to do otherwise than modify the proposition of the 22nd March, 1829; unless we conquer for the Greeks that part of the country included in the proposition still unconquered, which is contrary to the Treaty; or unless we allow the question to remain unsettled till the Greeks will have conquered for themselves that part; or unless the Russians should make the demand of it as a condition of their peace.

I think then that we ought to desire the Russian plenipotentiaries to refer to their Court for instructions on these points.

Will the Emperor consent to modify the territorial proposition of the 22nd March, 1829? Will he consent to modify it on the principle of the *uti possidetis* with exchanges? Will he fix the 13th September or any other day, as the day on which the state of possession is to be taken as the point of departure?

What are his Majesty's notions of limits of Greece founded upon this principle?

I see many advantages resulting from an independent Greece

governed by a prince of whom we could approve ; and I have a notion floating in my mind that if the Turks did not propose such an arrangement, the idea of it originated in the conversations with the Reis Effendi of your brother and General Guilleminot, or Mons. de Ottenfels, or Mons. Joubert. If the idea originated in any such conversations, I should then have no hesitation in proposing in the Conference the change as an alternative to the Turks ; with a very limited addition of territory to the Morea ; and provided the prince fixed upon is one of whom we can approve.

We might agree to the proposition by one of the other Courts still as an alternative, if the idea had not come from the Turks, as I believe it did.

But still it is desirable to know what is the Emperor's notion of the limits to be assigned to Greece in such a case ? as well as in the case of the alternative not being accepted ? I think that this is going as far as we can go ; particularly considering what the opinion of the Cabinet is.

Of course there can be no reason for calling the Cabinet till there will be something for them to consider. There is now nothing excepting that neither of the other Powers have instructions.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 30th September, 1829.

The King sent for me this morning, but it was only for the purpose of giving me a letter from the Emperor of Austria upon the subject of General Nugent's claims, or rather pretensions, in right of his wife to the Earldom of Lennox. This may be answered at leisure ; and there can be no necessity for any reference of the case, for it rests upon no foundation whatever. The wife of General Nugent is descended from James I., and that is the whole ground upon which he stands.

After giving me Nugent's history, the King mentioned my brother, and with great approbation ; upon which I thanked him for his gracious intentions towards him. He said that the ribbon should be sent out to him, and desired me to go to Naylor,* and have it done directly. I told him that I had already communicated to my brother his Majesty's gracious intentions, which I was sure would be quite satisfactory, and that he could very well afford to wait. He pressed this two or three times, to which I always made

* Sir George Naylor, Garter King at Arms.

the same answer; at last he said, quite abruptly, "Very well; just as you please." I thought it would be rather too strong to tell him in direct words that he ought to speak to you; but I am sure he must have felt that I had some reason for not complying with his desire, which might naturally have been supposed to be agreeable to me.

He was in very good humour, and appeared to be very well. As usual, he talked a great deal about the Lievens; and when I told him they were going to-day to Chatsworth, he said that we should soon have Lieven and Matuscewitz back again, but that she would contrive to go on to Lord Grey's alone. He abused Lord Grey, and told me a circumstance which I rather think he had mentioned before, that sitting with Madame de Lieven some time ago, and talking about the French government, she had said that Chateaubriand was the most distinguished man in the country, and that Charles X. ought to make him his minister. The King replied that Charles X. was not fallen quite so low as that, and need not so disgrace himself; adding, that it would be almost as bad as if he (the King) were to send for Lord Grey.

His confidence in the Emperor of Russia seems to be considerably abated; and he expressed some apprehension and dissatisfaction at their proceedings.

He is convinced that Matuscewitz will come here as ambassador; and says that when he took leave of him, in order to say something civil he expressed a hope that he might return in such a capacity as would enable him to remain. Matuscewitz replied, "Sire, j'accepte l'augure." This is odd enough certainly; but his station is not such as to entitle him to look to such a post.

I have written all this gossip to you because we have no arrival to-day whatever. I saw Roth before I went to Windsor; and he has written upon the subject of the French troops. That we shall procure their return before the meeting of Parliament cannot be doubted; but unless the whole question of Greece should be settled in a few days, it may perhaps be necessary to take some step now, which should either ensure their recall or show our sense of their continued stay.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

Lord Heytesbury to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

St. Petersburg, 30th September, 1829.

It was my intention not to have answered the letter, which your Grace did me the honour of addressing to me, until I had read your Memorandum to the Emperor, but I do not think it would be right to send off a messenger without at least acknowledging and thanking your Grace for your communications.

The Memorandum has produced an excellent effect upon the minds of the Russian ministers, and I have no doubt I shall be able to give as satisfactory an account of my interview with the Emperor upon the subject.

With respect to the Lievens, I shall abide strictly by the instructions given to me by Lord Aberdeen, and the line chalked out in your Grace's letter. I shall take no steps for obtaining their recall, but, at the same time,

I shall do nothing to prevent the adoption of such a resolution. Avoiding, as I now do, all conversation with respect to them, I cannot state positively what are the intentions of the Emperor, but I am not without reasons for believing that the project of a leave of absence is revived, and that Matuscewitz will be sent back to occupy the vacant place, till something be definitively decided.

I know not what your Grace will think of our peace, nor what can be said satisfactory about it, except that it is *a peace*. This, however, is something.

Count Nesselrode is so exceedingly annoyed personally, at General Diebitsch's having stipulated for the occupation of the Principalities till the payment of the indemnities shall be completed (seeing the opening that such a stipulation affords to those who are always suspicious of an *arrière-pensée*), that I am in very great hopes of seeing that article altogether new-modelled in the ratifications.

He is gone to Tzarsko-Selo again this morning in order to see the Emperor upon the subject, but I fear he will hardly return in time to allow me to give the result of his interview by the present messenger.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, my dear Lord Duke,

Your Grace's very faithful humble servant,

HEYTESBURY.

Le Général Müffling to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MILORD DUC,

Spezzia, ce 30 septembre 1829.

La mission que mon auguste maître m'avait confiée étant remplie, je m'empresse de m'acquitter d'un devoir en exposant à votre Grâce confidentiellement, et l'état des choses comme je l'ai trouvé à Constantinople, et mes relations avec Sir Robert Gordon.

A mon arrivée (le 4 août) le gouvernement Turc, avec sa méfiance ordinaire, nous cachait ses revers, et ce n'est que par des relations secrètes qu'on savait que le Général Paskewitch avait fait son entrée à Erzeroum, et que le Général Diebitsch avait opéré son passage du Balkan. Quant à moi, il m'importait de connaître les mesures que la Porte avait arrêtées pour résister à son ennemi, de connaître les positions de l'armée Turque et de ses réserves; enfin, de savoir *où* et *quand* on voulait livrer une grande bataille qui devait décider de la guerre et du sort de la capitale. Mais; hélas! je découvris bientôt qu'aucune disposition générale n'était arrêtée, et plus, qu'il n'y avait, dans tout l'empire Turc, aucun homme qui fût capable de soumettre au Sultan un plan général.

L'armée Turque s'était retirée en cinq positions—à Schumla, à Silivria, à Adrianople, à Kircklissa, à Kara Bournou; c'est-à-dire, en formant un demi-cercle de 80 lieues d'étendue.

Personne ne connaissait la force des corps qui se trouvaient dans ces positions, *pas même le gouvernement*. On estimait 8000 à Kircklissa, 6000 à Kara Bournou, on supposait 20,000 à Adrianople, 8000 à Silivria, et des forces considérables à Schumla. Le Grand Vizir, au lieu de se trouver au centre, était à Schumla.

Votre Grâce connaît l'organisation des armées Turques. Chaque Pasha

envoie un certain nombre de troupes (désigné par le Grand Seigneur) à l'armée. Il est obligé de les solder, de les recruter, et il commande cette troupe s'il se trouve à l'armée. Le Grand Seigneur n'entretient à ses frais que les troupes de ligne.

Il est aisé à concevoir que chaque Pasha a un intérêt particulier de ménager sa troupe autant que possible, et que cette organisation ne favorise ni le bien-être de la troupe ni la discipline des Pashas, dont le Grand Vizir est le Général-en-Chef. Mais le Sultan avait encore une autre difficulté à vaincre. Ses troupes de ligne étaient détestées par toute l'armée, et pour les garantir d'un traitement injuste, il en avait donné le commandement à un jeune homme (fils adoptif du Seraskier Kosrew Pasha), Halil Pasha, sans le soumettre entièrement au Grand Vizir.

La réserve que je trouvais à Constantinople n'était que des cadres—tout au plus de 3000 recrues, la plus grande partie des enfants de douze à dix-sept ans.

On se vantait d'avoir 80,000 hommes à sa disposition, désignés pour la défense de la capitale; mais d'après des renseignements dignes de foi, il n'y avait que 40,000 hommes *sur papier*, tous de la plus basse canaille, qui n'avait pas la moindre envie de se défendre, mais bien de profiter de cette belle occasion pour piller Constantinople.

Je réserve à votre Grâce de juger si je pouvais nourrir la moindre espérance que la Porte saurait se défendre, ou même se débarrasser de son ennemi, par la force des armes.

A ma première entrevue que j'avais avec Sir R. Gordon, je le trouvais *parfaitement dans les mêmes vues*, et j'avoue que ses craintes pour la Porte, qui surpassaient alors les miennes, étaient fondées sur des connaissances plus profondes de l'état intérieur des armées Turques, car dans ce temps-là je croyais l'armée incapable d'une révolte contre le Grand Seigneur.

Sir R. Gordon réunit ses efforts aux miens pour convaincre la Porte de la nécessité de se prêter à la paix. La France et l'Autriche appuyaient nos démarches; mais il était trop difficile de faire changer un gouvernement si fier de son système pour ne pas perdre un temps précieux. Enfin nous réussîmes; mais la Porte, pour conserver sa dignité, ayant traîné d'un jour à l'autre, le Général Diebitsch arriva à Adrianople, avant que j'étais à même de lui faire savoir les bonnes dispositions de la Porte.

L'armée Turque se trouva alors non-seulement battue, dispersée, et dans un désordre affreux, mais encore en pleine rébellion. Rien ne pouvait empêcher le Général Diebitsch d'entrer à Constantinople, sans pertes, sans difficultés. On a fait beaucoup de fables sur la grande muraille et sur la force des ouvrages de Constantinople comme forteresse.

D'abord la ville de Pera et Gallata (où se trouve l'arsenal, le port, &c.) n'a pas de muraille, et la position que les Français avaient choisie en 1812 pour défendre Pera est si mauvaise qu'on n'aurait pu la tenir pendant trois heures.

Ainsi le Général Comte Guilleminot, Sir R. Gordon, et moi, nous étions d'accord que dans ce moment critique la Porte devait prendre un des deux partis: se jeter aux bras des Russes pour avoir la paix, et se mettre à même de supprimer la révolte intérieure qui éclatait partout, ou d'attendre, si la marche du Général Diebitsch sur Constantinople réveillerait l'esprit Turc, et un fanatisme qui cependant depuis le commencement de cette guerre n'a jamais existé.

Je crois qu'il est inutile de justifier notre résolution de conseiller à la Porte une soumission parfaite à l'Empereur Nicolas, car je suis persuadé que c'était le seul moyen pour empêcher l'écroulement de la Porte, et les plus graves complications en Europe.

Le moment était si grand, et le temps pressait tellement, que selon moi nous devions nous élever sur les petites questions, comme celle des indemnités que l'Empereur Nicolas avait demandées par son manifeste.

Sir R. Gordon désirait de pouvoir agir sur ce point en faveur de la Porte, en prenant pour base ce que l'ambassadeur de France avait eu l'ordre de notifier à la Porte. Mais malheureusement cette notification sur les indemnités de la guerre ne s'accordait nullement aux informations qu'on m'avait données avant mon départ de Berlin.

Je m'étais bien gardé de contredire en public à ce que la France avait fait savoir à la Porte sur les indemnités, car je devais éviter l'idée qu'il y avait entre les Cours Européennes ou entre leurs ministres une différence d'opinion. Cependant je ne cachais pas aux ambassadeurs que le ministre de France à Berlin ne devait pas avoir parfaitement saisi les idées de l'Empereur Nicolas, s'il supposait que sa Majesté renonçait aux indemnités de guerre; que j'étais même autorisé à croire qu'une telle renonciation serait regardée par sa Majesté comme une injustice envers ses propres sujets, qui alors seuls auraient à fournir les frais d'une guerre terminée si avantageusement pour la Russie. J'ajoutais que selon mon opinion sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas avait l'intention de diviser les frais (peut-être en première et en seconde campagne), et en se chargeant d'une partie, elle ne demanderait que le reste des Turcs, encore avec beaucoup de modifications bienveillantes. Dans tous les cas, selon moi, cette question ne pouvait être décidée à Constantinople, où personne de nous n'était autorisé à *traiter* sur cet objet.

Si j'entre dans ces détails, c'est que ce fut le seul point sur lequel Sir R. Gordon et moi n'avons pu nous accorder. Je crois que cet ambassadeur a rendu les plus grands services à sa patrie et à l'Europe entière, mais son zèle l'entraîne à croire ne pouvoir jamais assez faire, et au moment où je quittai Constantinople avec une parfaite satisfaction du résultat de ma mission, il se tourmentait de la question : S'il n'aurait été possible d'obtenir un meilleur résultat.

Pour répondre à cette supposition, il faut examiner la position du Général-en-Chef Russe, Comte Diebitsch.

Arrivé à Adrianople, sachant que le Grand Vizir en négociant avec lui ne cherchait que de gagner du temps, quel autre moyen avait-il, pour terminer la guerre, que de profiter du désordre de son adversaire, et de marcher sur Constantinople ? Ajoutons à cela la perspective de prendre à Constantinople plusieurs milliers de canons, de détruire à la Porte tous les moyens de continuer la guerre par terre et sur mer, et n'oublions pas la gloire de faire signer la paix à la capitale de son ennemi.

Ainsi le Général Comte Diebitsch, *comme militaire*, devait marcher sur Constantinople. Aussi avait-il donné ses ordres pour commencer cette opération le 30 août, le jour après l'arrivée de sa réserve.

Sûrement il était dans l'intérêt de la Russie, comme de toute l'Europe, de voir signer la paix, sans que le Général Comte Diebitsch fût forcé de recourir au dernier moyen—à la prise de Constantinople ; mais je savais officiellement

que ce Général avait l'ordre exprès de ne faire arrêter ses opérations par aucune négociation, et d'ailleurs, personne de nous ne savait si le Comte Diebitsch avait les mêmes vues que nous sur la prise de Constantinople, et s'il ne répondrait pas aux plénipotentiaires Turcs : " Nous signerons après mon arrivée à Constantinople."

Pour motiver cette réponse, et pour couvrir sa responsabilité, il n'avait qu'à déclarer que sa position militaire ne lui permettait pas de se placer devant Constantinople—où son ennemi pourrait rassembler ses forces et tomber sur lui—sans être en même temps maître de cette capitale.

Je le regarde comme un grand bonheur de m'avoir trouvé dans ce temps à Constantinople, autorisé comme je l'étais de communiquer avec le Général Diebitsch ; car sans cela, le seul moyen qui restait aux ambassadeurs Européens, celui de protester contre sa marche sur Constantinople, aurait été sans effet ; le Général Diebitsch aurait répondu : Qu'il devait agir en militaire, et que l'Empereur son maître ne dévierait en rien de ce qu'il avait assuré à l'Europe.

De faire entrevoir que, dans certain cas, les flottes qui se trouvaient à la Méditerranée pourraient soutenir la protestation, aurait été extrêmement dangereux, car le Général Diebitsch se trouvant à Adrianople plus près des Dardanelles que de Constantinople, il n'avait qu'à se rendre maître de ces forts (qui n'ont pas de défense du côté de la terre, et qu'il pouvait prendre chaque nuit) pour isoler Constantinople des forces de l'Europe.

Ma tâche fut donc d'employer tous mes moyens pour engager le Général Comte Diebitsch d'arrêter sa marche sur Constantinople, et je dois lui rendre la justice qu'il sacrifia le résultat militaire le plus brillant à la considération que, si le Sultan fût obligé de fuir dans l'intérieur de l'Asie, si la révolte éclatait à la capitale, il n'y aurait personne avec laquelle on pourrait traiter de la paix, aucune autorité qui pourrait en garantir l'exécution, et que par cela les intentions magnanimes de sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas ne pourraient être exécutées.

Si d'un côté je respecte infiniment le noble sacrifice du Général Diebitsch, je serais le premier à déclarer qu'il avait tort, et qu'il ne pouvait pas arrêter sa marche, s'il n'était *bien sûr* d'obtenir une paix telle que l'Empereur la lui avait prescrite de demander. Mais comment pouvait-il avoir cette sûreté, si ce n'était par la déclaration de la Porte de se soumettre à la magnanimité de l'Empereur Nicolas ?

A présent c'est à votre Grâce à juger s'il était possible d'avoir un meilleur résultat.

Je lui présente la question avec d'autant plus de confiance, et je me rends à son opinion éclairée avec d'autant plus de satisfaction, que la partie dominante de la question est purement militaire, et que sûrement personne au monde n'est plus à même d'approfondir ces détails pour en former un ensemble, et d'en apprécier les conséquences, que votre Grâce.

Agréez, je vous prie, les sentiments de la plus haute considération, et d'un attachement à jamais, avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être,

De votre Grâce le très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

MÜFFLING.

[1465.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, October 2nd, 1829.

I did not receive your letter of the 30th till this morning.

I propose to write to the King to-morrow, to recommend that your brother should have the Order of the Bath. I forgot to mention this to you when I saw you on Monday.

Since you wrote, the French despatches have come, from which it appears that we are to have the affair of the troops in the Conference. I see, likewise, that we are to have the Portuguese affair as soon as the Duc de Laval will arrive.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1466.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 4th October, 1829.

I return your paper. It would be absurd to think of bolstering up the Turkish Power in Europe. It is gone, in fact ; and the tranquillity of the world, or, what is the same thing, the confidence of the world in the permanence of tranquillity, along with it. I am not quite certain that what will exist will not be worse than the immediate annihilation of the Turkish Power.

It does not appear to me to be possible to make out of the Greek affair any substitute for the Turkish Power ; or anything of which use could be made hereafter, in case of its entire annihilation and extinction. All I wish is to get out of the Greek affair without the loss of honour, and without inconvenient risk the safety of the Ionian Islands.

The choice of the Prince is very important, if we are to have a Prince ; but that choice will not rest with us. It will be carried against our views and interests, and we must adopt other measures to secure these interests.

After all, you must not be quite certain of Prince Philip.* I know him ; and I believe him to be as little friendly to this country as any other Prince on the Continent.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I am going to Stratfield Saye, and shall be very much

* Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg.

obliged to you if you will let Drummond know for what day you will assemble the Cabinet, as I wish to invite them to dinner.

Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Asia, Dardanelles, 4th October, 1829.

Captain Gregory, who served in the Rifle Brigade, and as aide-de-camp Lord Edward Somerset, was a visitor on board the *Asia*; I sent him to Enos, from whence he proceeded to Adrianople, where he was kindly received by General Diebitsch, Count de Heyden, at my request, having introduced him to that officer. On his return he favoured me with his remarks; and as they appear to me to be very interesting, and as I am certain that they may be relied upon, I send them to your Grace.

We have got the credit from the Turks, and the blame from the Russians, for saving Constantinople. Be it as it may, I am certain that you will participate with me in the satisfaction of its having been effected, and the peace of Europe preserved.

My communications with Sir Robert Gordon have been most agreeable; he expresses himself well pleased with the movements of my squadron. I have just heard that it is to be reinforced; but I suppose that, when the accounts of the peace arrive, it will be reduced.

Most sincerely do I wish you success in your many arduous undertakings; and believe me to be, with the greatest esteem, your most faithful servant,

PULTENEY MALCOLM.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM FROM INFORMATION GIVEN BY AN OFFICER WHO HAD JUST COME FROM THE RUSSIAN HEAD-QUARTERS, ADRIANOPLE, AT THE LATTER END OF SEPTEMBER.

A second campaign on this side the Balkan was talked of by the Russians as a thing very probable, and none of them appeared to think that peace could last long. The general feeling at not being allowed to enter Constantinople was disappointment, and was imputed entirely to the Duke of Wellington and the presence of our fleet. The moderation of the Emperor is their constant theme, and great surprise is affected at our interference in so just a war, as they say he never would have thought of keeping the Turkish provinces, having already more territory than he knows what to do with, and a paucity of population, and they add that he would have made Constantinople a free town, like Hamburg, and allowed the Christians to govern themselves. They anticipate the moment when England may not be desirous or so prepared to prevent their driving out the Turks. The Servians and Bulgarians were ready to rise, and it required great prudence and exertion on the part of General Diebitsch to prevent the latter from rising against the Sultan which he effected by always reminding them in his Proclamation that they were subjects of Mahmoud. The whole of the villages in the plains are inhabited by Christians, who are discontented and ripe for insurrection. Previous to passing the Balkan, the Russians had no idea of the weakness of the Turkish empire, they had been

accustomed to witness the bravery of the Turkish inhabitants on the banks of the Danube, and believed that the country on this side the Balkan contained similar people. Near the passage of the Kempshich no opposition was met with until the army reached Aidos, when it was trifling, but, trifling as it was, had the Sultan asked for peace on moderate terms, and prevented any further advance, the Russians would not even then have discovered that the spirit of the inhabitants was either completely broken, or in favour of Russia, and that the country was totally destitute of means of defence. The Russian officers seemed to impute the diminution of energy and confidence among the Turks to the recent alteration in their dress and discipline; and although on one or two occasions great courage and obstinacy were displayed by them, yet the Russian cavalry were allowed to form and advance again, after making unsuccessful charges, for which time had never been given them in any of their former wars; this was particularly remarked at the battle near Pravady on the 11th June, when regiments of cavalry were brought into action, were repulsed in two or three charges, reformed and attacked again, without having any second line to retire behind.* The army that crossed the Balkan consisted of 40,000 or 45,000 men, including 4000 or 5000 cavalry and 120 † *guns*; they suffered very severely from fatigue, making forced marches, with sixteen days' provisions on their backs. The sickness is very great, and has reduced them a third. They have been joined by a reserve, about 10,000 men, not fresh regiments, but recruits to fill up the ranks of the old ones. More are expected; 15,000 men with 56 guns were to be at Sophia on the 29th or 30th, under General Geismar, from the neighbourhood of Widin, and 15,000 men, with 4000 cavalry, remains before Schumla. The cavalry horses have suffered very little this campaign, owing to the green forage lasting until July. They are, however, nearly one-half below their proper establishment, the casualties of last year never having been filled up. The horses are in good working condition, and the appointments, though rough, are in good order. The men are very sickly. In a division of Hussars, and another of Uhlans (with their guns), the proportion of led horses was 48 or 50 to a squadron of 90 file; and, with the men required to lead them, one-third of the whole.

Their horse artillery has also been reduced, from the same reason, to 16 instead of 24 guns to each division of four regiments. The whole of the cavalry have lances, that weapon and grape shot creating the greatest effect against the Turks. The battalions are very much reduced, but what remain are in good order. Their arms and appointments very clean, but when not on a general parade, their whole army has a most dirty, slovenly appearance. At the beginning of the campaign they suffered dreadfully from sickness, nearly 60,000 men are supposed to have perished. At Varna there was a plague, differing from the common plague of the East, but a decisive plague. The men were dying from 150 to 300 a day. It has exhausted itself at Varna, but now exists in a rather milder manner at Sizeboli. In the camp at Adrianople there is a contagious disease. A cordon is drawn round the tents where the soldiers who have it are kept. I could not learn its exact nature, nor the exact number of sick, which must, however, have been very great, and every one talked of *fever*. Three generals had died there (at Adrianople), and two at Schumla; and the proportion of sick officers at the former was almost 17 in 20.

* Until four o'clock in the afternoon the same officer said that the Russians were uncertain of victory; and that to the explosion of certain Turkish tumbrils they chiefly owed the favourable result to their arms.

† N.B. An immense number of carriages; hardly an officer of any rank who had not a calèche.

The general hospital was the large barrack close to the camp, and was exposed to the same air as that which produced the sickness. A large detachment, just discharged from general hospital, which I saw in the streets waiting for their billets and routes to their regiments, looked more like men going into hospital than convalescents. The stench that issued from their bodies and clothes was perceptible all along the streets. The medical men are very bad, with the exception of a few Germans, who are attached to the staff of some of the principal General officers. The Russian regimental officers employ the Turkish doctors in preference to their own. The whole neighbourhood of Adrianople is infected with the stench of putrid carcasses. In the Russian camp, near the general hospital, and even close to the head-quarters, it is almost as bad as anywhere else. Throughout the whole army the strictest discipline exists. Between Enos and Adrianople, and in the neighbourhood of several large bodies of troops, the plain was full of flocks of sheep and herds of cattle. In the villages even, or in those through which troops were marching, the doors of all the houses were open, the inhabitants at their usual occupations, and quantities of all sorts of poultry in the streets. In a large garden close by a bivouac, which I passed in the morning, not a vegetable had been disturbed. There was abundance of forage in the plain of the Maritza, but the means of transport had failed from the number of bullocks that had died. The cavalry at Adrianople were beginning to be very badly off for forage. It is difficult to ascertain whether the Russians pay for their forage. The Pacha of Adrianople and Aga of Enos said not; but it is believed that if they do, it is by an order on the Turkish Treasury, to be deducted from the indemnity money. In other supplies the want is not great; meat twice or three times a week, biscuit of the very blackest and worst description, and a little oatmeal or barley, form the articles of food issued to the Russian soldier. A Prussian Major attached to Count Diebitsch said he was convinced that none but a Russian soldier could undergo the privations which accompany a protracted campaign in Turkey. The officers were nine months in arrear, and the money to be paid down by the Sultan will be immediately issued to them. It appears the soldiers get no pay, or if they occasionally get a trifle, it is merely sufficient to buy a little tobacco. The suffering and losses of the Russians in the last campaign were not exaggerated.

The Servians are spoken of as a very superior race, and to them on some future day the Russians will look for assistance. The Russian officers entertain a very mean idea of their fleet; none of them talk about it, and when anything was said by *me* in its favour, they did not believe me sincere. Count Diebitsch is beloved by his army. He is a very lively, good-natured man, talks with much energy, and uses a great deal of action. He is quite a *preux chevalier*, brave and religious, without ostentation. When the treaty of peace was taken to him to be signed, his first act was to fall on his knees and thank God that the war was at an end. He is very modest, and takes no credit to himself for the successful result of the campaign, which he imputes to the good conduct of the General officers, and the patience and discipline of the men; although it is known and universally acknowledged that his able manœuvres alone got him across the Balkan. He is open and frank in his manners and conversation, and talks so unreservedly upon the most important political affairs, that sometimes the people about him are afraid of his saying more than he ought. The Pacha of Scutari (on the Adriatic) appeared at Philippopolis with 15,000 Albanians and 16 guns. General Diebitsch sent to know his intentions; he replied he was going to take up his quarters at Dimotika. This movement, with the report of a large Turkish force being assembled at Rodosto, and the protracted arrival of the ratification, made Diebitsch imagine that something hostile might

be intended; and to prevent the junction, the line of the Maritza, as far as Enos, which had been evacuated, was occupied by troops, and two or three brigades of infantry sent in the high road to observe him. General Geismar was ordered not to lose sight of him, but to follow him up; and an adjutant was despatched to Constantinople to remonstrate, and to bring the signature of the ratification.

The Russians are making a new road across the Balkan, but I could not find out the exact spot. Had the ratification not arrived, Diebitsch was determined to advance again. During the whole war, among the quantity of baggage and number of fortresses which have fallen into the hands of the Russians, not a *single Turkish map or plan* has been seen or heard of. The number of carriages and carts with the Russian army is quite astonishing, almost every Field-officer appeared to have his calèche, and every company a cart for their camp kettles. The Russian army have no tents except those taken from the Turks. I asked permission of Count Diebitsch to visit Schumla and the Balkan, which he refused to grant at this time, but invited me to return to his head-quarters when regularly established for the winter, when he would send me about the Balkan, and wherever I might wish to go.

[1467.]

To Lord FitzRoy Somerset.

MY DEAR LORD FITZROY, Stratfield Saye, 5th October, 1829.

I have perused the papers in this portfolio respecting the trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey.

The new doctrine on the revision of courts-martial is, that the Court hearing the evidence must be the best judge of it; that fresh evidence, even explanatory, cannot be produced; and therefore that the finding of the Court, that is to say, *guilty* or *not guilty*, ought not and cannot legally be revised. Begging pardon for differing from such great authorities, I should say that their opinion manifests great ignorance of the nature of a military Court-martial, of the persons of whom it is composed, and particularly of the power of *confirmation* (for, begging Sir John Beckett's pardon, there is no *approbation* required), and revision given to the Crown, and of the principles on which these powers are founded.

The Court however have found that Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey had no knowledge of the steeping of the cats in brine, notwithstanding the positive evidence upon that fact; and they have laid out of their consideration that, as commanding officer of a dépôt standing in a square of four companies witnessing a punishment, the fair military presumption is, and ought to be, that he had a knowledge of this cruel irregularity; and that he and he alone is responsible for it. In opposition both to the

evidence, and to the fair military presumption, they have, however, positively found that he had no knowledge.

That point cannot be revised ; and it would therefore be useless to send back the proceedings of the Court-martial for revision. I would recommend to Lord Hill, however, to publish a very strong order upon the subject in the admonition to be given to Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey.

I would begin by stating the fact, how it had come to his knowledge. His thinking it necessary to inquire into it. The Report of the Inquiry, and his opinion upon it. And finally his bringing Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey to trial at his own request.

I would then observe upon the finding of the Court that the charge was true, that the men were thus punished with cats steeped in brine. But the Court have acquitted Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey of a knowledge of the fact. I would then state that Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey was in the exercise of the command of the dépôt at the time ; that he was on the parade in a square of four companies, in the command at the moment of the punishment, and must have seen what was going forward.

Whatever may be the sentence of a general Court-martial, Lord Hill may say that he must hold commanding officers of regiments responsible for what passes in the regiments and battalions under their command. They are placed in command, and have the assistance of officers and non-commissioned officers, in order to prevent the occurrence of such irregularities as that which has been the subject of inquiry and trial ; and either they know of such irregularities, and knowing them have not prevented them ; or the irregularity existing, as has been found in this case, and the officer in command being ignorant of it and not preventing it, he is totally unfit for the performance of the duty required from an officer commanding a body of troops.

Let this order be as short and pithy as possible, and it will do more good than the sentence of the general Court-martial will do harm.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1468.]

To Earl Bathurst.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST,

Stratfield Saye, 5th Oct., 1829.

I have received your note ; and I am very sorry that I cannot be in town in time to attend Seymour's wedding. I should have made it a point to attend if I had known of it sooner.

I hope that you will have been prevailed upon to stay for the Cabinet on Wednesday ; and that you will dine with me on that day.

You will see that affairs in the East are in an awkward way ; and that our Greek affair is critical. It is very desirable that we should have a full Cabinet, and that you should be there.

The Chancellor will certainly be in town. He was at Apethorpe yesterday.

Believe me, my dear Lord Bathurst,

ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Charles Arbuthnot to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Apethorpe, 5th October, 1829.

I came back from Lord Althorpe's yesterday, and I now write to tell you what passed between us.

It was clear to me by his manner that, having made an overture to me early in the summer (and I am sure that what he then said was a measure of the party to see how they stood with us), he meant to let it be remarked that he would abstain altogether from politics. We talked incessantly of farming, and of all belonging to it, but he had almost the affectation of avoiding public matters, whether relating to this country or to Ireland. I was in doubt whether or not I should speak to him, he being so determined not to speak to me ; and upon the whole, I thought it better to have some discussion with him, as my silence might be construed into determined hostility to him and his friends, and as I thought it not unimportant to ascertain, if I could, what line they were intending to pursue. In our last day's walk, therefore, I opened the subject by saying, " Well, Althorpe, we have had no talk on politics." I then, without giving him time to make any observation, made a statement of your position in the very words, as nearly as I could recollect them, that you used to me. I told him that you had taken up the Catholic question, because you felt that the state of the empire made it necessary that it should be settled ; that in resolving to attempt to settle it you were not blind to the difficulties you should have to encounter, and to the chance you would run of alienating many of your best supporters ; that the difficulties and the alienation had

been increased by the Duke of Cumberland; that notwithstanding the embarrassments brought upon you, you were, I saw plainly, gradually overcoming them, and that at this moment you were again standing as well with the King as any minister of a powerful mind could ever expect to be; that with regard to those who had supported you in carrying the measure you had already given abundant proof, by the appointments of Lord Rosslyn and of Scarlett, that you had no principle of exclusion in your mind; but that if you were required, according to a sort of suggestion made to me by him in the summer, to form a junction with him and his friends, you would be expected to do that which you were not prepared to attempt, and which if attempted would be sure to fail; that you knew very well how you stood at present, and that you were not ignorant that if he and his friends should think fit to unite with all other parties, there might be a chance of overthrowing your government; but that I must assure him that he and his friends would not be the reapers of the victory, as they were the persons the most obnoxious to the King, and that the Brunswickers, the Canning party, and such Whigs as would belong to Lord Lansdowne, would be preferred and selected to replace you.

This is the general outline of what I said; and I took particular care to let him understand that I was not attempting to prevent their opposition if they thought it for their interests to oppose. In conclusion, I told him again that in the persons of Lord Rosslyn and Scarlett you had done all you had been able to do; and that if he and his friends, in their dissatisfaction at your not doing more, should by union with others succeed in overturning you, it would be a matter of great indifference to you personally, as you had no ambition to gratify by remaining where you were.

Lord Althorpe listened to me with great attention, and made no observation whilst I was speaking, except to assent to the indication of your good will by the selection of Lord Rosslyn.

As soon, however, as I had finished, he immediately began to reply; and although he was mild in his manner (for he is a person of great good temper), it was obvious that in the minds of himself and his friends, the question now was whether you would share your power with them, or whether they should try to wrest power from you. He adverted scarcely at all to what I had observed respecting the difficulties of your position; but he at once said that he must tell me again, as he had told me before, that he and his friends must consider whether a government was strong enough to conduct the affairs of the country, or whether, on account of its feebleness and its inability to carry good measures, it might not be necessary to try to overturn it. He told me that when Canning's government was formed he had been highly dissatisfied with many of his friends for joining it; and that upon their observing to him that unless Canning were supported, the power of Ultra Tories would be fixed for ever, his reply had been that he could not look to such consequences, it being his duty, according to his own notions, to oppose every government which from feebleness or other causes was unequal to do what the country required.

He very much confined himself to these short observations. He did indeed say, as he had said to me in the summer, that many of his friends

did not look to office, though others of course were eager for it; but in giving me the impression that he and his friends are prepared for the most active opposition, he certainly did tell me that he himself, and his friends generally, were most exceedingly well disposed towards you, and would be very glad to be able to support your measures.

The conversation ended with my again assuring him that I had no thought or desire to prevent their opposing us if they were so inclined; but that I had said what I had because upon a former occasion he had opened his views to me, and that if he and his friends had the disposition towards you which he had expressed, it would be but fair, I thought, to wait for your measures before they condemned them. Upon no other occasion was there between us a word on politics, except indeed that he deprecated a war on account of the affairs in the East, he having the firm conviction that the Russians would become more vulnerable by their introduction into the Mediterranean; and that for this reason he would be rather glad than sorry for the overthrow of the Turkish empire.

I have given you as faithful a summary as I can of what passed between Lord Althorpe and me. I think you will see that I confined myself strictly to the language which you desired me to hold, and I am glad that I have had the conversation, as it is well to know who are our enemies and what their designs are. You know I have been anything but indisposed to those who supported you last session; but I now tell you, that unless I am greatly deceived, they are not the persons to whom we have to look, for they will turn against us if they are not allowed to share our power, and of that power they would mean to have the lion's share.

For my part I have nothing like despondency with regard to the next session, though we have among our own selves some lurking enemies. Yesterday, after dinner, in the presence of many strangers, Lady —— said to me, quite out loud, that you were the minister, only because there was no one at present to replace you, and that very silliest of women, Lady —— chattered nonsense about the attacks to be made on us, and the impossibility of our standing in the House of Commons. Lord Manners held quite a different language, and said that if peace were made by Turkey, we should have nothing to fear, and all else would soon come right. Lord Westmorland has the same feeling, and is as cordially disposed as man can be; but I think that the —— and the —— are the worst of all. This morning Lord Manners again said to me that give time and all would come right, that this was the moment when every real friend of yours should show himself, and that you will have many real and stout friends I doubt not, perhaps the more from the combination preparing against you; and it is in times like these that every one, according to his means, should exert himself to the utmost. It may be a most laborious winter; but the rising of enemies will cause a display of friends. One of our main difficulties is already surmounted if the peace with the Russians is confirmed; and upon this I congratulate you most sincerely.

I always inquire about the harvest and the state of the country. I am uniformly told that the wheat is good in quantity, and that the cold winds during the rains saved the quality. Of barley, I have had in my last excursion a less favourable account; and I certainly must own that from the

wretched harvest of last year, and from many other causes, the farmers do at present suffer sorely. They suffer much, but they do not cry out so loudly as in former times of suffering.

Ever, my dear Duke, most affectionately yours,

ARBUTHNOT.

Lord Strangford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Harley Street, 5th October, 1829.

I found, some days ago, among my Russian collections, two long memoirs given to me by a Wallachian in 1826, when the *Akermann* negotiation was about to commence. I send extracts from them, containing a full development of Russian policy respecting the islands in the Danube. As these islands form an important item in the new Treaty, I thought that the enclosed extracts might be acceptable to your Grace. I have sent the originals to Lord Aberdeen.

I leave town on Thursday evening on a visit to the Duke of Northumberland. If your Grace should have any commands in that quarter, I shall be most happy to execute them.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

my dear Lord Duke,

your Grace's most faithful and most obedient humble servant,

STRANGFORD.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

MEMOIR ON THE DESIGNS OF RUSSIA RESPECTING THE ISLANDS AT THE MOUTH OF THE DANUBE.

1826.

La première et la principale demande de la Russie sera sans doute *la délimitation des confins*.

Dans cette délimitation la *Russie n'a pour but que de s'emparer des îles qui sont à l'embouchure du Danube*, et qui mettent à sa disposition presque totale le seul port d'où la Turquie retire les productions immenses des deux provinces de Moldavie et de Valachie. C'est le port de *Galatz*. Il est incontestable que ce port détruit le commerce de tous les ports de la Russie dans la Mer Noire : 1° Par les facilités qu'ont les vaisseaux à prendre leur cargaison, n'ayant pas de quarantaine, et n'ayant que de légers frais de port. 2° Par le prix modique de toutes les denrées. 3° Par la grande diversité des productions. Tout ceci fait que ce port est dans la plus grande activité, lorsque *Tomavova*, port Russe, tout à côté de *Galatz*, aussi bien que les autres ports voisins, restent dans une inaction totale.

Si la Turquie donc cède ces îles devant Galatz, ce port est indubitablement perdu pour elle. Et elle perd, avec ce port, tout le profit que peut produire le commerce de son *Caban* ; car l'avantage que la Porte retirait des deux provinces n'était certainement pas le tribut modique d'environ deux millions de piastres qu'elle en recevait par an ; mais le grand gain consistait dans le droit exclusif qu'elle avait d'être le seul acheteur des différentes productions de ces pays, ce qu'elle faisait à un prix excessivement bas, en conséquence du monopole : et elle les revendait

à Constantinople à ceux qu'elle voulait—opération dont elle tirait un revenu immense. Je suis même en état d'en donner le calcul, en cas que vous le désiriez, parce qu'ayant passé six ans dans ces provinces, y ayant occupé différentes places, et y étant même propriétaire, j'ai été à même de voir de près, et d'y observer toutes ces choses dans le plus grand détail.

Les machinations que la Russie a employées pour empêcher cette exportation sont au-dessus de toute expression. Tantôt elle reprochait à la Porte les vexations qu'elle faisait éprouver à ces provinces par les taxes qu'elle mettait sur les productions; tantôt elle exigeait l'abolition du monopole. Voyant cependant que de cette manière elle ne réussissait pas, elle donna ordre au Baron de Stroganoff de ne plus faire aucune espèce de réclamation de ce genre, et de laisser aux Turcs la faculté de faire tout ce qu'ils voulaient, espérant par là que le gouvernement Ottoman abuserait de son autorité, et donnerait lieu enfin à des réclamations capables, au moins en apparence, d'empêcher une exportation aussi ruineuse pour les ports de la Russie.

Mais cette nouvelle ruse ne pouvant réussir à faire naître des objets de réclamation (parce que cette exportation non-seulement ne faisait aucun mal *au pays*, mais, au contraire, y donnait de l'abondance), elle suscita par ses agents ces troubles de Moldavie et Valachie qui ont occasionné l'effusion de tant de sang, comme si elle ne trouvait pas d'autres moyens de faire prospérer son commerce.

Maintenant, alléguant la misère dans laquelle ces deux provinces se trouvent, elle exige par un second article l'abolition totale du monopole. Mais la misère de ce pays, sur laquelle elle s'apitoie tant, n'est qu'un vain prétexte pour enlever à la Porte le droit qu'elle exerce d'être le seul acheteur. Car, une preuve bien palpable que la misère n'est pas si grande dans ces provinces, est que depuis le moment des troubles jusqu'aujourd'hui elles n'ont pas cessé de fournir à Constantinople *la même quantité* de denrées, et que les ports Russes sont dans la même inaction qu'auparavant. Une autre preuve encore plus saillante de l'abondance qui y règne, c'est qu'en 1823, seulement du côté de *Souleni*, il a passé 200,000 *vedrô* de vin.

Dans cette abolition de monopole l'Autriche trouve parfaitement son compte, attendu que toutes ses provinces voisines se trouvant continuellement dans le besoin, elle se procurera, et à très-bon compte, toutes les denrées qui lui sont nécessaires, et elle ne sera plus dans l'obligation de laisser chaque année de ses sujets Hongrois, Transilvaniens et Banatiens, venir se nourrir dans ces provinces, et payer des impôts au gouvernement Moldave et Valaque. Par conséquent, l'intérêt de l'Autriche est de contribuer de tout son pouvoir à l'extinction du monopole.

La Russie donc, une fois reconnue maîtresse des îles de l'embouchure du Danube, dont la possession servira à mettre dans une inaction totale le port de Galatz, et à faire perdre à la Porte le monopole de ces deux provinces, Constantinople et les deux rives de la Propontide seront obligées de mendier leur pain quotidien de la Russie, qui le leur vendra au prix qu'elle voudra.

II.

MEMOIR ON THE MANNER IN WHICH THE SUPPLY OF CORN, ETC., AT CONSTANTINOPLE WILL BE AFFECTED BY RUSSIA BECOMING POSSESSED OF THE ISLANDS IN THE DANUBE.

Le *Caban* de Constantinople est le monopole des grains que les Turcs ont trouvé établi dans cette capitale par les Empereurs Grecs.

Les cultivateurs de tout l'empire Ottoman ne peuvent pas exporter leur blé hors des limites de leur province, et sont obligés de vendre le surplus de leur

consommation pour un prix modique aux préposés du gouvernement. Ceux-ci doivent faire passer ces blés dans les greniers publics de Constantinople, seul dépôt où les boulangers de cette capitale et des environs peuvent se pourvoir des farines nécessaires à leur manutention. Mais depuis que les Pachas ont commencé à ne plus respecter les ordres de la Porte, ils enlèvent à un très-bas prix les grains des mains du cultivateur ; et au lieu de les vendre aux préposés du gouvernement (qui sont les *Cabanlis*), ils les vendent au premier étranger qui leur en offre davantage. Il n'y a que la province de Valachie où un tel abus est impraticable, à cause de sa position, et parce qu'elle est gouvernée par un prince chrétien. Car sa position s'y oppose, attendu que le seul endroit par où elle peut faire passer frauduleusement les grains est défendu par le canon de Vedir et d'Ada. Quant au Prince gouvernant chrétien, n'ayant aucun des moyens d'un Pacha Turc pour s'opposer aux ordres de la Porte, il s'y soumet aveuglement. Par conséquent, les seules provinces qui fournissent au Caban de Constantinople des grains et d'autres denrées sont la Moldavie et la Valachie.

La Valachie seule donnait chaque année à Constantinople six à sept *yûk* de grains, et quatre *yûk* d'autres denrées, comme, par exemple, du suif, du beurre, du miel, &c. Chaque *yûk* de grains se compose de cent mille *killos* de Constantinople. Le *killo* de Constantinople est de vingt *ôkes* ; l'*ôke* est de trois livres. Chaque *yûk* des autres denrées contient cent mille *ôkes*. Le Prince régnant est chargé d'expédier tous les grains et denrées de la province à différentes époques de l'année à Ibraïla ; là le Cabanli arrive, et achète au *killo* d'Ibraïla, qui contient dix-huit *killos* de Constantinople.

Autrefois la Porte mettait des taxes aux grains et aux denrées, mais cédant enfin aux réclamations de la Russie, elle laissa libre le Valaque de vendre au prix qu'il voulait. Le prix de la première qualité du froment (parce que dans ces pays on le divise en trois ou quatre qualités) n'a jamais surpassé celui de 26 piastres Turques par *killo* d'Ibraïla, et le Caban vend le *killo* de Constantinople six et sept piastres aux boulangers de Constantinople. Le *Cabanli* achète encore le beurre vingt *parás* l'*ôke*, et le vend 3 piastres à Constantinople. (La piastre Turque est de 40 *parás*.) Ce gain immense se partage donc entre le *Cabanli* et le gouvernement. Outre tout ce que fournit cette province à Constantinople, elle nourrit encore tous les Turcs riverains du Danube, et elle approvisionne chaque année toutes les forteresses Turques situées sur ce fleuve.

Si donc la Turquie perd le port de Galatz par la gêne que l'intérêt de la Russie, maîtresse des îles de l'embouchure du Danube, est obligé d'y mettre pour la prospérité de ses ports de la Mer Noire, et que l'abolition du monopole s'effectue dans ces deux provinces, le Caban ne peut plus exister. Or, tous les Cabanlis, la compagnie la plus riche, la plus nombreuse et la plus prépondérante sur l'esprit du peuple à Constantinople, se voyant tout à coup privés par là de leurs ressources, deviendront la cause des révoltes journalières que le gouvernement Turc ne pourra d'aucune manière empêcher. Et la révolution que la Turquie a subie par la perte de la Crimée sera nulle en comparaison de celle qui va suivre la perte des productions de ces deux provinces.

*The Archbishop of Tuam * to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD,

5th October, 1829.

I feel that I would expose myself to the just imputation of gross presumption were I to address your Grace and take up your valuable time

* The Right Hon. Power le Poer Trench.

with any *political* opinion of mine upon the awful state of this country, and upon such remedies as might occur to *me* for the removal of the evils under which we are so grievously afflicted. However mysterious and mistaken the mode in which we are governed may appear to me, I would persuade myself that my judgment must be erroneous; I *know* that it is permitted by God for his own wise purposes, and that all things will *ultimately* work together for good, and to the glory of his holy name; but holding the station which I do in the Established Church, and *spiritually* viewing our case, I could not in my *conscience* keep silence; I am *constrained* to suggest to your Grace my conviction, my deliberate conviction, of the only *solid* and *permanent* means of establishing peace and order in our unhappy and distracted land. Laws may be enacted to restrain the madness of the people; and it is necessary, and wise, and prudent that they should be; pains and penalties may be inflicted, and (however distressing) they also are necessary, wise, and prudent; but without a change and renovation of the *heart*, without an infusion of moral and religious principle, all will be in vain; the disease will only be *palliated*, it will never be *radically* removed.

I could say much to your Grace upon the awful responsibility attached to your exalted station in the administration of the patronage of the Crown in *spiritual* concerns in this country; but the substantial earnest your Grace has given of this being strongly impressed upon your mind, in the appointment to high ecclesiastical dignities of two such men as the Rev. Messrs. Murray and Daly, is a full and ample assurance that pious, spiritual, *devoted* men will in future be selected to fill such offices in the Church of Ireland, from the highest to the lowest, as may from time to time fall in to the patronage of the government.

The chief object of this letter is to attract your Grace's serious notice and consideration, to the general education, the moral and religious education, the *scriptural* education of our ignorant and deluded population. This is a measure of vital importance; to christianise the people will *assuredly* issue in tranquillising the people; give them a scriptural education (and believe me no other will do), and they will become good and faithful citizens and subjects, obedient to the laws for conscience sake, and not from an awe of authority.

I would venture to suggest two modes by which (in my humble judgment) this salutary measure may be accomplished.

First, let no parliamentary grant be made to any society for the purposes of education that shall not have as its first fundamental rule, that in the schools under its patronage, the *Bible* shall be *bonâ fide* read by the children who may have arrived at a sufficient age for such instruction, and that competent inspectors shall be appointed to ascertain whether this rule has been *duly* adhered to in *spirit* and in *truth*. This law will no doubt be objected to by the Roman Catholic priesthood. Rely upon it, my Lord, that these gentlemen have no desire for the education (*under any system*) of the people, particularly one of a *spiritual* nature. But is it too much for the King's Prime Minister, the Prime Minister of the head of our National, Reformed Church, to expect and *require* that the Scripture of God, written for the instruction of his people, should be the foundation of that system of education provided for by the State? No, my Lord, make the sacred volume

your stand, and be *assured* the work will prosper and be blessed, and very soon show forth its happy fruits in the civilisation of the people.

But if this course cannot be followed, if the prejudices of the Roman Catholic hierarchy must be submitted to, and that the *offence of the Bible* must not be *intruded* upon them, then I would secondly suggest that *all* parliamentary grants for the education of the people of Ireland shall be withheld for a season, that no grant whatever shall be made for this purpose; and I would pray your Grace to try whether the clergy and other members of the Established Church will not *amply* provide from their own resources, and from the funds of private societies, for the moral and religious education of the population—I feel *confident* that this would be the case throughout all the land from my *knowledge* that it would be so in my own diocese, the most Roman Catholic part of the empire.

I hold, my Lord, that *no education* is better than one not founded upon the sacred Word of God. If the Roman Catholics will not accept funds at the hands of the government for the education of the people upon this godly principle, I would hope your Grace would think with me that they can have no just claim to such funds; and however the ministers of the Established Church may seek and need the support and aid of the government in this great work, I would venture to answer for a large proportion of them, that they would undertake to provide means for its execution, were no funds given, which might and would assuredly be employed to counteract them.

I have now conscientiously laid before your Grace the conviction of my mind upon the all-important subject of the education of the rising generation of the people of this country. I would pray your Grace not to take the trouble of giving me an answer; if what I have said shall be considered worthy of your Grace's thoughts, I shall no doubt in due time observe it in the result; if not, I shall look forward to the fruits of your Grace's much better judgment.

The Lord's grace be with you and direct you. Amen.

I have the honour to be, my Lord, your Grace's very faithful,

POWER TUAM.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 5th October, 1829.

I enclose a letter from Lord Cowley, brought late last night by an Austrian messenger. You will also see by his despatches that they have at Vienna no official intelligence of the signature of peace, but that it is fully believed. Rothschild knows nothing more about the matter, having only heard the fact from his brother at Paris.

Bülow is confounded at the terms proposed. But he says that whatever the King may think or apprehend, he will be delighted that peace should be made upon any terms, his only object being to avoid war by all the means in his power. Bülow adds that he hears from all quarters of the great displeasure of the Russians at the part taken by Prussia in this affair. He says there are two or three Prussian officers at the head-quarters of Diebitsch who were very likely to communicate this feeling to General Müffling, and thereby to hasten his departure from Constantinople. M. de

Royer, he says, is a very different sort of person, who would desire no better than to address notes and speeches without end to General Diebitsch, and who would defend the cause of the Sultan as stoutly as that of his own King.

There is still something a little awkward in the delay of official intelligence of the signature of peace; but as they do not appear to have entertained any doubt at Vienna, and as Metternich must be the best judge of the credibility of his reporters, I suppose we may continue to think it certain.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[1469.]

To the Archbishop of Tuam.

MY LORD ARCHBISHOP,

9th October, 1829.

I have had the honour of receiving your Grace's letter, and I am very happy to find that your Grace approves of the selection made of gentlemen to be preferred in the Church of Ireland.

The attention of the government has been, and continues to be, directed most anxiously to the subject of education in Ireland.

I quite agree with your Grace in thinking that the advantage to be derived from the education of the people will be proportionate to the degree in which the knowledge of religion to be derived from the Scriptures will be diffused. The experience acquired in this country shows practically the importance of this principle, and I cannot believe that Parliament will be disposed to sanction any general measure for the education of the people of Ireland which will not provide for this important branch.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1470.]

To the Right Hon. Sir George Murray.

MY DEAR MURRAY,

London, 10th October, 1829.

I return the Slave Ordinance, with some notes that have occurred to me on the perusal of it.

In general, I should say that the gentleman, whoever he may be, who has drawn this Order in Council is a partisan in favour of the abolition of slavery. Government must act upon the principle of carrying into execution fairly the intentions of Parliament, but must avoid the extreme views of both parties, and

the hasty measures of the one and those of the other, which are calculated to defeat the views of Parliament.

In respect to property, unless the law enables a slave to have property, and recognises the existence of such property, the Order in Council cannot create it. I apprehend that such an Order would be illegal. At all events, I don't think that we ought to go farther in this new Order in Council upon any point, or include in it any regulation upon a subject which had not been touched upon by the Trinidad Order in Council.

It may be very right to establish saving banks; but I am convinced that it will not be legal to apply the revenues of the colonies to pay the interest on the deposits under this Order in Council. This regulation besides brings into question the subject of property.

You will see my observations on the manumission clauses. We must not allow the whole property in the West Indies to go to the support of manumitted slaves who will not work for their own subsistence.

In respect to compulsory manumission, I should wish to look over what passed before upon the Berbice Order. But as a proof that the drawer of this Order in Council is a partisan, I refer you to his reasoning in the memorandum which accompanies it.

It was settled in my room that the *onus probandi* of the source from whence the purchase-money of the slave should have come should be thrown upon neither party, the master nor the slave; but that the judge should inquire; and that it was intended that the purchase-money should be the produce of the industry of the slave. Then what happens? The drawer of the Order in Council discovers that, as it was the object of the government to throw the proof upon neither party, but to leave the subject open to fair and full inquiry, it was their intention that the slave should receive from any quarter (that is to say, the Society in England) one-fourth of the price of his manumission.

I am quite certain that this is not the mode in which this affair can be settled. We must look at it seriously ourselves, and oblige those under us to carry into execution our intentions, and not their own fancies.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

[1471.]

NOTES ON PROPOSED SLAVE LAWS.

London, 10th October, 1829.

Clause, the protector of slaves to assist the accused slave in his defence.—Does not this enactment lower the protector in the eyes of slave-owner and manager?

If he is engaged as an attorney to defend in a court of justice every criminal slave, he will soon lose his authority.

I would leave this optional. He ought to take cognizance of the charge, and defend the slave, or order that he might be defended if he should think fit.

Clauses relating to markets.—I think it very reasonable that in a Christian community the legislature should prohibit markets on a Sunday; and that one or more days in the week should be fixed for markets.

But I don't think that the legislature has any right to deprive the slave-owner of the labour of his slave, to enable him to attend such week-day market. The market might take place early or late, so as to enable the slave to attend, if his master should permit him.

But the master should not be deprived of one-sixth of his property in the slave by the grant by the legislature of one day in the week to the slave to enable him to attend a market.

Clauses regarding the employment of the slaves on Sunday.—I consider that the clauses preventing the employment of slaves on Sunday are reasonable; and it is likewise reasonable to allow of a departure from the rule, if it should be necessary.

But I don't think that the slave ought to be paid.

The protector should be informed of the necessity, and if he does not object, I should think that the slave ought to be worked, but without payment.

Clauses respecting marriages.—It appears to me that no slave, whether male or female, ought to be permitted to marry without the consent of the owner.

But if the owners should consent, and the slaves intending to marry should be in the service of different persons, they should be called upon to agree before the protector to purchase one or other of the slaves, so that the slaves to be married may be in the service of the same estate.

Clauses respecting property.—I should think it best to omit

all these clauses until it is really decided whether slaves can legally possess property.

Clauses respecting saving banks.—These ought likewise to be omitted.

A particular rate of interest cannot be insured to the slave. If the slave has not property, he cannot dispose of it as is proposed by these clauses.

All these clauses respecting the property of slaves had better be omitted.

Clause marked 33, respecting the presumption in favour of the liberty of the slave.—I think this is as unjust a provision as I have ever perused. In general the party claiming a benefit labours under the difficulty of proving the right to it. The slave or his protector could have no difficulty in proving his title to freedom if it was a good one. The owner having purchased the slave from another might experience great difficulty in being able to prove that the mother or grandmother had not been manumitted.

But this is not all. Is the sale of negroes now prohibited in the colonies? If it is not, how is a man to tell whether he purchases a slave, or a manumitted slave, or a man whose mother or grandmother had been manumitted, and their posterity therefore free born?

I am afraid that we shall, by adopting this clause, depart from a principle of justice, of which we do not see the consequences.

Clause marked 35, that all persons may manumit slaves belonging to them.—Is it not the custom to require that those who manumit slaves should provide for their subsistence in case they should by want of work, or disinclination to work, come upon the parish? If it is, this clause ought to be amended, by requiring that all persons manumitting slaves should give such security.

Testamentary manumissions.—The 37th clause ought to be omitted for the same reason.

Compulsory manumission.—I should wish to see the Berbice Order, and my observations on it.

The production of the substitute appears to be new.

Suppose this substitute should turn out to be the son of a free woman.

Evidence of slaves.—Should there not be some certificate of capacity from clergyman, owner, manager, or protector?

Forfeiture of slaves on conviction for cruelty.—It is impossible to agree to this clause.

Punishment of slaves making calumnious complaints.—How is the motive for making the complaint to be proved?

Surely the proof of making the false complaint would be sufficient.

WELLINGTON.

General Alava to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MI QUERIDO SEÑOR DUQUE,

Valencey, 10 de Octubre, 1829.

Los preliminares de paz nos han llegado, y preguntado por el Principe sobre mi opinion acerca de ellos, he tenido la desagradable satisfaccion de concurrir con su opinion. Digo desagradable, porque hubiera deseado mucho engañarme, y hacerme ilusion, pero desgraciadamente la cosa es demasiado clara para poderse equivocar. El Imperio Turco en Europa no existe políticamente, y aun su existencia es mas bien contraria á la conservacion del equilibrio, pues que en el dia no es mas que un instrumento en manos de la Rusia. La Turquía, respecto á esta Potencia, es ni mas ni ménos, y aun peor, que la de España respecto á este pais despues de la paz de Bâle, y sobre todo durante la dominacion de Bonaparte.

El Principe dice que la paz actual es igual á la que la Francia impuso á la Prusia en 1807, por la cual esta Potencia dejó de contar en Europa, aunque conservada en la lista de las Potencias. Sin la locura de la expedicion de Moscow, la Prusia no existeria como Potencia influyente; y en este estado queda la Turquía despues del actual tratado, si los preliminares son verdaderos.

Nicolas ha evitado sabiamente los inconvenientes de apoderarse de Constantinopla, lo que solo era bueno para contentar la necesidad é ignorancia de los Liberales Franceses, y ha sacado de su posicion todas las ventajas que podia desear. Es verdad que, en la situacion de la Puerta, no le quedaba á esta mas arbitrio que arrojarle en los brazos del vencedor, pero esta circunstancia no varía la cuestion, y de todos modos la Turquía ha cesado de existir en Europa. Esta es tambien la opinion de Pozzo en Paris, pues en una carta que he oido leer ayer, se dice con referencia á él lo siguiente: "Pozzo, avec un ton goguenard, dit à qui veut l'écouter, 'Les bons amis des Turcs n'ont qu'à payer les indemnisations et les troupes Russes se retireront: l'empire Turc est fini en Europe.'"

Destruído Giurgevo, y puestas en manos de los Valachos y Moldavos las fortalezas de la izquierda del Danubio, los dos Hosporadatos están enteramente bajo el poder de la Rusia; y con esto y las concesiones obtenidas en favor de la Servia, la casa de Austria presenta otro punto vulnerable á los ataques de la Rusia, que Metternich deseaba impedir á toda costa, y que ha tenido la desgracia de no poderlo lograr. Está visto que el Austria y la Inglaterra son las dos Potencias de quienes la Rusia trata de vengarse en el Tratado, y el artículo escandaloso de cerrar el Bosforo y los Dardanelos á toda Potencia que esté en guerra con la Rusia, es muy facil interpretar contra quien va dirigido.

He dicho á V.E. otras veces, y lo dije otras tantas á Esterhazy en esa, que he sido testigo personal, en Diciembre de 1816, en Bruxelas, almorzando con el Emperador Nicolas, de las malas disposiciones de este para con la casa de Austria (tales fueron sus espresiones), y harto será que estas malas disposiciones no se descubran y manifiestan ántes de dos años.

Es muy aventurado el dar una opinion sobre la conducta de los gabinetes cuando se ignora el verdadero estado de las cosas; y una cosa que parece muy facil, y sin inconveniente á los que miramos las cosas de afuera, es impracticable verdaderamente atendidas las circunstancias que se ignoran por los que no están iniciados en los negocios. Pero sin embargo puede decirse en esta ocasion, que cualquiera cosa que hubiera hecho el Austria, cualquiera partido que hubiera tomado, tenia ménos inconvenientes para ella que la paz de Adrianopolis.

No sé á punto fijo si el Principe es Turcophilo ó Ruso, pero sí sé que es de los que temen las consecuencias de la preponderancia Rusa, y que así lo ha manifestado en sus conversaciones y discusiones con el Conde de Golowskin, que ha pasado aquí una semana.

Me encarga mil cosas para V.E.; lo mismo que la Duquesa de Dino, que no está buena; y tambien la Princesa Poniatoska, que todavia está mucho peor.

El 16 salgo para Tours, donde, como en todas partes, es de V.E. sinceramente fino su agradecido amigo,

MIGUEL DE ALAVA.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

India Board, 10th October, 1829.

I send you a memorandum I have made, which comprises everything of importance in the memorandum given to me by the Chairs, and in the papers which accompanied it.

If we are to take any step we may as well take it at once, before the memorials of the regiments arrive.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

To Lord Aberdeen.

[1472.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 11th October, 1829.

I enclose you a Memorandum which I wrote last night upon the Russo-Turkish affair, which contains my opinion upon the whole case.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1473.]

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM.—OBSERVATIONS ON THE TREATY OF
ADRIANOPLE.

London, 10th October, 1829.

When his Imperial Majesty made known to his Majesty his intention of making war upon the Ottoman Porte, upon grounds affecting solely his own interest, his Majesty's government deprecated the execution of that intention, of which they did not feel the necessity ; and, in answer to the declaration of his Imperial Majesty that he did not intend to make conquests and did not aim at the destruction of the Ottoman empire, his Majesty's government asserted the right of his Majesty, as one of the Powers of Europe, to watch over the progress of the contest and to examine its results.

His Majesty's government likewise declared their opinion that the most complete success in the justest cause would not entitle the stronger party to demand from the weaker sacrifices which would affect its political existence, or would infringe upon that state of territorial possession upon which the general peace has rested ; and that demands of indemnity and compensation might be carried to such an extent as to render compliance scarcely practicable without reducing the Ottoman Power to a degree of weakness which would deprive it of the character of an independent Power.

From the period at which his Imperial Majesty first proposed to the Sovereigns, parties to the Treaty of the 6th July, measures of coercion to enforce upon the Porte the execution of the Treaty of the 6th July, 1827, that is to say, the 25th December, 1827 (6th January, 1828), his Imperial Majesty has professed his adherence to that principle of that Treaty enforced by the Protocol of the 12th December, 1827, which declared the absence of all interested motives on the part of any of the contracting Powers. His Imperial Majesty then declared that the manifestation of the absence of interested views was not an abstract maxim of generosity, nor a vain desire of glory on the part of his Imperial Majesty, but the well-understood interest of the empire of Russia.

His Imperial Majesty having subsequently on the 14th (26th) February, 1828, considered it necessary to declare war on

account of his own complaints of the Porte, again adopted the principle of the 5th article of the Treaty of the 6th July and of the Protocol of the 12th December as the guide of his conduct. He then declared that Russia would act without the desire of making conquests; that she would not renounce, in any manner, those useful principles of moderation which characterise her political system.

The same principle was again laid down in the despatch from Count Nesselrode to Prince Lieven of the 17th (29th) April, 1828, and the declaration therein made that no intention exists of demanding indemnities which could affect the political existence of the Ottoman empire; and it was over again declared that the well-understood interests of Russia excluded the idea of overthrowing the Turkish empire.

The same moderate views were again professed in the declaration of war and in the letter from Count Nesselrode to the Grand Vizir of the same date; and even up to the last moment, as late as the *, his Imperial Majesty's government declared that he *would not* take advantage of the circumstances in which the events of the war had placed him to require from the Ottoman Porte terms which he would not have required under other events.

Let us now examine how far the Treaty of Peace is in conformity with the professions of moderation and promises made.

The Sultan having lost his army, having ordered the remaining Asiatic troops to retire to their homes, threw himself upon the mercy of his Imperial Majesty at the suggestion of the ambassadors of his Britannic Majesty and the King of France, and of the minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the King of Prussia, by each and all of whom he was assured of his Imperial Majesty's justice and moderation. A Treaty and two Conventions were in consequence agreed to, which have left untouched no point affecting the interest, the strength, the dignity, or the independence of the Sultan, or his future security in relation to his Imperial Majesty.

The Treaty in respect to Greece is to be carried into execution in the manner the most onerous to the Sultan; and his claims for consideration are laid aside, contrary to the expectations held out by the Protocol of the Conferences of the three Powers

* Blank in manuscript.

parties to the Treaty, of which the details are thus forced upon the Porte.

The stipulations of former Treaties in respect to the Servians are required to be carried into execution within fifteen days, with the addition of five districts to be ceded to that people, and the Russian army is to maintain its position in the neighbourhood of the capital till those stipulations will be carried into execution.

Wallachia and Moldavia are to be, in fact, independent of the Porte, excepting as far as regards the payment of tribute and the approbation and investiture of the Sovereign Prince elected for his life by each of the Principalities. But the Porte is deprived not only of its ancient rights of pre-emption for Constantinople and its arsenals, and for supplies for its fortresses on the Danube, but likewise of the means of exercising and enforcing those rights of suzeraineté which remain to that Power. Every Mahometan in the Principalities is to be withdrawn. The towns on the left bank of the Danube, and even the islands in the Danube, are to be evacuated by the Mahometans; their works are to be destroyed, including even Giurgevo, which is to be evacuated though now occupied by Turkish troops, and its works destroyed within fifteen days and before the Russian army will quit the neighbourhood of Constantinople.

Can it be believed that the Sultan can exercise an independent, or any control over the various people submitted to his government after such concessions have been extorted from him?

Will he not be dependent for the enforcement of tribute from the Princes of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, upon the good will of the Emperor of Russia, as he will for the enforcement of tribute upon the Greek Prince, upon the good will of the Powers who will guarantee the execution of the Treaty to be framed under the provisions of the Treaty of the 6th July?

But let us look further into the Treaty. Let the seventh article be compared with the Treaty of Commerce of 1783, which it confirms, and with the stipulations of the Treaty of Akermann.

This article, after saying that the commerce of Russian subjects within the dominions of the Porte *ne pourra être gêné dans aucun cas, ni sous aucun prétexte, par une prohibition ou une restriction quelconque, ni par suite d'aucun règlement ou mesure, soit d'administration, soit de législation intérieure*, goes on to

stipulate that Russian subjects, their vessels and merchandise, shall be exempt from all violence or captious (*chicane*) interference.

The first are to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the minister and consuls of Russia; Russian vessels are to be subject to no visitation by Ottoman authorities, whether at sea or in Ottoman ports; and all produce or merchandise belonging to a Russian subject, after having paid the duties of customs, may be freely sold, deposited in magazine or store, or transhipped to another vessel of any nation, without giving notice to any local authority, and still less without the necessity of having their license.

It must be observed that the breach of any of the stipulations of the 7th article of the Treaty is to be considered an act of hostility, and justifying reprisals on the part of the Emperor of Russia.

Will anybody believe, after reading this article, that that Power upon which it is imposed can be considered independent within its own territories? Here is a positive stipulation that hostilities are to be commenced if there should be any visitation of a Russian ship in any Turkish port; which Russian ship, it must be observed, must be liable to be visited as well to ascertain that it is not a ship of war, as, if a merchantman, to ascertain the nature and value of the cargo, and the amount of duty to be claimed under the Treaty of Commerce.

Let us, then, see how far this empire is in a state of security to enable it to exercise any act of independent sovereignty, whether towards its own subjects, or foreign nations, or Russia.

It has been already shown how the Porte will stand in relation to its dependencies. The moral effect upon these dependencies, of all these stipulations, must not be lost sight of; but they are now considered principally in relation to the subjects of the Porte and to foreign countries, and particularly to Russia.

The Sultan has been required to pay a contribution amounting to 5,750,000*l.*; of which 250,000*l.* must be paid before the Russian army quits its positions in the neighbourhood of Constantinople; 500,000*l.* before the Russian army will repass to the northward of Mount Hæmus; and 750,000*l.* before the Russian army will cross the Danube. It is stipulated that these payments are to be made in a year from the period of the ratifications of the Treaty, and the further payments at the rate of

500,000*l.* a year in ten years; and that till those payments will be made the Emperor of Russia is to keep possession of Silistria and of the Principalities; and that, after the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian troops at the end of eleven years, their Princes are to pay no tribute to the Porte for two years; making in the whole thirteen years during which the Porte can receive no tribute from the Principalities, in addition to a year and a half elapsed since the commencement of the war.

In the mean time the Emperor of Russia is for six months to remain in possession of Roumelia, for a year of Bulgaria, and for eleven years of the Principalities and of Silistria.

Then upon the Asiatic frontier General Paskewitch is to remain in his position for eight months. But when he shall evacuate the territory to be ceded to the Porte, the Russian armies will be in a position to be able to commence hostilities when they please in the very heart of Asia Minor, with the advantage of all their forces in Asia being concentrated and of all their communications with Tiflis, as well as those by sea, being secure.

On the other hand, let the advantage of their position upon the Danube be considered.

If a vessel should be visited, if a Russian subject should be questioned, or any subject of difference between Russia and the Porte should arise, those who have contemplated with dismay the rapid success of the campaign of 1829 must see that the Emperor will for ten years hold in his hands all the advantages which he has enjoyed since the end of the month of July last. Yet in less than one month from that time the Ottoman Porte has been constrained to sign the Treaty of Peace. It is true that after a year the Porte will regain possession of Varna and of other places in Roumelia and Bulgaria, that is to say, of the ground on which these places stood. But of what use will those positions be to the Porte? The Sultan will not have a shilling to expend upon the reconstruction of their works, upon supplying those works with means of defence, with ammunition, provisions, or garrisons.

The Porte, then, will remain for eleven years in the helpless state in which that government has been placed for the last six weeks, and nobody can pretend that that state is one of independence in its relation with Russia, which can afford to other Powers any security that the positions and resources of the Ottoman Porte will not be used by Russia for the purposes of

its own aggrandisement, to the injury of the other Powers of Europe.

The occupation of the territories in Asia can be understood. Their possession is connected with schemes of ambition in Asia, which Russia may reasonably entertain. But of what use is the possession of the Principalities on the Danube? The pretence for keeping possession of those provinces and of Silistria is that it is security for the payment of the contribution. But of what value is a contribution payable in ten years? What would now be the amount of the discount upon prompt payment upon the hypothesis that the Porte could pay at all? What will be the expense of keeping and governing those Principalities over and above the receipt of the tribute due to the Porte which during the ten years' occupation will reach the Imperial treasury?

If all these expenses be fairly calculated it will be found that the contribution will be vastly reduced, if any should remain, and that just grounds of suspicion are afforded that the Principalities are kept in order to facilitate ulterior views upon the independence of the Porte and the integrity of the Turkish dominions.

These views are quite inconsistent with the Emperor's professions and promises, and with the security of other Powers; most particularly of Austria, to whom the occupation of the Principalities for eleven years, after the professions made, are not only a serious injury but an insult. This injury and insult are aggravated by the prospect, afforded by recent transactions and by this peace, that the Ottoman Power must crumble to pieces, and that the Principalities must remain in the hands of Russia, and with them and with Silistria alone, the command of the navigation of the Danube and of the Black Sea.

These are the considerations arising out of recent transactions and the Treaty of Peace.

In discussing the effects of this Treaty of Peace I see that I have omitted to state the influence which it is calculated to give to the Emperor of Russia over the Christian subjects of the Porte of all denominations.

The whole of Armenia, Persian as well as Turkish, is now the dominion of his Imperial Majesty. The Servians, Wallachians, Moldavians, Greeks of the Morea, and the Islands, &c., will have been delivered from the Turkish domination; and it cannot be doubted that the measures completed by this Treaty

of Peace must encourage other nations of Christians to endeavour to attain the same advantages by similar means.

The other Powers of Europe and all parties in Europe must view this Treaty of Peace in the same light as we do. They may not have such reasons as we have to look with jealousy and anxiety at its consequences ; but they must all consider it in the same light as the deathblow to the independence of the Ottoman Porte, and the forerunner of the dissolution and extinction of its power.

Some may look to advantage from the partition of the spoil, as France and possibly Austria ; others may consider the general war, which will be the consequence of the dissolution of the Turkish empire, as affording a chance of new combinations and a fresh partition of territory, as the Liberal party in France and elsewhere, and possibly Prussia. But the attention, the hopes, and expectations of all will be excited, and there is no chance of any Power disarming.

There is no doubt that it would have been more fortunate and better for the world if the Treaty of Peace had not been signed, and if the Russians had entered Constantinople, and if the Turkish empire had been dissolved.

The natural course would then have been for the great Powers of Europe to concur in discussing the disposition to be made of the wreck of the Turkish monarchy, including those important parts of it which the Emperor of Russia has taken to himself.

It is difficult now to have such a discussion.

If France or Prussia were disposed to take any steps in concert with this country to prevent the evils which must be the consequence of this Treaty of Peace, they would before this time have approached us. France will not move with England and Austria without Prussia, and Prussia will not move without being certain that the movement will be agreeable to the Emperor of Russia.

The object of our measures, whatever they are, should be to obtain an engagement, or at all events a clear understanding among the five Powers, that in case of the dissolution of the Turkish monarchy the disposition of the dominions hitherto under its government should be concerted and determined upon by the five Powers in Conference. It is obvious that in the existing state of the Turkish Power such an agreement cannot form the subject of a treaty or convention. The hypothesis on

which such agreement would be founded would cause the evil immediately, against the consequences of which it would be intended eventually to guard.

The object must be approached then by another mode, probably a guarantee with an engagement between the Powers that they will consider as a subject for general discussion and concert any measures to be hereafter taken respecting the Turkish empire.

I am aware of the objections to a guarantee, particularly in this country and as applied to a country which, as in this case, we have not defended and have allowed to be conquered and overturned. But a concert growing out of a guarantee appears to me the measure the best calculated as well to calm the anxiety, the fears, and expectations which must be the result of this transaction as to satisfy this country that the best that could be done has been done for its interests.

This measure, however, will not prevent the necessity for our making a remonstrance to the Emperor upon what has passed.

This remonstrance, strong in facts yet moderate and respectful in language, should be so drawn as to be producible if necessary; but it should not be produced or ever come to light if we should be able to attain our object, that of obtaining a concert upon the future fate of the Turkish dominions. It might lead to this desired concert by drawing from the Emperor a proposition that it should take place; or by inducing other Powers to propose it upon seeing the statement of our opinion upon what has passed and our views of the future.

If a concert should take place, our answer to the public would be that we are assured that the crumbling to pieces of the Turkish government would not create a war, and would not occasion such an accession of dominion and power to any State as would alter the general balance of possession and give reasonable cause of apprehension to others.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 13th October, 1829.

After a hard fight I have succeeded in carrying the Declaration as you proposed it. I enclose the paper which, it is understood, shall be inserted in the Protocol exactly as it stands, if we continue to insist upon it; at the same time, the words proposed in the margin are strongly urged by the

Russian plenipotentiaries as necessary to their justification ; I mean their personal justification, in making such a declaration. Upon my continued refusal to admit of any alteration, they requested me to take the proposal into consideration, with the most pressing entreaty that, if possible, we should agree to it. I promised to do this, and to let them know the result at our next meeting. It is, therefore, entirely in your hands, and whatever you decide will be perfectly satisfactory to me. Indeed, upon this, or upon any other matter, I beg you, once for all, to be persuaded that it is impossible for me to dissent from any decision to which you may come deliberately and dispassionately.

The rest of the business went on more smoothly. I was under the necessity of giving way about Eubœa ; and they agreed to carry the line of frontier to Missolonghi, close to the north side of the gulf, giving up to the Turks a considerable portion of what, on the map, I had proposed to assign to Greece. Of course we had a good deal of contention about this ; and seeing that the sacrifices of territory were real, and that the inducement held out to us, by the promise of a Prince, might possibly not be performed, I determined to secure this at the same time. I gradually, therefore, named Prince Philip, with the condition that the sovereignty should be proposed to him in the same Protocol which settled the rest of the affair. I am happy to say that this was agreed to by them.

I also stipulated to retain on the Protocol the power of considering the value of the Turkish objections to the Protocol of the 22nd of March, in case the Porte should refuse our alternative ; but it was perfectly understood between ourselves that the alternative should be offered, and sincerely supported, in the hope of being accepted.

No objection was made to the title of Prince Sovereign. As the question of a guarantee of the new State did not admit of an immediate decision, I proposed that we should merely refer to the article in the Treaty upon this subject, and declare that the Powers would make it the subject of future consideration and arrangement. I was the rather induced to do this from thinking that possibly the measure might be made useful in promoting a general arrangement of this nature. It seems reasonable that if Greece should be guaranteed against the Porte, there should be an equal guarantee of the Porte against the Greeks. As Greece will be made an independent State, will it be impossible to bring them both under the general European guarantee established at Vienna ?

In discussing constitutions and charters, they offered to enter into some agreement to assist in suppressing anything of a democratic tendency ; but I thought this too strong, and declined it.

Instead of having Turkish and Greek Commissioners to be parties in establishing the precise limits on the spot, which would only be a degradation to the Turks, and lead to some quarrel, I proposed that in the Protocol we should appoint our Residents, or other Commissioners, of the three Powers for the purpose of verifying the line described from the map ; and that when done they should officially notify the result to the Porte and to the Greeks. This was also agreed to.

It is, of course, understood that immediately after my producing the accession of the Porte, the armistice is to be declared. If the Turks of Eubœa should be compelled to quit the island, in which the Greeks are not

more numerous than five to one, there will be plenty of room for them in that district between the Gulf of Arta and the Gulf of Lepanto, now in possession of the Greeks.

I do not recollect anything more which it is material to mention. Lieven was throughout obstinate and stupid; Matuscewitz appeared to take everything upon himself.

I have this evening received M. de Laval. I am sorry to say that I do not at all like him, and do not very well understand him. He made some foolish observations upon the affairs of the East, as if he knew, or had heard very little about the matter; but he evidently wished to avoid much discussion; and after some commonplace talk, we fixed a meeting for the day after to-morrow. M. Roth was present. He will make his visit to Lieven to-morrow.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Le plénipotentiaire de Russie déclare que l'article 10 du Traité de Paix *ne prétend pas invalider les droits des Cours Alliées de sa Majesté Impériale, n'entrave pas** la marche des délibérations de leurs ministres en Conférence, et n'apporte aucun obstacle aux arrangements que les trois Cours jugeraient, d'un commun accord, les plus utiles et les mieux adaptés aux circonstances.

To Lord Ellenborough.

[1474.]

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

Walmer Castle,
14th October, 1829.

In respect to the measure to be adopted, my opinion is that the gentlemen of the India House ought to look well into the question of expense. Which would be the most expensive, full batta and no house-rent in half batta stations? or half batta with house-rent at the Bengal rates?

Having discovered this point we shall know where we are, and whether it is worth while to fight the battle at these great risks. There is nothing so unsafe as meddling with the pay and allowances of an army; and it may be relied that a just decision, although a hard one, is the best. As an officer I should say that the army have a right to think that the Oude pay withdrawn and the full batta given in Bengal and Raher were connected. If then the full batta is not much more expensive than half batta and the *Bengal* lodging-money, I would give the full batta; and I would take the ground of putting all allowances as they were placed in 1796.

* Variante: *N'a pas eu pour but d'invalider les droits des Cours Alliées de sa Majesté Impériale, ni d'entraver, &c.*

There is nothing so ridiculous as pretending to equalise all the expenses of these establishments. The climate of the three countries is almost as different as each is from England; and requires different habitations, a great difference in the number of servants and attendants, expense, &c. In Bengal the necessary as well as the habitual expense is the largest.

I never could convince Mr. Wynn upon this subject.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I return the Persian despatches, which however I have not read.

[1475.]

To the Right Hon. Charles Arbuthnot.

MY DEAR ARBUTHNOT,

Walmer Castle, 14th October, 1829.

I return Sir Charles Knightley's letter which Mrs. Arbuthnot sent me by your desire. I have a high opinion of Sir Charles, and I am very sorry to see that he thinks what is stated in this letter.

I will not discuss at large the question of distress, though there is a great deal to be said upon that subject. I think, however, that the enormous extent of our manufactures, their constant increase, our improved agriculture, the increase of buildings in nearly every town in England and throughout the country, the increase of luxury in the middle classes, and the keeping up of the revenue, would tend to show that matters are not in so bad a state as that in which they are represented to be.

At all events there is enough to prove that, if there is distress, which, existing in some degree, cannot be doubted, it is to be attributed to some transient cause of which the country will, in time, get the better.

Sir Charles Knightley proposes as a remedy the repeal of the malt tax, and as a substitute a modified property tax. The malt tax is a tax upon consumption; and before I go farther I would just beg those who wish to substitute a direct tax for a tax upon consumption to be repealed, to advert to the consequences of all the experiments which have been made in the repeal of taxes upon consumption. Look at coals, wine, shoes, and above all tea. There has been no reduction by law of the

tax upon tea ; but there has been an indirect reduction of the tax ; and I mention this article in particular, as I can prove, and I know you can likewise, what the price is, notwithstanding the reduction of the tax. Tea pays a duty of nearly one hundred per cent. upon the sale price at the East India Company's sales. The East India Company have within the last few years, reduced the charges of purchasing and bringing home tea ; and the price at their sales has fallen considerably. The duty of course has fallen likewise ; where a pound of tea paid a duty of five shillings, it now only pays three shillings. Consequently the price at the East India Company's sales, with duty, of the best black tea, is now little more than *five shillings* a pound. If you will go to any shop in London, it will be found, that the price of that same tea is *ten shillings* per pound. Every other tax upon consumption taken off, equally fails in producing relief ; witness the articles to which I have above referred, wine, coals, shoes.

If this be true, what would be the result of taking off the malt tax ? To put money in the pocket of the landlord, the farmer, the maltster, or the brewer, or the publican ! But not to relieve the consumer.

I have no objection to put money into the pocket of those classes ; still the State must be secured ; the establishments must be preserved. The faith and honour of the country must be kept. Then there must be a property tax. Has Sir Charles Knightley calculated what the amount of the property tax must be, in order to make up the deficiency occasioned by the malt tax ? Is he aware of the greater weight of this property tax upon some of those even of whom it is supposed that they would gain by the repeal of the malt tax ?

But I have another objection to the substitution of a direct tax for a tax upon consumption. The latter is paid by the people at large, in proportion each to his consumption of the article taxed ; and the produce is in proportion to their prosperity. If the tax is taken off, it never can be imposed again, if it relieves them ; and does not, as I suppose it would, go into the pocket of others ; for this plain reason. The people, at least those of England, always live as well as their means will afford. Put an article of consumption in their way (particularly drink) and they will consume at least as much of it as they can afford. But after giving them this article at a cheap

rate, and of course plentifully, tax it, and you will occasion a terrible discontent.

The malt tax has come to its present rate after a series of years; and I would not recommend its sudden repeal; even though its repeal and the decrease of duty should all go to the diminution of the price of beer; which it is obvious it will not.

What I have said of the duty upon and price of tea shows the real grievance under which the country is labouring. It is not taxation, it is not high rents, it is not tithes, it is not want of the means of employing the labour of the labourer, but it is high profits of the retail traders, and the state of luxury in which they live. Why is a man like Sir Charles Knightley obliged to quit the mansion of his ancestors? his rents are as high, his circumstances as good, his family as well regulated as theirs. The real price of corn, meat, cloth, whether woollen, linen or cotton, leather or silk, or timber, is not higher than it was in their days. But turn the corn into flour or into bread, make up the cloth or silk into clothing, or the leather into shoes or harness, or let any one be sold by retail, in its raw or manufactured state, and it will be found that a profit is taken of a hundred per cent. in addition to the King's taxes, &c.

This is the real grievance. It is this which distresses everybody; and renders it impossible even for the richest of us all to do half that he wishes to do in the way of employment of labour. I find that this is the great grievance even in the King's expenditure.

In respect to one pound notes Sir Charles Knightley is mistaken in supposing that the country bankers could give any security for that particular branch of their circulation. All that they possess is security for all their debts. The law could not allow them to allot any portion of their property as security for one particular description of debt, viz., a one pound note.

But this objection does not go to the principle. I say that no man who now enjoys good credit, can fail to get money if he has any security to offer. Cautious bankers, those who did not issue one pound notes, excepting in security to their several banking establishments, would not have lent money to any other description of borrower in the times at which one pound notes were most in favour.

It was those who were bankers without capital who were most ready to give this description of assistance to borrowers.

Now I contend for it that this sort of banker could not exist in the country, without eventual ruin to some class or other who had something to lose. It was either the labourer, the small shopkeeper, the farmer, the manufacturer, the merchant; but in general the landlord, who ended by losing all the money; either by the ruin of his labourers or tenants, the failure in the payment of his rents, or possibly by the loss of his own deposits, or by his having in his own hands some of the securities of the banks. This system could not go on.

I say that there is more of State currency now in circulation than there ever was; that there is fully enough for the transactions of the country, which are at this moment more numerous than they ever were; and that it is not currency that is wanting.

Believe me ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1476.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Walmer Castle, 14th October, 1829.

I have received your letter of the 13th.

I should prefer the words of the *projet* as proposed by us. We don't say that the object (*le but*) of the tenth article of the Treaty was to invalidate the rights, impede the deliberations, &c. If we said that such was *the object*, we ought to do more than remonstrate. We say that the *effect* of the article, by binding the Porte to agree to the Protocol of the — March, is to impede the deliberations of the Allied ministers upon the objections of the Porte to what was proposed in that Protocol, which their Courts had engaged to take into consideration. The words “*prétention*” then, or “*ne prétend pas*,” which are the words of the original paper proposed by the Russian plenipotentiaries themselves, really express the meaning which ought to be expressed in this paper; and after all it is as little as can be expected.

The question upon Eubœa is a very narrow one, and I thought that the Cabinet had decided against demanding it. If we have a good Greek Prince, I should wish to see him in possession of Negropont, if the Porte will cede that island willingly. But considering all that has passed, I must say that we could not be parties to force from the Porte a part of its territories in

which there has been no insurrection, in order to form the new independent Greek State. We cannot go to war, or allow Russia to renew the war, to ensure this demand; nor make the demand in a hostile tone. I should say then that it ought not to be made. There is a great deal of difference between asking for Eubœa and any part of the Continent within the limit of the Protocol of March. Nearly the whole of the Continent has been in insurrection. A great part of it is now in the hands of the Greeks; and the exchange for part of what is in the hands of the Turks, the whole having been in a state of insurrection, is not unfair. But it is not fair to demand from a humiliated Power a cession like Negropont, which, not having been in insurrection, it will be disgraceful to the Porte to make.

I understood that we had two objects in insisting upon the cessation of hostilities. One, the point of honour: but the demand would not have been made, and there would have been no point of honour involved, if we had not had another object, that of saving Negropont for the Porte. It was for this object that I expressed the hope that, if the Porte should not accept the alternative of an independent Greece, we might have an opportunity of considering thereafter her objections of the — August to the propositions of the 22nd March. My view was not only to keep the suzeraineté at a distance from our islands, but to have Negropont for the Porte; which we might have succeeded in effecting by refusing to give our consent to the renewal of hostilities between Greeks and Turks, or to allow of any further conquest being made upon the Turks.

What the Russians are driving at is, to involve us in an act humiliating to the Porte. This we must avoid.

The inclination of my mind is, to connect this new State with Europe in the same way as others are by the Treaty of Vienna. We might define its limits by an article of a Treaty, which we might call upon other Powers to recognise in the usual manner. This would take the new State out of the hands of the three Powers. It might lay the ground for our further proceedings in respect to Turkey.

It has likewise occurred to me, that it might be desirable to give this new Sovereign for a time the service of some troops, either at his expense or that of the Powers giving them. One battalion, say 1000, from each of the five great Powers or others

to be fixed upon. One or two Powers ought not alone to give them. I should have no objection to give our quota.

You may rely upon it that I have not formed an erroneous judgment of Monsieur de Laval.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

India Board, 15th October, 1829.

A proper letter relative to the publication of Lord Combermere's opinions will be sent to India as soon as possible after Wednesday next, which is the first day on which the Court meet.

The Chairman is to send me a letter he has received from Sir J. Malcolm, entreating him to hold out on the batta question against the Bengal army.

I find the Chairs very unwilling to go back.

The saving by the new arrangement is about 20,000*l.* or 25,000*l.* a year.

They will consider the subject thoroughly.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

India Board, 15th October, 1829.

After I had finished my own business, I amused myself the night before last by sketching the enclosed *projet* of the proposed remonstrance to Russia. You will see that the part relating to the terms of the Treaty is open to much alteration, and the whole might be shortened with advantage; but I think something of the nature of this paper would do as an ostensible document to be delivered to Count Nesselrode, our ambassador having specific instructions as to the particular modifications he should endeavour to procure in the conferences which would arise out of the presentation of the patent despatch.

I cannot help feeling that no time should be lost in making our remonstrance, both for its effect at St. Petersburg, and subsequently, if it should be produced, in Parliament.

I showed the sketch to Lord Aberdeen, who seemed to think parts of it would do.

I likewise suggested to him the sending of a despatch to Lord Heytesbury, of which I enclose a copy, instructing him as to the language he should hold with respect to Persia.

Lord Aberdeen will send it, with the omissions I have marked, unless it should occur to you that there is any objection.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

PROJET OF LETTER TO LORD HEYTESBURY, TO BE COMMUNICATED TO COUNT NESSELRODE.

14th October, 1829.

In declaring war against the Turks upon grounds of his own, his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia exercised his undoubted right of judging as to the nature of the grievances inflicted upon his subjects. His Majesty did not question that right, deeply as he lamented the exercise of it; but his Majesty commanded his Secretary of State to observe to the Russian ambassador that no war between two great Powers can be so far confined to themselves as not to give to the rest of Europe a right to watch over its progress and examine its result; and that the most complete success in the justest war would not entitle the stronger party to demand from the weaker such sacrifices under the name of indemnity as would affect its political existence, or would infringe upon that state of territorial possession upon which the general peace has rested during one of the longest and by far the most prosperous interval of tranquillity that Europe has ever known.*

After the long repose which Europe had enjoyed, his Majesty could not view without alarm the first march of great armies, and the first collision of great empires, and his Majesty's experience warranted him in apprehending that such a struggle would be the commencement of a long series of complications and disasters.†

But his Imperial Majesty having acknowledged that the first and most essential principle of the Treaty of London was that which interdicted to the Powers which signed it all conquests and exclusive advantages,‡ and having declared that from that principle he would not deviate in any hypothesis; and his Imperial Majesty having further declared that if, notwithstanding his intentions and his efforts, the decrees of Divine Providence should have destined him to be the witness of the last day of the Ottoman empire, he would only demand from his Allies the same absence of ambition and of exclusive thoughts of which he would give the first example. His Majesty could not but feel that in promises so solemn, and in the views of his own true interest, which his Imperial Majesty at the same time professed to entertain, his Majesty had satisfactory guarantees against the apprehended consequences of the war.

Still his Majesty could not but regard with anxiety the progress of hostile operations; and when the decisive success of the Russian armies in Europe and in Asia opened to them the roads to Constantinople, his Majesty felt himself called upon to desire through your Excellency that the Government of Russia would distinctly declare upon what specific terms they were willing to consent to the restoration of peace.

Your Excellency's communication of the reply of the Russian government to this demand was received so short a time before the news of the termination of the war as to prevent its previous acknowledgment. His Majesty, now fully informed of the final arrangements entered into by the plenipotentiaries of his Imperial Majesty, commands me to direct that your Excellency will intimate to the Russian government the sentiments of apprehension and of regret with which his Majesty, as the sincere friend of his Imperial Majesty, has viewed the stipulations of the Treaty of Adrianople.

* Lord Dudley to Prince Lieven, March 25, 1828.

† Lord Dudley to Prince Lieven, March 12, 1828.

‡ Count Nesselrode to Prince Lieven, January 6, 1828.

The declarations of his Imperial Majesty have been of too solemn a nature to make it possible for his Majesty to entertain any doubt as to the real views of his Imperial Majesty. His Imperial Majesty desires not conquests. He deprecates the fall of the Ottoman empire. His Majesty fears that the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople cannot be otherwise viewed than as practically extending the conquests of his Imperial Majesty in Europe as well as in Asia, and that the fall of the Ottoman empire, the very event his Imperial Majesty would avert, may be the consequence of the measures taken to secure the fulfilment of the conditions of peace.

As the Russian armies advanced into the centre of a Mahomedan population, and to the ancient capital of the Ottoman empire, Europe observed with astonishment the absence of all religious, of all national feeling; an unwillingness to fight amongst troops naturally brave, and the forward submission of a whole people to its invader.

Such events, portentous in their character, and marking the demoralising effects of long-continued misrule upon a nation once devoted to its religion and to its country, were sufficient to prove that to uphold the Ottoman empire was more difficult than to subvert it. Whether it might be possible to introduce into the countries now subject to the Ottoman rule a government securing good and equal laws to the various population of that empire, differing in race, in manners, in language, and in religion, is a question upon which philosophers may descant, but which statesmen are forbidden to entertain. They look not only to the end, but to the means by which that end is to be accomplished.

They view everything as it is connected with the general interests, and they cannot in the perhaps delusive hope of future and distant benefit to a particular people, consent to dissolve the bonds which hold all Europe together, to revive the spirit of revolution, and to excite the most destructive passions of mankind.

The Ottoman empire stands, not for the benefit of the Turks, but of Christian Europe; not to preserve Mahomedans in power, but to save Christians from a war of which neither the object could be defined, nor the extent, nor the duration calculated.

United under one energetic government, the Ottoman dominions in Europe embracing as they do countries once populous and productive, still fertile, inhabited by a warlike peasantry, possessing many natural lines of defence, and in their ports upon more than one sea extensive means of aggression, might become at no remote period the stronghold of a new military state, of which it would be impossible to foresee the policy or to estimate the influence. Divided amongst the Great Powers (if indeed such division could be acquiesced in by all, and in the interchanges of territory it would necessitate, did not lead to a degree of popular dissatisfaction and of international jealousy, which would interrupt the work of division by war), those dominions would still, in the hands of the partitionary States, introduce new combinations of interest, and altogether disturb the balance upon which the peace of Europe now rests without affording any security for the substitution of a system equally conducive to the general welfare of nations and to their repose.

It is for every prudent government to adhere to substantive good, and to reject the blandishments of visionary advantage.

Such his Majesty believes to be the sincere opinions of his Imperial Majesty; and if in judging of the conditions to which his Imperial Majesty has in the first instance deemed it right to subject the Sublime Porte, his Majesty should have arrived at conclusions different from those which have occurred to his Imperial Majesty, his Majesty is yet satisfied that his august brother has been actuated in the line of conduct he has adopted by the same pure principles which animate himself.

His Imperial Majesty has expressly renounced all desire of conquests; but he has exacted from the Sublime Porte, on the side of Asia, the cession of territories not indeed great in their extent, but important in their position and in their influence upon the event and upon the expense of future wars.

Russia, possessing the ports of Anapa and Poti, can transport her armies by sea to points equally threatening the most valuable frontiers of Turkey and of Persia. She is no longer obliged to march her troops by a circuitous and difficult route to the foot of Mount Caucasus, nor to canton them in an unhealthy country. She can retain them within her ancient provinces, equally prepared for European or Asiatic service, till the very moment of action, and then place them upon points within her acquired frontier, at once the most favourable for defence and for aggression.

Nor is it possible to consider separately the cessions exacted from the Porte by the Treaty of Adrianople, and from Persia by that of Turcoman Kale. The advantages derived by Russia from each of those Treaties are increased by those obtained from the other. To his Majesty as an Asiatic sovereign, whatever regards the independence of the Persian monarchy must ever be a subject of direct and deep interest; but limited indeed would be the views of that statesman who could think that her acquisitions in Asia did not affect the relations of Russia with the Powers of Europe.

Whatever enables Russia to produce the same effect upon her Asiatic frontier with fewer troops and at a diminished cost, enables her, without increased exertion, to devote a larger portion of her force and of her revenue to intervention in the affairs of Europe. But if on the side of Asia his Majesty sees territories acquired by specific cession and open conquests, on the side of Europe he sees other territories of which the occupation is only to cease upon the payment of a sum which an exhausted country cannot raise within any period which would not give to such occupation the character of permanent possession, and produce all the effects which would be the result of such permanent possession upon the calculations of Cabinets, and upon the relative position of States.

The Sublime Porte retains no fortress upon the left bank of the Danube.

No Turk is to be domiciled within the Principalities.

The ancient tribute in kind, so essential to the subsistence of Constantinople, is to be commuted for a pecuniary payment, to be fixed by the common consent of provinces, which have every inducement to reject the most just demand, and a Suzerain who has no means of enforcing it. The government, whatever it may be, which Princes in whose election Russia participates may make, in conjunction with Divans Russia alone can influence, is to continue unalterable by the Sublime Porte; and to Principalities thus independent of their Suzerain, are to be ceded all the islands in the Danube appertaining to its left bank, while, where that river divides the States of Russia and Turkey, fortresses may be erected by Russia on her bank, and Turks may not inhabit their bank within two hours of the river.

What is the result of these stipulations? That the Principalities are for ever severed from Turkey, and that they are annexed to Russia for a period which can be terminated only by her own good pleasure. That the advanced posts of the Russian army are permanently stationed within a six weeks' march of Constantinople; that the Bakovina and Transylvania, before protected by the Principalities as much as if a sea had washed the foot of the Carpathian Mountains, are now uncovered, and the relations of all the Powers of Europe are altered by the change effected in the position of some of the most important elements of the European system.

His Imperial Majesty is too deeply penetrated by the same sentiments as his

illustrious predecessor, and is too fondly attached to his glory to be willing to undermine the noble work upon which that glory rests, and to unsettle the bases upon which was fixed the pacification of Europe.

His Imperial Majesty desires the continuance of peace and the maintenance of the Ottoman empire; but when he sees that empire deprived, not only of physical strength, but of that moral force by which alone governments can be preserved—is it by converting the Sultan into the unrelenting extortioner of the last piastre from his exhausted subjects—is it by displaying in the fields of Roumelia the standards of a conqueror, that the moral force of that empire can be renovated, and its authority regain obedience?

To what good purpose can such measures tend? Equally pressing upon the Turk and upon the Christian Rayah, they augment the animosities of both, and afford no hope of tranquillity but in extermination; calling forth the worst passions of men, and dissolving the bonds, not only of government, but of society; they throw upon his Imperial Majesty the awful responsibility of causing calamities of which he will be unable to control the course, and which, in their extended influence, not only upon the devoted subjects of the Ottoman Power, but over the nations of Europe, will efface the memory of past evils, and make the reign of the most benevolent of Princes the darkest era in the annals of the world. But there may yet be time to avert these fatal consequences, long foreseen by his Majesty, of a war he has ever deplored.

There may yet be time for his Imperial Majesty, displaying that magnanimity which is the peculiar attribute of great sovereigns, and which in the day of complete victory, and in the presence of a proud and prostrate enemy, has a character almost beyond that of human virtue, to extend an arm as powerful to save as it has been to conquer; and relying upon his own tried strength, and upon the dread he has inspired for the execution of treaties, to secure the confidence of his Allies by a clemency as much demanded by his own true interests as it is by the voice of glory and of humanity.

His Imperial Highness may be assured that to any sovereign, however powerful, the confidence of his Allies is of more value than millions of ducats, and the protracted display of a triumph which no one disputes.

II.

DRAFT OF DESPATCH TO LORD HEYTESBURY.

MY LORD,

15th October, 1829.

It is probable that the conduct of the Shah of Persia, in concluding at the same time offensive alliances with the Emperor of Russia and with the Ottoman Porte, may come to the knowledge of the Russian government, and that taken in conjunction with the delayed payment of the last instalment of the indemnity stipulated by the late Treaty, it may give the Russian government a plausible pretext for demanding further sacrifices from the Shah of Persia whenever the army of Count Paskewitch may be at liberty to enforce them.

If your Excellency should become acquainted with the existence of any such design on the part of the Russian government, or with any facts which seem to lead to the inference that such designs are entertained, your Excellency will not fail to intimate that the independence of the Persian monarchy must ever be an object of deep interest to his Majesty, and that any attempt on the part of Russia to extend her conquests in Persia, unnecessary as such conquests are to the real interests of the Russian empire, could be considered by his Majesty in no other light than as an act unfriendly to his Majesty as an Asiatic Power.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 15th October, 1829.

I am very glad that you are disposed to agree to the notion of connecting the new Greek State with Europe, by placing it under the general guarantee; and that you also think we may possibly by these means arrive at an effectual guarantee of the Porte as long as it may exist, and with the view of establishing a perfect understanding between the great Powers, whenever the dissolution of the government shall render it necessary. This, I feel confident, is the great thing for us to look to now; and you will see by Stuart's private letter of this day, which I enclose, that if Polignac can be trusted, we may consider him as not unfriendly to such a project.

The question of comprising Eubœa in the Greek State stands very much as it ought to do; and, judging from your letter, as you would wish. If the Porte does not accept our alternative, we shall be just where we were—free to consider the objections already made by the Porte; and as the armistice will have been established, we can object to the renewal of hostilities. I had understood at the Cabinet, as you seem to do, that the proposal to include Eubœa in the alternative was to be agreed to or not, according to our success in naming the Prince. As I saw that the Russians would be resolute, it was this consideration which induced me to bring forward Prince Philip; being resolved, if he had been objected to, not to agree to the proposal of including Eubœa.

With respect to Eubœa, I should observe that there have been partial insurrections, although the Turks have never lost possession of the island. As this is the case, perhaps it will be right to stipulate in the Protocol that the Turkish inhabitants shall be at liberty to remain tranquilly in their possessions, if they should think fit to do so.

I have seen M. de Laval this morning, and we have gone over the matter for the Conference. I see the point of difficulty will be the reservation of the right to consider the objections of the Porte to the Protocol of the 22nd of March. The Russians had agreed to insert it, although of course highly disapproving of it; but perhaps the objections of M. de Laval may give them fresh courage. He says that it is with the view of bringing the matter to a speedy termination that his Court agrees to propose the alternative; whereas we shall still expose ourselves, by keeping this condition in the Protocol, to all the chances of an interminable negotiation. Of course this is a point upon which I shall not take upon myself to give way. He is to write to-night to Paris, and to endeavour to do justice to my arguments, which I am not certain that he fully understood. But the manner of the man is so odd, that he seems to me to be half-witted.

You will see by Stuart's despatches to-day, that most important intelligence has been communicated by M. de Mortemart to the French government. Should this be confirmed, it will go far to give a new complexion to the whole affair. We had already been prepared by Lord Heytesbury to expect that the Emperor would diminish the amount of the indemnity; but the immediate recall of his troops is a measure which could not have been anticipated. Should this really be the case, it will be the most wise and politic proceeding which it is possible for him to adopt. It will not

diminish his real power and influence in that wretched empire, which is at his mercy ; while at the same time he will obtain, and not undeservedly, universal praise for his magnanimity. My only fear is, that the news is too good to be true.

I have had Bülow here, who tells me that at Berlin they are in extasy ; he says that Ancillon's despatch is full of such exaggerated admiration of the Emperor and of the peace, that he was ashamed to read it to me.

This is the cry we must expect to hear most loud throughout Europe. I enclose a private letter which M. de Laval has delivered to me from Polignac, by which it appears, that whatever he may really feel, he will not show his discontent.

We shall soon see what the conduct of the Emperor really is ; but I presume that our statement or remonstrance must be modified accordingly. Let him do what he may, we shall at all events have to take care of the future.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1477.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Walmer Castle, 16th October, 1829.

My objection to demand Eubœa is that it throws an obstacle, which is insurmountable, in the way of the Porte accepting the alternative ; as to conquer Eubœa ourselves, to allow it to be conquered by others, or to use menace to this Power, is impossible. I did not understand that the consent to demand Eubœa was to be so easily given.

I hear sad complaints of the Treaty. People think that there is a great deal behind in the supplemental Treaties not published ; and they suspect secret articles. That of which they have a knowledge to which they object most strongly is contained in the 7th and the 10th Articles. But particularly the 7th ; the 10th Article is not so well understood. But they object to Russia going alone in the affair of Greece.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Horse-Guards, 16th October, 1829.

Prince Lieven sent to me some time ago a string of questions respecting our military establishments and regulations to which the Emperor of Russia had directed him to procure answers ; and I told him that, as various essential alterations were taking place in the War Office regula-

tions, I wished to delay replying to those queries. He has since occasionally pressed me on the subject, and I have therefore recently taken steps to collect the materials from other departments, and prepared those which I should have to furnish; but of course I should do so under the authority and in the name of Lord Hill, and I do not wish to send anything to Prince Lieven without your Grace's sanction.

I therefore take the liberty of enclosing, for your perusal, at your convenience, a paper containing the queries and the answers which I propose to give, and a letter which relates to our system of promotion, and other objects not clearly defined or explained in any printed regulations. This letter is extracted from a paper which I drew up in 1827, and my object in making this statement has been to show that our system rests, in all its parts, upon good principles, and such as can be maintained.

In the general answers to the questions, I have endeavoured to show that our resources, and our facilities of calling them into action, are equal to any emergency; at the same time that I have avoided communicating anything which may not be found in the printed regulations or in documents published by order of the House of Commons. The only information upon which any doubt can arise is that required from the Ordnance Department, and Lord Beresford told me that he would consult your Grace upon that point.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord Duke,
your Grace's most obedient and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Worthing, 16th October, 1829.

I enclose a copy of that part of Sir John Malcolm's letter to the Chairman which relates to the batta question. The last observation in the letter respecting the want of obedience and of respect in India towards the government is but too much confirmed by my own experience. The authority of the government has been let down by a habit of abusing much, punishing little, and enforcing nothing. It will require a long time to restore a proper tone to it.

I agree with you entirely in principle. I would make justice, strict justice, the rule of our conduct. The misfortune in this case is, that what is claimed on the ground of justice by the army in Bengal, has been over and over again declared not to be claimable on that ground by the Court. Certainly the Court never were parties to the supposed compromise. Colonel Salmond, who was Military Secretary at the time, says the arrangement never was understood in the light of a compromise by the Bengal government.

Still I agree with you; the mixing up of the two measures in the same Order, and the letter of the government to the Court announcing the two measures, are sufficient to lead the officers very fairly to the conclusion that there was a compromise; and that there was, all succeeding governments of Bengal have declared.

I should prefer leaving this as it is, if we can, and making it up to the

army in some other way. If they require full batta on stations where they are presumed to be always ready for the field, they want more than full batta when in movement against an enemy. In Ava they had additional batta given to them, and probably they would in any war. There ought to be higher advantages, I should think, when an army is actually in the field. Greater expense must be incurred during the march when the reliefs are made.

Could any boon be given to the whole army under either of these heads which would induce the officers to say no more about half batta?

In the middle of the fever about half batta will arrive the orders directing the reduction of two companies in each regiment; orders accompanied undoubtedly by the announcement of a royal boon long much desired; but still, by the reduction, two officers in each regiment will immediately lose the command-money of companies.

You best know whether, taken together, the two measures will upon the whole produce satisfaction. All are benefited by the boon, and few are injured by the reduction; still some will be discontented by it.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM SIR JOHN MALCOLM TO THE CHAIRMAN,
dated 6th June, 1829.

"You will be much annoyed at finding the spirit of discontent excited in Bengal. This was to be expected (though not in such extreme), from the favour that has been so long shown to that settlement; but allow me, in this confidential communication, to warn you from yielding to such memorials and such a spirit of clamorous discontent, however much attention may be *recommended* by the Commander-in-Chief! If you modify even, you will repent; for it is not half batta, but the principles of respect and obedience that are at issue. Examine the proportion of officers at Madras and at Bombay that now receive full batta, and make the comparison with Bengal, where every article of necessity and of luxury is cheaper; and after you must conclude, that attention to a reference which I am sorry has been made, will produce very strong feelings in the armies of the other presidencies. There is a bad spirit at Calcutta. The press is beginning every day to be more difficult to keep within limits, and all ranks have during the last five or six years lost that respect and fear of authority which I must think is necessary in such a government as that we exercise in India."

To Lord Ellenborough.

[1478.]

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH, London, 17th October, 1829.

I received your note with your proposed drafts to Lord Heytesbury, respecting Persia and the Turkish peace.

Since you left town we have received accounts that the Emperor has remitted the payment of half the contribution still due by the Persians, and has given five years time for the

payment of the other half. It would be useless, therefore, and would not be expedient to write at all about Persia.

In respect to the Turks, the Emperor has likewise manifested an intention of modifying his treaties with the Sultan. At all events we have so much evidence of that intention that we could not at this moment with propriety write at all.

We are, in truth, without knowledge of what will be the details of the Treaty.

We know that there is peace; but nothing more to a certainty. It is said among other things that the Emperor has ordered his army to cross the Balkan and even the Danube; that he means to remit a great part of the ten millions of dollars, and not to retain in his hands the Principalities.

It may still be necessary to remonstrate; but it would be ridiculous to remonstrate till we should know for what.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1479.]

To Lord Ellenborough.

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH, London, 17th October, 1829.

I don't care about the sentiments and feelings of the army when the case is clearly just. I don't care about the reduction of two companies in each regiment, particularly connected with the boon to the superior ranks. But a question regarding pay is a serious one.

Was Salmond in India or in London at the time the arrangement was made?

Anything else that you might do would only increase the evil and occasion the discontent at the other establishments to which Sir J. Malcolm refers.

If you put the Bengal troops on half batta in the Lower Provinces, leaving them only with full batta in Oude, you ought at least to give them the Bengal lodging money as fixed by the regulation of 1796.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Generals Torrijos, Valdez, &c.,

[1480.]

SEÑORES,

London, 17th October, 1829.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 12th instant, recommending to me the case of certain Spaniards who have recently arrived in England from Portugal.

I had before received a memorial upon this subject, to which I purposely omitted giving an answer, because I wished to avoid adverting to the topics which must form the subject of this letter.

When, in consequence of the misfortunes which occurred in Spain from the year 1820 to the year 1823, a number of Spaniards came to this country, and were under the necessity of residing here, as they could not return to Spain, his Majesty thought proper to afford pecuniary relief to such of them as were reported to his government to merit his beneficence, by their station, their talents, and the services which they had rendered to the cause at a moment in which his Majesty was closely allied with Spain, and engaged in military operations against the common enemy.

The public likewise subscribed, in order to support others in similar distress, for whom his Majesty's government had not made provision; and these contributions have been most generously repeated from time to time; and every mode adopted which could be devised of exciting the attention and compassion of the public.

You have now called upon me, not only as the King's minister, but as an officer and an individual, to provide for an additional number of Spaniards who have recently come to this country from Portugal.

These Spaniards went to Portugal voluntarily in order to take part in the troubles of that country. Some of them quitted this country; others deserted the army of their Sovereign to enter that of Portugal. These Spaniards were received in the service of Portugal contrary to the recommendations of the government of this country to that of Portugal.

Although now under the necessity of quitting Portugal, they are not under the necessity of coming to England; as I happen to know that a disposition was manifested by his Catholic Majesty to pardon those Spaniards who were lately serving in Portugal, and who should solicit that advantage; of which dis-

position many did avail themselves and returned to Spain. All might have done so. They are not under the necessity of remaining here, because I equally know that if, as individuals, they will now apply to his Catholic Majesty's minister plenipotentiary at this Court, the Spanish government is not indisposed to attend to their applications for pardon.

Under these circumstances, as it is impossible for me, as an officer, to do otherwise than disapprove of the conduct of these Spaniards, I decline, as an individual, to recommend them to the bounty of the public; and, as the King's servant, I equally decline to recommend that his Majesty's bounty should be extended to them.

I have the honour to be, Señores,
your most obedient humble servant,
WELLINGTON.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Worthing, 18th October, 1829.

You will receive with this letter the Persian despatches. Lord Heytesbury having sent them unsealed, they were read at the Foreign Office, then sent to you; and the Secret Committee, to whom they were addressed, did not get them till I received them from you on Thursday, six days after their arrival. I had to pacify the Chairs as well as I could, and I have written to Lord Heytesbury, so that the thing will not occur again.

On the subject of Persia, I may as well, perhaps, remind you, that Colonel M'Donald's present instructions, with regard to the officers in Abbas Mirza's service, are to urge the Prince to pay them himself, and to urge the point, with the impression upon his mind that the government may be obliged to recall them if the Prince will not pay them.

Colonel M'Donald was recently instructed, that if it should be proposed to make the money for the pay of the troops pass through his hands for security, as had been suggested by the Shah, he must not agree to the proposal without taking good care not to incur responsibility without having the money transaction arranged in such a manner as to enable him to meet his obligations.

The supreme government having refused officers to the Pacha of Bagdad, were ordered a year ago, if they should have another opportunity of getting English officers into his service, to take advantage of it; but economy obliged us to annex, as a condition, that the Pacha should pay them.

It is clear, I think, that there is a good Mahometan and anti-Russian spirit in the countries to the east of the Euphrates, and if any mischief happens there it will be our own fault; but if we allow the Persians to think we have ceased to trouble ourselves about them, a belief they have in consequence of our purchasing the abrogation of the subsidiary articles,

fear of Russia will secure the compliance of the Persian government with any demand, and our only security will be in the chance of the dissolution of the government, and of the irregular and uncombined action of the several tribes. That Russia will attempt, by conquest or by influence, to secure Persia as a road to the Indus, I have the most intimate conviction. It is evident that the latter and surer mode, that of influence, is the one she now selects.

I should suggest that the officers now in Persia should on no account be withdrawn, even if the Prince will not pay them. The chance they give us is well worth 5000*l.* a-year, which after all is only expended in Persia instead of in India, for the officers are not replaced. If it were considered desirable by the envoy, I should think the number of officers might be increased, as well as that of non-commissioned officers.

There may be objections to the envoy's receiving an assignment of lands for the payment of the troops, but might Major Hart?

The escort has been sent back merely from motives of economy, but it looked like an abandonment of the field. The Persian mission alone, I believe, of all Indian missions, has now no escort. The Russians have a large one. The death of the Shah may be followed by convulsions, during which the person of the envoy, if quite unprotected, might be exposed to insults and even to danger. May not the escort be sent back? It only costs the difference between pay and allowances in India, and the extra charge, small when they are once at Tabreez, occasioned by their being in Persia.

The supreme government have been recently told one assistant is enough in Persia, and they have their option of withdrawing Sir H. Willock or Captain Campbell. Colonel M'Donald will retain Captain Campbell, even if he pays him himself, as he cannot do without him; and Sir H. Willock, who was once chargé-d'affaires in Persia, gives himself airs, and had even succeeded in persuading the late General Gorbazadoff that he had superseded Colonel M'Donald. He cannot assist the envoy, and he, I believe, embarrasses him. May it not be as well to recall him? He costs a great deal and does no good.

If you approve of these notions I will write a despatch accordingly. There will be a steamboat in the Red Sea by the middle of December, and the despatches can go safely and rapidly.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

To Lord Francis Leveson Gower.

[1481.]

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS,

Sudbourne, 19th October, 1829.

I did not send you an answer, indeed I did not form an opinion on the fittest person to be the Representative Peer, as I heard that Lord Gort was likely to recover almost at the same time that I heard from you that he was dying. We must expect vacancies, however, and must be prepared; and I will

immediately speak to my colleagues and the King upon the subject.

I am very much inclined to Lord Doneraile, particularly if he is of the Protestant persuasion; and more particularly as he is recommended by the Lord-Lieutenant. Lord Fingall would not answer at all. The truth is, that we have done as much for the Roman Catholics as the public will bear just at present. I think that our measure has produced pretty nearly as much effect out of doors and in Ireland as I expected. It remains to be seen whether it produces the effect in Parliament which I confess was my principal inducement for recommending it, viz., whether we shall be fairly supported in the measures which we may find necessary to propose in order to settle and keep Ireland in a state of tranquillity, order, and submission to law.

But some circumstances connected with the measures of last session have turned out unfortunately, more so than I could have expected; and some have occurred which I confess I did not, and could not, foresee.

I was aware that a very large body in Parliament would oppose these measures. But I did not think that this body would become *an Opposition*. This misfortune is to be attributed to a particular individual who seeks to attain objects abroad by making himself the head of a party in England; and to some unfortunate events which occurred early in the session.

Then after the pains which I took, and the perseverance with which I laboured, to convince the King's mind of the propriety and necessity of the measure which I recommended, and the success which attended those labours, I confess that I did not, and could not, expect to be told that his Majesty had been deceived; that he was, and always had been, opposed to our measure, which we had carried in spite of him.

It is true that this false position in which things find themselves is to be attributed to the same individual above referred to. But the consequence of the whole is that we are not in the situation in which we ought to be. Many wise and good men entertain doubts whether we can go on; and what I should call the government party in this country look at us with jealousy, if not with mistrust and a desire to oppose and put us down if they could find successors for us.

I have made this statement to you of what is really the truth in

order to show you the necessity for proceeding with great caution in any further approaches to the Roman Catholics; and particularly to any leading individuals among them. I confess that I don't care one pin about them; nor ever did. I look to keep Ireland in tranquillity by good temper, justice, and a vigorous execution of the laws in every case that occurs; and I hope that Parliament will support us in carrying this system into execution now that we have conceded the Roman Catholic question.

But I am convinced that in the existing temper of men's minds, the King being supposed to have been forced, very little would create a flame in this country, which it would be more difficult for me or any man to extinguish, and which would do more mischief than any little ill temper on the part of the Roman Catholic leaders in Ireland.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Burghersh.

[1482.]

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

Sudbourne, 19th October, 1829.

You are aware of the relation in which we stand towards the Roman Catholics in Ireland. The old laws in respect to communication with Rome are strictly in force. But there is no doubt that the peace and welfare of Ireland depend in a great degree upon the selection of the persons appointed to fill the places in the episcopal mission to that country.

We cannot officially admit the existence of the interference of the Pope; we cannot at all acknowledge it. But we are anxious that it should be exercised in such a manner as will promote the peace and harmony of the country.

The gentleman is dead who filled the office of bishop in the diocese of Waterford. His name was Kelly. He had been coadjutor of Baltimore in the United States. The person who is recommended by the priests in that part of Ireland for the office is a Mr. Foran; respecting whom the intelligence which I have received does not lead me to believe that his appointment to the dignity in question would be beneficial to the peace of the country.

The person who has been suggested to me is Bishop Weld,

coadjutor of Canada. This gentleman is connected with some of the best families in this country, and would be of great service in Ireland.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will lose no time in exerting all your private influence at Rome to have this appointment made.

The Roman Catholics of this empire have now all that they can require from his Majesty in the way of political privilege. There remains no concession to be made excepting of our religion, our properties, and our lives; and I should think that the authorities at Rome will see that the interests of religion coincide with the political interests of the State, in rendering it desirable that the gentlemen selected for the performance of episcopal duties of a spiritual nature in Ireland, should be well disposed towards the State and such as the government can approve of.

Pray lose no time about this affair, and manage it with discretion.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Bishop Weld is now I understand on his way to Rome.

[Send this letter to Lord Stuart, and tell him that it is desirable that it should be sent to Lord Burghersh by a safe hand as soon as possible.]

[1483.]

To Sir Herbert Taylor.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Sudbourne, 19th October, 1829.

I return your papers which I have perused. I am astonished that the Emperor of Russia should have put such questions. I don't believe that there is an instance of such questions having been put to any government whatever; nor do I believe that there exists one that would allow them to be answered.

I know that the Russian government would not. When I was in Russia, I desired to know how it was possible that one million of men could be maintained at the expense stated in the accounts published; and I asked to see the printed regulations. I never could get the regulation or acquire the information which that would have afforded.

It is perfectly true that we have no secret in fact. But it is not true in theory.

All our documents that are laid before Parliament, and all those communicated to the army however public they become, are not published; and I should say that a person in your situation, or in Lord Hill's, cannot communicate even these documents, much less detailed information upon them to a foreign government, without the King's permission conveyed by a servant of the Crown, who will be responsible for the act of giving the permission.

All this goes to the form. In respect to the substance, I ask what is the motive for requiring this detailed information? Is it to form an army upon the model of ours? or any establishment of an army upon the model of ours? No such thing. If it was, there might be question of policy upon the granting or withholding the information. But we know that there is no such motive.

What is wanted is to gratify individual curiosity. If this were the Emperor's curiosity there might be no inconvenience in gratifying it. But the communication of this detailed information from the highest authority will lead to a comparative review and discussion of our system possibly with the Russian, possibly with other military establishments, which can only lead to inconvenience. This hypothesis is founded upon the most innocent motives.

But there might be others, and I confess that if I were to be called upon as the King's servant to give my opinion, whether this information should be given at all, I should say not.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 19th October, 1829.

There are two questions arising out of the discussions with M. de Laval, respecting which it will be necessary to come to a decision.

Some time ago I gave Matuscewitz an outline of a Protocol for the final settlement of the Greek affair, being pretty much the same, as to form and substance, as that which I stated to the Cabinet at our last meeting. I requested that he would fill this up, and put it into proper diplomatic shape. We have had several meetings, and with the exception of particular expressions, which may be altered, I think the Protocol now contains

everything which is necessary for the conclusion of the whole business. I had hoped that it might be ready, as it will be, in a day or two for your inspection. In the mean time comes M. de Laval, and insists that the Protocol shall be founded upon the proposition of the French plenipotentiary. This is not a simple measure, but it is an extensive arrangement of the whole Greek question. It appears preferable, therefore, that we should merely say on the Protocol, that the Powers were agreed; and not make the whole transaction originate with one. If I recollect right, something was said to this effect in the Cabinet, although nothing definitively.

The Duke de Laval has again brought forward his Prince. They, the French, appear disposed to recompense the King of Bavaria for their unfavourable decision respecting Sponheim, by giving Prince Charles this kingdom. I have given M. de Laval to understand that our consent to the whole transaction is connected with the nomination of the Prince, and he is to write to Paris to-morrow to render availing, as he says, my reasons for the nomination of Prince Philip. I have led him to believe that the whole affair of the alternative, and everything connected with the new proposition, will stand still unless this is conceded. Russia would like, undoubtedly, that we should put forward one candidate, and the French another, in order for the Emperor to decide. Here they will not propose any one. From what has passed, however, they are bound to support Prince Philip in preference to any other; and I shall see Lieven to-morrow, for the purpose of ascertaining how this is. This is a point upon which, I think, we should by no means give way. The question is delicate, and may be easily injured by bad management; nevertheless, I think of writing to Stuart about it to-morrow.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

The Duke of Northumberland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Phoenix Park, 19th October, 1829.

I communicated very fully to Mr. Peel, in my letter of the 15th ult., the general views which I had taken on the more important matters connected with this country.

The most interesting event which has recently occurred is the meeting at Cork, held under the patronage of the Earl of M——, for the avowed purpose of devising some plan for the reformation of the Established Church.

The singular fact of this assemblage was its constituency. It was composed of men calling themselves the friends of the clergy, and who had been the loudest in their cry against "the Relief Bill," as tending to endanger the Establishment, and to trench upon the inviolable precincts of the Church. The speeches, however, were all made in a spirit of unqualified hostility; and, as I must think, in the childish idea of revenging themselves on some of the bishops and higher clergy who had not gone all lengths with them in opposing the admission of the Roman Catholics to a constitutional equality.

Lord M—— is, as your Grace knows, a very weak man; but his

wife is a Calvinist, and some of his collateral connections have been nurtured, as I am informed, in what it has been the fashion to call a philosophical hostility to every profession of faith.

Be this as it may, the partisans of both factions have united to give publicity and countenance to this strange transaction; and I suspect that in the next Session of Parliament a violent assault will be made under cover of this meeting upon the Irish Establishment.

This will of course be resisted, for, with all its faults (and it has many), the integrity of the Irish Church is greatly auxiliary, if not essential to British connection. On this side of the water, *we* must be particularly cautious in any recommendations we may make for the higher grades of the profession: we must encourage the acknowledged spirit of improvement, which has lately manifested itself amongst the junior clergy, and by bringing forward men of enlarged views and parochial (*Irish*) experience (such men, for instance, as Mr. Daly), demonstrate our intention of consulting the general interests of the community.

The public mind is now also employed upon another question of a far more doubtful nature, I mean the question of "Poor Laws," for which I learn that *many* good, and some reasonable men, are strenuous advocates. I will not enter here into the discussion, whether of the obligation or the expediency, of making some provision for those who are infirm by the act of God, by the decay of age or the helplessness of infancy. Most countries, perhaps *all* countries but this, have had some such provision. I acknowledge, too, that the voluntary relief, to which alone the poor in Ireland can resort is a most unequal tax, levied on the local occupant of good and kindly feelings, and evaded by the ungenerous and the absent. Still I must confess that I have never yet read, nor heard, nor imagined, any safe or practicable way of giving effect to a law of *pecuniary* relief. Certain I am, that no parochial machinery can be found, and there is something strangely capricious in the proposition of those, who whilst they condemn and perhaps calumniate the agency of grand juries for all other possible purposes, would confide to them the administration of a sum to be levied summarily, and to be disbursed (as of necessity it must be in the first instance) with an unquestioned discretion. The utmost which I think *can* be done, and which I almost persuade myself *ought* to be done, is an extended establishment of asylums and hospitals to be supported by a general county assessment, where care and protection, *but not money*, might be given to the sufferers under the most obvious cases of mental or bodily misfortune.

If to this could be added a system of general and gratuitous education, neither the rich nor the poor of Ireland would have any fair ground of complaint.

It may now be prudent to avail myself of this opportunity to request your Grace's advice as to the succession to any vacancy which may occur in the Representative Peerage, for it is desirable on these occasions to be prepared with a candidate, and to be ready at once to declare, and take, our definite course.

Two noblemen have occurred to me for this succession; First, Viscount Doneraile, a man of unblemished character, of hitherto uncompromised politics, and now professing an attachment to the existing administration;

a constant resident, a good landlord, and a popular man in the wild and singular district in which his property is situated. It is true, that he is an Eton contemporary of mine, but as I have scarcely ever seen him, since that early period of our lives, till my arrival in Ireland, I cannot accuse myself of any great partiality in the description which I have given of him. The other nobleman is one with whom I am entirely unacquainted, but whose name I bring forward because I do most firmly and conscientiously believe that his election, under the auspices of government, would be attended with very beneficial effects in this country. I mean the Earl of Fingal. Highly popular in Ireland, he is known to possess loyal and patriotic feelings, and although a strenuous supporter of the Roman Catholic claims, he seems to have given so little offence as to have been the sole nobleman of his creed who was honoured with the Order of St. Patrick.

I am aware that his pecuniary circumstances are embarrassed, but I nevertheless apprehend that your Grace will concur with me in the belief that his election to the Representative Peerage will be a safe and yet a satisfactory proof that "the Relief Bill" was passed as a practical measure; and that so far as the government is concerned, we mean to give henceforward "fair play" to all men.

With regard to any probable vacancy in the Spiritual Peerage, your Grace will have already discovered that I am greatly inclined to recommend Mr. Daly, and you will oblige me by favouring me with your opinion concerning him.

I have the satisfaction to conclude this letter with acquainting your Grace, that the measures we have taken in Tipperary have been already productive of satisfactory results. We have asserted and maintained the supremacy of the law, and the menaced vengeance of the peasantry towards the police has never taken effect.

Our latest accounts, indeed, from different parts of Ireland bring tidings of two or three outrages attended by loss of life; but they are counterbalanced by as many cases of resolute and successful resistance where the ruffian assailants have been killed or taken by the householders.

Wherever this has occurred, upon a satisfactory proof of the fact, a liberal reward has been granted.

On the whole, the general aspect of affairs is cheering, and I am day by day more satisfied that party spirit is slowly but certainly subsiding.

I have the honour to remain, my dear Duke,

with great truth and regard, yours very faithfully,

NORTHUMBERLAND.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Worthing, 19th October, 1829.

The enormous and increasing expense of new buildings, both civil and military, in India, seems to show that there is something defective in the system. It appears to me that without a previous reference to the home authorities, accompanied by a detailed estimate where any new buildings beyond a certain cost are represented to be required, we shall never intro-

duce anything like economy into this extensive branch of expenditure; and the same system of previous reference home should be established in the case of large repairs. What should be the limit beyond which the Indian government should not go without authority from home? I am disposed to think that for buildings altogether new the limit might be fixed at 1000 rupees. Is that too low?

I see no reason why, with some alteration in the limit beyond which expense may not be incurred without authority, the same system might not be introduced into India which prevails under the Ordnance Department in the King's Colonies, even in Ceylon.

The abuse is now very great. The Governor-General expended 10,000*l.* in each of three successive years upon the Government House in Calcutta, and even Sir J. Malcolm converted the bungalows at Malabar Point into a house at an expense of 4000*l.*, and bought another house at Dhapooree for the same sum without saying one word before the bill came in.

The new buildings at all the Presidencies are more expensive than the repairs of old ones, and are again, in that climate, the fertile sources of new annual expenditure.

If you approve of the principle of previous reference, and will fix the limit, I have the materials ready for a letter to the Court upon the subject.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

To Viscount Beresford.

[1484.]

MY DEAR BERESFORD,

London, 20th October, 1829.

I have perused these papers. Mr. Perkins before showed his machine for nothing; having constructed it at his own expense. He now wants to construct another machine at our expense, and to show it to us for 15,000*l.*

Tell him that his proposal is so far fair that it is explicit. But that we must likewise be understood. First, we must have some description of what he proposes to construct at our expense. Secondly, the opinion of the Master-General or of the officers employed by him is to be conclusive whether or not Mr. Perkins is to have his reward.

Lastly. If we give him 15,000*l.*, or any sum, it is to be understood as for the purchase of the secret.

Before we decide whether we will incur any expense at all we must know what it is that he is about to propose to us.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1485.]

To Lord FitzRoy Somerset.

MY DEAR LORD FITZROY,

Sudbourne, 20th October, 1829.

I wish that you would look at and show to Lord Hill my letter to Sir Herbert Taylor on the queries from the Emperor of Russia respecting the army.*

In truth the organisation and economy of our army are not its brilliant parts. Its conduct in the field is unrivalled. Its officers are gentlemen, and moreover the gentlemen of England. The organisation suits the purposes of our service in peace and war, scattered as the army is from Indus to the Pole, and from the pillars of Hercules to the eastern extremities of the earth. But it would be ridiculous, when opened in all its details, to one of the military nations of Europe; and that for the purpose of being criticised.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1486.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Sudbourne, 20th October, 1829.

Not being quite *au courant*, I cannot give you any opinion on the questions to which you refer in yours. I understood that it was the wish of our colleagues not to propose or agree to anything that was not founded on the Treaty of the 6th July, excepting to be proposed to the Porte as an alternative. We were willing to agree to the alternative being proposed if the proposition should originate with the French government. I was not unwilling to originate the proposition of the alternative, provided that the Sovereign should be the Prince proposed by us, and that no new sacrifice were demanded from the Porte in the settlement of the limits of the Greek sovereignty.

I think likewise that the Russian plenipotentiaries being prepared to support the nomination of the Prince proposed by you, it would be ridiculous to give him up.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

* See page 242.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 20th October, 1829.

I have had Lieven and Matuscewitz here to-day with the *projet* of a final Protocol. We made some progress in preparing it; and I took the opportunity of ascertaining from them what they were disposed to do upon the choice of the Prince. They still professed to approve highly of Prince Philip, and to be ready to sign the Protocol by which the Principality should be offered to him; but they declared that they were not authorized positively to reject a candidate who should be proposed by France; so that, unless we could agree with France, the Conference could come to no final decision. I objected entirely to the notion of going before the tribunal of the Emperor, in order to see on which side he would vote; and insisted on the promise of their support in the Conference. This, however, they were determined not to give, unless France should also acquiesce. I treated the nomination of Prince Philip, or of some one whom we could equally approve of, as a *sine quâ non*: and insisted that this nomination should form part of the Protocol. I have also held the same language to Laval. I enclose a letter which I have written to Stuart, for the purpose of being communicated to Polignac, which may possibly be productive of some effect.

It is clear to me that, notwithstanding my assertions, the Russians think there is some Austrian intrigue at the bottom of this proposition. Notwithstanding the civility with which they speak of Prince Philip, it is evidently constrained. There is a great difference in their manner with respect to Prince Frederick of Orange, who was accidentally named. In case of necessity, they would undoubtedly support him; and, in some respects, he would be the best for us, if he should accept it. But, at all events, as we have put forward Prince Philip, we must do what we can to carry him through. I have mentioned to Esterhazy, confidentially, what was the state of the case, but without anticipating such formidable objections from France. We shall have M. de Laval's instructions in the course of the week; and in the mean time, when you come to town, the *projet* of the Protocol, with the several annexes, will be ready for your examination.

The Nova Scotia question has not been neglected. You have probably seen Sir Howard Douglas's observations upon the American statement. Mr. Chipman has nearly finished a very detailed examination of the geographical part of the subject, more especially relating to the old boundaries. I have received a statement from Addington, and a paper from Stratford Canning. I rather think of putting the various materials into the hands of Stratford Canning, who thoroughly understands the subject, and who will probably be well able to make the most of them. I am glad you have turned your attention to it, so as to communicate your own view of the case. We are allowed until the 1st of January for preparation.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[1487.]

To Mr. Planta.

MY DEAR PLANTA,

Sudbourne Hall, 21st October, 1829.

I have had the same complaints from all parts of the Cinque Ports respecting the conduct of the French fishermen, equally unsupported by proof with those which you have sent me.

The sea is open to everybody to fish. We cannot prevent, and have no right to ask the French fishermen to desist from fishing. A sloop of war, and even a squadron, could not prevent the accidents which are stated to occur; supposing it to be possible to authorize the use of force for that purpose.

I confess, however, that I am ashamed of the English fishermen; they come complaining like children of the French fishermen. Why don't they go in numbers sufficient to prevent them from doing the mischief, or to catch them in the act of doing it, so as to prosecute them in the French Courts by the aid of proper evidence.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 21st October, 1829.

I enclose two private letters from Stuart. The information which Polignac has obtained respecting the retreat of the Russian troops will I hope make him more disposed to give way respecting the nomination of a Prince; as this is the only cause of delay at present. The intention of the Emperor not being officially announced, or publicly known, I presume that we cannot interfere. He does not tell us that he will make the retreat of his troops depend upon the result of the Conferences; but still, he may regulate that retreat in any manner which is most convenient to himself, and which is recognised by the Treaty. It is, however, an additional reason for settling the whole affair without delay.

Stuart's other letter, respecting the smuggling affair, would be satisfactory so far as he is personally concerned, if information had not been received which makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to understand his declaration according to the plain meaning of the terms. I hope the whole of this business will shortly be made clear.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

To Lord Ellenborough.

[1488.]

Sudbourne,

22nd October, 1829.

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

I was anxious to read the Persian despatches before I should answer your letter of the 18th, and I have been able to do so only this day. I think that Sir H. Willock may be recalled.

I recommend to you to leave the officers and non-commissioned officers in Persia, even though they should not be paid by the King of Persia. But get them paid if possible.

I recommend to you not to take payment in land, nor to allow Colonel M'Donald and Major Hart to have anything to say to land. I don't approve of Major Hart's notion of getting out English military adventurers. They would be the first to attempt to overturn the British influence in Persia, and possibly use the Russian influence for that very object.

The consequence of the possession of land by any British subject will be disputes with the Native governments with other British authorities, and the loss of the reputation and honour of the country.

I do not recommend an augmentation of the military establishment in Persia. Major Hart thinks it sufficient. But I earnestly recommend that Lieutenant-Colonel M'Donald should be desired not to cease to urge the Prince to reform his regular army as soon as possible, as the only mode of being efficient or respectable, either in peace or war.

It might be possible for the Resident to form a guard in Persia. The advantage of this course would be that it would cost less money than the Indian guard, and would show the Persians what they could do if they would submit to discipline; the Resident might borrow from Major Hart the cavalry officers to form this guard till he should obtain the assistance of officers from India.

I would pursue the same course with the Pacha of Bagdad; but it is very desirable that he should pay for his officers. This would certainly be effected if his mind could once be convinced that the formation of the corps is as essential for the efficiency of his government in peace as it is for its defence in war.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1489.]

*To Lord Ellenborough.*Sudbourne,
22nd October, 1829.

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

In answer to your letter about the expense of public buildings in the East Indies, it is very difficult to suggest a regulation to you which may not occasion inconvenience. The delay from the first application for a new building, or the alteration or repair of an old one, till the receipt of the Order from the authority at home, would be at least two years, unless the Court of Directors should very materially accelerate their decisions and movements. I should think, then, that the climate in Bengal Proper in particular, occasions such rapid decay, and buildings throughout the peninsula are liable to so many accidents from storms of rain, &c., &c., that much inconvenience might be experienced if the Ordnance rules in respect to repairs were adopted as between the Court of Directors and their governments abroad. Those rules are, 1st. That no repairs are to be undertaken by the Master-General and Board without producing an estimate of the whole expense; and, if the expense shall exceed five hundred pounds, without the previous consent of the Treasury. 2ndly. The sum which the Ordnance officers abroad may lay out differs in different places. But it nowhere amounts to five hundred pounds.

Alterations in the Ordnance stand on the same ground as the repairs.

No new building can be undertaken of which the expense amounts to more than five hundred pounds, unless the estimate should be laid before Parliament. In laying an estimate before Parliament, the whole of the plan contemplated, and the estimate of the whole expense, as well as that of the expense proposed to be incurred in the current year must be specified. I should think that the Ordnance rules in regard to alterations could not be strictly applied.

What I would recommend is, that the Court of Directors should order that no more than a certain sum should be laid out in the whole in alterations and additions to buildings in any one year; that no more than 10,000 rupees should be laid out in alterations or additions to any building, without their previous sanction; that in the month of October of every year an estimate shall be sent home of the repairs, alterations, and additions to old buildings, and construction of new, intended within the

following year; and that this estimate is not to be exceeded, excepting for repairs rendered absolutely necessary by unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances.

That a sum shall be fixed, to be never exceeded in any year, for new buildings; and that, after a period to be fixed, no new building whatever is to be commenced without the previous consent of the Court of Directors, after having before them the whole of the plan intended to be adopted, and the estimate of the expense.

I think this system might introduce order and regularity into this expenditure.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Drayton Manor, 23rd October, 1829.

Have you fixed any time for the meeting of the Cabinet in November?

It certainly would be a great object to prevent the reunion, on any pretence, of the *agitating* party in Ireland, and to detach Shiel and his friends from O'Connell.

I think we ought to give to the Roman Catholic barristers the fair privileges and advantages of the profession. The question is whether Shiel by his attack on the Duke of York, and his violence before the passing of the Relief Bill, acted in such a manner as to compel the government to exclude him from an advancement to which his professional station would entitle him.

I think nothing could be done without a previous communication to the King, and I do not know that it is necessary to come to any decision until we reassemble in November.

Ever most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

India Board, 24th October, 1829.

There has not been a word said in the Court of Directors relative to the batta question. They leave it to the Chairs.

The Chairs are very desirous of having the opinion of the Cabinet upon the course that should be pursued.

Although all these official representations from the officers appear in the newspapers, no letter whatever upon the subject of the batta question has yet been received from the government.

You will have seen that Lord William Bentinck has increased the difficulty of our position here by expressing his hope that the Court will reconsider their orders.

I wrote to Lord Wellesley to ascertain what his view was, in 1801, of the connection between the two measures. Lord Wellesley coincides in opinion with Colonel Salmond. He says there was no compromise with the army. He had no power to enter into any such compromise, and the government is at liberty to deal with the allowances of the officers as it thinks fit.

I will try to see you on Monday.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

[1490.]

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 26th October, 1829.

I received yesterday your letter of the 23rd, with the enclosed from Lord Francis Gower. I don't think that any promise, or even appointment, would give the government the support of Mr. Shiel; nor do I think that it would be desirable to seek for it. It might be desirable, and it might be practicable, to neutralize him, and to separate him from any active co-operation with O'Connell by the promise or grant of a silk gown. But neither could be done without the consent of the King; and we should not obtain this consent without going very near to a quarrel. Of all subjects of quarrel this appears to me to be the one to be avoided. The language of Shiel about the Duke of York, not yet three years old, his appearance last year in Kent, and his pretensions to the representation of the county of Louth, founded on the Radical Roman Catholic interest, are all topics of which we should never hear the end if we were to get into a discussion with the King upon such a subject.

I don't believe that in this country it has ever been the practice to appoint demagogues to be King's Counsel. I should say that, even if it were necessary to make King's Counsel in Ireland, which I hope it is not, I would make Protestants and Roman Catholics who, from their standing, reputation, and station, should deserve that promotion, excepting O'Connell and Shiel as agitators. To this measure I should not doubt about the King's consent.

I am much concerned to see that Lord Francis is a little in dread of O'Connell. I cannot bear to see a young man afraid of anybody or anything. He should work to render himself a match for him.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Thomas Newenham, Esq.

[1491.]

DEAR SIR,

London, 26th October, 1829.

I have received your letter of the 19th instant, and am obliged to you for the perusal of the enclosure. The writer appears to me to travel very fast, much faster than he will find the public disposed to travel with him.

Those who discuss this subject of the Church of Ireland appear to me to forget the Act of Union.

Believe me, dear Sir, your most obedient faithful servant,

WELLINGTON.

To Sir Herbert Taylor.

[1492.]

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 26th October, 1829.

Since I wrote to you I have considered over again the subject of our late correspondence; and I am more than ever convinced that I have not misjudged the case.

We have, in fact, no secret in this country. Everything is or may be known by anybody. Why, then, ask questions?

It can be only for the purpose of a comparative discussion, or of acquiring a knowledge of the results of our establishments for some hostile purpose.

The real benefits of our system—that is, that we have English gentlemen for the officers of our army—foreigners can never know, feel, or acknowledge.

I would recommend to you to tell Prince Lieven that you found the departments very unwilling to furnish even the information which was before Parliament and the public, and which he or anybody might acquire. That you could furnish no information excepting of the same kind, and that you thought it upon the whole more regular to refer him to the various regulations, warrants, returns, &c., which had been printed, than to supply him with written answers to queries.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1493.]

*To the Archbishop of Canterbury.**

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 26th October, 1829.

I had the honour of receiving your Grace's letter when I was in the country, and I wrote immediately upon the subject of it to the Lord Chancellor.

His Lordship had already received from Mr. Secretary Peel an intimation that it was his opinion, that it was expedient to add to the Commission two bishops who should have been educated at Oxford; and he suggested the Bishop of Durham and the Bishop of Exeter. If your Grace should approve of the principle of this suggestion of Mr. Peel's, and the Bishop of Lichfield should have been educated at Oxford, his name might be substituted for that of the Bishop of Exeter. In this case I would request your Grace to apprise the Bishops of Durham and Lichfield of the objects of this Commission, and of the desire that their Lordships should give their assistance in its enquiries.

Adverting to the Act of Union, and to what has been passing lately in Ireland regarding that part of the United Church, it has occurred to me that it might be desirable to put into the Commission two of the Bishops of the Church of Ireland. If your Grace should agree in that opinion I would request you to let me know which of them you would fix upon. It is desirable that no more time should be lost, as the labours of the Commission ought soon to commence. Indeed, so much time has elapsed since I took the King's pleasure upon the subject and conveyed it to the Lord Chancellor, I imagined that the Commission had passed the Great Seal.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Northumberland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Phoenix Park, 26th October, 1829.

I have two events to impart to your Grace, on the former of which I ask for your congratulations, on the latter for your advice.

You will be pleased to hear that four persons have been capitally sentenced, under a special commission: for conspiring to murder certain magistrates in the Doneraile district. One of these men is advanced in

* The Right Hon. William Howley, D.D.

years, and in a respectable situation of life; but he has been a very prominent leader in Whiteboyism and all its horrible consequences.

I consider this triumph of the law as a very fortunate event, tending greatly to the maintenance of the public peace, and to the credit of this government.

The other statement I have to make is the perpetration of a barbarous murder in Tipperary. The Rev. Mr. Going, Rector of Mealiff Parish, and a magistrate, has been murdered on his return from the Sessions at Thurles, and his body has been found (to use the words of Major O'Donoghue, the stipendiary magistrate) "literally riddled with slugs and balls."

This is indeed no new case in the sanguinary annals of Tipperary. But it is not on that account less appalling, and I know full well with what malicious perseverance it will be commented on by the ignorant or the factious both here and in England. The moral and social derangement, under which this remarkable district has laboured for centuries, will be studiously overlooked, and Mr. Going will be represented as "another victim" to the law of relief.

I need not, I hope, assure your Grace, that no exertion shall be wanting on my part to prevent the recurrence of such atrocities, or to accelerate that better order of things which I believe even now to have commenced. But beyond giving rewards for detection, and making examples of the detected, I know not how we are to deal with a system of assassination. Still, however, it may be asked by others, and I often ask myself, *can no preventive* measures be taken with the police and the large military force at my disposal? The former, indeed, are I believe actively employed; but the military have been hitherto retained in their cantonments, mainly to support the police against any assemblage which might overwhelm, or overawe them, and to keep in check the inhabitants of the towns and populous villages in which they are quartered.

Let me then request your Grace's opinion (and that at your earliest convenience), as to the possibility of making *any* and *what* more effectual use of them. Could anything be done, by sending out nightly patrols from their present quarters? Might not the main roads be kept clear at all times? and might not a dread be inspired by their occasional appearance in more remote situations? I know that the attendance of some civil authority would be requisite; but this I should not despair of obtaining, if I could be satisfied that any good results would arise from it. Of *one alone* I am certain. It is the proof which the measure would afford to Parliament and the country that we made every possible use of the means confided to us.

I beg your Grace to believe that I do not write this with any alteration of my prior impression as to the general aspect of our affairs. My belief that we are in a good course is quite unshaken, and I continue to deprecate the introduction of any new law of summary severity, by which one of our great misfortunes, the alienation of the higher and lower orders, would be infallibly increased.

I think we are going on well; I merely wish to seek advice from your great experience and authority, to ascertain if we can go on better.

I have the honour to remain, with great truth and sincerity, my dear Duke,

yours very faithfully,

NORTHUMBERLAND.

Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Horse-Guards, 26th October, 1829.

I have been honoured with your Grace's letter of the 19th instant, and I feel extremely obliged to you for the trouble you have taken to enter so fully into the subject on which I had taken the liberty to address you, nor less sensible, from the observations you have made, that I had acted inadvertently, and possibly imprudently, in entertaining for a moment the idea that the information called for in the queries sent to me by Prince Lieven could, without impropriety or inconvenience, be furnished to him.

I had not however supplied any, nor otherwise committed myself or others, as will, I trust, be manifest to your Grace from the draft of the letter to Prince Lieven which I submit for your consideration and approval. I have endeavoured so to word it as to prevent any further application without giving room for suspicion that the refusal results from a reference to higher authority.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord Duke,
your Grace's most obedient and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

Lieut.-Colonel C. de Villerot to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

CONSIDÉRATIONS SUR le TRAITÉ DE PAIX entre la RUSSIE et la PORTE; le Droit et l'Intérêt des Trois Puissances signataires du Traité du 6 Juillet 1827, à réclamer la Délivrance des Prisonniers Grecs et Étrangers depuis 1821.

Bruxelles, ce 27 Octobre 1829.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Vieille Halle au Bled, No. 1408.

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser l'état des forces militaires du Viceroy d'Égypte, ainsi que trois exemplaires d'un article du 14 courant, qui a été inséré dans les journaux.

L'Angleterre a un double intérêt pour exiger la délivrance des prisonniers désignés dans cette note. Le premier est le même que la Russie et la France.

La plus grande partie de ces prisonniers et esclaves Grecs de tout sexe et de tout âge, transportés dans les premières années en Égypte, furent des innocens qui, quoique n'ayant pris aucune part à l'insurrection, furent enlevés partout où les Turcs et les Égyptiens débarquaient.

Ce système barbare, favorisé par des Chrétiens, força toute la population à prendre les armes. C'était un acte légitime.

Ces malheureux Hellènes et autres prisonniers étrangers ont droit d'espérer que les trois Souverains exigeront leur affranchissement. C'est un acte de justice que les peuples réclament, et auquel se lie l'intérêt général de la tranquillité future en Europe.

L'état des forces militaires de l'Égypte ci-inclus, son organisation confiée à tous officiers Français, la plupart envoyés par leur gouvernement, rappelleront le contenu de mon mémoire du 5 Octobre 1825 et notes ultérieures à feu le ministre Canning, dont j'ai fait mention à votre Grâce dans mon mémoire du 26 Mars dernier, relatif à l'Émancipation Catholique.

Le gouvernement Britannique appréciera son intérêt personnel à insister pour que tous les prisonniers et esclaves Grecs ou étrangers soient rendus.

Par cette mesure elle diminuera les forces du Pacha d'Égypte, et paralysera les projets de ses ennemis.

Ces mêmes individus rentrés dans leurs foyers, ainsi que leurs compatriotes, conserveront un attachement pour l'Angleterre et les autres Puissances.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec la plus haute considération, Monsieur le Duc,

Votre très-humble serviteur,

CARTON DE VILLEROT,

Lieutenant-Colonel au service des Pays-Bas.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Des Forces Militaires de l'Égypte.

Les renseignemens qui suivent sur l'armée Égyptienne sont les premiers qui nous soient venus jusqu'ici d'une source authentique. Ils sont extraits d'un *Mémoire de Planat*, qui a introduit le système de discipline Européenne dans l'armée du Viceroy d'Égypte. Depuis la mort du ministre de la guerre, Mahomet Bey, le système disciplinaire de l'armée est confié à une commission d'instruction, composée du Général Osman Bey, du Colonel Sélim Bey, du Colonel Gaudin, du Lieutenant-Colonel Férirole, du Lieutenant-Colonel Jolyt, de M. Planat, directeur de l'école de l'état-major, de deux professeurs, et d'un secrétaire. L'état-major n'est pas encore organisé : Ibrahim Pacha en est le chef. L'état-major spécial se compose d'un colonel, de deux chefs de bataillon, de six adjudans-généraux, de six adjudans, de trente-huit capitaines, et de dix-huit lieutenans, en tout de soixante et onze officiers. Il est établi dans le camp à Djad-Abad, près du Caire, et on y remarque déjà l'existence de travaux systématiques pour la levée de plans, terrains, et pour la topographie. L'infanterie est divisée en troupes régulières et irrégulières. Les premières forment 12 régimens de 4000 hommes chacun, 2 bataillons sans numéro d'ordre, et une compagnie de gendarmes ; total 50,000 hommes. Parmi les troupes irrégulières on compte 5000 Turcs et 1200 Maugrabes. Chaque régiment a 5 bataillons (le bataillon ayant 8 compagnies de 100 hommes), commandés par 1 colonel, 4 chefs de bataillon, 10 adjudans, 5 porte-enseignes, 5 professeurs, 1 chirurgien-major, un aide-chirurgien, 5 fourriers appartenant à l'état-major du régiment. Le 1^{er} Janvier 1828, la musique n'était pas encore organisée. Chaque compagnie a 1 capitaine, 1 lieutenant, 2 sous-lieutenans, 1 sergent-major, 4 sergens, 8 caporaux, 2 tambours, 81 fantassins.

La cavalerie n'est pas encore organisée d'après le système Européen ; elle consiste en 6000 chevaux, partagés en 6 corps, commandés par les beys et les kachefs de provinces.

L'artillerie consiste en 3 bataillons, chacun de 8 compagnies à 100 hommes, 34 compagnies du train, 2 d'ouvriers, et 1000 canonniers vétérans dans les trois forteresses. L'école d'artillerie, sous Hussein Bey, au Caire, compte 30 élèves ; la fonderie au Caire est entièrement organisée à la Française. Dans le camp à Djad-Abad on compte 8 batteries de 6 pièces, avec les chevaux nécessaires à l'attelage ; au Caire se trouvent 4 bataillons de vieille artillerie. Le corps du génie consiste en 12 compagnies de sapeurs à 100 hommes ; mais il manque d'officiers. Le total de l'armée s'élève à 66,000 hommes sur une population de 3 millions. Le recrutement se fait en grande partie par force, sans aucun règlement ; on s'empare des fellahs partout où l'on en trouve, on les envoie au

camp, et on les y exerce. Quelquefois le Pacha achète des esclaves sur les marchés à Darfur, Senaar et Cordofan ; ces esclaves sont plutôt au fait de l'exercice que les fellahs ; mais tous les officiers sont pris parmi les Turcs, les Arabes, ou les renégats. L'uniforme se compose d'une chemise, d'un gilet, et d'un pantalon en étoffes de laine ; pendant l'hiver il est rouge, et en été il est de coton blanc ; le gilet étroit a un petit collet ; la ceinture et le pantalon s'ajustent étroitement au genou ; la tête est couverte d'un bonnet de laine, et les pieds le sont de souliers à la façon orientale. En hiver on y ajoute un manteau noir ou blanc. Les habillemens des officiers se distinguent par des broderies sur les manches et la poitrine, souvent aussi par des décorations en forme d'étoiles ou d'un croissant en laine, en argent, en or, ou même en diamans. Un sac en cuir renferme les habillemens, de longues gibernes noires, des fusils à bayonnette à la Française, des sabres légèrement courbés, venant de l'Allemagne, pour les officiers, forment l'équipement ; l'artillerie a fusils et sabres ; la cavalerie est sans uniforme, mais bien montée ; l'infanterie irrégulière est armée d'après la manière Albanaise. L'entretien et la solde de l'armée sont richement soignés : chaque soldat reçoit par jour 5 drachmes (dont 140 font une livre) d'huile de table, 5 drachmes d'huile de lampe, 6 drachmes de sel, 300 drachmes de pain, 75 drachmes de viande, 20 drachmes de riz, 40 drachmes de lentilles, 60 drachmes de fèves, et une drachme de savon.

La solde d'un militaire est 49 paras, celle du sous-officier une piastre, le sous-lieutenant 200 paras par mois ; le lieutenant en a 350, le capitaine 500, le chef de bataillon 1500, le lieutenant-colonel 4000, le colonel 8000, non compris le dédommagement pour nourriture et uniforme. Les maîtres d'exercices Européens se divisent en quatre classes, dont la première a 350 fr., la 2^e 250, la 3^e 175, et la 4^e 110 fr. par mois, plus un cheval et la ration, des comestibles, deux uniformes ou 330 fr., les armes et un mois de paie extraordinaire, avec dispense des droits pour le vin, etc. Pendant la campagne ils jouissent de 6 à 800 fr. additionnellement par mois. Le chirurgien-major a 330 fr. par mois, les aides-chirurgiens 250, les subalternes 175 fr., non compris la ration, l'habillement, et dédommagement. L'état sanitaire est organisé sur un excellent pied ; on a des hôpitaux très-vastes et étendus. M. Clot est médecin en chef, les docteurs Brosari, Karakuki et Martini forment ensemble le conseil sanitaire. Il est statué que l'avancement se fera d'après l'ancienneté de service ; cependant jusqu'ici c'est le bon plaisir du Pacha qui en a décidé. Les longs et fidèles services se récompensent par des pensions et des gratifications. L'instruction de l'infanterie est confiée au Colonel Gaudin, et se fait d'après le règlement Français de 1792. Les recrues restent pendant 6 mois dans le camp, et y sont exercées 7½ heures par jour ; les nègres apprennent avec plus de zèle, les fellahs sont plus habiles, mais les officiers Turcs sont les plus paresseux. La discipline est sévère ; cependant les officiers et les sous-officiers ne peuvent pas infliger des peines corporelles, et ce n'est que le chef de bataillon qui est autorisé à faire subir la bastonnade à laquelle, ainsi qu'à la peine dite *courbatch*, les officiers d'un rang inférieur ne sont pas moins soumis que les soldats. Toutofois la dégradation et l'emprisonnement sont pour eux les punitions les plus ordinaires. Les délits militaires, la désertion, le vol commis par les soldats entre eux, et l'insubordination, sont portés devant le conseil de guerre ; tous les autres délits sont de la compétence du cadi ou juge civil. Les gendarmes sont chargés de la police de l'armée. L'école militaire à Cazerlain, près du Caire, est le principal établissement de ce genre, et Achmed-Effendi en est le chef. Elle compte jusqu'à 600 élèves, tant Turcs et Arabes qu'enfans d'officiers Européens, de 12 à 16 ans. On y enseigne les langues Turque, Arabe et Italienne, l'arithmétique, la géométrie, le dessin et les détails du service ; dans ces cours qui durent 4 ans tout est sur un pied militaire. Au sortir de l'établissement l'élève subit un examen ; ceux dont on est content passent dans l'état-major ou dans une école

supérieure ; ceux dont on est moins satisfait passent dans l'armée comme sous-officiers. L'école de l'état-major, sous Noureddin-Bey, à Djad-Abad, est dirigée par M. Planat ; elle renferme 70 élèves sortis de l'école militaire, qui y apprennent les hautes mathématiques, l'algèbre, la géologie, la théorie de l'artillerie, du génie et des fortifications, l'art de lever des plans, les langues Arabe, Persane et Française, et la pratique des manœuvres ; la durée de ce cours est de 3 ans. Pendant l'année qui suit on leur enseigne encore la physique, l'histoire, la géographie et les mathématiques transcendantes. L'arithmétique, l'algèbre et la géométrie sont professées par Cheik-Hassan ; l'Arabe et le Turc par Arif-Effendi ; la théorie de l'artillerie et du génie par M. Planat ; l'art des manœuvres par M. Tolgt ; le Français par MM. Pachot et König, et le dessin par M. Finzi. Les emplois des trois bureaux de l'état-major sont occupés par des élèves de cette école, savoir, le service du camp sous Selim-Bey, la correspondance sous Osman-Bey, et les archives sous Paulici et Tarbé. Les Arabes se distinguent par leur goût pour les sciences exactes, tandis que les jeunes Turcs excellent dans le dessin. Dans l'école d'officiers d'Inakhile, établie particulièrement pour les jeunes Turcs et Arabes, on enseigne le service et le maniement des armes. Dans trois écoles dirigées par Soriano, 220 élèves apprennent la musique. L'école de médecine et de chirurgie, sous le docteur Clot, compte 110 élèves Arabes ; elle est établie dans le vaste hôpital d'Abuzabel, qui peut contenir 1500 malades. La pathologie et la clinique sont enseignées par le docteur Clot, l'anatomie par le docteur Gaetano, la chimie et l'histoire de la médecine par le docteur Barthélemy, la botanique par le docteur Figari, la médecine par le docteur Bernard, le Français par M. Ucelli, et l'art d'opérer par le directeur Clot. Les professeurs ont 330 fr. d'honoraires par mois, plus 175 fr. de supplément et d'indemnités. Tous ces établissemens, qui existent depuis 5 à 6 ans, exercent déjà une grande influence sur l'esprit de la nation entière ; et il est certain qu'il ne dépend que de la volonté de Mehemed-Pacha de rompre tous ses rapports avec la Porte.

II.

Affaires d'Orient et Délivrance des Prisonniers Grecs.

Bruxelles, 14 Octobre 1829, Vieille Halle au Bled, N° 1408.

Les écrivains de tous les pays s'empressent de soumettre leurs considérations sur le Traité de Paix d'Andrinople, du 14 Septembre dernier. Les uns en ont séparément discuté chaque article et son résultat futur, d'autres ont fortement désapprouvé qu'on eût proposé, relativement à la Grèce, d'adopter le Protocole du 22 Mars dernier ; mais tous ont omis de faire remarquer l'oubli d'une condition essentielle qui aurait dû être stipulée à l'article de la question Grecque : c'est la délivrance de tant de milliers d'Hellènes, ou étrangers militaires et civils, qui depuis 1821 ont été faits prisonniers, et dont la plupart, sans distinction de sexe ni d'âge, ont été transportés en Egypte, et même vendus comme esclaves.

C'est cette circonstance que je m'empresse de signaler à toute l'Europe. Le grand œuvre de la pacification de la Grèce serait incomplet, si les trois Puissances signataires du Traité du 6 Juillet 1827 hésitaient à comprendre dans la paix actuelle ces malheureuses et innocentes victimes.

Les Cabinets sauront sans doute apprécier la justice, les avantages et leur devoir d'exiger cette délivrance ; néanmoins j'invoque vos lumières, écrivains éloquens ; réunissez vos efforts ; hâtez-vous, avant que la paix ne soit définitivement conclue et signée, d'émettre vos mûres réflexions sur l'intérêt des Souverains à requérir l'affranchissement de tous les prisonniers et esclaves Grecs ou étrangers qui étaient à ce service.

D'après la conduite de la Porte, depuis 1827, et son refus continuel d'acquiescer aux propositions des trois monarques, l'Empereur Nicolas est en droit, de concert avec ses Alliés, de profiter du succès de ses armées pour imposer au Sultan les conditions qu'il juge les plus favorables au sort de la Grèce; il appartient donc à ces Souverains de stipuler que tous les étrangers et Grecs prisonniers ou esclaves soient rendus, et que les Hellènes viennent sur le sol qui les a vus naître recueillir, au sein de leurs familles et de leurs compatriotes, la récompense et le fruit de leurs sacrifices, de leur courage et de leurs vertus.

Quant aux autres clauses favorables au sort de cette nation, les principes d'une paix stable et de la tranquillité future en Europe serviront de guide et présideront aux sages délibérations des trois Puissances: elles continueront de protéger la Grèce, en lui garantissant son existence future par un territoire assez vaste et une population assez nombreuse pour pouvoir, en cas de guerre, résister à la Turquie.

CARTON DE VILLEROT,
Lieutenant-Colonel au service des Pays-Bas.

[Suggests his making his communication to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.]

[1494.]

To the Duke of Northumberland.

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 27th October, 1829.

I saw your letter to Mr. Peel of the 15th September, by which I was much gratified, and I have now to return my thanks for that which you wrote to me on the 19th instant,* which I received when I was at Sudbourne.

A letter which I wrote from thence to Lord Francis Gower, and which he has laid before your Grace, will have shown you what I felt upon part of that which I have since received from you.

We must not attempt to move too rapidly in this reign. Indeed, we cannot succeed in making any further progress at present. I don't think that I could persuade the King to consent at present to support Lord Fingall. To make the proposal and fail, even if I could submit to the failure, would be known, and be attended by very unpleasant consequences. I should say, then, that it would be better on this ground not to make the proposal.

But I confess that there are other grounds on which I think that it ought to be postponed. The foundation of Lord Fingall's claim is that he is a Roman Catholic.

* See p. 244.

I am quite certain that his being a Roman Catholic ought to be no reason against him. But I think that the time is gone by when we ought to look for opportunities for satisfying the Roman Catholics. We have done everything for them. In so doing we have shaken the confidence in public men of some of the best people in this country; and we must endeavour to regain it by conducting the government with vigour and decision, and by making the best selection that we are able for all situations, and by our measures.

I am happy to see that those of the government of Ireland give general satisfaction, and I entertain no doubt of the result.

There is a great deal to be amended in the Church in Ireland. But those who undertake this reform forget the clause in the Act of Union which provides for keeping the Church in both countries on the same footing.

We have a Commission here to enquire into the state of the Ecclesiastical Law, and the improvements which could be made, particularly with a view to enforce residence; and I this day, adverting to the clause in the Act of Union, wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury to propose to him to extend the enquiries of the Commission to Ireland, and to add to the Commission two bishops of the Church in Ireland.

I think that this measure may have the effect of smothering the controversy.

I quite agree with your Grace about poor laws. We ought to improve the laws establishing houses of industry, asylums, dispensaries, &c., in counties. It would be impossible to establish anything like the English or the Scotch system of poor laws to be administered by parishes.

Something may be done in respect to the employment of the poor by an improved system of conducting works under the grand juries; but we cannot expect to do more.

I expect that the Cabinet will assemble here in the course of a fortnight or three weeks, and I shall by that time have had an opportunity of speaking to the King, as well about the Representative Peer as about a vacancy on the Bench. You will have seen, however, that I like the notion of Lord Doneraile, as I do likewise of Mr. Daly.

Pray remember me most kindly to the Duchess, and believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1495.]

To the Duke of Northumberland.

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 28th October, 1829.

Since I wrote to your Grace last night I have received your letter of the 26th;* and I sincerely congratulate you upon the success of the trials at Cork.

In respect to the employment of the military I entertain no doubt that those against whom they would be employed know their business sufficiently well to watch their barracks, and their movements to and from those barracks; and that no outrage would be committed while any patrol should be on foot in the neighbourhood. There must of course be limits, as well to the time during which these patrols should be out, to the distance to which they should patrol from their stations, and to the number of times patrols should be sent from each station. But I should say that when there is a military patrol upon a high road it is not probable that any outrage would be committed upon that road or in its neighbourhood; and that for that period of time at least the measure would be effective. During the remainder of the twenty-four hours it would not, and it must be observed that if this measure is not successful in entirely preventing these outrages, and in giving security to life and property, we must apply to Parliament to enact others that will be so.

In this view of the case, as well as to manifest the desire of the government to do everything that is in their power to maintain the peace, I think that the measure might be desirable.

We must not conceal from ourselves, however, that it will be very harassing to the troops. A magistrate ought to accompany each patrol, which might consist of from four to twelve men from each of several stations; three or four times every night and at different hours. Magistrates will not be found to perform this duty. The commanding-officer, or even the field-officers of regiments, or captains with commissions of the peace *ad hoc*, would not be sufficient or able to perform it. Yet if the troops are not efficient, which they would not be excepting under the direction of a civil magistrate, it would be better not to send them out.

It will likewise be necessary, in order to avoid harassing the troops, and to give them greater security in carrying the

* See page 256.

measure into execution, and to render it more effectual, that they should be more dispersed than they are; that *half billet* stations should be occupied on the several high roads from which patrols should be sent; each with a magistrate. Upon these points the Commander of the Forces will give you more information than I can. It would probably be necessary that the most intelligent General officer in Ireland should be employed to occupy Tipperary, with a view to the execution of this system; and that he should be charged to settle with the magistrates their nightly attendance.

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Charles Arbuthnot to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Cheveley, 28th October, 1829.

I have done all I could, in every quarter, to ascertain whether the complained of distress is very great and general, or whether it is only such a pressure for the moment as must occur occasionally, and against which no foresight can avail. I was aware that coming into this house I should hear from the Duke of Rutland the very worst that could be asserted. The morning after our arrival the Duke read aloud at breakfast a letter from his agent and brother-in-law, Mr. Norman; and if the tithe be true of what that letter contained, we are for ever a fallen and ruined nation. But after breakfast Mr. Thornton told me that the letter was false from the beginning to the end; that Mr. Norman was an infidel in religion and a democrat in principles; and that if there were complaints in Leicestershire, on the Duke's property, it was mainly owing to the encouragement given by the agent to the tenants to make the worst of everything, and thus to obtain a reduction of rents. Mr. Thornton said that the graziers had certainly suffered by buying lean stock dear and by selling fat stock cheap, but that this autumn lean stock had fallen to a remunerating price for the feeder; and indeed, in Mr. Norman's letter to the Duke, he did confess that the distress would not henceforward be so much felt by the graziers, but that the plough farmers would be the chief sufferers. Scarcely a month ago the cry was that arable land might continue to give a profit, but that all the rich pasture lands were not worth having.

It is not my wish to make things look well when they are, in fact, bad. But having made all the enquiries I can, my own conviction is that the bad harvest of 1828, the stagnation in the manufacturing districts until very recently, and above all the desire of the Duke of Cumberland's faction to magnify everything that can be complained of, have caused a dissatisfaction, and a tendency to despond, which for the time are injurious to the government, but which have not affected, in an alarming degree, any of our vital interests.

That there will be much clamour at the meeting of Parliament I have

little doubt; but for this we shall have very much to thank those of our friends who, like the Duke of Rutland, really wish us well, but who study their own interest so little as to take pleasure in breaking down their own resources by exciting outcry and complaint. No one lowers his establishment; no one who wishes to buy fine cows, fine sheep, fine racehorses, or fine anything, ever refuses to indulge his fancy; and although there is certainly a great cry of distress, I see the distress nowhere, whether I am asked to eat in a farmer's house, or whether I come into such houses as Cheveley. I care much more for our own party and political position. I cannot help being annoyed greatly with Lord Hertford for having caused a meeting between you and Huskisson at Sudbourne. You say it is but a nine days' wonder; but in those nine days much mischief is done. Impressions are made, and although the result may falsify the expectation, still there is a feeling in men's minds that what had been talked of may ultimately take place.

If ever I had a right to be certain of anything, I have at present good ground for being convinced that nothing would lower you so much as the seeing you again embarked with Huskisson. It may suit Fitzgerald's views. It may even suit Peel's views, for it would not be his character, but yours, that would suffer; but it would give me a mournfulness beyond expression if I lived to hear people say that you had cast off Huskisson in your strength, and that you had sought him again in your weakness. But you are not weak, and will not be weak unless the return of Huskisson to office should proclaim weakness to the world. I feel all this the more strongly at this moment because it is in all people's mouths that the new administration (as it is called) was settled at Sudbourne. So Sir C. Knightley heard at Boodle's. So Henry de Roos told me was the general talk in all societies. And so said to me last night Lord G. Cavendish.

I have felt I owed it to you and to truth to deny it. On the course yesterday I had a long talk with Henry de Roos. He is a great and able deceiver if he does not wish you well; and being a very shrewd man, and seeing and hearing everybody, it is of use to learn from him what is passing. He has been recently at Chatsworth. I hardly like to repeat to you the insolence of Madame de Lieven. Her opprobrious expressions I will leave out; but it will suffice to say that she said to all who would hear her that she rejoiced the more in their great successes as she felt they would cause embarrassment to you. Chatsworth was full of our enemies, among whom there was no one louder than Lord Grenville, who anticipates much evil to you from the Russians having been allowed to run their course without a remonstrance from this country; and a more private source of pleasure to Lord Grenville was Lord Stuart's smuggling case, which he hoped would be embarrassing to him, and in its effects to this government also.

Henry de Roos said that the most malicious devil of all was that little woman, Lady ———. But he told me (and it is always well to know everything) that even with those who wished you best there was a great disposition to regret that nothing had been done to arrest Russia in her career. He gave you the fullest credit for the line you had pursued, and he, with others, was disposed to defer to your judgment; but he believed that the non-interference of this country would be a main point of attack in Parliament, and he trusted that your case in the present instance would be as good as you showed it to be on the Portuguese question.

It was on the subject of the Canning party that Henry de Roos spoke the most and the strongest. He was at once convinced that there was no truth in the report; but he assured me that great mischief had been done by the meeting at Sudbourne, as there was a general belief that it had been purposely arranged, and that nothing gave such sorrow to your friends, and such delight to your opponents, as the notion that you had thought fit to recall a man whom you had discarded. He said that the man did not exist who was thought so ill of as Huskisson. He told me that even Lord Melbourne had declared to him that although he thought Huskisson the cleverest man he knew, nothing should induce him to be his associate. Henry de Roos said that although the Canning party would be opposed to you, and although the Duke of Cumberland might be able to keep up much hostility to you, yet he knew that you would receive voluntary and disinterested support from many from whom you had no reason to expect it. He quoted his own relation, the Duke of Leinster, who told him recently that you had rendered such a boon to Ireland as entitled you to his support; and that as he could see no one who could replace you advantageously, his support of you should be a cordial one. He added that this also was the feeling of many he had met in Ireland; and to my surprise he numbered Lord Durham among those who now spoke highly of you, and of his wish that your government might not be shaken. I am sure it will be essentially useful to have it known that you are not to be connected again with the Canning party; and in this I think I shall have been instrumental in letting it be known that the meeting at Sudbourne was not political, nor of your seeking.

Lord George Cavendish dined here yesterday. In the evening he said to me, "Well, you have been settling a new administration with Mr. Huskisson, at Sudbourne." This, of course, I denied, and said enough to let him know that anything of that kind was out of the question. He then said that we must have additional strength. I acknowledged that the Catholic measure had to a certain extent unhinged us, but that I did not apprehend any danger to your government, as I relied upon your measures, and upon the strong feeling which I knew existed for you throughout the country. The short conversation ended by his saying that nothing could be more noble or more able than the whole of your conduct in that great measure of the last Session; and that whatever happened, you had done that for the empire which no other could have done.

Yours most affectionately,

C. ARBUTHNOT.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

[1496.]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 29th October, 1829.

In returning Lord Francis Leveson's letter of the 25th, I enclose one which I received yesterday from the Lord-Lieutenant, and the copy of my answer.

The patrols cannot be effective. The magistrates will not give their attendance; and in the interval of the patrols out-

rages will be committed. However, they may be tried ; and I conclude that the military officers will not object when they will see what I think upon the subject.

In the mean time we must think of something else. The Irish government will begin to regret the ill-timed flourish which they made in Mr. Gregory's letter against the renewal of the Insurrection Act. The affair in Ireland now is between robbers and murderers on the one hand, and those who have something to lose on the other. I don't think that Parliament will be adverse to give any powers to enable government effectually to protect the latter, and to put down the former. In the mean time we should make every exertion in our power.

In this view it would be desirable to consider whether we could not carry into execution the Arms Acts in the county of Tipperary. If the measure produced no other effect it would convince these miscreants that government was too strong for them ; and would further prove to the satisfaction of Parliament and the public that we had done everything in our power.

If you should agree with me in opinion, write to Lord Francis without loss of time.

I desire that the Arms Acts may be sent down to you by this night's post if you should not have them by you.

I think that if Lord Francis can obtain any evidence of this new conspiracy to murder in Tipperary, and particularly if he can get any of the murderers of Mr. Going, they should send a special commission immediately for the trial of the criminals.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1497.] MEMORANDUM UPON THE SEVENTH ARTICLE OF THE TREATY
OF ADRIANOPLE.

29th October, 1829.

The more I reflect upon the seventh article of the Treaty of Peace, the more important it appears as a subversion of the independence of the Porte.

The navigation of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, and of course of the intervening sea, has been considered as belonging to the Porte, as the Thames is ours, and as the Rhine belongs to the King of the Netherlands, excepting in as far as

the possession of the latter river is limited by the Treaty of Congress. These straits, and the intervening sea, are, in fact a *mare clausum* in the possession of the Porte, over which that Power has always exercised, and must always exercise a dominion.

Accordingly many of the Powers of Europe have treaties with the Porte, containing stipulations for the passage of vessels, bearing their flags through the sea; more or less onerous according to the degree of influence which such Powers had at Constantinople at the moment of negotiating such treaties. In the former treaties with Russia of 1774, 1779 and 1783, merchant vessels are particularly mentioned as those permitted to pass from the Black to the White Sea. Their form is described as required to be similar to those used by the English and the French in their commerce, and their size or tonnage. The meaning of these stipulations is that no vessel should enter the *mare clausum* which should be a vessel of war without the permission of the officers of the Porte.

The right to withhold this permission; the right to ascertain that no vessel in the waters of any State carries off persons whom it is the desire of the sovereign authority to retain, or lands persons to whom it is the desire of the Sovereign to prohibit the entry of his dominions, appear to be the undoubted and necessary attributes of independent sovereignty.

Without the exercise of those rights neither the Porte, nor any other Power, can be independent, or in a state of safety from surprise by individual or domestic treachery.

The power of visit of the ship in order to ascertain the points above mentioned is quite distinct from the visit of a cargo for the purpose of ascertaining its nature and value, with a view to fix the duties to be paid upon importation into the Turkish territories: that is a right which the government of the Porte has relinquished, in most, if not all of its treaties with foreign Powers, taking the certificate of the ambassador or consul of the nation as conclusive evidence of the cargo, instead of the bill of lading verified by visit.

But the visit of the vessel for the purpose of ascertaining that it is not armed, and of the crew for the purpose of ascertaining that they are not persons who ought not to be introduced into, or to quit, the Ottoman territories, has never been relinquished, nor cannot be relinquished by any Power that is independent.

The Porte is deprived of this power, not only in reference to Russian ships, but to those of all the world ; and this by the Treaty of Peace with Russia.

Thus then if the government of the Porte should visit a ship of Portugal, the offence is not done to Portugal, but to the Emperor of Russia ; who under this same Article has the acknowledged right of instant reprisals.

Supposing the government of Portugal to introduce armed ships, or armed men into the *mare clausum*, the centre of the dominions of the Porte, will the Emperor of Russia be responsible ? Whether he will or not, the government of the Porte will no longer be an independent Power, that is, a Power acknowledging no superior in its own internal concerns ; particularly in that great concern of all, the provision for its own safety against surprise or treachery.

Some Powers pay the Porte certain duties for the passage of their ships through the Straits. It is not stated that these duties are to be paid no longer. Is that intended ? If it is, here is another badge of dependence manifest to the world.

The treaties between the Porte and other parties are annihilated by the act of the government of Russia ; and this on a point on which the existence of the Porte depends.

If these treaties are not intended to be annihilated, are those Powers, which have no treaties with the Porte, to be put on a better footing in respect to the navigation of the Straits than those which have made sacrifices in order to make such treaties ; and this by the act of the Emperor of Russia ?

Are not the interests of all, who have treaties with the Porte, injured by this stipulation ? So far in respect to the navigation of the *mare clausum* under the dominion of the Porte.

In respect to the commercial part of the Article, it is not quite clear whether countries which have no treaties with the Porte, are or are not to trade with the Ottoman dominions, with the privileges of Russian subjects. If it is, there can be no doubt that in respect to foreign trade, the Sultan is a dependent of Russia, equally as he is in respect to the navigation of the *mare clausum* and to his defence.

If this is not the object of the Article, it appears that every Russian subject, who calls himself a trader, is to become in fact independent of the government of the Porte. He is to do what he pleases, and no person whatever is even to question his acts,

under pain of an acknowledged right of reprisals ! Observe that these acts may be those of any captain, or officer, or even seaman of a ship, or of any Russian subject finding his way into the Turkish territories ; or the reprisal might be produced by the indiscretion or treachery of any servant of the government of the Porte.

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Ellenborough.

[1498.]

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH, London, 31st October, 1829.

I return your East India papers upon remittances, upon correspondence, and the last paragraphs of a despatch upon the Raajpoots.

I doubt the expediency of a Commissary-General of Military Stores in lieu of the Military Boards at each Presidency.

The Military Boards perform the duty of the Board of Ordnance in respect to military stores, camp equipage, barracks and fortifications, and in general of all works of a military nature performed by the military engineers. The Boards are composed of the Commander-in-Chief, Commanding Officer of Artillery, Chief Engineer, Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, Auditor-General. Besides the duties of the Board of Ordnance, they have under their direction the Commissariat of Provisions ; the clothing of the army ; and the consideration of every question of military economy referred to them by the government.

Their mode of transacting business is very much the same as that of the Board of Ordnance. No military store can be issued from any magazine beyond the regulated supply, excepting under their direction, after application or (to use their phrase) indent made upon them. Upon this indent they issue their order to the commanding-officer of the station at which the magazine is placed, who is, in truth, responsible for the safe keeping of the stores which it contains.

This system is consistent with those of the revenue and trade departments. The details of each are carried on by a Board, presided over by a member of the government, and I don't think that it would be altered as you propose, by creating a new officer with great patronage and power, without expense and inconve-

nience ; even if officers could be found capable of conducting such details.

I know that the Military Board is not a favourite establishment. But I believe the reason is, that it is one of great economy and efficiency. In truth a man in any one of the offices named, who can and will perform his duty, must render that Board economical and efficient. He has only to speak out about the abuses which he sees and wishes to remedy. His Minutes must draw the attention of the government abroad, and of the authorities at home.

In respect to the correspondence, the remedy which you propose as to its form, and the lithography to be used at home as well as abroad, will do a great deal of good. But I recommend to you to have every paper of the record sent home. It would not answer to allow the officers of the government abroad to determine what should and what should not come home. For instance, look at some cases under your own consideration. Could you have trusted Mr. Lushington on the one hand, or Mr. Hill on the other, to have selected the papers to be sent home on the Græme controversy ? Everything must be sent home in a separate despatch on each subject, instead of a numbered paragraph in the same despatch.

It is easy then to select the subject for immediate answers, and those to which the answers may be delayed ; and the real business will be much advanced.

I do not recommend to you to consent to alter the plan of collecting all that has passed on a subject to be considered with the despatch upon it. But if copies are required to be made of such collections, they should be lithographed in order to multiply the copies with greater facility, and thus accelerate consideration by all the authorities who must consider the subject and final decision.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Worthing, 1st November, 1829.

You have misunderstood me in supposing I wished to substitute altogether one officer for the Military Board. I wished to place one officer at the head of the Commissariat of Ordnance Stores, and to give him a seat

at the Military Board. I wished to substitute real individual responsibility for the responsibility of a Board which rests nowhere, and to reserve to the Board the power of checking the individual, which it can well perform. I believe the real Commissary General of Ordnance Stores now to be the Secretary of the Military Board.

Before I came to any conclusion upon the subject, I communicated with Colonel Limond,* who was principal Commissary of Stores at Madras, and Colonel Hodgson, who held the situation for nine years at Bombay. Colonel Limond, who was subsequently acting Commandant of Artillery, pressed the expediency of giving the entire control, with the entire responsibility of the Ordnance Store Department, to one officer, in the strongest manner.

I will see you upon the subject before any step is taken.

I am very glad you concur generally in the view I took of the expediency of altering the system of correspondence with India. Everything yields in importance to that.

I always intended *every paper* to be sent home; but it was the opinion of the clerks whom I consulted that much of the time consumed in the formation of collections might be saved by the arrangement I suggested without any diminution of effective check upon the local governments.

There will probably be a great deal of discussion with the Chairs before any alteration can be carried into effect, and you shall be informed of its progress.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

Mr. J. E. Devereux to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE, Chapter Coffee-House, St. Paul's, 1st November, 1829.

I have the honour to acknowledge your Grace's letter of the 19th of October, which had been sent down after me into Somersetshire, and is only just now come to hand.

It gives me great pain to find that my unguarded levity in the use of a word should for one moment have caused your Grace to apprehend that I could misinterpret and abuse that which in confidential kindness you, my Lord Duke, had been pleased to communicate to me.

Having in my preceding letters spoken with no great reverence of our diplomacies, it is with regret that I feel myself called upon by the critical position of affairs in France again to advert to so ungracious a subject, in the hope that a brief exposure of our former errors may teach us at all times, but more particularly at this present momentous crisis, to avoid them, by guarding against those misrepresentations, or nonrepresentations, of the state of things in France, which for years have impressed such delusive opinions on our ministry, and have occasioned a versatility of conduct as inconsistent with the dignity as with the interest of Britain.

In 1814 and 1815 the combined Powers declared that the House of

* Afterwards Sir James Limond.

Bourbon should be maintained on the throne of France; the same declaration was made at Verona in 1821. The common sense of the thing would accordingly point out to us the only consistent line of conduct to be pursued, that is, now that our arms have done their part, to exercise our diplomatic influence and vigilance to uphold the Bourbons and put down their enemies. Whether this has or has not been done we shall shortly see, and whether, if this has not been accomplished, it be time that some change of system be adopted, will then remain a question for the consideration of the minister.

From the first dawn of the Restoration, the Bonapartist and Liberal faction had deeply laid their plan, and have ever since been unceasing in their efforts to undermine the throne. They have from that period closely linked themselves with Russia, and have notoriously been uniformly aided and abetted by Pozzo di Borgo, and yet no effort has been made on our part, though such effort would not have been inconsistent with diplomatic usage, to procure Pozzo's recall; on the contrary, he has by our diplomatic listlessness (to use no harsher term) been suffered from that day to this to Viceroy it over Louis XVIII. and Charles X., our allies and *protégés*, and thus to establish a paramount Russian interest amongst our neighbours, of which we are not without having felt the inconvenience.

Instead of a fixed and honourable course of policy, ours has perpetually wavered; at times we figure as Royalists, at others as *quasi*-Liberals, and at others again as Liberals. This wavering has engendered suspicions of insincerity and bad faith, not less injurious to our renown than to our interests. Our speeches in Parliament, and the articles and correspondence in the ministerial paper, the 'Courier,' will prove my statement. I would even wager that if the despatches which have been received from France since 1815 were consulted, they would mostly appear as if dictated alternately in the salons of the Faubourg St. Germain, of the Chaussée d'Antin, of Madame de Staël, of Pozzo di Borgo, and of the *Duchesse de Broglie* (got by Constance out of de Staël, and showing the blood of dam and sire).

The 15th of April, 1814, Talleyrand, by his artifices, by the flummery thickly laid on Alexander by the *savants* and *gens de lettres*, and above all by the all powerful influence of the Swiss *La Harpe*, the cousin and crony of a whole gang of Swiss Bonapartists and Libéraux, persuaded the Emperor Alexander to recognise him (Talleyrand) as president of the Gouvernement Provisoire, that is, in fact, as the representative of the Bonaparte and Liberal interest. This proposal was rejected by Britain and Austria with marked disgust, these Powers recognising no authority but that of the restored monarch. The alliance between Russia and Talleyrand's Bonapartist-Liberal faction was nevertheless from that moment cemented, and that alliance, undisturbed by our diplomacy, has continued uninterrupted to this day; for to Alexander and the President du Gouvernement Provisoire have succeeded Pozzo and the *Comité Directeur*, who have from session to session so undermined Royal authority as to have brought things to this pass, that if in the last session their law for organising the communes had not been rejected, 40,000 Republics would have been created in France, and Charles would have held his crown at the nod of Pozzo, Talleyrand, and Co. Every Liberal manœuvre by which, since 1815, the monarchical

principle has been depressed, and the democratic principle raised, may in truth be laid to the charge of the blind and inconsistent inertness of our diplomacy. Had we from the first acted according to the spirit of our declarations in 1814, that is, as at last we are at this moment acting, the French crown would not have been endangered, but "*la Royauté* would have been long since *mise hors de page*," and the Russian influence in France would have been long since done away with.

The Russo-Liberal faction beholding with dismay that the monarchical principle was gradually gaining ground all over France by the judicious conduct of the Royalist Chamber of 1815, had recourse to their Russian ally. Alexander answered their call with alacrity, and with as perfect *nonchalance* as if British ministers, British diplomatists, or even the British name had never been heard of, he wrote a letter requiring the immediate dissolution of the said Royalist Chamber of Deputies. Our diplomacy was silent, and this most impudent, insulting, and monstrous interference in the domestic administration of our ally remained unnoticed. Alexander's commands were obeyed, the Chambers were dissolved; but Pozzo having assured our government upon his word of honour that all this was done for the best, we were at once consoled and comforted. Indeed, our worthy ministers were quite charmed with this tranquillising communication, as it left them more leisure to pursue the deep and far more important cogitations in which they were then immersed, devising the best means of ministering bibles, calico, and hardware to the benighted Papists of South America, and of distributing the newest and most approved versions of the Holy Volume to Foulahs, Mandingoes, and Kalabars.

Thus through the criminal apathy of our ministers and diplomacy was a blow struck at Royalty and British interest, by giving anew a footing to Libéraux the enemies alike of Royalty and the British name. Through similar neglect Pozzo was suffered to name a Prime Minister, M. de Richelieu, convincing the favourite by sterling argument, he undertaking to persuade the monarch that a French Royalist would have lost, but that a Russian Liberal would save the throne. The same Pozzo, by means of the French and British press, proving to our ministers, as usual profoundly conversant with the internal state of things in France, that the dissolution of the Royalist Chamber and the nomination of the Duc de Richelieu would so conciliate all parties, that henceforth the ardent devotion of the Jacobins in the cause of monarchy and the Bourbons would only be limited by the extent of power which the Allies would cause to be placed in their hands.

Richelieu being thus by Russo-Liberal influence named Prime Minister, the question arose, who was to be his secretary?—a post of the more importance as the said secretary was to act as brain carrier to his Excellency. In this nomination, as accustomed, our diplomacies took no sort of concern, good humouredly leaving the matter to the ultimate arrangement of Pozzo, Talleyrand, and Co.

That distinguished statesman and excellent man, the senator Barthélemi, recommended for this employment an old friend of his, a person of superior talent, and who had occupied important diplomatic functions. This gentleman was not a noble, not an émigré, not an ultra, not a bigot; he was, in short, as unexceptionable a person as could be proposed. The senator

Barthélemy's recommendation was backed by a host of Royalists, amongst others, by the Duc d'Aumont, the king's friend ; by a very able ecclesiastic, the Abbé de Latour, afterwards Archbishop of Bourges ; and by the Marquis de Langeron, who though a Russian officer was a good Frenchman. As I said before, we did not interfere, probably considering the nomination of a secretary as unworthy of the grandiose notice of British diplomacy. This matter was not, however, so considered by Russia, whose political interests do not fare the worse from having no admixture of this said grandiose, for as we shall see, this very nomination called forth all the more strenuous diplomatic exertions of that Power.

Richelieu was quite pleased with his proposed secretary, and the nomination was considered as so decided, that during forty-eight hours the candidate received the compliments of his friends on his appointment. But this gentleman entertained certain principles incompatible with Liberal interests, he was a friend to liberty, but not to revolutionary liberty ; and it was known that he was decidedly of opinion that it was the interest of the House of Bourbon to cultivate an intimate understanding with England ; he was then in every point of view such a candidate as our ministry and diplomacy ought to have supported.

No sooner did the Libéraux hear that this Royalist was to be named secretary to the *Premier*, than they were up in arms ; Pozzo, Talleyrand, and Co. set all their engines to work, and by dint of Liberal front and exertion, they bullied both the King and the Minister, the Royalist candidate was dismissed, and they forced upon M. de Richelieu a man after their own heart, a devoted Bonapartist, M. de Rayneval, ci-devant secrétaire intime de sa Majesté Impériale et Royale.

We have seen that our diplomacy suffered the Royalist Chamber of 1815 to be dissolved by command of Alexander, without noticing this flagrant act ; that they suffered themselves to be humbugged by Pozzo into Richelieu's nomination ; and here we find our same diplomacy tamely suffering the dismissal of a Royalist candidate friendly to British interests, and the nomination of a candidate in the Russian interests without remonstrance, though it was notorious that both King and Minister preferred the Royalist, and that the other owed his nomination to downright Russian and Liberal intrigue !!!

The sequel has proved of how much consequence it would have been to Anglo-Royal interests to have had this Royalist instead of the Bonapartist secretary, for it is from M. de Richelieu's ministry, or rather from this M. de Rayneval's secretaryship, that may be dated the commencement of that succession of measures carried by the Libéraux, and which, but for the energy exercised by Charles X. the other day in the nomination of a Royalist ministry, would ere long have levelled his throne with the dust.

Thus the Royalist candidate was laid aside, and the Russo-Liberal, by dint of Russian liberal exertion, was named. As Russia thus succeeded, and as we did not interfere, the Royalists considered themselves as sacrificed, accused us of duplicity and treachery, and a stigma was cast on the British name.

As soon as it was known that the Duke de Laval was to leave Vienna, the Libéraux anxiously looked about to see how they could get a friend

there. Their eye was immediately fixed upon Rayneval; he was a Bonapartist and Liberal, and while secretary to M. de Richelieu he had *fait ses preuves* by his unlimited devotion to Liberal interests. Pozzo and Talleyrand (for the latter has been throughout behind the curtain) commenced operations. The King was assailed, the Dauphin gained, and Pozzo, though he well knew how much he was detested by her Royal Highness, had even the hardihood to intrude upon Madam his eulogiums of M. de Rayneval, and of his fitness to represent his most Christian Majesty at Vienna. Our worthy Prince de Polignac was circumvented in all quarters either by Libéraux apparent converts, or by deluded or bribed Royalists, all chaunting the same tune to King, Dauphin, and Prince, congratulating the Royalists upon their power, and rehearsing the advantage of conciliation, and concluding their melodies with an eulogium of Rayneval, and of that magnanimity which a Royalist would manifest by naming a Bonapartist and Liberal ambassador to Vienna, a magnanimity which could not fail to gain all hearts; in short, by dint of bamboozling our worthy Prince was brought to name as ambassador the very same man who we have seen was by Russian Liberal interest made to overcome the Royalist candidate for the secretaryship of M. de Richelieu. The whole of this intrigue was carried on by Russia and the Liberals, without having in any manner attracted the notice of our ministerial or diplomatic sapience.

Rayneval was the man of all others the Bonapartist and Libéraux men have most wished to see at Vienna, and therefore was the man of all others whose nomination British diplomates ought to have opposed, and whom a Royalist minister ought not to have named. Why were the Bonapartists and Libéraux so anxious to get Rayneval to Vienna? Because he would there be conveniently placed to foster the proverbial double policy of Austria; and not too far removed from the Prince of Reichstadt to act according to circumstances, should certain events confidently predicted by the Libéraux take place. Could the Prince de Polignac answer a simple question? Was there or was there not in France any other man who could have been sent to Vienna besides the *ci-devant* secrétaire intime de sa Majesté Impériale et Royale? The Royalist ministry of 1829 here commit a similar blunder to that of the Royalist ministry of 1815. Instead of a Royalist they send a Bonapartist to Vienna; just as in 1815, instead of a Royalist, Massena was named governor of the Bouches du Rhone, as it were to cover a tête-de-pont for the secure landing of Napoleon, which landing every man in France expected, except M. de Blacas and Louis, precisely as every man in France who knows anything expects that if ministers do not dissolve the present Chambers, but are so deluded as to meet them, that there will be a revolution and a change of dynasty, and to this the Libéraux are confident that the unprincipled policy of Austria will lend a willing hand. Hence their anxiety to have Rayneval named to Vienna, for him they know they can trust with their full powers to treat and negotiate, and hasten the determination of the Austrian court. Thus by the blind and unaccountable infatuation of this Royalist ministry, Rayneval, a Bonapartist, will be as advantageously placed at Vienna to proclaim the son of his old master, Napoleon, as in 1815 Massena was by another Royalist ministry advantageously placed to secure the landing of his former master, Napoleon.

If it be for the interest of Britain that the Bourbons should be dethroned, and that we should have Napoleon II. or a Republic, then so be it; but if the Bourbons are to be maintained, something more manly, more effectual than these discreditable and impolitic proceedings, which for these thirteen years have marked the conduct of our government, and have gradually more and more perilled the crown of our ally, ought to be acted upon.

I have now clearly shown the disastrous effects both to Royalists and British interests which throughout have been produced by the inertness of our diplomacy. This is no time for complimentary deferences, and it is to be hoped that the minister will no longer trust to the purblind eyes of others, but that he will look at Continental matters with his own clear vision, and all will be well.

The French Royalist ministry, as we evidently see, are not fit to be trusted to themselves. Some of them know that to be my opinion of them, for one day, after a long conversation about France, my respected friend Prince de Polignac told me that he never had met with an Englishman who knew France as well as I did. I replied that I had met with but few Frenchmen who knew anything of France. Some knew the Faubourg St. Germain, some the Chaussée d'Antin, but hardly any understood France and Frenchmen. I instanced the boldness with which they attacked ministers, and their pusillanimity when in power; always afraid to take energetic measures, and thus suffering themselves to be thrown into the most disadvantageous position in which from the time of Julius Cæsar to this day a Gaul can be placed, that is on the defensive, &c. This pusillanimity when in power, my Lord Duke, would render the amicable hortatory surveillance of their distinguished friend here of great importance to them, in order to save them from their own irresolution, and keep them up to the mark when energetic measures are necessary; and at no time was an energetic measure more imperatively required of them by the interests of king and people than is at this moment the dissolution of the Chambers. I find that every possible manœuvre is now employed by the Libéraux to persuade ministers that this measure is unnecessary; that the Libéraux are all coming over, and that they will have a large majority, and that a dissolution would throw all into confusion, &c., &c. If they yield to the clamours of enemies, or the exhortations of false friends, and meet the present Chambers, they, and after them the Bourbons, disappear.

You may be assured, my Lord Duke, that never was a determination more decidedly entered into than that which, with the perfect accord of the *ci-devant* President du Gouvernement Provisoire, and the understanding of Pozzo, the Libéraux have resolved upon, that is, on the first favourable opportunity *d'en finir*, and *coûte que coûte* to get rid of the Bourbons. If ministers dissolve the Chambers the throne is safe; I say triumphantly safe; and without egregious mismanagement or foreign interference the Libéraux are not likely to cope again with government. With most people, but more particularly with Frenchmen, *les "battus ont toujours tort."* From the moment when this dissolution takes place, the energies of the Libéraux will decline, and their influence will soon follow.

If the French ministers are so besotted as not to dissolve the present Chambers, but to meet them, the first measure will be an address for their dismissal; and addresses to the same purport will shower down from every

corner of France. The king and Duke d'Angoulême will be terrified, ministers will be turned out, and the dismissal of the Royal personages themselves will only be retarded in order that it may be rendered more secure. This, my Lord Duke, will take place, though the great majority of the people of France are for the Bourbons ; this, I am convinced, is the fact, however extraordinary the assertion may appear after all that has been said and written by Libéraux to the contrary. I maintain that nineteen-twentieths of the people of France, if left to themselves, would be against the dethronement of the Bourbons, some from liking, but more from a desire for peace and quiet, which they conceive they never could enjoy under the Libéraux. But these nineteen-twentieths are passive beings, who would see the thing going on without stirring a finger either way, whilst the one-twentieth, composed of the rabble of towns and villages, and Libéraux of every hue, would figure as "*la nation Française qui ne veut plus de Bourbons.*"

We should then either have Napoleon II., or a Republic, or anarchy, or all commixed, and be forced into the same round of turmoil as heretofore. If these disasters should take place, I presume that as I have shown that both the degradation of Royal power and the increase of Liberal power since 1815 are mainly due to the inertness of our diplomacy, that these disasters may be fairly attributed to the same cause ; therefore I conclude that if the Bourbons are to be upheld, somewhat more of consistency and energy must be manifested in our diplomatic discipline.

The length of this letter prevents my stating some matters which I conceive might be of use upon the question now in agitation, viz., the naming of a Prince or King for the new Grecian State.

I have the honour to remain, with respect, my Lord Duke,
your Grace's most obedient and most humble servant,

J. E. DEVEREUX.

[Compliments. The Duke has received his letter.]

Lord Rolle to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Bicton, Honiton, 2nd November, 1829.

It is proper your Grace should be apprised that a serious subject (the tithes) is now agitating in this county (Devon), as will appear from the enclosed advertisement, which, I am sorry to say, will very much disturb its present peace and tranquillity. It is started by two very restless magistrates, who will not wait to see what steps may be taken by the government in the ensuing session of Parliament, but prefer their *political* views to the peace of the county. A solicitation is made to certain descriptions of persons to assemble on a fixed day for a requisition to the High Sheriff to convene a general meeting of the county, to petition Parliament on the *subject of tithes*. I am confident they will not confine their discussion, but will introduce other matters, from which I fear much animosity and mischief will be the result.

Mr. Pitt, I have understood, had a digested plan on the subject

which he meant to have brought under the consideration of Parliament, had he not been, *most unfortunately* for his country, cut off in the prime of life.

The country now look to your Grace as his most able successor. It is reported that your Grace intends to submit some plan for the consideration of Parliament, and if it were so ascertained and known it would stop these angry meetings. *Devon* will be soon followed by other counties, and we cannot form an opinion to what extent it may be carried. No person is more anxious, as a land and tithe owner, than myself, should it be practicable, that a plan should be adopted which would be fair and just, and more palatable to those chiefly concerned, if not to all, and the person who could accomplish such a desirable measure would bring a blessing on his country.

As a most sincere friend to your Grace's government and the public good, I have been induced to make this communication to your Grace.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

your Grace's faithful and obedient humble servant,

ROLLE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

THE TITHE LAWS.

A meeting of payers and receivers of tithes, and parties therein interested in the county of Devon, will be held at the Globe Inn, in Exeter, on Wednesday the 18th of November next, at Twelve o'clock, to deliberate on the propriety of transmitting a requisition to the High Sheriff to convene a County Meeting for the purpose of presenting a Petition to Parliament to take into their consideration the present state of the Tithe Laws.

N. FELLOWES.

CALMADY POLLEXFEN HAMLYN.

Dated October 23, 1829.

Baron Bülow to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Ce Lundi soir, 2 Novembre 1829.

C'est avec bien des remerciemens que j'ai l'honneur de vous renvoyer la lettre du Général Müffling, que j'ai lue avec le plus vif intérêt. Il aurait gagné encore si le Général eût donné son opinion sur les chances et l'avenir de la Porte Ottomane après qu'elle se trouvait forcée à accepter la loi du vainqueur. Cette question est aujourd'hui, si je ne me trompe, une des plus importantes, et difficile à résoudre.

En attendant, Monsieur le Duc, votre réponse au Général Müffling, que j'aurai bien du plaisir à lui faire parvenir, je vous prie d'agréer l'assurance renouvelée de ma plus haute considération.

BÜLOW.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 2nd November, 1829.

I have written to Lord Francis on the subject of a search for arms in the county of Tipperary, but I have not positively directed that measure,

because I have had such repeated proofs of its total failure, and because I think the *ineffectual* interference of government has a tendency to make bad worse. It is so common a practice to preserve the arms which the peasantry hold in their possession in their potatoe gardens, or in a bog, or, in short, in any other place than the dwelling-house, that even if a search were made generally and simultaneously, there is a great probability that very few arms would be procured. The failure of the measure would, I apprehend, do positive mischief, not counterbalanced by the advantage of demonstrating to the public that we had done all in our power.

I have desired Lord Francis, however, to give to this subject immediate and serious consideration; to communicate *confidentially* with the stipendiary magistrates, with the most intelligent of the subordinate officers of police, and with the county magistrates, who know most of the habits of the people in Tipperary, as to the probable success of a general search for arms, and as to the consequences of the measure, should it prove, as it so frequently has proved, quite inoperative. I have pointed out to him the necessity of concerting the execution of the measure, should it be resolved on, with the utmost secrecy, and of having almost every suspected house searched in the night time, and as far as possible at the same moment. To search one house in succession after the other, making a *proper* search at each, would be perfectly useless. The notice of a search would be generally given after a very few houses had been examined. I am sure that a *fruitless* search, after the preparation and parade, with which any search must be accompanied, would encourage rather than prevent the illegal possession of arms.

I am confident that Parliament could not refuse any measure calculated to put down the atrocious spirit that prevails, and has so long prevailed, in many parts of Ireland.

The difficulty is to devise an effectual measure, but we must well consider the subject. The Insurrection Act produces no permanent effect, as is proved by its frequent application to Tipperary. It leaves the people at least as bad as it found them; it rather weakens the energy of the regular law, upon the due execution of which, after all, the main reliance must be placed.

Whatever measures may be required for immediate coercion, we should well consider whether others may not be adopted, laying the foundation for a permanent improvement and civilisation of the disturbed part of the country. Suppose it were divided into small police districts, so small that the name of every resident householder and his family within each district could be registered, an effectual system of patrol established, and the characters and occupation of the inhabitants within each district accurately ascertained. Suppose there was a periodical trial of all criminal offenders within that district much more frequently than at present, that the judges were sent there every three months, or every two months if necessary, and that exemplary punishment thus regularly and certainly followed the commission of crime. Something of this kind, or founded on these general principles, would have a great effect, I think, ultimately, particularly if the offending district was saddled with as much of the expense as it could bear.

No doubt the expense would be very great, but what is the consideration of any expense compared with the continuance of that wretched state of things, which has for so many years baffled every attempt at effectual remedy?

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

P.S.—You have not said what period you think of for the Cabinet.

[1499.]

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 2nd November, 1829.

I have received your letter about the execution of the Arms Act in Tipperary; and I quite concur with you that everything ought to be done to render the measure completely effectual. But I don't think its partial or even its entire failure would be so injurious as not to endeavour to execute it when we shall have the county filled with troops for the purpose of patrols.

I understand that the 13th of November would be the day most convenient to the majority of the Cabinet for meeting.

If that day will suit you I will send out a notice for our assembling. Lord Bathurst must be in town on the 12th. All the others are in town or within reach.

I find that the King goes to Brighton in the middle of next week.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1500.]

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 3rd November, 1829.

I return the enclosed papers. There is nothing like patient perseverance. We shall at last get the better of all these difficulties, notwithstanding that by the corruption of jurymen, and the pusillanimous seeking of popularity, murderers do escape from the punishment which they deserve.

The Marquis of Headfort is dead. He was a Representative Peer and a Lord of the Bedchamber. Who shall be the Representative Peer? The candidates are Lord Meath, Lord De Vesci, and Lord Doneraile. I think that the selection should be made of the second or third.

The second is a man of very large fortune, and very respectable.

The third is recommended by the Lord-Lieutenant, and a Protestant. His fortune is not large. Let me know by return of post what you think; as I shall see and will speak to the King on Thursday.

The representation of the county of Meath will be vacated by Lord Bective succeeding to his father. Mr. Napper or Lord Killeen will probably succeed. The one I believe a Whig, the other a Roman Catholic. I should think that it would be desirable that government should not interfere. If Mr. Napper should not be a Whig we might support him. Lord Killeen will certainly stand upon the Radical interest.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I congratulate you upon the entire success of the Police in London. It is impossible to see anything more respectable than they are.

I understand that Mr. Napper was in Parliament before, and a very good friend of government.

To Lord Rolle.

[1501.]

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 3rd November, 1829.

I have received, and am very much obliged to you for, your letter.

I am aware that it has been said by some, believed by others, and asserted positively by a third set of people, that government had a plan in contemplation for a reform of the tithe system in England and Wales. I assure you that that is not the case.

Men in these days are prone to speculate upon obtaining by some means or other the property of their neighbours, and all so engaged consider tithes as fair game.

However I entertain no doubt that the good sense of the country will defeat such schemes, as it has others.

Believe me, my dear Lord, ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[1502.]

To General Baron Müffling.

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

À Londres, ce 3 Novembre 1829.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 30 Septembre, et je vous suis très-reconnaissant de la confiance que vous me témoignez en me faisant connaître les circonstances qui avaient occasionné votre mission à Constantinople, les détails de vos négociations, et les raisons qui ont motivé vos décisions.

Lorsque j'appris que sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse vous avait envoyé en mission à Constantinople, j'ai jugé que l'objet de votre mission était de faire connaître à la Porte, d'une manière précise, les conditions sur lesquelles sa Majesté Impériale jugerait à propos de lui donner la paix. Peu de jours après, l'arrivée d'explications de Berlin, et une entrevue que j'ai eue avec Monsieur le Baron de Bülow, m'ont détrompé, et m'ont fait connaître le vrai objet de votre mission, qui était de faire participer à la Porte la confiance de sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse dans les dispositions pacifiques et modérées de sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ; et de communiquer à la Porte les impressions qui sont restées à sa Majesté de ses entretiens avec l'Empereur ; que si d'un côté aucun événement ni aucune contrariété ne pourraient jamais porter sa Majesté Impériale à accepter des conditions de paix dérogatoires à sa dignité ; de l'autre, les succès les plus brillans, et les avantages les plus réels qu'obtiendraient ses armes, ne l'entraîneraient pas à s'écarter en rien des intentions généreuses et désintéressées qu'elle avait hautement énoncées au moment où elle s'est vue obligée de prendre les armes.

Pendant le temps nécessaire pour votre voyage de Berlin à Constantinople, les événemens militaires avaient marché ; et l'état des affaires avait sensiblement changé ; quoique ce changement n'ait pas dû causer de changement dans les dispositions sur la paix que vous étiez chargé de communiquer à la Porte.

L'ambassadeur de France à Constantinople était autorisé à annoncer à la Porte les conditions sur lesquelles sa Majesté Impériale était disposée à traiter et conclure la paix. Celui d'Angleterre n'en avait aucune autorisation ; puisque nous connaissons les dispositions de sa Majesté Impériale seulement par ses manifestes, et les correspondances officielles de ses ministres de l'époque du commencement de la guerre. Mais quoique instruit

seulement de conseiller la paix, en toute occasion où il en serait question, connaissant le désir sincère de son gouvernement de voir rétablir la paix en Orient, Monsieur Gordon a cru devoir soutenir les représentations de son collègue, malgré qu'il n'eût pas reçu d'instructions à cet effet.

Peu après votre arrivée à Constantinople le Maréchal Comte de Diebitsch s'est établi avec son armée au sud du Mont Hæmus, et il s'est trouvé en possession de la ville d'Adrianople, et ses avant-postes sur la route de Constantinople, avant que la Porte ait voulu négocier. L'armée Turque était en dispersion complète ; les moyens de résistance n'existaient plus, ou ce qui en existait devenait, par l'indiscipline, la corruption et la trahison, plus formidable au gouvernement Turc que l'ennemi étranger.

Les données que vous aviez sur les intentions de sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie vous mettaient plus que les autres ambassadeurs dans le cas de juger de la vraie position des choses, et des probabilités que, vu l'état des opérations militaires, et des moyens qui se trouvaient au moment à la disposition des deux parties belligérantes, le plénipotentiaire chargé des négociations de la paix de la part de sa Majesté l'Empereur serait disposé de conclure la paix sur les conditions énoncées par son Excellence l'ambassadeur de France. En tout cas il est clair qu'il n'y avait plus de temps à perdre en discussion, délibération, ou même en négociation ; et il ne peut exister de doute que vous avez bien fait de conseiller à la Porte de se "jeter dans les bras de la Russie," et "une soumission parfaite à l'Empereur Nicolas." Le conseil était en conformité exacte avec les objets de votre mission, et les instructions que vous aviez reçues dans l'état des affaires au moment où vous l'avez donné.

Nous avons sous les yeux dans le Traité de Paix d'Adrianople et ses Annexes, conclus après votre départ de Constantinople, lesquels en ont été les premiers résultats pour la Porte et pour l'Europe.

Il faut voir quels seront les résultats des mesures que la Porte se propose d'adopter pour se procurer un soulagement aux conditions du Traité de Paix, etc. ; qui lui paraissent incompatibles avec les indications de modération et de générosité dont vous l'aviez entretenue de la part de sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse.

J'ai beaucoup regretté de savoir que vous aviez été indisposé à votre arrivée à Constantinople. J'espère que le voyage de

mer jusqu'à Gênes, et le temps passé à la quarantaine, vous aurez remis des conséquences de vos fatigues ; et que quand cette lettre arrivera à Berlin vous y serez rentré en parfaite santé.

Agréez, mon cher Général, l'expression des sentimens d'amitié et d'attachement que vous a voués bien sincèrement,

WELLINGTON.

[1503.] MEMORANDUM UPON THE 7TH ARTICLE OF THE TREATY OF
ADRIANOPLE.

4th November, 1829.

The 7th article of the Treaty is a violation of the independence of the Porte.

1. By insisting contrary to usage and former treaties that ships of all sizes and of all nations shall navigate the waters of the Porte.

2. That the Porte shall not visit such ships in order to ascertain that they are not ships of war, or filled with armed men, or that they convey persons who ought not to be conveyed into or out of the dominions of the Porte.

This violation of the independence of the Porte places the Porte in the safe keeping of Russia, for that which is of all other points the most important to every nation ; its safety from surprise by domestic or foreign treachery. The Porte cannot provide for its own safety by the visit and detention in its own waters of suspicious ships without incurring the penalty of *reprisals*.

The Emperor of Russia is consequently responsible for the safety of the Turkish empire from all such abuses of the exemption from visit afforded to all nations under this article of the Treaty.

The independence of the Porte is important to all the Powers of Christendom. Its maritime independence, and particularly the independent exercise of sovereign authority in its own waters, is important to all the Powers of the Mediterranean, and to all maritime Powers.

The deprivation of this independent exercise of power, and the transfer of the responsibility for its exercise from the Sultan to the Emperor of Russia, is an alteration of the state of power in that part of Europe which is very important to the interests of this country.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 5th November, 1829.

I have no doubt that Mr. ——— is a decent respectable man; but if we are going to add to the number of the judges, on account of their inability to discharge their present duties, and to undertake the new ones which the abolition of the Welsh judicature will impose, I certainly think it unfortunate that a man of ability in the prime of life is not placed on the Bench. All my experience in public life is in favour of the employment of what the world would call young men instead of old ones; and I think the judicial Bench ought not to be made the place of retirement for barristers waxing old, however respectable they may have been. The profession, I dare say, leans towards the employment of a man whom they have respected, whom they have seen eminent and in full practice, and whose business is leaving him; but as far as the public is concerned, the man whose body and mind are in full vigour is worth ten of the others. Who could hesitate between Mr. Justice ——— and ——— who was appointed the other day?

I write to you my opinion without reserve. You will bear in mind that judicial appointments differ from almost all other appointments, and are specially vested in the Chancellor. Mr. B—— is, I believe, a personal friend of the Chancellor. The appointment will not be a discreditable one, but to you I am bound to say that I do not think it will be a very good one.

I am very glad indeed to hear that you think well of the police. It has given me from first to last more trouble than anything I ever undertook; but the men are gaining a knowledge of their duties so rapidly, that I am very sanguine of the ultimate result.

I want to teach people that liberty does not consist in having your house robbed by organised gangs of thieves, and in leaving the principal streets of London in the nightly possession of drunken women and vagabonds.

The chief danger of the failure of the new system will be, if it is made a job, if gentlemen's servants, and so forth, are placed in the higher offices. I must frame regulations to guard against this as effectually as I can.

Ever most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 6th November, 1829.

I enclose two letters from Lord Stuart, with my answer. They are more provoking than ever; and I much fear they are not likely to be set to rights by the reports of Laval. I have encouraged the notion of the Archduke Maximilian, against whom St. Polignac does not appear to have such a repugnance. He would probably suit us quite as well. I suppose now, that Matuscewitz will go immediately to St. Petersburg. I hope he will call on me before he leaves London. Would it be right to have any conversa-

tion with him respecting what we have done upon the subject of the Peace? I need scarcely ask, however, because you will already have done what is necessary. His presence at St. Petersburg may very probably be useful.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

The Duke of Northumberland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Phoenix Park, 6th November, 1829.

I am very much obliged to you for communicating to me the death of Lord Headfort, and the prompt measures which you propose to take for receiving his Majesty's pleasure, as to the nomination of a candidate for the vacancy in the Representative Peerage of Ireland.

The two gentlemen whom your Grace points out as likely to aspire to the representation of Meath are quite unobjectionable. Perhaps if we could be sure that Lord Killeen would abstract himself from all demagogue connexion, his would be a preferable election, because it is desirable that the Roman Catholic nobility and gentry should experience the practical good effects of their recent admission to constitutional privileges. I must add, however, my firm persuasion that from the limited nature of their habits and acquirements, very few of them are fitted for prominent situations.

Your Grace will remember that Lord Headfort was a Knight of St. Patrick, in which order there are said to be (I know not how truly) three other vacancies.

In looking over the list, I find that neither the Duke of Leinster nor the Marquess of Downshire have received this national decoration, and as they are of the highest rank of nobility, constantly and beneficially resident on their property, and as I have reason to believe both (and especially the latter) well affected to his Majesty's government, I conceive it due to them and I will add to the respectability of the Order, to bring their names under your Grace's consideration. You will be pleased to observe that I have had no communication with them on the subject.

Our accounts from the North, so far as we have received them, are good; and in Dublin we have brought to justice and a capital conviction two of the murderers of Hanlon for an offence against a cruel law of combination.

The spirit of assassination and outrage is still stirring in Tipperary, and I fear we have a new evil to contend with in the low prices which have been obtained in the late fairs for agricultural, and especially pastoral produce.

Every attention will be paid to your Grace's suggestions and those of Mr. Peel, with regard to patrolling and searching for arms; and as to any measures to which Parliament may resort, I must express my hope that they may be moderate, permanent, and applicable by statute to all parts of Ireland. To parochial, or rather townland responsibility, and a more frequent dispensation of criminal justice, I would add the necessity of investing a more efficient police with some preventive powers of detention

under questionable circumstances of night walkers and all other suspicious characters.

I have the pleasure to remain, my dear Duke,
with great truth and sincerity, yours very faithfully,
NORTHUMBERLAND.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 7th November, 1829.

We have no arrivals to-day. I enclose the copy of another despatch which I have addressed to Lord Heytesbury, in order to account for our silence respecting the 10th article of the Treaty, in the ostensible remonstrance. This was the more necessary, as in his last despatch he speaks of the report of *angry discussions* having taken place here upon the subject. I also enclose the copy of a private letter to him. It contains the old story of the Greek Prince; but as the subject was new to him, it became necessary to go over it again. As this is a matter in which the Emperor, if he should be disposed, can greatly assist us, I have ventured to make some friendly professions; although, looking to the probable effect of our remonstrance, the moment is not, perhaps, very favourable. In the mean time, the King appears to be well pleased with the line we have taken, for he has returned the despatch, marked "*Excellent,—most highly approved.*" I take for granted this is the result of some new light which he has received from you, during your last visit at Windsor.

I have just heard that there is to be a council at Windsor on Tuesday; and I am very desirous, if possible, that Stratford Canning should be invested with the red ribband on that day. On his account I have requested that the notice of my brother's appointment should not appear in the 'Gazette,' as it ought to do, so that Stratford Canning may have the precedence. I shall be very much obliged to you, therefore, if you will do what is necessary respecting a Chapter, as you had proposed on the last occasion. I will inform Stratford Canning, who is not far distant from London.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

The Right Hon. Sir G. Murray to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Colonial Office, 7th November, 1829.

Lord Aberdeen sent to me lately a communication which Sir Robert Farquhar had made to you about the French expedition to Madagascar, and I returned it to him on coming to town.

It appears to me that this is a matter of some importance. The French have gone to Madagascar to re-establish (by force if requisite) the French flag upon the points of that island belonging to France. Now if there were any points in Madagascar which did belong to France, the first question which offers itself is, whether these are not to be deemed dependencies of

Mauritius ; and consequently that whatever claim there is to them is vested in Great Britain.

But, if there were no such dependencies, and Great Britain has therefore no claims arising out of her sovereignty of Mauritius, then France has no claim ; and her expedition is neither more nor less than an invasion of Madagascar ; as an intimidation of the ruling powers there, to force them into some arrangement for the benefit of France. In this latter case we may not have any positive right under any treaty to interfere, but it would be very much for our interest to prevent any encroachment upon the independence of Madagascar.

I have put up, along with this, the papers which explain the state of the question, in case you should wish to read them.

I remain, my dear Duke, faithfully yours,

G. MURRAY.

[1504.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

Stratfield Saye,
8th November, 1829.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Count Matuscewitz is just gone, after a conversation with me which lasted so long as to keep me from church.

He is determined to return to St. Petersburg immediately, in order if possible to obtain a termination of the Greek affair. He says that the Emperor will not now support the nomination of Prince Philip, as France is opposed to that nomination. But that he will support everything else ; and the nomination of Prince Frederic, or of Prince Leopold, or of any other who may be agreeable to us. Indeed, he was so full of the Emperor with us nominating the Prince, that I was under the necessity of stopping him, and of telling him that it had not hitherto been the practice for majorities in this description of concert to bind minorities. That which was generally done was to seek for an arrangement that would suit all parties.

He urged that we should press upon the Porte the adoption of their alternative ; which he said that the Emperor would endeavour to obtain by the sacrifice of some of his millions of ducats.

I mentioned to him the idea of a general guarantee of the Greek State by all the Powers of Europe of the same sort with that given to the Netherlands, for instance, by the Treaty of Congress ; and I stated that my reason was the desire which I felt to take Greece from under the guardianship of the three Powers. He said that that was exactly the result which he was

desirous of obtaining by the article of the proposed Protocol referring to the Treaty to be hereafter negotiated. In the same view I threw out, as an idea of my own for the consideration of the Emperor, the measure of giving the Greek Prince for a time the assistance of one thousand men of each of the five Powers. He said that the proposition of a force from each of the three Powers would be approved and adopted. He could not answer for the approbation of the Emperor to the supply of a force by the five Powers. I urged it on the ground of conciliating other Powers to our measure; giving them an interest in the existence of the new State, and as tending to re-establish the confidence of Europe in the continuance of peace.

I touched on the chord of the necessity for their conciliating the confidence of the world, and for showing that they intended to preserve peace by the moderation with which they should carry into execution the stipulations of their Treaty. I stated that it appeared to me quite obvious that those who negotiated the Treaty had not been instructed to demand all that had been granted. He talked of the Emperor not continuing to hold the Principalities; of the mischief which his holding them would do him; of his remitting part of the contribution. But he held himself in reserve upon every point, saying that he did not know positively what would be done. I did not think it proper therefore to go farther.

In respect to ourselves, I observed to him that he had been here long enough to become acquainted with us, and to perceive that we had no views excepting to maintain the general peace, and to preserve harmony among all the Powers of Europe; and I begged that he would on my part entreat the Emperor to state to us frankly whenever anything was stated to him of us of which he should disapprove or which he should wish to see otherwise than was reported to him.

I assured him that his Imperial Majesty would find us disposed at all times to do everything in our power to please him. He said that he should be very happy to represent to the Emperor what I had said; but he took no notice of the stress which I had laid upon the *reports made to him*. He said that he hoped that we would deal with equal frankness in our relations with the Emperor.

This is the substance of a very long conversation.

I would recommend to you not to enter more deeply than I

have done into the merits of the Peace. You might tell him that we should write our sentiments upon it to Lord Heytesbury. The more I reflect upon the subject the more convinced I am that we must speak out, but civilly, upon the navigation of the Straits. A conversation with Matuscewitz upon the subject, in which he should tell us that our remonstrance would be ill received, would ensure that reception: at the same time that the information that it would be so received ought not to induce us to withhold it. You might tell him that you write to Lord Heytesbury because it is impossible that he should be instructed to talk to you upon the subject of the peace.

In respect to the Lievens, I earnestly recommend to you not to mention or even to allude to them unless he should mention them to you. I think that our only ground of complaint is, that they misrepresent to the Emperor what passes here. It is obvious that Matuscewitz will not open upon that ground. A public complaint of their intrigues here is impossible, because, however strong the proofs, they cannot be produced in court. I discussed this point, among others, with Matuscewitz this morning in reference to Capo d'Istria.

A private complaint is improper. The proofs would equally be required. They might be produced; but the production of the proofs would occasion more inconvenience than the Lievens can in a century. A general complaint of their conduct, of their intrigues, &c., would be, in my opinion, *infra dig.*, besides being useless. If such complaint should occasion their removal we shall have to explain ourselves to society at least; and I would prefer to incur not only all the evil which Madame de Lieven can do me, but even all that she would wish me, to having to explain my conduct upon any such subject.

I write to the King about the red riband for Mr. Canning.

I send you this now, because Matuscewitz may see you this day. I shall be in town early to-morrow in order to dine with the Lord Mayor.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Upon reading over my letter, it is very clear to me that if we don't complain of Lieven we must cease to do business with Russia otherwise than through our minister at St. Petersburg. We have complained of misrepresentations. They won't under-

stand these complaints. We will not complain of intrigues, because they are unworthy of our notice.

These intrigues, however, show us that we cannot trust a secret to the Lievens. For instance, can we now talk to Lieven or even to Matuscewitz about the navigation of the Straits? If we did we should have a statement of the case with Lord Grey, Lord Palmerston, and Mr. Huskisson, as soon as the post would carry it.

That which we must do in future is to listen to Lieven, but answer through Lord Heytesbury, and the Emperor will discover the inconvenience of trusting his relations with England to such persons.

The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Royal Lodge, 9th November, 1829.

As it is impossible for me, on account of the state of my eyes, to write a letter by candle-light, I am under the necessity of having recourse to an amanuensis to convey to you my sentiments upon the subject of your letter just received.

I must express to you my extreme surprise, my dear Duke, that you should suggest to me that I should either decline to receive the Recorder's Report to-morrow, or submit to the indignity of receiving the Common Serjeant to fulfil the duties of the Recorder upon the occasion, when you cannot fail to know the insult which I have received from that individual; and you ought to know the firmness of my character in not bearing an insult from any human being with impunity.

A provision has long since been made for the fulfilment of the Recorder's duties, in the event of his indisposition, in the appointment of Mr. Serjeant Arabin as Deputy Recorder for that express purpose; and I desire that he should attend in that capacity to-morrow rather than defer the Report, he having already officiated in that character.

I must express a hope that this will be the last time that I shall be troubled relative to Mr. ——— as no consideration will ever induce me to admit that individual into my presence.

I remain, my dear Duke, your sincere friend,

G. R.

P.S.—Mr. Peel will accordingly announce to the Deputy Recorder that he will be required to officiate to-morrow.

To Sir William Knighton.

[1505.]

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

10th November, 1829.

I saw the King, and had a very distressing scene with him. It ended by his approving of the act of his ministers of last

night, and his determining that he would hear no report till the Recorder should be well enough to make it. His Majesty did not mention your name, and I did not tell him that I had seen you.

If I had known in January 1828 one tithe of what I do now, and of what I discovered in one month after I was in office, I should have never been the King's minister, and should have avoided loads of misery! However, I trust that God Almighty will soon determine that I have been sufficiently punished for my sins, and will relieve me from the unhappy lot which has befallen me! I believe there never was a man suffered so much; and for so little purpose!

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[1506.]

To Count Nesselrode.

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,

London, 10th November, 1829.

I avail myself of the return of the Comte Matuscewitz to St. Petersburg to thank your Excellency for the letter which you were so kind as to write to me when his Imperial Majesty sent him to this country.

I anxiously wish that his Imperial Majesty may be convinced by his reports of his intercourse with my colleagues and myself of our earnest desire so to discharge our duty by the King as to satisfy his Imperial Majesty and to preserve and strengthen the amicable relations existing between his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia.

Your Excellency appreciated correctly the difficulties attending the progress of the Greek affair, and M. Matuscewitz will report to his Imperial Majesty the sacrifices of opinion which we have made in order to bring it to the state in which he will report it to be at the present moment.

We hope for the co-operation and support of his Imperial Majesty's ambassadors at this Court and at Paris, as well to conclude that affair to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned, and of the other Powers of Europe, as to re-establish confidence in the continuance of the general peace and to consolidate the tranquillity of the world.

I cannot sufficiently express to your Excellency my thanks

for your having deprived yourself of the assistance of Count Matuscewitz, and for having sent him here at the moment you did, as I don't doubt that this country, as well as his own, has been benefited by his good offices.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Northumberland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Phoenix Park, 10th November, 1829.

Lord Francis Leveson Gower will duly communicate to the government those technical and judicial points which Baron Pennefather has brought forward so *forcibly* as to render it my indispensable duty to respite the execution of three prisoners sentenced to death by the late Special Commission at which the Baron presided.

Satisfied as I am of the *moral* propriety of their sentence, and feelingly alive to all the ill effects which this failure in bringing them to punishment must entail upon us, I need not assure your Grace that in coming to this decision *individually* I have not been actuated by a base fear of responsibility or by a baser desire of mob popularity.

But I am convinced (and the cool good sense of Lord Francis is convinced also) that there are legal objections to inflicting the awarded punishment which ought not to be disregarded; and that there are doubts, to the benefit of which these prisoners are entitled at the hands of the executive.

Upon these grounds I have not hesitated for a moment to respite them; and in so doing I have convinced myself that we shall give a new proof to the deluded people of this country of the unfailing protection of that law which they are too apt to insult or to evade.

There is another circumstance, certainly of minor importance, and which would not be noticed in any other state of society but that of Ireland: we have forestalled the demagogues; and this act, be it of mercy or of justice, has been resolved on by the government after an investigation of our own seeking and before any memorial had reached me on behalf of the prisoners.

In short, my dear Duke, we have acted, as we conceive, honestly and according to law, and we wait the result without uneasiness.

It is a great satisfaction to me to acquaint your Grace that the 4th and 5th of November have passed off in Ulster without the occurrence of any fatal outrage. The Orangemen were in some few instances indiscreet, but, luckily, the Roman Catholic population took no notice of their proceedings.

We have nothing new from Tipperary. The usual circular has been despatched in favour of Lord Doneraile. Mr. Napper declines to come forward for Meath, and Lord Killeen has declared himself with much apparent propriety.

I have the honour to remain, my dear Duke, with great truth,

yours very faithfully,

NORTHUMBERLAND.

[1507.]

To the Duke of Northumberland.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Stratfield Saye, 11th November, 1829.

I don't understand that Lord Headfort's death will make a vacancy in the Knights of St. Patrick which can be disposed of. When the King was in Ireland he made a number of supernumerary Knights. Some still remain; I believe two. The number must be brought down to that fixed by the statutes of the Order before any can be made. Otherwise I should think Lord Downshire a very proper appointment.

I confess that I don't feel much inclination to support Lord Killeen. I wish that Mr. Napper would stand. It appears to me that all the Roman Catholics of the higher classes, by not protesting against the conduct of Mr. O'Connell and of other agitators, and by keeping aloof, do all the mischief to the government that they are capable of doing, and a great deal to themselves. They injure the government by giving ground for the belief and assertion that the measure of last year has done no good. They injure themselves, because no good subject will believe that Mr. O'Connell, who has hitherto been their leader and their mouthpiece, is not so still, and that, as they do not contradict his language and dissent from his declared intentions, they are not, as they have been hitherto, participators in his declared designs.

This state of things renders it difficult to do anything for them.

I put out of the consideration party politics.

It will scarcely be believed that every one of the eight Roman Catholic peers admitted into Parliament by the measure of the last session of Parliament is in opposition to the ministers who risked everything for their relief; that Lord Fingall, Lord Kenmare, and the Roman Catholics in Ireland, are generally so. But this is the fact. I don't care so much about this fact as I do about their omission to declare themselves in some way or other upon Mr. O'Connell's declared plans. Till they will do so no minister of this country can confer favours upon them.

I quite concur in your Grace's notion of the nature of the measures which we must propose to Parliament. They must be permanent, and they must include some provision to enable

magistrates to prevent people from being out of their houses at night without giving some account of themselves.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I beg to be kindly remembered to the Duchess, to whom I will write in a day or two.

To the Right Hon. Sir George Murray.

[1508.]

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Stratfield Saye, 11th November, 1829.

I sent back, after perusal of the papers which it contained, the box with the papers regarding Madagascar.

It is quite obvious that Mr. Canning, when Secretary of State, gave up the claim of this country to the settlements in Madagascar as a dependency of the Mauritius. Indeed, I should imagine that we could claim as dependencies upon that island only those named in the article of the Treaty.

We can urge no claim to those settlements. The question is whether the French can?

The Treaty admits their right to possess everything which they possessed on the 1st January, 1792.

I believe there is no doubt that they did possess settlements in Madagascar at that period, whether as commercial establishments, or factories, or, as they now claim, colonies. I think that the existence of these possessions in 1792, and the right of the French to regain possession, are admitted in Mr. Canning's papers, and at all events cannot with justice be disputed.

The question for consideration is how far we shall allow them to go. In order to have some guide to ascertain the necessity for a decision, it would be desirable to know what is the nature of the intercourse between Madagascar and Mauritius; how far the supply of provisions to the latter island depends upon its intercourse with the former; whether the occupation of the French commercial settlements, or their forming them into colonies, or any extension of their conquests in Madagascar, can essentially affect either the advantages or the security of the Mauritius.

It would be desirable that you should have the correspondence examined to ascertain these points, in order, if possible,

that the Cabinet may consider and decide whether anything and what shall be done upon the subject. It is quite obvious that if anything is to be done this is the time to do it, before the French government will have incurred any large expense on its establishments in Madagascar and can be pledged to maintain them, or that they can be strong enough to maintain themselves.

It would likewise be desirable to know what sort of a person Radama is, and whether his military force could be of any avail to interrupt the operations of the French.

Probably you will be able at this meeting of the Cabinet to settle the affair of Manumission and that of Canada.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE EARL OF ABERDEEN TO LORD STUART
DE ROTHESAY, DATED 13TH NOVEMBER, 1829.

"You will see Matuscewitz before his departure. You can let him understand that Prince Frederick, Prince Philip of Hesse-Homburg, or the Prince of Modena would be perfectly agreeable to us. If Russia and France should approve of Prince Leopold, we have no objection. The basis of our whole settlement of the affair depends upon the character of the Prince. This Matuscewitz will recollect that I have stated from the first; so much so, that I had almost understood that Prince Philip was a *sine quâ non*, and that Russia would join in supporting him to the exclusion of any other. To show, however, that our interest is not personal in this business, we are ready to give way if any other shall be named who will give us equal security and confidence for our possessions in his neighbourhood."

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE EARL OF ABERDEEN TO LORD STUART
DE ROTHESAY, DATED 20TH NOVEMBER, 1829.

"I informed you in my last letter, in order that Matuscewitz might leave Paris fully aware of our decision on this subject, that we could agree to no Prince who had yet been named, except Prince Frederick of Orange, the Prince Philip of Hesse-Hombourg, or the brother of the Duke of Modena, Maximilian of Este; but if Russia and France approved of Prince Leopold, we should have no objection. You were to let all this *be understood by Matuscewitz*, rather than make any declaration to this effect; but to Polignac you will make no statement on the subject. You will profess ignorance of our decision, and take everything which he may say for reference to us. You must have said quite enough to give him a general impression of our views; and it is now desirable that he should send his impression here."

AMENDED PROJET OF PROTOCOL.

No. 2.

La Conférence s'étant assemblée pour continuer ses délibérations sur l'exécution des stipulations contenues dans le Protocole du * s'est occupée du choix du Souverain à donner à la Grèce.

Les plénipotentiaires des trois Cours ont pris en considération que, parmi les personnes qui se recommandaient plus particulièrement au choix de l'Alliance par leurs qualités personnelles et par leur existence sociale, le Prince Léopold de Saxe-Cobourg offrait à la Grèce et à l'Europe entière toutes les garanties possibles; que d'après toutes les informations recueillies jusqu'à ce jour, il y a lieu de penser que les Grecs le recevraient avec reconnaissance pour leur Souverain.

Le Prince Léopold n'est pas un membre de la famille royale régnante en Angleterre. Il n'est pas capable d'être appelé à la succession de la couronne.

Par conséquent le Prince de Cobourg n'est point dans le cas de l'exclusion prévue dans le Protocole du 22 Mars.

Époux de la Princesse, fille du Roi, il a été assimilé par suite d'un acte du Parlement, en fait d'honneurs, à la famille royale; mais il a été reconnu et constaté, d'après les assurances et les explications données par le gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique, que le Prince Léopold n'est pas Pair du royaume; qu'il n'a jamais siégé au Parlement; et que, depuis la catastrophe qui a rompu les nœuds qui le liaient à l'Angleterre, il n'y exerce aucune fonction publique.

Dans son existence pécuniaire créée par le Traité de Mariage, traité par sa nature inviolable, et confirmé par un acte du Parlement, le Prince Léopold se trouve entièrement indépendant, quels que puissent être les événements.

Le plénipotentiaire de France, celui de la Grande-Bretagne et celui de Russie, ont alors déclaré qu'ils réunissaient les votes de leurs Cours en faveur du Prince Léopold de Saxe-Cobourg, et ils sont convenus de rédiger en commun une note, destinée à lui offrir, dans les termes et sous les conditions insérées au Protocole du *, le gouvernement du nouvel État Grec, avec le titre de Prince Souverain de la Grèce, qui passerait héréditairement à ses descendants.

Le Protocole de ce jour, ainsi que celui du *, seront en même temps communiqués au Prince Léopold de Saxe-Cobourg, et ce Prince sera invité à y donner son assentiment.

Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 22nd November, 1829.

The messenger returned last night; and this morning Lord Hill wrote to the King to the effect of your draft. I send you a copy of your letter to me, and a copy of Lord Hill's letter to the King. It is the same as the draft, only that Sir F. Watson's letter is more fully described. It occurred to me, indeed, that the expressions made use of by Sir F. Watson were particularly offensive, and that it was material to record them.

* Blank in MS.

Lord Hill is excessively obliged to you for the advice you have given him, and he feels confident that the course you have recommended him to pursue is the best that he could follow. He has not the least idea of yielding; and, whatever may be the result, he is satisfied that he has done what is right in his situation.

We think that the King will send for Taylor as soon as he gets Lord Hill's letter, and we have enjoined Sir Herbert to make no allusion to you. Your open interference will be sufficiently required by-and-by.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

[1509.]

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

To Lord FitzRoy Somerset.

Woodford, 21st November, 1829.

I send back the messenger immediately.

My opinion is, that Lord Hill should write a letter to the purport of the enclosed draft.

This will lay the ground for his future proceeding.

If the King should not attend to his recommendation, it will be for him to determine whether he will or not go on. I would not, if I were in his situation; and this he may rely upon,—that if he gives way and goes on under the circumstances attending this arrangement, there is an end to his authority.

If the answer to Lord Hill's letter is that the King does not accept his recommendation, Lord Hill had better take no farther steps excepting through me. He must send off one of my messengers to me at Peel's.

I will come up to town immediately. Unless the King gives way, this affair cannot be settled. We cannot allow the Duke of Cumberland to conduct the military affairs of the country.

Believe me ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

II.

I have received from Sir Herbert Taylor, the Adjutant-General, the communication of your Majesty's pleasure, addressed to him by Sir Frederick Watson, dated the 20th instant; that upon the death of General Garth, M.G., Lord Edward Somerset should be removed from the 17th Lancers to the Royal Dragoons; and that Major-General Sir Edward Kerrison should be appointed to the 17th Lancers.

I considered it my duty on the 19th instant to report to your Majesty the death of General Garth; and to submit for your Majesty's consideration an arrangement in consideration thereof.

Not having yet been honoured by your Majesty's notice of what I have submitted upon this subject, I humbly request to receive your Majesty's pleasure upon my letter of the 19th instant.

Sir W. Knighton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Royal Lodge, 22nd November, 1829.
Sunday Night.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

I came here yesterday from Hampshire, in consequence of a letter from Sir Henry Halford, stating the continuance of Lady Conyngham's indisposition, with some symptoms of a more severe character. I think, however, from Sir Henry's judicious treatment, that the dangerous part of this illness has already subsided; but the restoration of health will not, I fear, be speedily accomplished. This afternoon it appears that Sir Frederick Watson received the accompanying memorial, with a long letter, from the Duke of Cumberland, pressing for an IMMEDIATE answer, that his Majesty would become the patron! His Majesty was graciously pleased to direct what was obvious,—that I should transmit it to your Grace; and knowing that you were at this moment with Mr. Peel induces me to send off a messenger for that purpose!

Perhaps your Grace will think it right that whatever answer is returned, either by your Grace or Mr. Peel, should be written to the King *himself*.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, your sincere servant,

W. KNIGHTON.

Be pleased to burn this.

W. K.

Lord Hill to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Horse-Guards, 23rd November,
Half-past 12 noon.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

I will not detain the messenger a moment, as I am in hopes, if he sets out immediately, he will reach you in good time to-night. I cannot, however, allow him to go without expressing to your Grace my sense of the valuable advice on the late unpleasant communication from Windsor.

The letter, of which I send a copy, just received from his Majesty is not altogether satisfactory; but I presume that as the King has consented to Sir John Elley's appointment, the arrangement ordered by his Majesty should now proceed.

I, however, will not send the official papers for his signature until I hear from you, and I shall be glad if you will send back the messenger to-night.

I have the honour to be, my dear Duke of Wellington,

your ever faithful and obliged servant,

HILL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The King to Lord Hill.

MY DEAR LORD,

Royal Lodge, 22nd November, 1829.

Subsequent to the receipt of your letter of this day, your letter of the 19th reached my hand; and with reference to the recommendation therein preferred I have to observe to you that I consider it essential for the service, that the Royal Dragoons should ever be held by an officer of rank (notwithstanding the two successive precedents to the contrary); and as Lieutenant-General Vandeleur has already a regiment of equal emolument, I prefer that Lieutenant-General Lord Edward Somerset should be removed from the 17th Lancers to the Royals. I readily accede to your recommendation of Major-General Sir John Elley to succeed to the 17th Lancers; but in relinquishing in his favour my recommendation of Major-General Sir E. Kerrison, I must express my desire that Major-General Kerrison be selected for the next occurring vacancy, and that in future you should pursue the mode adopted by my late lamented brother, viz., that of submitting for promotion three or four names to me for my selection.

G. R.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 23rd November, 1829.

You will see, from Lord Stuart's last letter to me, that if Prince Leopold has spoken the truth, we are likely to have him for our Greek sovereign. It is a little suspicious, however; for the Duke de Laval has just been here, and has read to me a private letter from M. de Polignac, in which he presses his Saxon Prince, but does not say a word about Prince Leopold. At all events, he is the least desirable, perhaps, of all our candidates; but his nomination will be respectable. We shall soon learn what Prince Frederick may feel upon the subject; and I take for granted, in case he should be disposed to permit himself to be nominated, that we must support him so far as to receive his absolute exclusion by the French government.

I send you a letter which I have received to-day from Sir Charles Bagot, giving but an uncomfortable account of the state of affairs in the Low Countries. I am not aware of its being possible to give him any instructions or advice respecting such a state of things as he describes. If the King should speak to him with the view of receiving assistance and the benefit of his opinion, of course he will refer home before committing himself in any manner. After all, it does not seem very likely that he should be directly applied to for such a purpose.

It appears that M. de Polignac is disposed to be active in the settlement of Portugal. I should have been inclined to prefer a tone rather more decisive and explicit in the instructions to Mr. Aston. When approved of by you, I propose to send the draft to Lord Stuart, with directions to communicate with the French government, and to engage them to send instructions at the same time to their minister at Rio de Janeiro. There is no reason why the Austrian and French ministers should not recommend the marriage, if they think proper to do so.

Count Ludolf came to me yesterday, to say that he thought it probable the King of Naples would recognise Don Miguel when at Madrid. I

requested him to write to his Court and to recommend some delay in this affair, which he promised to do. M. de Zea will also write to his government, in order to prevent the request being made for the acknowledgment on the part of Spain. Count d'Aglié also came to say that the King of Sardinia was desirous of recognising Don Miguel, but he wished first to have our opinion. He has promised, at my desire, to recommend a further delay, which he has no doubt will be complied with. We shall preserve our ascendancy in the affair by restraining them in this manner, otherwise there might be a convenience in letting each of them take their own course. You may have observed in a letter from M. de Santarem that the Netherlands government had declared to M. de Lascelles that they would immediately follow the example either of England or *France*. M. de Laval was commissioned to talk upon the subject, but professed the strong desire of his government not to act separately in this affair. In the private letter which he read from M. de Polignac, and which appeared to be quite confidential, he gave him an account of the changes in the ministry. He said that all his colleagues, with the exception of M. de la Bourdonnaye, had represented to the King and to himself the necessity of establishing the Presidency. They had endeavoured to persuade M. de la Bourdonnaye to retain his office, but in vain. No mention is made of an offer to M. de Villèle, which you will see that Lord Stuart asserts in one of his despatches to-day. Lord Stuart's information must be wretchedly bad. He writes a strange, incomprehensible despatch, professing to give an account of the real state of the ministry; and this is dated precisely the day before the change appeared in the '*Moniteur*'! M. de Polignac writes with increased confidence, which others, however, do not seem to share.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

November, 1829.

I doubt whether the King should *desire* the enclosed to be sent to him through the Lord-Lieutenant. Would not the safer answer be, that his Majesty's rule is not to become the patron of any society of a public nature in Ireland, excepting upon the express recommendation of the Lord-Lieutenant.

I am sure the King ought not to be the patron of this society, which is a mere Brunswick scheme. Surely the King would feel the ridicule of patronising the projects of *Lord Aldborough* and *Lord Mountcashel*. I should think the latter name just at present would be quite decisive with the King.

Ever yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

P.S.—It is quite clear that the Duke of Cumberland ought not to have presented this petition to the King. My opinion is that the best course would be for the King to return it to the Duke of Cumberland, observing that it is a public matter, in which he cannot act without the advice of a

minister; and a public petition, which he can only reply to through a Secretary of State.

We must, I think, take care not to recognise a petition presented through the Duke of Cumberland.

[1510.]

To the King.

Stowe Park, November, 1829.

I have received the enclosed petition from Sir W. Knighton with your Majesty's commands that I should state my opinion upon it.

It is impossible that your Majesty should become the patron of a society in Ireland, of which Lords Enniskillen, Aldborough, and Mountcashel and Mr. Brooke are the trustees, unless the Lord-Lieutenant should submit that it is desirable that your Majesty should be its patron.

This society is evidently established for a public object; of which I know enough to be able to assure your Majesty that it cannot be attained without the assistance of Parliament. It is not fitting that your Majesty should approach Parliament as a suitor with the Earl of Aldborough and the Earl of Mountcashel.

I submit to your Majesty that your Majesty should be graciously pleased to direct the Secretary of State to return to the Earl of Enniskillen an answer to this petition, informing him that your Majesty cannot take the subject of it into consideration, unless it should be officially submitted and recommended to your Majesty's attention by the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland.

Which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[1511.] OBSERVATIONS UPON MR. HAY'S MEMORANDUM RELATIVE TO
THE ORDER OF THE BATH.

Stowe Hall, 23rd November, 1839.

There are some important omissions in Mr. Hay's memorandum.

Shortly subsequent to the establishment of the Order according to the new system, the admirals and post-captains of the navy of three years' standing and the general officers and

colonels of the army upon whom the Order was conferred, discovered that it was improper that junior post-captains of the navy and lieutenant-colonels of the army should receive the same class of the Order as they did, notwithstanding that the criterion of the services of the latter was the most severe.

Their feelings, however, were attended to, and their complaints listened to: and the consequence was an order that the star should not be worn by knights commanders of a rank junior to the admiral and major-general; and it was determined that the commanders' crosses should be given to officers of those ranks only in future.

Thus then it followed that, after the year 1814-15, there were to be in the army and the navy 240 admirals and generals decorated; that is to say, 60 with grand crosses and 180 with commanders' crosses. Such a notion is ridiculous.

It is quite impossible that any war of which the country can bear the expense can produce 240 admirals and generals deserving such decorations.

Indeed, it now appears that there are only 146 knights commanders of both professions, including the lieutenant-colonels and post-captains who obtained those crosses when the Order was established.

The whole subject should be reconsidered. It is impossible that the establishment should not do more harm than good as it is now.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 26th November, 1829.

I have had a long interview with the Duc de Laval to-day, in which we went over the subject of the nomination of the Greek Prince in many different points of view, but in which very little was said about Leopold. He once tried to describe him as our candidate; but I corrected him, and said that since the rejection of Prince Philip of Hesse we had put forward no other candidate than Prince Frederick of Orange, who would indeed at all times have been equally agreeable to us. He continued to press in every possible manner the Prince of Saxony; but does not know, or at least affects not to know, anything of his intentions or wishes, and even does not believe that it has ever been proposed to him. I did not appear to know anything about the change respecting Leopold, and continued to speak of Prince Frederick as the person for whose nomination we were anxious. I shall probably hear from Sir Charles Bagot to-morrow, when it may be

possible for us to learn the inclination of the Prince. The difficult position of the King at this moment would, I should think, make him more unwilling than ever to part with his son.

I send you a couple of private letters from my brother; one of which applies to a question long since decided, and the other contains no matter of interest. I also enclose one from Lord Cowley. If the Sultan should persevere in refusing to pay the indemnity, we may still have fresh difficulties in that quarter. What do you say to the diminution of our fleet? It is true the three sail of the line have arrived rather late, although their approach may not have been without its use. If you think they could be spared, I suppose their recall would tell very considerably upon the estimates. When Lord Melville spoke to me some time ago upon the subject, I rather discouraged it at that moment.

Believe me ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[1512.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Stowe Hall, 26th November, 1829.

I send back this morning your draft to Lord Cowley on the subject of Prince Metternich's fancies. I inserted some observations in pencil in the margin, but I did not write to you, as we were going out, and I did not wish to retain your draft till the post of to-morrow, as you might wish to send off your despatch.

I return the other papers sent from the office. I observe that M. de Palmella is very active in his endeavours to send off another expedition from the Netherlands to Terceira. Surely to stipulate that this individual should be pardoned, or to require that he should be pardoned, is carrying very far the principle of generosity to personal enemies, considering the manner in which he has conducted himself towards this government, and particularly towards me; or as an homage paid to the liberality of the times which is not very necessary. We shall facilitate our measure in Portugal by allowing of exceptions to the general amnesty; and I should wish to see the Marquis de Palmella excepted by name.

I likewise draw your attention to the payments made to Count Capo d'Istria by the Emperor of Russia. You will see that the money for this service was lodged in London on the 7th July, 1827, the auspicious day of the signature of the Treaty of London.

The good man! came to England afterwards entirely emancipated from the service of Russia. I saw him in Sep-

tember of that year. He laboured to convince me, and he desired me to assure others, on his word, that he had nothing to say to the Emperor of Russia; that he was going to Greece as a citizen of Greece, &c. &c. Yet there was at that time a Russian credit in London in his favour amounting to upwards of 40,000*l*. The Emperor likewise had nothing to say to Capo d'Istria! He never thought of assisting him with money till the demand of pecuniary assistance was simultaneously made upon each of the Allied Powers!!

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I think that the fair exceptions from the amnesty in Portugal might be those who went from England to Oporto to assist in the operations carrying on there against Don Miguel; and those concerned in any act of insurrection or hostility to the Portuguese government, whether in Portugal or elsewhere in the Portuguese dominions, since the Portuguese troops were driven from Oporto; and those by name who have received from Don Pedro the appointment of Regent, which they are now executing in England by carrying on war, &c.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1513.]

Buckingham House, 27th November, 1829.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

In the letter which I sent you this morning I omitted to tell you that Prince Leopold's letter to me, of which you had heard, was merely to express a wish to see me as soon as possible; and to remind me that I had not sent an answer to his invitation that I should go to Claremont.

I think that as the French do not object to his being the Sovereign of Greece, there must be something in the idea that he is to connect himself with the house of Orleans. Yet one does not see how the "Eldest Son of the Church" can give a Princess of his house to a heretic. I conclude that Leopold will not change his religion to marry or to become Sovereign of Greece.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 27th November, 1829.

I have had Lieven with me for three hours upon the subject of the Prince. He read the letters of Matuscewitz, containing an account of his interview with the King, as well as his discussions with M. de Polignac. You have no conception with what obstinacy and even ill-humour both Charles X. and his minister insist upon the first offer being made to the Prince of Saxony. Matuscewitz appears to have stated our objections very well, but found both of them immovable. They seem to be aware of the probability of his refusal; and Matuscewitz, from the information he has received, thinks the refusal certain. At the same time, as an affair of vanity towards the Chambers, and with the King as an affair of religion, they desire that in the first instance a Catholic Prince proposed by France should have the offer. I do not find that Prince Charles of Mecklenburg has been at all named. The King observed, that if the Prince of Saxony should decline the offer, he would have no objection to Prince Leopold or Prince Frederick. The difficulties are so great, and the consequences may become so serious, that, if we could be assured of the refusal of the Prince of Saxony, it might be worth while to gratify the vanity of the French Court by making the offer. This, however, is too great a risk to be incurred; and to all Lieven's persuasion I answered, that to make a proposal in the hope only of its being refused would be leaving the matter to chance, and thereby contradict the whole principle upon which we had from the first proceeded in drawing up the final Protocol, founded as it had been entirely upon our being secure in the choice of a Prince who should satisfy our expectations. I do not think there is the least understanding between the Russians and the French, further than that the Russians are most desirous of terminating the affair, and therefore wish us to agree to the French proposal. On the contrary, I think it clear that they would prefer Prince Frederick or Prince Leopold to the Saxon Prince. I did not give him the least shadow of hope that we should yield, and reminded him over and over again of all that had passed between us on the subject. He wished to see you, and to show you the letters of Matuscewitz, which he will do; but I answered for your attaching even more importance, if possible, to the choice. He is to see me again on Sunday morning, before I go to Woburn, so that perhaps I may have some new proposition; but it does not seem likely, unless the instructions of M. de Laval should furnish the materials. Our position is an awkward one; because it is not easy to see the means of settling the question without a positive concession on one side or the other. I send you Sir Charles Bagot's letter, which looks as if Prince Frederick would finally decline; at all events, with the feeling of the French government made known to him he would certainly do so. Perhaps the only method, as a middle term, will be to agree upon Leopold, whom nobody likes, but to whom no one objects. Lieven did not hint at the notion of a French marriage for Leopold, nor did I allude to it.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 28th November, 1829.

Although I hope to see you to-morrow, I think it as well to continue the account of our proceedings touching the choice of the Greek Prince. M. de Laval has been here to-day, and it appears, as might have been expected, that he has been much mistaken in his notion of the view we have taken of the nomination of the Prince of Saxony. He thinks that when we accepted the Prince as the candidate proposed by France, we gave up all right to object to him in future; and that the only question was to whom the first offer should be made. I take for granted that we only intended fairly to examine the pretensions of the Prince of Saxony, but that we always retained our right ultimately to reject him. On the contrary, he thinks, and his government appear to do the same, that if Prince Frederick should refuse, we are bound to support the Prince of Saxony. It was time to undeceive him in this respect, which I have done, although much to his surprise. He insisted with great force upon the matter, and said he was ordered by his government to declare that they had come to a determination to agree to nothing which did not give a priority of choice to the Saxon Prince; and that this determination was "*ferme, invariable, et irrévocable.*" I only told him that these were not arguments, and that one government might make such declarations as well as another. The only declaration which I would make was, that we would never consent to the nomination of any Prince who did not give us by his character a reasonable security for the welfare of the country, for our own tranquillity, and that of his neighbours. It is very possible that the Saxon Prince, had he been otherwise brought forward, might have been a good choice; and I shall be glad to see what Metternich says about him. The more I think of it, the more probable it appears that he will not accept. He probably is religious; but, at any rate, it will be difficult for a Catholic Prince to change. I know the Greeks well enough to be certain, unless they are greatly changed, that they would as soon have a Turkish Prince as a Roman Catholic. If he preserves his religion, he will be constantly an object of hatred and suspicion; should he change it, and should he afterwards be called to the Crown of Saxony, he would make an odd figure as the member of a family strictly Catholic reigning over a people entirely Protestant. In Greece, I believe that a Protestant Prince might, if so disposed, preserve his religion; for the ignorant and fanatical Greeks only suppose that Protestants are, somehow or other, the enemies of Catholics, which is recommendation enough. On the other hand, he might change, if he thought fit, as among Protestants there are various roads to heaven; but if a Catholic were to leave the only true faith, I apprehend it would consign him to perdition.

Very little was said about Prince Leopold; and although the affair of the marriage is certainly probable, it is still open to considerable doubt. It is perfectly clear that M. de Laval has not a suspicion of the matter. He treated the choice as a proof of the desire of the King of France to do what was agreeable to England, provided the Prince of Saxony should refuse; and grew quite indignant when I observed that, in point of fact, Prince Leopold had been put forward by the King of France in his interview with Matuscewitz, as the person in case of the refusal of the Saxon Prince, and might therefore strictly perhaps be considered as a candidate proposed by

France; especially when it was known that we were anxious for Prince Frederick of the Low Countries. What rather inclines me to doubt the Orleans marriage is the extraordinary zeal with which the Prince of Saxony is supported, which would scarcely be worth while if such an arrangement was in view. This part of the subject was not in the least alluded to by either of us. He wishes to see you, when you come to town; not that he expects a different answer, but his government expect that he should do so. I find that he reckoned upon the support of Lieven; but I told him that the Russian support amounted merely to the advice that it was better to yield to unreasonable people than to oppose them. It is possible that Lieven may have something new for me to-morrow, as I am to see him before leaving town.

I will alter the despatch to Mr. Aston, as you recommend, when it returns from Paris; and I have already done so with that to Lord Cowley.

I enclose a private letter from Prince Metternich to Esterhazy upon the subject of Prince Emile of Hesse Darmstadt, which I rather think that you have already seen, as well as a very excellent description of M. de Laval, which he proposes to show you at Woburn.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[1514.] MEMORANDUM FOR SIR GEORGE MURRAY UPON SENDING A STATEMENT FROM THE BISHOP OF LONDON REGARDING THE WANT OF A CHURCH AT MALTA, AND THE ATTENDANCE OF PROTESTANT SOLDIERS UPON CATHOLIC CEREMONIES.

6th December, 1829.

The paper of which the enclosed is a copy was given to me by the Bishop of London on the 5th instant.

In my opinion the Jesuits' church in Malta ought to be given for the use of the inhabitants professing the creed of the Church of England.

I don't agree in opinion with the Bishop as to the respect shown by the army to the ceremonies of the Church of Rome. But I do object to the order directing that the soldiers employed on the duty on the 10th May should be Roman Catholics.

This order rendered the duty for the soldiers a religious, instead of being, as it was, a military duty. The firing the salute upon the accession of the Pope might as well have been omitted. But the subject is of no consequence. The solemn Irish service was a farce of which the governor ought not to have taken any notice.

The firing a salute on the Eve of St. Lorenzo was quite justifiable.

The practice of having field-days on Sundays should be discontinued.

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

STATEMENT RELATIVE TO THE PROTESTANT CHURCH IN MALTA.

4th December, 1829.

The Bishop of London begs to lay before his Grace the Duke of Wellington the following statement relative to the Protestant residents in Malta.

The Island of Malta has now been in our possession about thirty years; and the English residents there have still to complain of the want of a church. There is indeed a chapel in the governor's palace; but it is scarcely worthy of the name, and is quite insufficient for the accommodation of those who are desirous of attending. The foundation of a new church was at one time actually laid, but the work was discontinued. The Marquess of Hastings applied to the Bishop of Malta respecting the appropriation of a church, formerly belonging to the Jesuits, but now the property of the British government, to the English Protestants. The Bishop is said to have answered that he could not directly sanction such an appropriation, but that the government were at liberty to act as they pleased. Instead, however, of the proposed appropriation of this church it has since been granted for the use of our Roman Catholic soldiers, for whom Divine service is now performed by an Irish priest, in a building greatly exceeding in size what is required for their accommodation. The almost total absence of provision for the decent performance of our Protestant Church service in such a country gives occasion to remark upon the indifference of the English to their national religion.

It is further submitted to the consideration of his Majesty's government, whether the respect which the Protestant soldiery are required to show towards the offices and ceremonies of the Roman Catholic Church be not in some instances carried beyond the point at which expediency should give way to conscience.

On Sunday, the 10th of May last, *Te Deum* was sung in the Cathedral Church at Valetta, in honour of the Pope's accession. The 7th, or Royal Fusiliers, were ordered to furnish the guard of honour in the Cathedral. The order specified that the Roman Catholic soldiers were to be selected for that duty; but the regiment being almost entirely Protestant, the number required was made up from the Protestants who were taken away from their own place of worship and marched to the Roman Catholic Church. On the other hand, by a General Order, Roman Catholic soldiers are not to be required to attend a Protestant Church. The Artillery were on duty at the same time, to fire salutes in honour of the same event, to which there would have been no objection had not these honours been connected with a religious service.

When the intelligence of the Roman Catholic Relief Bill reached Malta, the Irish priest before mentioned obtained permission to celebrate a solemn service in honour of St. Patrick and of Roman Catholic emancipation, and an order that no Roman Catholic soldiers should be on duty that day

(Trinity Sunday). The Protestant soldiers were therefore placed on guard, and the Protestant congregation proportionably diminished. Again, Sunday the 9th of August being the Eve of St. Lorenzo, the Artillery were kept from church to fire salutes in honour of that saint. The having field-days on Sundays (a practice lately introduced) greatly interrupts the attendance on the Protestant service. These statements do not come from a quarter which can be suspected of fanaticism; and if the proceedings in question had been less marked, or had taken place on any other day than Sunday, they would probably have passed without animadversion.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Stowe Hall, near Stradset, 7th December, 1829.

On two points Lord Francis Gower requires an opinion: the course which the government should take with regard to any bill that may hereafter be introduced with respect to the formation of Protestant colonies, or rather the declarations now to be made on that subject; and secondly, the abandonment of or perseverance in the prosecution of Lawless.

On the first point I think it will be better for him to make no declaration at all. The settlement of agricultural labourers, whether Protestant or Catholic, is part of a great question, and I see no reason why we should be called upon two months before the meeting of Parliament to give any opinion whatever either on the principle or the details of a bill, which we have not seen, and about which we know very little.

The question as to the prosecution of Mr. Lawless is a more difficult one. The Irish government, and probably the Irish law officers, are evidently disinclined to the prosecution. It is unfortunate that it has been delayed so long, though I suppose Mr. Lawless had the power to postpone the proceedings.

Before I answer Lord Francis I shall be glad to have your opinion. When last the subject was under our consideration, it was understood that some of the parties opposed to Lawless at Ballybay were under prosecution for matters connected with and growing out of the Ballybay affair.

If their prosecution is still pending, I do not see how we can abandon that against the prime cause of the whole.

Ever most faithfully yours, my dear Duke,

ROBERT PEEL.

[1515.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Stowe, 8th December, 1829.

Upon considering what you stated to me yesterday in the few words that passed between us respecting your conversation with the King, it appears to me that it is necessary to attend to and to take some steps respecting the information which the King gave you.

It appears that the King of Prussia has written to the King to *canvass* his Majesty for his vote for Prince Charles of Mecklenburg to be Sovereign of Greece. His Majesty approves of that Prince, and is desirous that he should be appointed the Prince Sovereign of Greece. His Majesty intends to send you the King of Prussia's letter. But he will write himself to the King of Prussia to inform him that he has sent you the King's letter, and that his Majesty coincides with the King in wishing that Prince Charles may be selected to be Sovereign of Greece.

It is not usual for the King of England to receive from other Sovereigns letters which do not pass through the hands of his ministers. Indeed, I have known instances of letters having been returned because copies were not sent with the sealed letter; the copy being intended for the information of the minister. But it is still more unusual and improper for the King to answer a letter from another Sovereign without the advice of his minister, who, whether he advises or does not, is responsible if he knows of the letter being written.

It is not a very gentlemanlike act for anybody excepting the King's minister to deliver a letter to the King of England from another Sovereign. But I don't know that it is criminal. Like other acts of the same kind, it would be stigmatized by some and approved by others.

We cannot doubt who it is that has committed this act, nor who it is that has advised the King to write an answer.

The question is, can the ministers allow of this transaction passing unnoticed?

The affair upon which this correspondence takes place is not trivial. It is the most important one of the day in foreign affairs, and one in which the honour and interests of this country are materially involved.

Is this correspondence likely to affect the decision of the question remaining for decision, which is neither more nor less than who shall be the Prince Sovereign?

It is impossible that the King's sentiments in favour of Prince Charles should not be known in London, at Paris, at Berlin, and St. Petersburg. At St. Petersburg the wish is that Prince Charles should be the Sovereign. In France it is supposed that the King is not disinclined to Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg. We know this from himself. If this proposi-

tion were made, it would be acquiesced in here and at St. Petersburg. But we know the inclination of the French Cabinet always to adopt the views of the Emperor of Russia, particularly if agreeable to the King of Prussia; and who can believe but that the King of France will disappoint Prince Leopold, and adopt the proposition of Prince Charles for Prince Sovereign as soon as he shall hear that the King has in a letter to the King of Prussia approved of Prince Charles, and that he disapproves of Prince Leopold?

We must then accept Prince Charles or we must quarrel with our Allies; or we must go out. I should prefer the last. But I conceive that we shall not be able to make the world feel the difference between Prince Charles and Prince Leopold, even if we could state it in public. We should be accused then of having resigned in disgust because we could not make Prince Leopold the Sovereign of Greece.

From all this I come to the conclusion that by far the best mode of proceeding is, that either you or I should now have a serious conversation with the King upon this subject. I would point out to him the serious consequences to his brother as well as to himself of this correspondence with the King of Prussia; the manner in which it must affect the public interests and the honour of his government; and the impossibility that any set of men can serve him if he thus publishes to the world that he is of one opinion upon so important a subject and they of the other.

In these views of this case I have left out of the question the intrigues in London, as well as at Paris, which this transaction will occasion.

Rely upon it that the only safe course for us to take is to strike at once at what is a gross unconstitutional irregularity, which may be followed by national inconvenience, injury, and dishonour.

If you think the matter too serious for you to speak to the King upon it, let me know, and I will be in town on Thursday, and will go to Windsor on Friday morning. But you must in the mean time write to the King, and entreat him not to answer the letter from the King of Prussia till he shall have heard from you again.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 8th December, 1829.

I enclose two letters which I have written to Lord Stuart, and to my brother. They may possibly be useful, under the present circumstances I suppose we shall hear from Sir Charles Bagot to-morrow, or the next day, after which I propose to make a fresh move. M. de Laval was here to-day, but had nothing to say upon the subject of Greece, except to renew his proposition respecting Samos, but in which he did not persist. He appeared to expect that he should receive some overture from us, and said that he waited for it; as he did not think that his government would now take any further step.

To cross the Atlantic; you will see by Colonel Campbell's despatches, that a formal demand has been made for our opinion and support, in favour of a monarchy to be constituted, first under King Bolivar, and afterwards under some European Prince; probably a son of the Duke of Orleans. I think the sort of correspondence which is carried on between Colonel Campbell and Bolivar is not quite regular; especially as he does not send his own letters. From the answer of Bolivar it appears that Colonel Campbell must have committed himself too much. To doubt, or remain silent respecting the accession of a French prince is carrying civility to the Liberator rather too far. I enclose a despatch which I addressed to Colonel Campbell so long ago as the 8th of August last, when we first heard of this project. I do not know that there is anything to add to the instructions contained in it at present. Probably Mr. Madrid will shortly make some communication upon the subject.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

I should mention that before the departure of Mr. Turner for Columbia I had a very full conversation with him, and gave him full instructions respecting this scheme of royalty.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1516.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Stowe, 9th December, 1829.

I return *one* letter to Stuart, you did not send any other; that to your brother; and that to Colonel Campbell. I have not yet seen Colonel Campbell's last despatches. We must not allow a French prince to be established any where out of France.

I omitted to mention to you that Samos is an island inhabited by Roman Catholics whom the French *affect* to protect; and they have been more than once suspected of desiring the possession and government of the Island. You will see a curious piece of Mr. Canning's jealousy of their conduct and

views respecting this very Island in his correspondence with Lord Granville just about the period of the signature of the Treaty of the 6th July. We cannot, therefore, be too positive upon this subject.

I don't think that Polignac will pay much attention to our objection to Prince Charles being the same as his to Prince Philip, if he discovers that the King is in favour of Prince Charles. By insisting upon Prince Philip, after Polignac should have waived his objection as applied to Prince Charles, we should probably succeed in obtaining Prince Philip if the King was not in favour of Prince Charles, and should not have declared himself. But if the King should have declared himself, the Russians, and probably the French likewise, would have the additional inducement to insist upon the pretensions of Prince Charles, that their success would be injurious to this government; and that it would mortify Austria.

Rely upon it that our only measure is that which I suggested to you yesterday.

Believe me, &c.,

• WELLINGTON.

[1517.]

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR PEEL,

Stowe, 9th December, 1829.

I return your letters. I think I told you of the Speaker's desire to retire. Indeed I think that I showed you his letter to me upon that subject. I am very happy to find that he is satisfied with what I wrote to him.

I look with suspicion at every proposition which comes from Ireland which has for its object to avoid carrying into execution the law. In my opinion Mr. Lawless was guilty of an outrage which was only just, if at all, short of rebellion. He would have been engaged with the King's troops if General Thornton had not stopped him. The motive for the act was as illegal and unjustifiable as the act itself. I cannot think that we can refrain from prosecuting him without casting a stigma upon Parliament, and even upon ourselves, for having delayed to propose the Concession Bill so long. My opinion is decided that, be the result what it may, he ought to be prosecuted. I don't think that the omission to prosecute the persons guilty of outrages in Monaghan ought to influence the decision of government.

I agree with you about these Colonies. We ought not now to pronounce any opinion. If these Colonies are to be established in England or Ireland, those who are to direct and govern them will require powers to enable them to do so, which I suspect no British Legislature would grant. We ought to see in detail what they ask, and what means they possess of attaining their object, before we give any opinion. I don't think that Mr. Blacker gave his real opinion to Archdeacon Singleton in the conversation reported by Lord Francis.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 9th December, 1829.

As your messenger is impatient to start, I will only delay him to say that I will write to you again to-night, after having reflected a little upon your letter which I have just received. That something must be done is clear, but we must also be careful not to make a false step. The Duke of Cumberland was at Windsor again yesterday, contrary to his usual custom, which is to go there every Saturday and Sunday. Indeed he had only left Windsor on Monday morning.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 9th December, 1829.

The case is not quite so bad as you suppose, although it is quite bad enough. The letter in question is not written by the King of Prussia, nor is it addressed to the King. It is written by some person who has a German name which I could not very well make out, and which I never heard of before, but who the King told me was employed in matters of the strictest confidence. The letter was addressed either to the Duke or Duchess of Cumberland, but I could not make out during the hasty perusal which the King allowed. As he more than once said that I should have a copy of it the next day, I did not insist further. The King certainly treated the letter as that of the King of Prussia, and began his conversation with me by saying that he had just received a proposition from the King of Prussia. The manner in which this has been managed is less objectionable as to form, than if the correspondence had been direct.

Esterhazy tells me that he was at Kew yesterday, and that the Duke, when he came from Windsor, said that he had been for three hours closeted with the King; but did not mention the name of Prince Charles of Mecklenburg. The Duchess asked Esterhazy what he thought of the duration

of the French ministry ; and before he could answer, the Duke interrupted him by saying he was certain it could not last ; but he was still more certain that the English ministry could not, and he was ready to bet to any amount that it would fall first.

Upon reflecting a little upon the contents of your letter, it seems to me that there are two things to be done, one of which may be said to belong to me, and the other to you. I should think it too serious an affair for me to go with a general remonstrance upon the conduct of the King towards his government ; and upon his manner of conducting business through irresponsible persons. This perhaps might more properly come from you, and certainly would do so with more effect. But it is my duty to protest against any interference in the management of this particular affair of the Prince ; and to show the King the mischief which he is doing, and all the objections to the course which he proposes to adopt. This can scarcely be done without blame being pretty clearly imputed, which must therefore be well understood. From your letter, I imagine that you think my going down would be the natural course ; and wishing to do whatever is right, I have resolved to do so to-morrow morning, as no time should be lost. I shall write to night to say that I propose to be at Windsor to-morrow ; and I will let you know on my return what is the result. The business is far from agreeable certainly, but it is not fair that everything of this kind should fall upon you.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[1518.]

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 10th December, 1829.

I have never read anything like this. It would be very desirable to ask him who made enquiries *at the Castle* respecting Mr. Cahill, and from whom ? and whether it is usual for him to receive and act upon recommendations of gentlemen to be justices of the peace *lithographed* according to a form, the blank filled up by the name of the gentleman recommended ; and the paper only signed by him who recommends ? and likewise whether it is usual to nominate as a justice of the peace a man of whom it is reported that he had been liberated from prison under the Insolvent Act, without previous enquiry whether he was in such pecuniary circumstances as would render him independent and respectable, even though the report of his liberation from prison for debt under the Insolvent Act was not founded.

I don't wonder at the Irish gentlemen being displeased with such a Lord Chancellor.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

[1519.]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 10th December, 1829.

A few moments after I wrote to you on Monday from Windsor that nothing of a discordant nature had passed in my interview with the King, I found that his Majesty had been not very good-humoured in his conversation with the Lord Chancellor, and that his interview with Lord Aberdeen was far from being agreeable.

He observed to the Lord Chancellor that he understood that there were several names of Roman Catholics on the list of sheriffs. That he had not mentioned the subject to me as the affair was in his Lordship's department, and he did not wish to have any unpleasant discussion with me which was not necessary. But his Majesty desired to be understood as declaring that he would not appoint any of those gentlemen to be high sheriffs.

I don't understand that the Lord Chancellor made any answer. I should say that the right course to be taken now is not to notice the declaration ; but to bring the Roll of Sheriffs regularly before him with all its imperfections ; and to advise him to act in respect to it as he has upon all former occasions.

The King told Lord Aberdeen that he had had an application from the King of Prussia to give his vote to Prince Charles of Mecklenburg for the office of Sovereign of Greece ; and that he should answer the King of Prussia and inform him that he had given the letter to his minister, and that he approved of Prince Charles.

I had no opportunity of speaking to Lord Aberdeen after he had communicated to me the purport of this conversation. I wrote to him from Stowe on Tuesday ; and I pointed out to him the irregularity of this communication from Sovereign to Sovereign through the hands of a private individual, the Duke of Cumberland ; and the inconvenience and injury which would be the consequence of this unconstitutional and irregular communication on the future negotiation of the Greek affair ; and I told him that either he or I must have a communication with the King upon the subject. He went to Windsor this day. The letter in question is from the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz to the Duke of Cumberland, written, as he says, by desire of the King of Prussia, desiring that the Duke would, in the name of the King of Prussia, canvass

the King for his vote for Prince Charles. The King has given Lord Aberdeen a copy of the letter. After some discussion he promised Lord Aberdeen that he would authorize no answer excepting of civility to Prince Charles, that he was in negotiation with his Allies respecting the Sovereignty of Greece, and that he had given the Grand Duke's letter to his minister.

Then the King gave information to his minister of the application, has since given a copy of the application, and has promised that the answer shall be a proper one; but I don't think that this goes far enough. In my opinion Lord Aberdeen ought to state what has passed in a despatch to Sir Brook Taylor, ought to inform him of the King's answer, and desire him to convey it to the King of Prussia. One advantage of this mode of proceeding will I hope be, that it will come out that the King of Prussia never authorized such a communication and most probably that the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg never wrote the letter of which Lord Aberdeen has the copy. At all events we shall stand on our proper ground, and we shall probably avoid the inconvenience in the negotiations respecting the Sovereign for Greece, which this transaction was calculated to occasion.

I have spoken to Lord Aberdeen, who will write the despatch and send it to Windsor.

I went to Stowe, as Holmes will probably have told you, very much to please Lord Chandos.

The Duke received me remarkably well; and in very few minutes after my arrival assured me of his determination to support the government.

He the next day desired to have a conversation with me; in which he informed me that his object was to be Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. I told him that I could not hold out to him expectations that he would be so employed, or even that I would talk to the King on the subject. That all that I could say was that I was informed by himself that he wished to be Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. He repeated his determination to support the government even though he should not be appointed Lord-Lieutenant.

Nous verrons !

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the King of Spain.

[1520.]

SIRE,

À Londres, ce 11 Décembre 1829.

Je saisis l'occasion du départ de Monsieur Addington pour se rendre à Madrid pour me rappeler au souvenir de votre Majesté, et pour présenter mes félicitations très-humbles et très-sincères sur son prochain mariage.

Je désire que cette union puisse faire le bonheur de votre Majesté, ainsi que de son peuple.

Je souhaite que votre Majesté soit satisfaite du choix que sa Majesté Britannique a fait de Monsieur Addington pour la représenter à la Cour de votre Majesté en qualité de son ministre plénipotentiaire. Votre Majesté peut s'assurer qu'il plaira au Roi, son maître, en proportion que par ses bons offices il pourra raffermir la paix, la bonne intelligence et l'harmonie qui existent entre les deux nations.

Je prie votre Majesté de me croire, avec le dévouement et l'attachement à sa personne le plus sincère,

Son très-fidèle et très-zélé serviteur,

WELLINGTON, DUQUE DE CIUDAD RODRIGO.

To Lord Beresford.

[1521.]

MY DEAR BERESFORD,

London, 12th December, 1829.

I have perused the enclosed papers. All that Perkins contracts to do is to show a machine which is equally applicable to war as cannon. He before showed a machine equally applicable to war as a musquet. But I believe the whole world now agree that it is not applicable excepting in certain situations, and that at an expense which would render it scarcely possible to use it.

I besides believe that it would have been found that, for a minute or two, for the purpose of show, this machine might answer tolerably. But that it would not have fired for an hour, much less for a day. But this observation is referable to the trial which the Committee would give of the machine under your instructions, which are in your own breast.

I think that you should call upon Mr. Perkins to specify what he means. The weight of shot he would throw ; to what distances ; and for how long a period of time he would keep up

his fire without interruption. You might also call upon him to state generally the weight of the machinery. You might tell him that all this is important, because these are, of course, points upon which you must instruct the Committee to Report, and that it is desirable for them (Perkins and Co.) that they should be known beforehand, in order that, in case the machine should not be found applicable to war in consequence of the state in which it is on any one of the points enumerated, they may not unnecessarily open their secret, and incur a large expense.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1522.]

To Lord Francis Leveson Gower.

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS,

London, 12th December, 1829.

Mr. Peel sent me some days ago your correspondence with the Lord Chancellor respecting the appointment of Mr. ——— to the commission of the peace of the County of Clare, upon which I have given him my opinion, and he will probably apprise you of it.

In the mean time, however, I heard by accident this evening that, although Mr. ——— had not been liberated from confinement in a prison under the Insolvent Act, he had been a shopkeeper and had been a bankrupt. He has no property in the County of Clare. Surely such a man ought not to be appointed a magistrate in any county whatever, and he ought to be removed from the Bench.

I recommend magistrates for three districts in this country; the County of Hants, the Tower Hamlets, and the Cinque Ports. But I make it a rule never to recommend a gentleman to the Lord Chancellor whose presence and assistance on the Bench would not be agreeable to the other magistrates performing their duty in the same division, or in the same Petty Sessions.

That which would disgust gentlemen from the performance of a public duty in England, we may rely upon it, must be prejudicial to Ireland. We cannot expect that gentlemen of fortune and character in the County of Clare will sit on the Bench as justices with a bankrupt shopkeeper. I would not;

nor do I know a gentleman that would ; and I am convinced that the Lord Chancellor cannot render to that part of the country a more acceptable service, than to rectify his error by striking the name of Mr. ——— out of the commission of the peace.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Stowe Hall, 12th December, 1829.

I have just got your letter respecting the King's communications at Windsor with the Chancellor and Lord Aberdeen.

I shall return to town to remain there early next week.

I doubt the King's adherence to his declarations to the Chancellor with respect to the non-appointment of Roman Catholic Sheriffs. He will hardly break with us on a point on which we shall be so decidedly in the right.

We have had nothing whatever to do with the nomination of Roman Catholic gentlemen on the Roll of Sheriffs. That was the act of the King's Protestant judges, who felt it to be their duty to give effect to the declared intentions of the Legislature, and present to the King the names of Roman Catholics in common with Protestants, for the appointment of Sheriff.

My decided opinion is that we ought to imitate the example of the judges, and whatever the King may say, to presume that he will not *personally* stand in the way of the execution of a public measure to which as King he has been a party. Depend upon it when the time comes he will discover that this is a question on which the government must have the support of Parliament. If *we* were to deprive the Roman Catholics of the advantages of our own act, the judges having voluntarily so far as they were concerned given them the fair benefit of it, we should be condemning ourselves.

I quite agree as to the course you propose to take in the Greek affair.

The Duke of Cumberland has no sort of influence over public opinion in this country, or over any party that is worth consideration. I do not believe that the most violent Brunswickers have the slightest respect for him, or slightest confidence in him.

I think we should be particularly careful to exclude him from all interference, through private influence over the King, with the public measures of the government. You may rely on my cordial concurrence in any measures, however decided, that are necessary for this purpose, whenever a case arises (as it has arisen in my opinion in the Greek case) of sufficient importance to bear us out.

Ever most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

[1523.]

To Lord Heytesbury.

MY DEAR LORD,

The Deepdene, 15th December, 1829.

Having seen your despatch to Lord Aberdeen upon his No. 22, and your private letter to his Lordship of the 27th November, I am anxious to write to you a few words. This government declared its intention of stating its opinion upon the result of the war when it refrained from delivering any upon its commencement and its causes, and it failed in prevailing upon his Imperial Majesty to continue at peace. It was under the necessity, on this ground alone, of stating its opinion. His Imperial Majesty's ministers to the last moment declined to explain themselves to this government upon the terms on which his Imperial Majesty would make peace; and I observed that his Excellency Count Nesselrode informed your Excellency, at the period at which the intelligence of the conclusion of peace first reached St. Petersburg, that his Imperial Majesty was disposed to modify certain of its articles. We waited for a considerable time to see what should be these modifications; of which the necessity was apparent, or his Imperial Majesty would not have declared his intention of making them. But having, even up to this moment, heard of none, these two circumstances, viz., the state of ignorance in which we were left during the war of the terms of peace which would be dictated, and the acknowledged necessity for modification, which has not been granted, are other reasons for which this government is bound to state its opinion upon the peace.

The war was undertaken to obtain compensation for injuries received; and security against the repetition of such injury. His Imperial Majesty's ministers always refused to enter into details respecting their intentions on either point. But they professed moderation, and repeatedly declared their intention not to make conquests, not to add an inch to the dominions of his Imperial Majesty; and his Imperial Majesty's persuasion that it did not suit the policy of his government to destroy the government of the Porte or its independence.

This government admits, and has admitted even in the despatch No. 22, that if the Treaty of Peace is to be considered only in relation to the *status quo* of the belligerents at the period it was negotiated and signed, it is moderate. The Grand Seignior, his family, his government, his capital, his

arsenals, and everything belonging to him, were at that moment in the power of the Emperor of Russia. But that is not the view in which we think the Treaty ought to be considered. We think that it ought to be considered in relation to the Emperor's previous professions and promises; particularly by this government, which professed its intention of not delivering its opinion, till the peace should be concluded; which was kept in the dark upon the terms intended to be dictated, till those terms were actually concluded and signed; and to which hopes have been held out of an inclination to modify those terms.

After such a war it is not easy to discover the terms of peace, which would leave the Porte in a state to exercise with independence the powers of its government. But this I must say, that if the negotiators of the Treaty of Peace—instead of keeping steadily in view his Imperial Majesty's professions and promises; his professions to maintain the independence of the Porte; his promises not to add to his dominions; and his Imperial Majesty's relations with his Allies, particularly England and France, whose governments have expressed an anxious interest to maintain the independent existence of the government of the Porte—had desired to destroy that government by the demands of Russia, by the weakness in which they have left it to resist these demands, and by the surrender of the independent exercise of powers, without which no government can exist in a state of independence, they would have dictated exactly the Treaty which has been concluded.

There is one point however upon which our interests in the Mediterranean particularly require that this government should have explanation. That is, the right of the Porte to regulate the resort of ships of war to its own waters.

This is a point upon which all the Powers of the Mediterranean must feel an interest; and we must know whether the Porte is, or is not, independent of Russia in the exercise of the powers of government in relation to it.

But all these considerations are sufficiently detailed in Lord Aberdeen's despatch, and I should not have troubled you upon the subject at all if I had not, previously to his departure, had a confidential conversation with Count Matuscewitz, in which I did not advert to these topics. I refrained from doing so purposely; and I wish to apprise your Lordship of the reason.

First. He never spoke to me upon the subject of the Peace ; nor I to him, excepting generally to express my anxiety that the Emperor would find means to calm the uneasiness which was felt, and would be felt, respecting the consequences of this Peace. I believe these are the very words that I made use of.

Secondly. I knew that there was no use in speaking to him upon the subject as he would have no authority to speak to me upon it.

Thirdly. I knew that I could say nothing to Count Matuscewicz which he would not consider it his duty to mention to Prince Lieven. If we are to have any discussion with his Imperial Majesty's government upon this subject, and particularly if that discussion is to be carried on in the temper which Count Nesselrode has manifested in the first interview, it is desirable that it should be kept secret as long as possible. I knew that any mention of the subject to Prince Lieven would immediately be communicated to four parties in this country for the purpose of exciting an opposition to the government. Whether we shall eventually have that opposition, or we shall not, is not the question. I considered it desirable to prevent parties from being excited *prematurely* upon this subject ; and therefore did not converse with Count Matuscewicz because I knew that he must repeat what I said to Prince and Princess Lieven.

I give you this explanation of my conduct authorizing you to make such use of it as you may think proper, if you think it necessary. At the same time telling you that I desire to be understood as making no complaint of Prince and Princess Lieven. They have a right to talk to whom they please ; and to do what they please for the service of the Emperor.

But I must act accordingly.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 15th December, 1829.

According to the enclosed interception from M. de Polignac, the Duc de Laval sent Lieven to me yesterday evening to talk upon the two points referred to. Upon the character of an English prince I told him there could be little difficulty ; for although all the declarations in the world

would not get rid of the fact of Prince Leopold having married the daughter of the King of England, I took for granted that when he became the sovereign of an independent State, all personal connection with England must necessarily cease; and that his relation could be no other than that of a political alliance.

With respect to the pension, he treated the matter rather differently, and more rationally, than appears in Polignac's instruction; for he did not contemplate the possibility of the pension being resigned. He was quite satisfied with the assurance that the pension of Prince Leopold was as much beyond the control of the Royal, or any other authority of the State, as the most absolutely existing right could be. It was equally protected by the law; and could not be affected except by the Supreme Power by which laws were made. I told him that we should be ready to give the French government such satisfaction upon these points as should be thought reasonable and proper.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 18th December, 1829.

I enclose rather a remarkable letter from Lord Stuart, just at the present moment, upon the subject of the communication between members of our Opposition and Pozzo. My despatch relating to the article in the 'Foreign Quarterly Review,' will come very à propos; and I hope, as the matter has already engaged the attention of Polignac, that he may be disposed to take some means of fixing the blame in the right quarter. The article has caused a good deal of discussion here, and especially at Holland House. Rogers tells me that Mackintosh speaks slightly of the performance; and that he does not think any of them know who is the author; although all agree that it is written by some person who has been furnished with his materials by Pozzo. This supposition agrees with the assertion of the editor; that the papers were not communicated to the writer by any person in this country.

I also send another letter from Bagot, who seems rather less alarmed than when he wrote last. The newspaper which he encloses is certainly violent enough; but the message of the King appears to be judicious and moderate, and it may be hoped will have the desired effect.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

India Board, 19th December, 1829.

I have addressed the enclosed letter to the Foreign Office requesting that information may be obtained as to the movements of the Russians in the Caspian, &c.

A copy of the letter will be sent to Sir J. Macdonald, and he will be instructed to obtain similar information.

The Chairs lend themselves most willingly to the project of repelling the Russian commerce from Cabul and Bokhara, by carrying our goods directly up the Indus.

Instructions upon that point will be ready to go by the first ship in January, and the attention of the commercial department will be immediately given to the preparation of a proper cargo.

The presents to be sent in the King's name to Runjeet Singh, in return for presents received a year and more ago, will ascend the Indus and the Ranee to Lahore.

It has occurred to me that Mr. Fraser, a Madras officer, and a very able man, who has published 'Travels in Khorasan,' and who has studied the geography of Central Asia, would be a very fit person to have charge of the commercial venture up the Indus; but I am not quite sure where he is. Means have been taken to find him.

The Chairs enter thoroughly into your view of the nature of the danger to be apprehended from the advance of the Russians towards the frontier of India. I have made them see it as a question of expense.

Sir George Murray's brother, who is Resident at Umballa, and acquainted with Runjeet Singh, will probably be the envoy to Lahore.

Major Barnewall, who was recently sent to England by Sir J. Malcolm on the affair of the Supreme Court, will I think be the envoy to Scinde.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

To John Backhouse, Esq.

SIR,

India Board, 18th December, 1829.

I am directed by the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to request that you will move the Earl of Aberdeen to obtain information for the Board upon the following points:

The amount of tonnage in the several ports of the Caspian.

The number of vessels employed in that sea for commercial purposes, and the number and force of those belonging to the Russian navy.

The value of the several articles of export and import.

The route taken by the caravans to Bokhara, the length of time occupied on the journey to Bokhara, the nature of the country through which the route lies.

The number of camels and of other beasts of burthen of which the caravans consist.

The number of journeys taken in each year; the value of the several articles of export and import by this trade.

The Board are desirous of having information upon all these points for as many years back as it can be obtained, that they may be enabled to judge of the increase or diminution of the trade both on the Caspian and by the caravans.

They wish to receive an annual report upon all these subjects in the fullest detail, and I am directed to request that you will move the Earl of Aberdeen to give instructions for the annual transmission of such a report in the month of December.

The Board wish to receive the first report it may be possible to make at

as early a period as may be consistent with the attainment of correct information.

It would be very satisfactory to the Board if it should be possible not only to obtain the information above specified without exciting any observation, but in the same manner to find channels of communication through which the earliest intelligence may be conveyed of any movement of a military nature which may be made by the Russians on the Caspian or in its vicinity, and of any establishments which may be formed by them on the eastern shore of the Caspian, having professedly a commercial object.

The Board are likewise desirous of being informed whether any progress has been made by the Russians towards the northern shore of the Sea of Aral, or any attempt made to form establishments in that quarter, or on any of the streams which flow into that sea.

They wish to receive the earliest intelligence should any such attempts be made hereafter, and the fullest details respecting them.

It will be at all times a matter of much interest to the Board to obtain full and correct information as to the military and political situation of the States of Khiva, Bokhara, and Khokand, and as to the nature and extent of any commerce carried on by the subjects of Russia with the people of those countries, and it will be a source of satisfaction to them should means be found for keeping them constantly informed upon these points.

I remain, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

ELLENBOROUGH.

To Mr. Planta.

[1524.]

MY DEAR PLANTA,

Stratfield Saye, 20th December, 1829.

I agree in opinion with those who think that a lie perseveringly told passes with the world for truth, if not contradicted. But we must not be too sensitive, nor allow our organ to speak with too much authority.

I have no objection to the paragraph of Friday, nor to that proposed for to-morrow. But I would add to the latter that this story proceeds from the authors of all the lies published throughout the summer and autumn in the 'Morning Journal' and 'Standard.'

They reported that the government was broken up; that the ministers were treating with other parties, particularly with Brunswickers; that Mr. Peel had resigned, &c., &c.; repeating all their remarkable lies during the recess; and say that this intention of interfering with the property and doctrine of the Church, or with the Church Liturgy, is as well founded as each of the other stories, that is to say, has no foundation whatever, excepting in the malevolent wishes of the original projector.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Worthing, 21st December, 1829.

My wish to establish a quicker communication between England and India has led the Court to direct the preparation of the enclosed memorandum, which will, I think, interest you. I have requested them to have a memorandum prepared by the same person upon the navigation of the Indus, and upon the internal and external commerce of Bokhara. For this there are ample materials.

I have likewise requested the Foreign Office to obtain information from the Consuls as to the route from Beles on the Euphrates to Latakiah, which seems the best route from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean, and likewise as to the route from Suez to Lake Menzaleh and old Pelusium; while the Admiralty have been requested to obtain a report as to the practicability of vessels remaining off Pelusium.

From the accounts I have obtained, I am satisfied that the difficulties of navigating the Red Sea by means of steamboats are overrated in the memorandum.

The chief information as to the Red Sea has been hitherto obtained from persons who were in Arab vessels, which always hug the land where all the shoals are. The middle passage is safe, and all the dangers are visible.

I requested information from the Foreign Office a long time ago as to every point connected with the ordinary water from Alexandria to Suez and Kosseir. I fear that in the present and probable state of the country from Bussorah to Latakiah, there would be no security for the safe passage of a steamboat and messengers. The route by the Red Sea to Suez and across to Pelusium, would be quite safe.

I am afraid the experiment of ascending the Red Sea in a steamboat will not have been tried this year. We have heard that she was damaged on the voyage from Madras to Ceylon, and obliged to remain there to refit.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING THE APPLICATION OF STEAM NAVIGATION TO THE
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS OF INDIA.

East India House, 10th November, 1829.

1. The Bengal government has caused an experimental voyage on the Ganges, to and from Allahabad, to be performed by the *Hooghly* steam-vessel. The Bombay government has communicated to the Court its intention of sending the *Enterprise* steam-vessel to Suez on the 15th November next. Mr. T. Waghorn has proposed to repeat the experiment of steam navigation round the Cape of Good Hope, and has received some encouragement from the Court: but he has postponed the execution of his purpose in consequence of not receiving the encouragement he solicited from the Post-office.

2. The possibility of sending despatches by steam-vessels on the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates, with a land transit from either Bir or Beles on that river to either Scanderoon or Latakiah on the Mediterranean, has not yet been

brought into discussion, but it is worthy of consideration in connection with the general subject.

I. Steam Navigation on the Ganges.

3. The proposed uses of steam navigation on the Ganges are these:—

First: To transport treasure, which is now conveyed at great risk, both from the navigation and from other causes. The latter render necessary a very large escort. Thirty-eight lacs of the Gwalior loan were escorted from Agra to Calcutta by an entire battalion. A steamer would only require a common Havildar's guard. The dangers of the navigation to the common river boats are so great, that the rates of insurance at Calcutta on a voyage to Allahabad are the same as on a voyage to London. Native, and other mercantile remittances of treasure, might be made by the government steamers. The facility of sending bullion from Benares to Calcutta, and receiving coin within a moderate time in return, would supersede the necessity for the Benares mint.

Second: To convey officers proceeding to join their regiments, or otherwise travelling by water on duty, who now receive a boat allowance according to their rank.

Third: To transport European troops and stores to the Western provinces.

Fourth: To carry the bhanjee or parcel dawk (sufficient celerity for the letter dawk appears unattainable).

Fifth: To convey stamped paper to the different district stations, for which an establishment of four expensive boats is at present kept up.

4. The profit or saving under these several heads is confidently expected to render an efficient steam navigation on the Ganges beneficial to government, even in a pecuniary point of view, independently of its other manifest advantages.

5. The *Hooghly* steam-vessel* ascended the Ganges in the rainy season to Allahabad (about 800 miles) in twenty days of twelve hours each, anchoring as many hours at night. She returned in ten days of twelve hours each. The vessel was ill-constructed, swam when full loaded eight inches † deeper by the head than the stern, and did not well answer the helm. The Governor-General anticipates that with better arrangements, and more experience of the river, the voyage may be performed in the rainy season in fifteen days, and eight days down (days of twelve hours each) with either of the present river steamers (*Hooghly* and *Burrampooter*), and, of course, more expeditiously with better vessels.

6. A second experimental voyage was to be performed in the dry season, the *Hooghly* having previously undergone some necessary alterations.

7. Eight hundred miles in twenty days is forty miles per day. The American steamboats ascend the Mississippi and Ohio at the rate of 120 to 140 miles per day,‡ having high pressure engines and wood fuel. The latter is of no advantage, but from its local abundance; but high-pressure engines seem essential to very great success in the upward navigation of powerful rivers.

* *Hooghly* steam-vessel: engines, two of 25-horse power; length on deck, 105 feet 2 inches; breadth, 18 feet; tonnage, 158; draught when full laden, 4 feet; number of hours' fuel, country coal, 84; consumption per hour, 8 maunds 25 seers, or 709 lbs.

† Aft, 3 feet 10 inches; forward, 4 feet 6 inches.

‡ They go from New Orleans to Louisville, upwards of 1400 miles, in ten or twelve days.

8. The Governor-General says: "All the objects in view seem hardly attainable, except by the use of high-pressure engines. Modern discovery in Europe may perhaps have succeeded in preventing the danger hitherto belonging to the use of this description of engines, and the Honourable Court should be solicited for information on this important point: but there seems to be no objection whatever to the use of a high-pressure engine in a separate vessel to be used as a tug, by which all apprehension for the safety of the crew and cargo would be averted. The division of the burden would remove all the obstacles to complete success in the deficiency of room both for fuel and for passengers. The second experimental voyage will prove the practicability of tugging, and if established, no time will be lost in begging of the Court to send out the necessary engines."

9. Tug-boats would undoubtedly have many advantages if they should be found consistent with celerity. The smaller draught of water, and the complete separation of the passengers from the heat of the engine, would be among the greatest. The danger of high-pressure engines appears to be removed by Mr. Gurney's tubular boilers.

10. The principle of the high-pressure engine is this; steam at 212 degrees is a balance to the atmosphere, and has no force against a piston moving in air; but moves a piston into a vacuum with a power of from 14 to 15 lbs. on the square inch. If the steam be heated to 245 degrees, it exerts a power of 30 lbs. on the square inch, and has therefore the same power against air as it before had against a vacuum. The condenser and its cistern, the air-pump, the cold water pump, all the apparatus for forming the vacuum, are thus rendered unnecessary, and the high-pressure steam engine is accordingly a much more simple, compact, and cheap machine than the condensing one, and is not above one-sixth of the weight. There is besides some economy of fuel, and a great saving of the power which is lost in the low-pressure engine by friction and resistance. The only argument against its general use is the danger from the explosion of its boiler. Plans for obviating this danger have been brought forward by several persons, especially Mr. Perkins, Mr. Gurney, and Mr. James. Captain Ross thus enumerates the advantages of Mr. Gurney's invention:—

"1st. Safety from explosion: the tubes, which are only three inches in circumference, are made so strong that they will bear a pressure of 1000 lbs. to the inch; the steam-separators, junction pipes, and indeed every part which contains steam are in proportion, so that high-pressure steam can be worked without the least probability of bursting the boiler or any other explosion; and should it burst, the quantity of water it contains is so small as to be incapable of doing any mischief.

"2nd. The boiler is only one-twentieth of the weight compared to that in use on the principle of Boulton and Watt, and it occupies only one-third of the space.

"3rd. The saving in fuel, taking all circumstances into consideration, will be more than one-third.

"4th. The steam can be always got up in ten minutes from lighting the fire, whereas in other boilers from one to two hours are necessary.

"5th. The boilers, and indeed the whole of the apparatus, except the shaft and paddle-wheels for propelling, can be placed completely out of the reach of shot, *i.e.* under the water line.

"6th. This boiler is less liable to get out of repair, and when damaged will be much more easily repaired than the common boiler. One of its tubes being broken is of no consequence, as it can be immediately plugged up, when only one thirty-sixth part of the power of that boiler will be lost, or a two-

hundredth part of an engine with six boilers of 80 or 100-horse power, all which has been proved by an experience of near two years, so as to have put the question beyond all doubt, because boilers on this construction have been in constant use during that period, at his own manufactory near the Regent's Park, as well as at various other places."

11. The rapidity with which the salt is deposited in the tubes, the inconvenience and difficulty of removing it, and its corrosive effects on the tubes, render the use of sea-water impossible in these high-pressure engines. Whether they can be rendered available to naval purposes by Mr. Gurney's contrivance for economising the expenditure of fresh water by condensing the steam and returning the water to the boiler, need not be considered in this place. Their applicability to rivers is unquestionable.

12. The *Hooghly* appears to be by no means a well built vessel, and to be not worth any extensive alterations. Vessels of better construction will, of course, produce better results. The smallest possible draught of water is eminently desirable, but a smaller draught of water than four feet is stated to be scarcely compatible with low-pressure engines of 50-horse power, which is said (though the reason is not given) to be the lowest degree of power that can be employed economically.

13. "The result of the present expedition," says Captain Prinsep, "has furnished sufficient data to prove both the advantage and ease of steam navigation in point of celerity and security, over every other method at present in use upon the Ganges. The trial was perhaps made under every possible disadvantage. The vessel having to struggle with the strongest currents in her way up, and in her way back, the river being rapidly on the decline, the daily fall of the upper river, where the chief danger of grounding was apprehended, being by measurement nearly one foot per diem. That she has triumphed even against such great odds there can be no question, and the way in which she succeeded in extricating herself from the sands on the only two occasions of her touching the ground in the return voyage, is evidence sufficient both of her strength and of the capability of such a vessel."

14. To what extent steam navigation can be carried on the Ganges, the Jumna, and their tributary streams, remains to be ascertained.

15. "The Ganges, above its confluence with the Jumna, is a stream of shoals and rapids." The navigation appears to be full of difficulties in the dry season through the whole of the upward course of the river; but the first six miles above the confluence, from the fort of Allahabad to Papanow appear to be most notoriously formidable.*

* "Of the difficulty of passing the Ganges," says Captain Smith, "in the first six miles above the Fort, the causes, I fear, are such as will not warrant my holding out strong expectations of their removal. The principal obstruction is felt at the junction of the rivers, where the large body of sand and earthy matter brought down by the current, particularly of the Ganges, is deposited near the eddies, and back-water is again suspended by the stream, as the rivers rising and falling, as they are constantly doing, in different levels, alternately disturb each other, and again deposited in new situations, thus forming at the entrance of the Ganges from the united rivers a shallow and continually shifting bar. From its confluence upwards the Ganges runs between banks more widely separated than below, here three miles apart; through this expanse of sand the diminished stream of the dry season winds its way with strong current, but neither deep nor settled channel, the waste of sand bank presenting less resistance to the lateral cutting of the river than the bottom does to its deepening the channel. A substratum of konkur in clay

16. The voyage up the Ganges may still, it appears, be extended to Cawnpore during at least the rainy season. The proposal of lateral canals in the upper part of the Ganges will not, it is presumed, be seriously entertained by the Government under present circumstances, but the Court will perhaps do well in positively interdicting any such operations without the sanction of the home authorities.

17. The expense of the voyage to Allahabad and back, estimating the prime cost of the vessel and outfit at 140,000 rupees, and including wear and tear and all other expenses, is calculated by Captain Johnson at rupees 5000 per mensem, and the probable return at rupees 7000 or 8000.

II. Communication between India and Europe.

1. Route by the Cape of Good Hope.

18. The experiment of steam navigation round the Cape of Good Hope has been tried by the *Enterprize*. The following abstract from her log gives a compendious view of the results of this experiment.

19. The *Enterprize* left the land August 16th, 1825, and arrived at Diamond Harbour December 7th, having made the passage in 113 days 17 hours.

Of this time she was at anchor 10 days 15 hours,

Under steam	62	"	23	"
Under sail	40	"	3	"
	113		17	

She was therefore actually under weigh 103 days.

The greatest run by sail in twenty-four hours was 211 miles; the least, 39 miles; the greatest by steam, assisted with sail, 225 miles; the least by steam, 80 miles.

The greatest heat in the engine-room during the voyage was 105°, the air at the same time being 84½°.

The length of her route is about 13,700 miles; the consumption of coal was 580 chaldrons; about 9 chaldrons per day (64 days including an excursion at the Cape); the utmost speed of the engines in calm 8 knots, and by the log 9 knots; the additional knot by the log being occasioned by the wash of the paddles.

20. The *Enterprize*, it appears, was 113 days from leaving the land to reaching Diamond harbour.* Mr. Waghorn expresses himself certain that if she had had more depôts she would have performed the voyage in ninety days, and that in another steam-vessel (under his own management) he could perform it in seventy. He proposes to have depôts of coal at St. Helena, the Cape, Trincomalee, and Madras.

21. By another plan it is supposed possible to reach Calcutta in sixty days by a vessel of 1000 tons burthen, carrying 800 tons of coal, and not touching at any port in her way.

22. Captain Ross's observations on long voyages by steam-ships are worthy of attention under this head.

probably checks the action of the water in deepening its bed; it is scarcely, however, discernible, the bottom of the channel having usually a layer of rolling sand."

"7. The preceding account will be found not so much that of a river having its navigation impeded by rapids of defined extent, as of one generally of tedious and laborious navigation."

* The *Betsey*, from Bourdeaux, which sailed about the same time, was, according to Captain McKonochie, three days less on her passage than the *Enterprize*.

II.—2. *Route from Bombay by the Red Sea and Alexandria.*

23. The Bombay government in 1823 proposed to the Court to establish a steam-packet communication by this route. They supposed that the whole distance might be accomplished in thirty-four days, allowing three days for crossing the Isthmus, and thirty-one days for the sea voyage of 6000 miles (3000 from Bombay to Suez, and 3000 from Alexandria to Portsmouth) at an average rate of eight miles an hour; and in a still shorter period if the packets were sent through France from a port on the European side of the Mediterranean.

24. The Bombay government renewed this proposition in 1826, but the Court were not disposed to act on the suggestion.

25. Sir John Malcolm has recently announced his intention of sending the *Enterprize* on the 15th November from Bombay to Suez.

26. Supposing the *Enterprize* to perform the voyage at the same rate as her voyage to Calcutta, she would reach Suez in twenty-four days from Bombay. She will have the advantage of the most favourable season; but still this calculation supposes that she will run on by night as well as by day; and either the navigation of the Red Sea has been very much misrepresented, or this is not practicable without imminent danger from the coral reefs with which that sea abounds.

27. "The navigation of the Red Sea," says Ali Bey, "is dreadful. We sailed almost continually among banks of rocks, above and under water, so that we were obliged to have a guard of four or five men upon the prow, who examined the course attentively, and who cried to the steersman to steer to the right or left." "All the shoals of the Red Sea," says Tuckey, "are composed of coral, which is in such abundance that travellers have, with their usual exaggeration, compared its bottom to a vast submarine forest." The observation of the same writer, "that the reefs which line the shore oblige ships to keep at too great a distance in the night to profit by the land wind" when the monsoons are adverse, seems, however, to imply that the middle passage is always safe, and if so, it will almost always be practicable for a powerful steam-vessel. "The improvement of the science of navigation," says Lord Valentia, "has not yet attained to the discovery of any means by which a vessel could resist the force of the northerly winds which blow in the upper part of the Gulf;" but since this was written the means have been discovered. "Steam navigation," says Captain Ross, "sets at defiance the monsoons, the currents, and the calms."

28. It will, however, in all probability, require a more powerful vessel than the *Enterprize* to make efficient head against the strong northerly winds that prevail in the upper part of the Red Sea. The *Enterprize* will make the first experiment in the most favourable season.

"In the southern part of the Red Sea," says Dr. Horsburgh, "in the vicinity of Mocha, southerly winds are prevalent, but they seldom extend so far as 20° north, for light winds and calms are frequent in 19° to 21° north latitude. In the northern part of this sea, adjacent to Kosseir, northerly winds prevail during the greater part of the year; ships, however, which sail well on a wind may generally be able at all seasons to beat up as far as Kosseir, but the north-westers blow so violently down the sea of Suez, that it is frequently impracticable for a ship to beat up that part of the Red Sea, particularly in June, July, and August. The months of December, January, and February are the proper months for proceeding up the sea of Suez, southerly breezes being frequent in this season."

29. "The tides in the Red Sea," says Tuckey, "are very considerable; its entrance facing the east, and there being no rivers to counteract the stream, the

winds considerably affect the tides, *and it is not uncommon in strong north-westerns for the bottom to be left entirely dry on the ebb between Suez and the opposite shore.*"

"The monsoons, which are strong and regular in the open sea of Arabia, are subject to variations in approaching the land. In the Gulf of Socotra their direction is usually from the east between October and May, and from the west the other six months; while within the Red Sea they blow directly up and down, but with this variation, that the south-east winds blow without intermission in the lower part of the sea from October to June, when the northerly winds begin and continue for four months. Towards the head of the sea in the Gulf of Suez, northerly winds, on the contrary, prevail for nine months, and blow with great violence."

30. Supposing the power of steam sufficient to command a rapid passage to Suez in all seasons, the next point is the transit of the Isthmus.

31. The distance from Suez to Alexandria is about 220 miles, going the whole way by land. Going by water from Cairo, of course, increases the distance.

32. "The desert from Cairo to Suez," says Captain De Havilland (1803) "is in general a flat barren plain, divided by several low ridges of hills, except near Adgeroot, and at the back of Cairo, where there are some of considerable height and extent. The soil is a hard gravel, with pebbles. There are two principal routes, both extremely good, and of nearly the same length, viz., sixty-three miles from the cultivated country to Adgeroot, where there is a well about 130 feet deep, with an abundant supply of water, but very brackish, $8\frac{1}{2}$ miles* from Suez. The upper or southernmost was that of the Pilgrims to Mecca; the northernmost was adopted by our army as passing nearer Jofferah, where water was found in the bed of a torrent."

33. "Every one in these journeys," says Colonel Rooke, "goes armed, as the caravans are frequently attacked and plundered by the wild Arabs, who strip the people and leave them to perish in the desert." This was in 1782; Colonel Capper about the same time (1778) thought "the danger with common discretion perfectly imaginary." With an armed escort under the present government of Egypt, the chances of molestation are in all probability exceedingly small.

34. From Cairo to Alexandria there are three modes of proceeding, though not all equally practicable at all seasons: by land; by the mouth of the Nile and the open sea; by the canal of Alexandria.

35. "The land route from Alexandria to Cairo," says Captain De Havilland, "is generally by Damanhour Rhamahneah, and along the river to Cairo, but that which the Indian army returned by, across the country from Damanhour to Terreah, is considerably shorter, and fully as practicable; the distance is 140 miles (measured)."

36. The route from Cairo by the Nile to Rosetta, and by the open sea to Alexandria, is that which has been taken by the majority of travellers in Egypt. There is great delay in this route, unless everything is pre-arranged. Boats are not always procurable at a moment's notice. The river and the sea require different vessels, and the bar of Rosetta can be passed with safety only in moderate weather, and with men well accustomed to the passage. The length of the route can scarcely be less than 250 miles. Many travellers have been a long time in performing this double voyage by detention at Cairo and Rosetta, especially the latter, for want of vessels. Four days from Cairo to

* This makes $71\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Suez to Cairo. Colonel Rooke says 80, Colonel Capper 70.

Rosetta, and one day of twelve hours from Rosetta to Alexandria, is about the time usually employed in the passage. Steam would, of course, greatly abridge it.

37. The canal of Alexandria, which has been cleared out by the present ruler of Egypt, branches off from the Nile at some distance below Cairo, and while its navigation is practicable, appears the best mode of communication.

38. "Alexandria," says Tuckey, "has two ports: that on the north of the island, now peninsula, of Pharos, is called the great or new port, and is appropriated to the vessels of Christians: but being exposed to the north, and the bottom rocky, on the appearance of bad weather ships usually put to sea, rather than run the risk of riding out a gale. It has also several banks, and grows daily shoaler, so that large ships cannot now enter it. The old port (Eunostos) is on the south of the peninsula, and is reserved for Mahomedan vessels: it is well sheltered in every direction, and has safe anchorage in five or six fathoms."

39. It is to be presumed that Mahommed Ali has done away with this absurd distinction.

40. A serious disadvantage of this route is the necessity of passing through so many places subject to the plague. If a regular steam-packet communication were established, it is at least a question worth asking, whether this danger and much delay and inconvenience might not be avoided by making the Mediterranean packet station either on the Lake Menzaleh or in the adjacent portion of the Mediterranean, in the vicinity of the ancient Pelusium. This would be about seventy miles due north of Suez.*

41. It is probable that the ancient canal between the Red Sea and the Nile has a branch communicating with the Lake Menzaleh. The level of the Red Sea is higher than that of the Mediterranean; but the modern invention of locks would render the construction of a more available canal on this line a matter of little difficulty. It is, in fact, more than half made.

42. Supposing the navigation of the Gulf of Suez to prove more difficult even to steam-vessels than is consistent with the desired expedition, the port of Kosseir, in the Red Sea, is always attainable. "The road of Kosseir," says Lord Valentia, "is, indeed, not very good for ships, but it is protected from the north-west, which is the most prevailing wind, and when it begins to blow from the east, a vessel might run for any of the numerous harbours which were entered by Don Juan de Castro." But as these harbours have not since been examined, this might be an awkward alternative in a gale. The passage of the desert from Kosseir to Kenneh on the Nile is 120 miles. It was travelled by Colonel Fitzclarence in forty-five hours. He descended the Nile from Kenneh to Cairo in eight days. The distance from Cairo to Suez is about 300 miles; the corresponding distance by the Nile, owing to the winding of the river, can scarcely be less than 450, and thus, with the additional fifty miles of desert, 200 miles would be added to the length of the route. The heat of the desert is also much greater by this track. Still, with proper arrangements, there would most probably be a saving of time, and the voyage on the Nile would be more agreeable than that of the Gulf of Suez.

* Note from Lieut.-Colonel Leake's map of Egypt: "From what still remains of the ancient canal from the Red Sea to the Nile, which was begun by the ancient kings, continued by the Persians, and completed by the Ptolemies, it is obvious that it would not be difficult to re-establish this water communication between Europe and India. Nor are there any very material obstacles to a communication by lakes and inundations from Suez to the Lake Menzaleh and to Tineh, by which Africa would become an island.

43. Mr. Maclaren says, "the Nile is only navigable about seven or eight months in the year, viz., from August to March, inclusive." This assertion requires explanation and authority. Colonel Fitzclarence went down the Nile in April. Belzoni went up it in July. Lord Valentia found it unnavigable above Baramoun for large vessels in May; but it was still navigable for boats.

44. The Ptolemies, to avoid the difficulties of the navigation to Suez, established a new port at Berenice, from whence an oblique journey over 200 miles of desert led to Coptos on the Nile, the modern Konsh, which is not far above Kenneh. Berenice is 140 miles south of Kosseir. Belzoni, who visited the ruins of Berenice, says the harbour is excellent and well protected, but the entrance at present choked by a bar of sand, through which a passage could be easily cut. Belzoni returned from Berenice to the Nile, in the vicinity of Eleithias, at which place he says there is still a landing-place, indicating former commerce by boats; and he is of opinion that this place must have been more frequented by caravans from the sea than Coptos, as it is a somewhat shorter journey from the Nile.

45. The disadvantage of this route from Berenice to Eleithias is the additional length of desert; the advantages are the better harbour (supposing the bar cut through), and the gratification of travellers ascending or descending the Nile to and from a point above Thebes.

46. These are all the practicable routes from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.

47. Water is bad and scarce at Suez and Kosseir. Berenice must have had either wells, or water brought from a distance. Belzoni found none fit for drinking.

II.—3. *Route by the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates.*

48. The Bombay government in their above cited letter of 31st May, 1820, said, "Egypt has seldom or never been so disturbed as to stop our packets; but if it were so, the steamboats might for the time go to some port in Syria on the one side, and to Bussorah on the other, so that the packet would still pass with great rapidity, though not so quick as through Egypt."

49. One of two routes has been usually taken from Bussorah to the Mediterranean: that of the Great Desert, which is a land journey of 824 miles;* and that of the Little Desert, which includes a voyage up the Euphrates to Hillah, or Anna, or up the Tigris to Bagdad.

50. "I imagine," says Dr. Howell (1788), "that the journey from Aleppo to Bussorah would be much sooner performed if the traveller was to make directly for the Euphrates, and there take boat to go down the river to Bussorah."

51. The route which is here recommended is that which was commonly taken in ancient times by travellers from the Mediterranean to Babylon.† The nearest point of the Euphrates to the Mediterranean is the City of Bir. The distance by the most direct road is about 120 miles. The land transit will be considered below.

* 718 miles to Aleppo, 106 to Latakiah = 824 miles.

† 'Herodotus,' l. i. c. 185: "Οἱ ἂν κομίζονται ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς θαλάσσης ἐς Βαβυλῶνα, καταπλέοντες ἐς τὸν Εὐφρῆτην ποταμὸν," κ. τ. λ.

Voici, si je ne me trompe, le sens de ce passage: "Ceux qui veulent passer de la Méditerranée à Babylone, se rendent par terre à la partie de l'Euphrate la plus proche, s'embarquent sur ce fleuve, et descendent jusqu'à Babylone." Cette mer-ci est la mer dont les Grecs étaient voisins: Ἑλληνικὴ θαλάσση. Ainsi dans Horace: *Hoc mare*. Epod. ii. 52.—*Remarque de M. Larcher.*

52. From Bir to Bussorah is about 1100 miles. The river is navigable during the greater portion, if not the whole of the year, for vessels of considerable burthen. In very low water the river is sometimes shallow enough to be fordable at three places, Alalis, Racca, and Dar,* but small vessels can pass those points always, and large ones almost always. It would not appear that there is ever less than four feet water at these fords. In most places where the Euphrates has been examined its depth in the low season is nine or ten feet. On the other hand, the marshes of Lemlum are said to interrupt the common navigation in the floods by spreading out the waters to such an extent, that the channel "is lost in the immensity of the fluid hollow." The upward navigation being now carried on by tracking is, of course, suspended when the banks are submerged, and this seems to be the extent of this impediment. A steamboat would scarcely be impeded by too much water, and at any rate a few conspicuous buoys would mark out the channel along the ten miles which are the whole length of the marshes.

53. The boats which navigated the Euphrates in the time of Herodotus, and which, according to his description, were coracles on a large scale, carried sometimes in a single boat a freight about equal to that of the largest Thames barges (128 tons), 5000 talents in weight. Beloe, with his usual ignorance, says 5000 talents in value, nearly a million sterling, which is absurd in the highest degree.†

Trajan,‡ and after him Julian, descended the Euphrates with powerful fleets to Babylon. The wood of which Trajan's fleet was constructed was cut in the mountains of Nisibis. The vessels were so constructed as to be taken to pieces and put together at pleasure. They were dragged to the Tigris, where they formed a bridge, by which the army crossed into Mesopotamia. After several intermediate conquests the vessels were again launched on the Euphrates, descended the river to Babylon, were again dragged overland to the Tigris for the conquest of Ctesiphon, and descended to the Persian Gulf, where Trajan, seeing sails on the sea, lamented that he had not the youth of Alexander, that he might undertake the conquest of India.

55. Julian's fleet was probably constructed and conveyed to the Euphrates in the same manner as Trajan's. Neither Ammianus Marcellinus, nor Zosimus mention these preliminaries. The former says, Julian met his fleet near the confluence of the Belias (now Bellichi) with the Euphrates. Julian descended the Euphrates, and cleared out the ancient canal, Nohar-mala, to convey his fleet to the Tigris. This fleet consisted of eleven hundred vessels.§ It departed from Cercusium in the beginning of April.

56. The Euphrates has been navigated wholly or partially from Bir to Bussorah by many travellers, amongst others by Nicolo Conti, from Hillah to Bussorah, in 1449; Ranwolf, from Bir to Felugia, in the end of 1574; Balbi, the same, in January and February, 1580; Fitch and Eldred, the same, in the

* The ancient Thapsacus

† M. Larcher says, more correctly: 257,162 livres, 7 onces, un gros, cinq deniers. The French livre was equal to 1 lb. 1 ounce 10½ drachms avoirdupois.

‡ Gibbon says Trajan descended the Tigris. This is an error arising from the imperfect text of Dio. Trajan undoubtedly crossed the Tigris and descended the Euphrates to Babylon.

§ "Classis latissimum flumen Euphratem artabat: in qua mille erant onerariæ naves ex diversâ trabe contextæ, commeatus abunde ferentes, et tela, et obsidionales machinas; quinquaginta Aliæ bellatrices; totidemque ad compaginandos necessariæ pontes." — Ammianus Marcellinus, lib. xxiii. cap. 3.

summer of 1583; Niebuhr, from Bussorah up to Lemlum, in December, 1764: Parsons, from Hillah to Bussorah, in October, 1774.

57. Thus we have in these few instances testimonies for January, February, April, Midsummer, October, and December. It is, therefore, difficult to suppose that the river is unnavigable at any time of the year at any point between Bir and Bussorah.

58. The Tigris is navigable for large boats from Diarbekr to Mosul, for rafts from Mosul to Bagdad, and for large vessels from Bagdad to Bussorah. It has been navigated by the following persons: Balbi, from Bagdad to Bussorah, in March, 1580; Eldred and Fitch, the same, in the summer of 1583; Plaisted, the same, in April, 1750; Captain Campbell, the same, in the summer of 1780; Mr. Irwin, the same, in April, 1781; Captain Macdonald Kinneir, from Mosul to Bagdad, and from Bagdad to Bussorah in August, 1814; Mr. Keppel from Bussorah up to Bagdad in March, 1824.

59. The Tigris is a more rapid stream than the Euphrates, rises higher in floods, and is much more winding in its course. The Euphrates is lowest in January, and highest in June and July, when it is swelled by the melting of the snow.

60. The Euphrates is navigated up to Hillah by tracking. Above Hillah the strength of the stream and the steepness of the banks have always been impediments to upward navigation. It has always been more economical to sell the boats with their cargoes and return by land, as was done in the majority of instances before steamboats existed, by those who brought down the produce of the Ohio to New Orleans, where, indeed, they still sell the boats with the cargo, but they return by steam.

61. The stream of the Euphrates does not, however, seem so rapid as to oppose any formidable obstacle to a steamboat. Its average rate is about three miles an hour. At particular places in the floods this rate is perhaps doubled, but there is nothing in the whole course of the river from Bir that can be called a rapid, although Balbi seems to have found one at Eltofeftrouil, which not being mentioned by any subsequent voyager, was probably (and his narrative seems to imply it) the result of a temporary obstruction, caused by the fall of a portion of the hill.

62. The land transit from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean would be either from Bir to Scanderoon, from Beles to Aleppo and Antioch, or from Beles to Aleppo and Latichea.

63. Beles is about 100 miles below Bir on the Euphrates, and is so far a better point. Antioch is distant from it about 120 miles, and if the mouth of the Orontes furnished a good harbour this would be the most desirable route. The Orontes, it is said, might easily be made navigable up to Antioch for vessels of considerable burthen. The next most desirable route is that direct from Bir to Scanderoon. The distance is about 120 miles, the country very mountainous, and information deficient respecting the road.

64. Scanderoon has a good harbour, but a pestilential climate. The port of Latakiah is small but well sheltered, and capable of containing very large vessels. The distance from Latakiah to Aleppo is 106 miles. From Aleppo to Beles is about sixty. Latakiah appears to be the port most frequented by travellers to and from Aleppo. There are no natural causes to make the journey either disagreeable or dangerous, and of many travellers who have taken it, none seem to have met with molestation.

65. The Pasha of Bagdad would no doubt do all in his power to facilitate this mode of communication. Danger may be apprehended from the Arabs; but of the many voyagers on the Euphrates and Tigris none would appear to have been seriously molested by them. Dr. Madden was twice shot at by Turks in descending the Nile. Belzoni was once wounded and once shot at by

soldiers at Cairo, and mentions the wanton murder at that city by a Turkish soldier of the Swedish consul's daughter. Instances of this kind may be found much more frequently in Egypt, even as it now is, than in Syria or Mesopotamia. The testimonies of the majority of travellers are favourable to the Arabs.

66. The distances by this route would be :—

	Miles.
Bombay to Bussorah	1600
Bussorah to Beles	1000
Beles to Latakiah	166
Total	2766

Two thousand seven hundred and sixty-six miles from Bombay to the Mediterranean; 460 miles less than the distance by Suez to Alexandria, and 660 miles less than the distance by Kosseir. The Mediterranean voyage would be 200 miles more from Latakiah than from Alexandria.

67. A private letter, written very recently, in answer to a question respecting the practicability of steam navigation on the Euphrates says: "I should be almost afraid to have the question stirred for opening a steam navigation on the Euphrates. It would necessarily lead Russia to desire the same mode of communication by the Tigris, which would give her great facilities for the conveyance of troops and stores, if at any future time she should be disposed to annoy us in the East. The Tigris is navigable from Diarbekr for large boats, and the fort now at that place is built upon a bed of lava, and might be made a strong *place d'armes*. El Jezirah is perhaps a still better position, as the river is there larger, and the distance from Erzeroum is not greater. The natives are in the practice of constructing rafts with copswood and blown skins, capable of conveying great burthens upon shallow water. I descended the river from Mosul to Bagdad at the rate of three miles an hour upon one of them, and had at least, with people, covered conveyances, and baggage a burthen of thirty tons. My raft was constructed in less than twelve hours."

68. The probability of this navigation being suggested to Russia by us is not much to be apprehended. The Russians are very good geographers, and know the relative practicabilities of the several routes to India too well to need our teaching.

69. The route which it has been deemed most expedient to guard against them, is that through Persia to Attock.

70. The Volga, the Caspian, the Sea of Aral, and the Oxus offer a better route to Attock than that through Persia, with facilities of navigation, and abundance of supplies by far the greater portion of the way. This is the route by *Khiva*, and is the principal subject of the lately published treatise of Colonel de Lacy Evans.

71. The route by the Persian Gulf is not likely to be attempted in preference to that last noticed, in the face of our present maritime superiority; but its natural facilities are not unworthy of notice. Naval and military stores may be transported with little difficulty from the south-eastern ports in the Black Sea to the points where the Tigris and Euphrates first become navigable, and may be floated down those rivers on rafts, which may be constructed in any quantities from the timber of the mountains of Armenia. If the Russians choose to take it, the whole country, from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf, is theirs (as if we choose to preoccupy it it is ours). Dockyards may be formed in Bagdad and Bussorah, and vessels of any size may be floated at the latter. Admitting the possibility that, in the event of our being at war with Russia,

they might attempt what is here supposed, we must keep a strong naval force in the Persian Gulf. If a Russian invasion of India be within the limits of probability, it is as well to pass under review all the means by which it can be accomplished and prevented. One of the means of accomplishment would be the occupation by Russia of Bagdad and Bussorah; and one of the means of prevention would be the preoccupation by us of a station at or near the mouth of the Euphrates, at Apamea, for instance, as suggested by Colonel Macdonald Kinneir, in the angle formed by the junction of the Euphrates and Tigris. An interest in the navigation of the Euphrates would give us a reasonable ground for opposing innovations.

72. The Bombay government propose the route by Bussorah and the Syrian desert as an alternative to the route by Egypt. Major Taylor thought the descent of the Euphrates would be a more expeditious route to Bussorah than that by the desert. This would unquestionably be the case with the accession of steam-power. The question whether the power of steam would not make the ascent of the Euphrates more expeditious than the route by the Desert must be answered in the affirmative, if steam-vessels can ascend the Euphrates at anything like the rate at which they ascend the Mississippi. The stream is assuredly not more powerful than the Mississippi, the general depth is much less, but there is abundant water for vessels of four-feet draught in every part of the river for at least eight months, if not for the whole of the year; and if during four months of the twelve it were necessary to employ vessels of less draught, such a vessel as the *Endeavour*,* which is flat bottomed, draws only two feet water, and was originally built for the Rhine, seems fully adequate to all the purposes required. By means of tugs with high-pressure engines, the draught of water, if necessary, might be still further reduced.

73. The downward voyage would, of course, be more expeditious than the route by the desert.

74. There appears to be no question but that the navigation of the Persian Gulf is very much better than that of the Red Sea, and Bussorah is little more than one-half of the sea distance of Suez from Bombay.

75. The steam navigation of rivers has great advantages over that of the sea. The Americans, who do so much with it on their rivers, do not apply it to crossing the Atlantic. Smaller vessels afford the same accommodation; and high-pressure engines may be more easily and safely employed.

76. To the great majority of passengers this would probably be the most agreeable of all the possible routes to India that are consistent with the required expedition.

77. The attraction to passengers ought to be brought into view as a means of defraying a part, at least, of the expense, which would unquestionably be great.

78. Steam-vessels cost at first twice as much as sailing vessels. The consumption of the best coal is one bushel per ton per hour to every ten-horse power. The consumption is greater in proportion as the coal is inferior. Eighty-four lbs. of coal are equivalent to a bushel, with some difference in respect to compactness. The cost of coals would be 2*l.* 10*s.* per ton at Alexandria, and 6*l.* 10*s.* per ton at Suez. It must be much less than the latter amount at Bussorah.

79. The vessels which go in ballast from India to Bussorah for horses would afford ample facilities for transport of coals; and as far up the Euphrates as Hillah depôts might be formed and supplied by means of the common navigation.

80. The opportunity of touching at Bushire would be an advantage on

* This is a very fast-going vessel of 20-horse power, low pressure.

this route so long as we attach any importance to the connection with Persia.

81. The steam navigation of rivers has made the fortune of the north-western territory of America, and given to population and industry throughout that immense tract of country an impetus to which there seems no limit for many generations. The protecting arm of a civilised government is all that is required to do as much for the now thinly peopled and devastated regions that border the great rivers of Asia. The country on the banks of the Oxus appears to have many points of resemblance to the prairies of Louisiana. The vicinity of the sea of Aral abounds with coal. The Russians have unlimited resources in coal, wood, iron, pitch, flax, cattle, and corn. They have now steamboats on the Volga and the Caspian Sea. They will have them before long on the Sea of Aral and the Oxus, and in all probability on the Euphrates and the Tigris. It is not our navigating the Euphrates that will set them the example. They will do everything in Asia that is worth the doing, and that we leave undone.

MEMORANDUM UPON SIR HERBERT TAYLOR'S PROPOSED CIR- [1525.]
CULAR TO COMMANDING OFFICERS OF REGIMENTS RE-
GARDING THE MODE OF PUNISHING SOLDIERS, ETC.

Claremont, 22nd December, 1829.

I have considered this paper, which is written under a sense of what appears at least to be a gross anomaly in the service. But I believe that it is not an anomaly to the degree supposed; and that it is more difficult to correct it than is imagined.

Courts-martial perform at the same time the duties of judge and jury. They find the guilt, and they pronounce the sentence of the law. Their sentence is liable to subsequent confirmation by superior authority; and they may be ordered to revise it. But if confirmed it is final.

The Articles of War require regimental courts-martial to sentence according to *the nature and degree of the offence*. They cannot be deprived of this power. It cannot even be limited, without danger to the discipline and eventually to the efficiency of the army.

Drunkenness, the commonest of all offences among soldiers, so common as to be almost universal, is in the abstract the least criminal. But we know that it is the parent of every other military offence; and that if drunkenness prevails in a regiment, nothing whatever, either relating to conduct, discipline, or efficiency, can be relied upon.

Who can venture to give an order from the Horse-Guards that drunkenness in soldiers shall or shall not be punished in a

particular manner, or according to a particular scale of punishment, or not at all?

The sentence, that is the final judicial act of the court, must be left to the court, who must judge *from the nature and degree of the offence* according to the words of the Article of War; that is to say, whether drunkenness is prevalent, whether at that particular time and place, and in the particular circumstances in which the regiment is placed, and, considering the usual propensities of the soldiers and the temptations held out to them, whether it is necessary to punish it with severity or otherwise, and with what degree of severity.

It is impossible for the Horse-Guards to give such an order to regiments even in London or in England, much less in Ireland and on foreign stations.

Next to drunkenness there is nothing so common as disrespect to, or striking non-commissioned officers. Who that is absent can say that this crime ought not to be punished?

There is an observation in this very paper on the expediency that non-commissioned officers should not chide soldiers when they are drunk! Who at a distance can venture to give such an order?

What does a soldier do when he is drunk? He invariably commits some outrage. In the prevention of this outrage the non-commissioned officer is assaulted. Is he to be ordered to allow of the outrage in order that the drunken man may not be tempted to commit an act of insubordination?

There is nothing so difficult as to give orders upon details which are to be applied to all descriptions of men in all the different situations in which soldiers may be placed.

But it may be said that these anomalies exist. Is there no remedy for them? I answer by another question, Are they not more apparent than real?

If it be true that in some situations there is more temptation to drunkenness than in others, and at the same time a more urgent necessity for keeping the soldiers in order, these circumstances alone would account for part of the anomaly.

But this is not all. We have been for years inculcating that the difference between a good regiment and a bad one, between a good commanding officer and a faulty one, is shown by the less or greater quantity of *punishment* in regiments under their command respectively; and we endeavour to form a judgment

upon this matter by calling for the returns of courts-martial. If, instead of judging of the discipline of regiments according to the quantity of punishment, we were to form our judgment according to the quantity of crime, and were to call for the Guard and Morning Reports and States, instead of the Court-martial Books, we should see what the crimes and conduct of soldiers really were; and we should be able to judge of the care taken by the commanding officer, the commissioned officers, and the non-commissioned officers, to prevent crime and misconduct, and of its success. We should then find, very possibly, the use of the interference of non-commissioned officers with drunken soldiers. Indeed, I don't know the use of non-commissioned or of commissioned officers unless it be to discipline (I mean in the enlarged sense of the term) and to keep in discipline and order the soldiers under their command. How they are to perform these duties if they do not interfere with the soldiers when they are drunk, considering who and what they are, I cannot conceive.

Upon the whole, I would recommend that this circular should not be sent.

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 23rd December, 1829.

I have reason to believe that a person of the name of Broadwood has been induced to lend a sum of 5000*l.*, on an assurance that attempts would be made to procure a baronetcy for him, and I hear he was informed by those who have probably swindled him out of his money, that the application for this baronetcy will be made *through me*.

I merely send this as a Memorandum for you in case this Mr. Broadwood should approach you through any other channel.

Ever yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

Lord Francis Leveson Gower to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Dublin, 23rd December, 1829.

Major Warburton having accidentally arrived in Dublin, I took the opportunity of speaking to him on the subject of Mr. Cahill, the Clare magistrate. I learn through Major Warburton's inquiries that Mr. Cahill himself has not been engaged in trade. The information which reached

you to that effect applies to his father, who was a bankrupt. It is well that you should know that I received yesterday a letter from Mr. Cahill, holding out an expectation of some important discoveries of offenders in the neighbourhood of Corofin, *moyennant* 40*l.*, which he requested. I declined the advance, but referred him to Colonel Osborne. I should be curious to learn the result of this proceeding. It is not impossible that he may really have obtained some useful information in that quarter.

Believe me, my dear Duke, very faithfully yours,

F. LEVESON GOWER.

The Duke of Buckingham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Stowe, 24th December, 1829.

Since you left Stowe I have considered a great deal the idea which you threw out respecting the Irish Catholics taking some steps to disavow O'Connell, and I have had some communications on the subject. The result is that I think you had better leave matters to find their own course. In the first place, O'Connell is hourly more and more disgusting the Catholics, and making it impossible for them, or any honest men, to act with him or go near him. You cannot desire better than that he should share the fate of an extinguishing tallow candle, and die in his own stink. In the next place it is very desirable to encourage the Irish Catholics in the idea that the concession of their claims extinguished them as a separate deliberate body. You have taken away their grievance. The best argument in favour of your measure was the breaking up that body, and dissolving it amidst the elements of the State. There are individuals enough amongst them who to-morrow would assemble to disavow O'Connell and his propositions, which have for their merit their utter extravagance and impracticability. But I should esteem the very meeting of any part of the Catholic body for any purpose, however beneficial, a grievance; and I am inclined to think that they would consider it in the same light themselves. I think that at the meeting of Parliament you will find Lord Killeen and other Catholics very desirous of proving their utter contempt of the Liberator: but let them do it individually, and not collectively. Between ourselves, I think, from all I hear, that you will act imprudently in deciding in your own mind Lord Killeen to be *in opposition*. I believe him not to be so. Do not set Holmes or any violent Protestant about him, or you will alarm him. But with proper Catholic management my belief is that he may be induced to act cordially with you. He has talents, but he has more ambition; and if he could once be brought to imagine that you would consult him, as Catholic Leader in the House of Commons, you would secure him. I congratulate you sincerely on the verdicts.

Yours very sincerely,

BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOS.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Worthing, 26th December, 1829.

I send you the Minutes of the Governor-General and of the Members of Council on the half batta question, together with Lord Combermere's letters and the reply of the government.

In the latter a very proper admonition is given to Lord Combermere and to the army.

The Governor-General is stout against the claim of right, and, with all his objections to the measure, he reserves his final opinion upon it, as a measure of equalisation, until the Report of the Military Finance Committee upon the comparative condition of the armies of the three Presidencies shall have been received. As he reserves his opinion, it would seem that the Home authorities could not do better than reserve their reply to the memorials until that report is before them.

The delay in communicating his sentiments and those of the local government does not rest with Lord William Bentinck, whose Minute was recorded on the 22nd of February, but with Mr. Bayley, at whose suggestion communication with England seems to have been postponed till Lord William's return from Penang.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1526.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Hatfield, 27th December, 1829.

I enclose two Memorandums on the points to which I referred yesterday. They explain the view which I take of these points. I leave to you and Sir Stratford Canning to make what use of them you please, or no use.

It is quite clear to me that we must break down the American notion that the Treaty speaks for itself.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING THE TRUE COURSE AND POSITION [1527.]
OF THE ST. CROIX RIVER.

27th December, 1829.

The difference of opinion between Great Britain and the United States respecting the true course and position of the St. Croix River appears important in the discussion of the question respecting the boundary in the following views.

The second article of the Treaty says "from the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, viz., that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix River to the Highlands," &c.

The conclusion to be drawn from the perusal of this article is that the position of the River St. Croix must have been known to both parties when the Treaty was concluded; and it must be supposed to have been the intention of both to fix the north-west angle of Nova Scotia upon a point on the Highlands due north of that position. This point had before been fixed by the Commissioners of the United States at the source of the St. John's River.

It appears however from subsequent transactions, that the real St. Croix River and the position of its real source were not known till the year 1794. The British Commissioners considered the Penobscot to be the St. Croix. The river designated by that name in the Treaty was at length fixed upon by Commissioners appointed under the article of the Treaty of 1794.

Even if the position of the source of the St. Croix had been accurately known at the moment that the Treaty of Peace was concluded in the year 1783, the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, as described in the second article, remained to be found. That point depended upon the discovery of the point on the Highlands described, on which the due north line from the source of the St. Croix should strike those Highlands.

But in the article as framed, everything was to be discovered. The St. Croix River, its course, its source; the due north line from that source, and the point at which such due north line should touch the Highlands.

It is very important that the arbitrator who shall decide the difference which has arisen under the Treaty of Ghent should understand exactly what passed respecting this St. Croix River and its source; and seeing how little was known of that important point at the time the article was drawn, should seek for the intentions of the parties from other sources of information besides the words of the article itself.

He should attend to the original instructions to the Commissioners of the United States in 1779, to the admission which they contain that the north-west angle of Nova Scotia was to be found at the source of the River St. John, to the

geographical features of the country, and to the distinction which clearly exists between the term *sea* and the term *Atlantic Ocean*, and between those parts of the sea called respectively Atlantic Ocean, Bay of Fundy, Bay of Chaleurs, and Gulf of St. Lawrence, in the Diplomatic Act referred for his arbitration.

It is quite clear that neither party knew what was the real source of the St. Croix River. Is it not probable, considering the course of the negotiation of the definitive Treaty, that both parties considered it to be placed farther to the westward than it has been found to be? In that case the due north line from that point would have struck the Highlands not far from the source of the River St. John.

WELLINGTON.

II.

MEMORANDUM.—AMERICAN BOUNDARY QUESTION.

[1528.]

27th December, 1829.

The Proclamation of 1763 has for its object to erect within the countries and islands ceded by the Treaty of Paris four distinct and separate governments.

It proceeds to define the limits of the government of Quebec; and after bringing them across Lake Champlain in 45 degrees of north latitude, it provides that “the line passes along the Highlands which divide the rivers that empty themselves into the River St. Lawrence from those which fall into the *sea*; and also along the north coast of the Bay des Chaleurs and the coast of the Gulf of St. Lawrence to Cape Rosiers.”

The Act of the 14th George III. c. 83, for the better government of the province of Quebec, commonly called the Quebec Act, states that “all the territories, islands, and countries in North America belonging to the Crown of Great Britain, bounded on the south by a line from the Bay of Chaleurs along the Highlands which divide the rivers which empty themselves into the River St. Lawrence from those which fall into the *sea* to a point in 45 degrees of north latitude on the eastern bank of the River Connecticut, shall be, and these are hereby made, part and parcel of the province of Quebec.”

The object of that part of this Proclamation quoted, and the

clause of the Act of Parliament, was to fix the boundaries of the province of Quebec alone. The Act of Parliament contains a proviso that nothing therein contained relative to the boundary of the province of Quebec shall in any wise affect the boundaries of any other colony.

The whole of the remainder of North America was under the dominion of his Majesty; and in the Proclamation and in the Act of Parliament it is stated that Canada is bounded by Highlands which divide rivers that empty themselves into the River St. Lawrence from those which fall into *the sea*.

It is quite obvious that those who drew the original instructions to the American Commissioners of the 14th August, 1779, had before them the King's Proclamation of 1763 and the clause of the Quebec Act. They say the boundaries of these States are as follows: viz., "These States are bounded north by a line to be drawn from the north-west angle of Nova Scotia along the Highlands which divide those rivers which empty themselves into the St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean; . . . and east by a line to be drawn along the middle of St. John's River from its source to its mouth in the Bay of Fundy."

Thus fixing the north-west angle of Nova Scotia or the north-east angle of the United States at the source of the River St. John, and carrying the north line along the Highlands between the source of the St. John and the source of the Connecticut.

Those who drew the second article of the definitive Treaty had likewise before them the Proclamation and the Quebec Act. But they do not follow the words of either instrument. They describe the Highlands along which the north boundary of the United States is to be carried as dividing those rivers that empty themselves into the River St. Lawrence from those which fall (not into *the sea*, as in the Proclamation and in the Act of Parliament, but) into the Atlantic Ocean.

The British government thus clearly manifested that they were aware that the Bay of Fundy, the Bay des Chaleurs, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, were distinct from the Atlantic Ocean.

When defining the south boundary of Canada to separate that province from the remainder of his Majesty's dominions in North America they used the general term *sea* to mark the Highlands which should be the boundary, meaning that the

countries watered by the Restigouche falling into the Bay des Chaleurs, and the St. John's falling into the Bay of Fundy, should not be in Canada.

But when they came to agree to an article of a Treaty fixing the northern boundary of the United States, the term used in the Proclamation and the Act of Parliament to describe the Highlands along which that boundary should be carried was altered evidently in order that the countries watered by the rivers Restigouche and the St. John might not be ceded.

These facts and reasoning confirm all the reasoning which shows that the Bays of Chaleurs and of Fundy, and the Gulf of St. Lawrence, are distinguished from the Atlantic Ocean in law, in geography, as well as in the diplomatic Act now under discussion.

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1529.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Apethorpe, 28th December, 1829.

I don't think that we quite settled the description of the country west of Mars Hill. Underneath is what appears to me would answer.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

After the words *eastern slope* at the top of page 26:—And that there is a hilly or mountainous tract covered with wood going off from it in a westerly or north-westerly direction, and that in this same direction is the tract of High Country in which the rivers have their source which run north into the St. John's River and the St. Lawrence, and south into the dominions of the United States and the Atlantic.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 28th December, 1829.

I have been so long engaged to-day with Stratford Canning in putting a finishing word to the answer to the American statement, that I have not left myself time to write to you at any length; and I must also give up going to Hatfield to-night. We have inserted into the statement what appeared to be material from both your Memoranda; and the various points which had been adverted to have met with due attention. The paper will be delivered to the printer this night.

I enclose two or three private letters which I have received. Lord Stuart as usual is obscure and contradictory. After having told us several times that M. de Villèle was about to join the administration, it would now appear that there is a serious question of the junction of M. de Vitrolles. It appears also from Lord Stuart's letter that M. de Laval has not understood my meaning when he intimates that we desire that any part of the Protocol should be drawn up at Paris. I only observed that, as the French government felt the difficulty respecting the relationship of Prince Leopold to the Royal Family of England, it was for them to propose for consideration the terms by which this difficulty would be obviated.

We shall evidently have a storm at home. Bülow was with me to-day; and it really appears that the King of Prussia has interested himself very much about Prince Charles of Mecklenburg. Bülow confirms the fact of Bernstorff being in ignorance of the affair, and says that he has received a letter from a person in the King's confidence. He was not desired to speak to me officially; but from what the Duke of Cumberland had told him of his communication with the King, he was astonished at my silence, and therefore had introduced the subject. He said that the Duke of Cumberland had written to say that the affair might be considered as settled; for that the King was decidedly in favour of Prince Charles, and that he would probably be proposed by the English government. We had a great deal of general discussion respecting Prince Charles; my principal objection resting upon the cause assigned by the French government for the rejection of Prince Philip of Hesse Hombourg. He pressed very much the declarations of the King, and the written assurances of the Duke of Cumberland; until at last I told him that I knew nothing, and would know nothing, of the King's sentiments as conveyed by the Duke of Cumberland; that I had myself officially communicated his Majesty's opinion to the King of Prussia, through the English minister at Berlin. He expressed great pleasure at this, as he hoped it would open the eyes of the King to the value of the assurances which he had received from the Duke of Cumberland, and probably engage him to let the matter drop. In the mean time it is quite clear that we shall have to contend with a fixed determination on the part of the King, strengthened by inclination towards one candidate, and aversion from the other.

Bülow spoke as if he was certain that the Russians had suggested to the French government the rejection of Prince Philip, notwithstanding their own consent; but this does not seem likely, nor was it required. He at the same time took it for granted that Prince Philip had been pressed upon us by Metternich; and no doubt we shall have this quoted as the failure of an Austrian intrigue.

I suppose we shall have the French proposition almost immediately. It will be essential to take no false step now, for of course the real state of the affair respecting Prince Leopold is perfectly well known at Paris as well as here. The Duke of Cumberland told Bülow that I had thrown difficulties in the way of the nomination of Prince Charles, but that they would be overcome.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

I add a letter from Bagot, who is recovering from his alarm.

To Lord Aberdeen.

[1530.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Apethorpe, 29th December, 1829.

I return your letters, for which I am much obliged to you.

We shall certainly have a severe contest respecting Prince Leopold. But I do not entertain any doubt respecting the result. If we should have this contest I hope that it will produce other good results, besides the decision on the points on which it will immediately turn.

I have much mistaken the character of the King of Prussia, his sound sense, his experience in public affairs, and particularly in transactions with this country; his knowledge of his ally and good brother, and above all of his brother-in-law, if he has had any concern in the dirty transaction in which his name has been used; and most particularly if he has written to Bülow through a private channel without the knowledge of his minister Count Bernstorff.

If he has done so we shall have much difficulty in the affair, and that from a new quarter, viz. Russia. Because it is not to be believed that the King of Prussia, so anxious upon the subject as to have been induced to move out of the direct course in order to attain his object, should not have applied to the Emperor of Russia.

Come what may we have done our duty, and whatever may be the result of the affair we shall come out of it with the character of honest servants of the public.

I was right about Sir W. Knighton. I find that he was sent for as soon as your letter arrived with the account of the duel at Berlin.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Worthing, 29th December, 1829.

I mentioned when I last had some conversation with you on Indian affairs, that if the Board adhered to the rate of exchange fixed in 1814 between territory and commerce, the Company would probably be unable to declare next year their usual dividend.

I then apprehended that the result of a calculation I had desired to be made upon what seemed just principles, of the amount of interest due every year from territory to commerce upon the advances made for territorial

purposes in England, would show that the Company had been in the habit of carrying to account as profit every year a much larger sum than they were fairly entitled to charge under the head of such interest. It appears that the Company last year brought to account 198,000*l.* under that head, and by the calculation now made they should only have brought 58,000*l.* I should mention that the opinion of the Chancellor (when Attorney-General) and of Sir Charles Wetherell was that the Company had no claim at all to interest on the outstanding amount of these advances made by commerce to territory; and that it is only a subsequent opinion of the present Attorney-General and Sir N. Tindal which admits the legality of the allowance of such interest by the Board.

There was last year brought to account by the Company a sum of 225,000*l.* as profit, out of which a dividend was to be paid, which sum was composed of a number of small items, which had been omitted in the accounts of former years from 1814. Of these I believe they were only justly entitled to bring to account the last item of 22,000*l.* The other items belonged to former years, and became surplus profit, not liable to appropriation to the payment of dividends in subsequent years. Even with this overcharge of 140,000*l.* for interest, and of 203,000*l.* as above stated, they only made an apparent surplus profit of 62,000*l.* If these two sums had been abstracted the real deficit would have been about 281,000*l.*; a deficit which would have reduced the dividend from 10½ to 6 per cent. The items brought to account last year cannot appear again. We must decide on what principles interest on the sum due by territory to commerce is to be calculated, and I see no fallacy in the principles upon which the calculation I mentioned has been made. There is no probability of a more profitable out-turn of their commerce, and therefore it is to be expected that a smaller dividend must be declared. In apprehension of this necessity they have got an opinion from their standing counsel that they may state the cost price of their goods in India at the mercantile rate of exchange, and not at the Board's rate; thus making the apparent profit greater, and acquiring the excuse, not the means, for paying the usual dividend, which would really be paid not out of profit, but out of capital. The case laid before their standing counsel, and his opinion, are sent to the Attorney and Solicitor-General. I cannot doubt their deciding against the legality of the proposed measure. If they should, we must alter the rate of exchange fixed in 1814, or the dividend of 10½ per cent. cannot be paid. If they should find the proposed measure to be legal, we had still better effect the same thing in a less objectionable manner.

The effect of the existing rate of exchange at the present time is to apply to the purposes of the annual expenditure in India a sum of 300,000*l.* or 400,000*l.*, of which, if the rate were altered, a portion would be paid in dividends, and a portion become applicable, as surplus profit, to the payment of Indian or Bond debt. Under an altered rate the real Indian deficit would be increased to the extent to which the territory now gains; that is, about 360,000*l.* This would make the revenues insufficient to meet the charges in the sum of 1,028,000*l.* a year.

In order to save the Company harmless, it will be necessary to make the altered rates of exchange commence in 1826-7.

As the Board has since 1814 insisted upon preserving the present rates, and the alteration of them for the purpose of enabling the Company to pay

their usual dividend will excite much public notice and discussion, I should wish to have your opinion before the measure is adopted.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1531.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Apethorpe, 30th December, 1829.

I quite concur in the enclosed despatch.

In respect to the Greek affair, I recommend that as soon as you shall have settled with the French and Russian ambassadors who is to be the Sovereign, you should go to the King and propose him. If the King refuses or should attach conditions to his consent, and you should not be able to prevail upon him to give his unqualified consent, you had better send off for me. If the Allied ambassadors should attach any condition to the Prince's (Leopold's) appointment other than his resignation of his rank in the army and his regiment, you had better let me know it before you go to the King.

I knew that the duel would have a great effect.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Duke of Buckingham.

[1532.]

MY DEAR DUKE, Apethorpe, 30th December, 1829.

I was very much obliged to you for your letter of the 24th December, which I did not acknowledge immediately, as I had already formed the same opinion as you have, and there was no step to be taken.

I do not think however that it is quite clear that O'Connell will not retain or regain his influence in Ireland. If he should be vulgar and violent in Parliament nobody will listen to him after the first days, and he will lose his influence everywhere. But he is a very diligent and a very able lawyer, and a good debater, and if he should be only moderate in his language and he behaves at all like a gentleman he will be listened to and his influence will be greater than ever. You may rely upon it that I will not knowingly lose one particle of the advantage acquired by the Roman Catholic measure. But I think

that the Roman Catholics might have conducted themselves better than they have.

I advised the English Roman Catholics as far back as May last to act exactly in conformity with the principle stated in your letter.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 31st December, 1829.

Laval has been with me to-day, but as he has only read to me the papers of which he is to send a copy to-morrow, I cannot pretend to give more than a general view of them. In the mean time you will see by Stuart's letter, which I enclose, the effect produced in Paris by the nomination of Prince Leopold.

They propose to insert in the Protocol a description of the situation of Prince Leopold, and the reasons for appointing him to the Sovereignty, which are not quite correct, to the whole extent stated; but which I suppose may be altered without much difficulty. They also add certain conditions in favour of the Roman Catholics, and an obligation on the part of the Prince to tolerate and protect them. Their admission to all offices, &c., is permitted. Certain other regulations of the kind are mentioned; so that we may possibly make him a present of a Catholic Question to begin his reign with. It is clear, however, that they attach infinite importance to these conditions.

There is the form of a letter proposed to be addressed to Prince Leopold by the plenipotentiaries, with the projet of his answer.

The most material proposition which they have made is to get rid of the alternative, and to establish the independence. They found this, upon the declaration of the Porte to abide by the decisions of the Conference of London whatever they may be. They assert that the Porte, knowing our unwillingness to subscribe to the Protocol of the 22nd of March without alteration, will infallibly reject the proposition of independence if any choice be left to them, merely in the hope of making us quarrel for their advantage. If no real freedom of choice should be left them, it will then be a deceptive proceeding to talk of the alternative. All this is no doubt true, and it is what I have long felt; with the addition of the great difficulty of fighting to obtain better terms for the Turks in the teeth of an article of a Treaty which they have themselves signed. But I am by no means certain if this entire acquiescence of the Turks in the decisions of the Conference will enable us to declare the independence of the State. Compared with the Protocol of the 22nd of March, the territory which we shall restore to them will be equal to one-half of what was given by that Protocol to the new State north of the Isthmus. This is no doubt a great concession, and may justify the terms, which are also most consistent with their tranquillity and real interests. Could we possibly arrive at this conclusion, it cannot be denied that it would be most advantageous; and, being

equally desired by all, it appears objectionable to risk the success of it by voluntarily playing an insecure game. At the same time I have given Laval no encouragement whatever to think that we should agree to any change in this respect. I wish you would consider this a little; for, if we could arrive at it, the advantage would be incalculable.

I did not think of going to the King until we have agreed upon the terms in which Prince Leopold is described. There will also perhaps be some advantage in waiting for the answer from Berlin, which must arrive in two or three days; by which time I shall hear what you think. Laval did not mention the name of Prince Charles of Mecklenburg; neither did Lieven, whom I met last night at Hatfield.

I will send you the papers to-morrow if I receive them in time; at all events that containing the description of Leopold, upon which it is indispensable that we should in the first instance agree.

It is so impossible to make the King listen with attention, at least for me to do so, that I thought of drawing up a short memorandum explaining the state of the question, which should be sent to him in the morning of the same day upon which I go down to obtain his consent:

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

The French have returned to the charge with a separate proposal respecting Samos. They want something to counterbalance Leopold.

MEMORANDUM.—OFFICERS HOLDING THE GOLD STICK SINCE [1533.]
1760.

1830.

1760. Lord De Lawar, not a Privy Councillor till 1766.

1760. Lord Cadogan, not a Privy Councillor.

1766. The Earl De Lawar, not a Privy Councillor.

1767. The Marquess of Lothian, not a Privy Councillor.

1776. Lord Robert Bestre, not a Privy Councillor.

1779. Lord Amherst, was a Privy Councillor, but because he held other offices.

1789. Lord Dover, had been ambassador at the Hague and Privy Councillor.

1792. Lord Houghton, not a Privy Councillor till many years after appointment, in 1801.

1797. Lord Cathcart, was a Privy Councillor, but had been Chairman of the House of Lords.

Duke of Wellington, had been Chief Secretary in Ireland, and was Master-General of the Ordnance.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, of the Royal Family.

WELLINGTON.

[1534.] MEMORANDUM.—NOTE OF CONVERSATION WITH THE KING
RESPECTING PRINCE LEOPOLD.

January, 1830.

Proposition of Alternative.

After the Peace of Adrianople, when the settlement of Greece was under consideration, the Russian plenipotentiaries proposed that an offer should be made to the Turks, of the arrangement under the Protocol of March, 1829, or of the establishment of an independent sovereignty in Greece, with restricted limits.

This proposition was formally made to Lord Aberdeen on the 29th September.

The Prince to be chosen.

His Lordship had spoken to me before respecting the Prince to be selected, in case such offer should be made. It was Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg. His name was mentioned to Russian plenipotentiaries on the 13th of October, who engaged to support the nomination.

Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg.

Named to the Russians on the 13th of October.

French government propose Prince Charles of Bavaria on 19th of October.

When the French government first heard of the intended proposition to be made to the Turks respecting Greece, they proposed that Prince Charles of Bavaria should be the sovereign, on the 19th of October; the Prince, however, declined.

The French government objected to Prince Philip of Hesse Homburg, and the Russian plenipotentiaries did not

Lord Aberdeen proposed Prince Frederick of Orange to the Russian plenipotentiaries on 20th of October.

Prince Maximilian on 30th October.

The recital of the former nomination of Prince Frederick of Orange and Prince Leopold by the Emperor of Russia.

Objections of the French to Prince Philip and Prince Frederick of Orange, and to the Archduke Maximilian.

Mention of Prince Leopold.

appear disposed to support that nomination. Lord Aberdeen mentioned the name of Prince Frederick of Orange to the Russian plenipotentiaries on the 20th of October.

His Lordship likewise desired Lord Stuart, on the 30th of October, to mention Prince Maximilian d'Este to the French government. This same letter contains the recital of the former nomination of Prince Frederick of Orange and Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg, by the Emperor of Russia.

A Conference of the plenipotentiaries was held in London on the 11th of November.

In this Conference the French plenipotentiary positively objected to Prince Philip and Prince Frederick of Orange, and to the Archduke Maximilian.

Upon this occasion the name of Prince Leopold was mentioned.

In this Conference I declared that this government would consent to nothing unless the whole arrangement should be completed, and the Prince should be named; and that he should be satisfactory to this country.

As the Russian plenipotentiaries appeared to be disposed to support the nomination of Prince Frederick of Orange,

Offer to Prince Frederick of Orange, November.

He declined 11th of December.

King of France's conversation with Prince Leopold, November 20th.

My opinion on this subject, 24th November.

Arrival of Prince Leopold.

Denial on the 26th of November that Prince Leopold was, and assertion that Prince Frederick was our candidate on the 28th November.

measures were taken to ascertain whether his Royal Highness would accept the offer if made to him on the 13th of November.

He finally declined on the 11th of December.

On the 20th of November Prince Leopold had an interview with the King of France; when his Most Christian Majesty told his Royal Highness that he should think of no other claim than his, if Prince John of Saxony, whose wishes his Most Christian Majesty had seconded, should decline.

My answer of the 24th November, to Lord Aberdeen's letter, enclosing the report of this conversation states:—

“I don't think that we can object to Leopold, if those who have objected to the nomination of the Prince proposed by us should propose that he should be nominated.

“But our own candidate must be first distinctly rejected, or he must have declined.”

Prince Leopold arrived in London on the 24th November.

In a conference with the Duc de Laval, on the 26th November, Lord Aberdeen assured his Excellence that Prince Leopold was not a candidate of our nomination. On the 28th November his Lordship told the ambassador that

Audience of his Majesty on the 7th of December: Prince Charles of Mecklenburg.

Enquiry of the King respecting Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg.

Answer of Lord Aberdeen.

Second interview with the King.

Third interview with the King.

Prince Frederick of Orange was our candidate.

On the 7th of December Lord Aberdeen was honoured by an audience by his Majesty. His Majesty in this audience informed Lord Aberdeen of the application from his Prussian Majesty, through the Duke of Cumberland, for the King's support for Prince Charles of Mecklenburg.

His Majesty inquired what was passing respecting Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg. His Lordship informed the King that the French government were thinking of Prince Leopold, if Prince John of Saxony should decline.

Lord Aberdeen went to Windsor and had an audience of his Majesty on the 10th of December, respecting the answer which the Duke of Cumberland might have written to the request of the King of Prussia.

A conversation to the same purport as on the 7th again took place.

Lord Aberdeen had a third audience of the King on the 24th December. His Majesty again adverted to Prince Leopold.

Lord Aberdeen told his Majesty that the second candidate of the King of France was Prince Leopold; if Prince John of Saxony should decline, which was probable.

Presentation of a projet of a Protocol on the 1st of January, nominating Prince Leopold Prince Sovereign.

Projet altered 5th and 6th.

Alteration communicated to French ambassador on the 9th.

Cabinet consulted on the 11th.

King's pleasure taken on the 12th.

On the 1st of January the French ambassador delivered to Lord Aberdeen the *Projet of a Protocol*, for the settlement of the Greek question, in which Prince Leopold is nominated Prince Sovereign.

I was out of town and returned on the 5th. On the 6th and 7th this part of the *Projet* was altered; and the alteration was communicated to the French ambassador on the 9th.

The Cabinet was consulted on Monday, the 11th; and on Tuesday, the 12th, Lord Aberdeen attended his Majesty, to take his pleasure on the nomination of Prince Leopold.

WELLINGTON.

[1535.]

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR PEEL,

Apethorpe, 1st January, 1830.

I return the enclosed. Lord Francis is quite right not to meddle with O'Connell's disputes. He is equally right in departing from the rule in respect to the appointment of sheriffs, in the case of the county of Limerick, in which it is clear that the judge, the Chief Baron, is interested in the nomination of the candidates for the office.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1536.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Apethorpe, 1st January, 1830.

There is no doubt whatever that the alteration of the Greek arrangement from the cession of a suzeraineté to that of a sove-

reignty is a departure from the Treaty of the 6th of July, that in its consequences it involves loss of dignity to the Porte, besides the loss of tribute, of indemnities for property, and other advantages held out by that Treaty, and by the Protocol of the 22nd of March. This alteration was adopted because it was supposed to be more advantageous to the Porte; and that the arrangement was attended by many advantages to the Allies as well as to ourselves.

The form of proposing the alteration was in the way of an alternative, either of the arrangement under the Protocol of the 22nd March, after consideration of the representation of the Porte against that arrangement, or of the cession of the sovereignty; and we intended to press the latter upon the Porte by all the diplomatic means in our power. We have hitherto refused to agree to press the latter branch of the alternative only. We did not consider that the words used by the Porte in respect to abiding by the decisions of the Conference, referred to any arrangement other than one founded upon the acts of the Conference at that time before the Porte, such as the Treaty of the 6th of July and the Protocol of the 22nd March; and we were about to propose an alternative adopted by the Conference for the advantage of the Porte itself, which we intended to press by all diplomatic means.

This course coincides exactly with all that we have done since our ambassador returned to Constantinople. We first contended that the Porte had accepted the Treaty of the 6th of July; we next contended that the Porte were entitled, under the Protocol of the 22nd March, to have their objections to the arrangement under that Protocol fairly considered before we should finally carry into execution any arrangement. We then remonstrated against the pretension of the Emperor to settle the Greek affair himself under the article of the Treaty of Adrianople; and lastly, although agreeing to the offer of an alternative to the Porte, and to pressing it, we positively refused the Russian plenipotentiaries to offer the cession of the sovereignty alone; and I stated in the Conference as well as to Count Matuscewitz, that I could not consider the consent of the Porte to be applicable to anything that was not in conformity with the stipulations of the Treaty of the 6th July.

I request you before you go any further to take all this into consideration; and just to see how we shall stand in discussion

if we adopt this French proposition at once, without looking to anterior proceedings and conferences.

In respect to the King I recommend to you not to go to him till all will be ready for signature. I likewise recommend to you not to send him a paper beforehand. The King understands every subject perfectly, the contents of the paper will not enlighten his mind. He will communicate it to others; and it will be made the ground-work of a justification of what we have reason to apprehend may pass. Take with you, if you choose, a note of what you wish to say to him for your own convenience, and in order that you may be certain that you have said all that you wish to say. But do not leave it with him; nor let him believe that it was framed to be communicated to him.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I should object to the three Powers stipulating anything with the Prince Sovereign of Greece, in respect to the internal government of the country.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 1st January, 1830.

I have just received from Laval the enclosed papers, which I send in original, as I have no time to make copies, and I wish you to have them without delay. There must, at all events, be some omissions in the description of the situation of Prince Leopold; and I think the insertion of the sentence which I propose in the margin will be useful. Will you have the goodness to return the papers when you have considered them, with any observations you may think necessary? The nomination of Prince Leopold will, under any circumstances, be a difficult matter for the French to digest; we ought therefore to give every facility; but there are bounds beyond which we cannot go with propriety and truth.

I also send a private letter from Lord Heytesbury, which, although it announces a better temper in the Russian government, ends with a most extraordinary supposition on the part of Matuscewitz, which would justify the most hostile feelings. Lord Heytesbury leaves him to choose between two suppositions, both wrong, and from anything which appears in his letter, seems to have let him remain confirmed in one, rather than set him right.

You have also a despatch from Sir Brook Taylor, dated on the 25th December. This is extraordinary, because the messenger with the despatch relating to Prince Charles of Mecklenburg left London on the 13th,

and ought to have arrived on the 20th. Sir B. Taylor does not announce his arrival, nor does he refer in any manner to the subject of the despatch which he carried.

Prince Leopold sent to desire to see me to-day, previously to his receiving Laval. I gave him the necessary information, and as Laval does not intend to make a communication to him of the papers at present, he will not be called upon to declare any specified opinions or resolutions. He had seen Lieven yesterday, who expressed himself very cordially towards him, and showed great impatience to finish the whole affair. They had talked about Prince Charles of Mecklenburg; but Lieven appeared to attach no great importance to the subject, and declared his readiness to sign the Protocol as soon as we were agreed, without waiting for instructions respecting Prince Charles. He mentioned the delicacy of his situation, from the near connection of Prince Charles with the father-in-law of his Emperor, and the interest which the King of Prussia appeared to take in the business.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

Viscount Melville to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Brighton, 1st January, 1830.

By the recent decease of Admiral Sir George Montagu the number of Grand Crosses of the Bath among the flag officers of the Navy is reduced to seventeen, being one below the number allotted to that branch of his Majesty's service at the establishment of the Order on its present footing in January 1815.

Before submitting to the King the name of any flag officer to receive the decoration of Grand Cross in the room of Sir George Montagu, I am anxious to draw your attention to the present state of the Order, as it affects not only the Navy, but in some degree also, though not to the same extent, the Army.

In 1815, the number of Military Grand Crosses was established at 60, exclusive of the Royal Family, viz. 42 for the Army and 18 for the Navy; and the number of Knights Commanders was fixed at 180, viz. 100 for the Army and 80 for the Navy. Subsequently, in 1823, in consequence of a communication with his late Royal Highness the Duke of York, and the serious inconvenience which was felt in keeping those numbers complete, it was proposed that the Knights Commanders should be limited to 56 for the Army and 44 for the Navy.

I believe there are at present about 500 general-officers in the Army, and, consequently, if the number of Grand Crosses and Knights Commanders were reduced to the above minimum in each class—42 G.C.B. and 56 K.C.B. (total, 98)—there would be about one-fifth of the general officers holding those decorations.

My immediate object, however, in addressing you is with reference to the Navy, in which the case is still stronger, and, consequently, the evil still greater than in the Army. There are at present, exclusive of his

Royal Highness the Admiral of the Fleet, 172 flag officers; in allotting, therefore, 18 G.C.B. and 44 K.C.B. (total, 62) to that rank, the result is that more than one-third of the flag officers must hold those honours.

It would be unwise and injurious to the public interest if any limitation of numbers were to be acted upon so strictly, that in any special case of distinguished services hereafter, his Majesty should be held to have debarred himself (which would be absurd, as well as improper) from conferring on an officer the decoration of any class of the Order of the Bath which his Majesty might be graciously pleased to bestow; but on the other hand, we must not disguise from ourselves that if his Majesty's servants are to be called upon, as they *must* be while the numbers remain as at present established, to take his Majesty's pleasure for keeping up those numbers as vacancies arise, the value of the favour is greatly diminished; and instead of its being a high reward conferred on a comparatively limited number of the most distinguished officers, it operates as a sort of stigma on many who do not receive it, but who would have no reason to complain, and would not complain, if it were not so profusely distributed. I am confident, from the experience of the last fifteen years, that, if the present arrangement is to continue, the Order will be no benefit to his Majesty's service.

I do not know what may be the King's feelings on this subject; but if his Majesty would be pleased to consent that yourself, and such others of his servants whose duty it is occasionally to take his pleasure in conferring the Order of the Bath on officers of the Army and Navy, should prepare for his Majesty's consideration a *projet* to limit still further the minimum of each class, so that we should not be called upon as a matter of course to submit the names of any officers beyond such amount, except in special cases by his Majesty's command, I am persuaded that great advantage would accrue to the public service from such further limitation, and much unpleasant feeling would be removed from the minds of many deserving officers.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours most sincerely,

MELVILLE.

Mr. Robert Thompson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Oakham, 1st January, 1830.

With profound respect, I submit the enclosed plan to your Grace's attention, with the fullest confidence that, under your Grace's Administration, it will meet with the consideration which it deserves.

I submitted the same to Lord Bexley as much as ten years ago.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most devoted and obedient humble servant,

ROBERT THOMPSON,
Superintending Surveyor of Taxes.

[ENCLOSURE.]

RECEIVERS-GENERAL OF THE LAND AND ASSESSED TAXES.

Plan for receiving the Land and Assessed Taxes like the Excise Duties, namely, by placing the Receivership under the control of the Board of Taxes, and promoting their District Officers to the situation as the present Receivers die off.

Benefits of the Plan.

First.—A clear saving of the salaries of seventeen Inspectors, at 400*l.* per annum each; and a saving also of a considerable portion of their travelling and other expenses, by contracting the circuit of their districts.

Secondly.—A more speedy, regular, and economical collection of the duties.

Thirdly.—A more effectual control over, and support to the Surveyors; and, by consequence, a more complete and equal assessment of taxes throughout the Kingdom.

Fourthly.—As a prospective reward for merit amongst the Surveyors, who are very ill-paid, and whose chance of promotion is nearly hopeless by reason of the great reduction made in the number of Inspectors.

The present Receivers-General

Are subject to little control. The Board of Taxes know and feel this to be an evil. The Receivers too commonly thwart the exertions of the Board, and of their officers, to obtain a due payment of the duties. As at present appointed, they are, and ever must be, merely nominal Receivers—their clerks or agents are the real Receivers.

Would the Revenue be safe under the plan here proposed?

Fifty-nine Collectors of Excise receive 18 millions; 49 Receivers-General (the reduced number by Act 3 Geo. IV., cap. 88) receive 5 millions only. In the Excise, Remitters are appointed, with a small percentage, who receive the moneys from the hands of the Collectors, and pay them into the Exchequer. The Act just above mentioned has made the same provision for the Land and Assessed Taxes. In Leicestershire, the Remitter constantly attends the Receiver-General, and takes and counts the money from the hands of the parish officers. The Receiver's agent sits by, and enters the sums received as a mere accountant; and all the Receiver himself does is to sign receipts.

According to this system of management, the Collectors of Excise and the Receivers-General of Taxes are little else than accountants.

The Inspectors of Taxes might safely act as Receivers under the present system of appointing Remitters.

At present there are 17 Inspectors for England and Wales, being, on an average, one for three counties. An Inspector of Taxes, in like manner with a Collector of Excise, might with great propriety receive the taxes. A Collector has the like control over the inferior officers as an Inspector has. If an Inspector, instead of having three counties, as the case is at present, were to have only one, he might well receive the moneys, and have a nearer and a more effectual supervision of everything that is passing in his district, than he possibly can have at present. When placed under the control of the Board of Taxes, he would act in union with the inferior officers, instead of opposition, an evil not uncommon at present.

As to Loss of Patronage.

There would not be any absolute loss of patronage by adopting such a plan. The Surveyorship would be enhanced in value by the change; so would the patronage over it. And it deserves notice, that where the patron has one opportunity of recommending a Receiver, he has four of recommending a Surveyor.

[Compliments.—Inform him that it is his duty to make his communication to the Commissioners of Taxes, and the Duke desires that he will perform it.]

Mr. John Parry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Haverhill, Suffolk, 1st January, 1830.

I will not waste your Grace's time in reading an apology for taking this liberty in writing. Considering the subject to be of great importance to trade and commerce, I shall immediately proceed to detail.

I am a Tuscan straw-plait manufacturer, and employ a great number of women and children. I send my goods to London, and receive payment weekly in Bank of England notes, and for the sake of brevity shall use round numbers, say, 50*l.* every Tuesday morning by the post. That note being a large sum, and in order to facilitate payments in small sums, I get it exchanged at an agent's of a country bank for ten of his fives; but having lost 1300*l.* by a banking-house, I have not confidence in such notes, nor wish to keep them one day in my possession, and therefore proceed to exchange them at one shop and the other, until the whole fifty pounds is, in gold, silver, and copper, placed in my cash-box, which I keep there until Saturday; and thus lock up so much of the circulating medium in specie for four days in the week regularly, thereby contracting the currency, to the injury of the public.

I might alter my mode of payment by requesting my correspondent to send his remittance in five-pound notes, but the postage of fifty or a hundred in five-pound notes, and the risk of the money, would incur a greater expense than the profit of my business will allow; and therefore I cannot obtain five-pound Bank of England to pay my people with.

Believing that my case is the case of thousands, and that five-pound Bank notes are most urgently required in every part of the realm, I most humbly solicit of your Grace to procure an alteration in the Post-office laws in that respect, by giving "Wings to the Fives," and enact, *That any number of Bank of England notes may be forwarded from one post office to another through the United Kingdom at the same expense as a single letter would be charged in going the same distance.*

Such notes to be enclosed in an envelope, with the number and value of each written thereon, the signature and total sum properly and conveniently stated, folded and directed, and delivered to the Postmaster at the office window *unsealed*; when the Postmaster or his deputy shall examine the same, take the postage, seal the letter, and forward it to its destination, giving at the same time a memorandum of date and total amount as

an acknowledgment for the money, of which the government shall guarantee the safe delivery.

This system would immediately release hundreds of thousands of the specie of the country from their holes and corners, and drive away those pests of society, the country bank notes, speculative paper, and accommodations, which have robbed millions, destroyed confidence, and ruin the country.

This system would also supersede the necessity of establishing branch banks at an enormous expense; whilst the single postage, *unfelt*, would add to the revenue, facilitate business, re-establish confidence, and increase the circulating medium to the extent required.

There is no need for one-pound notes in this little town, if supplied with staple fives; the change in gold and silver is in abundance. And trusting this brief *exposé* will be taken into consideration, and that some modification, if not the whole relief hereby humbly solicited, will be granted,

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

your Grace's most obedient and humble servant,

JOHN PARRY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

PRESENT RATE OF POSTAGE FOR CONVEYING BANK NOTES FROM LONDON TO
HAVERHILL, SUFFOLK.

One Five Pound Note.

	s.	d.
A letter containing half of the note charged double	1	4
An answer acknowledging receipt of the half „ single	0	8
A letter containing the other half „ double	1	4
Total expense for conveying one note	3	4

Two Five Pound Notes.

	s.	d.
A letter containing two halves charged treble	2	0
An answer acknowledging their receipt „ single	0	8
A letter containing the other halves „ treble	2	0
Total expense for conveying two notes	4	8

These charges are so extremely high, that they embarrass every commercial engagement in money matters through the country; and the present low price of goods, with the small profit arising from trade, will not permit such an expensive mode of transmitting money. And whilst such Post-office regulations exist, public writers may well clamour about the currency. The opponents say “that the fives can’t go without wings,” and so I say; and, if pinioned to the post-bag, they will wing their way all over the kingdom at the rate of seven miles an hour; and not a person who was worth 5*l.* but would have Bank paper, in preference to any other specie in his possession, it being a more tangible property for security in case of its being mislaid or lost.

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his letter of the 1st Jan.]

[1537.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Apethorpe, 2nd January, 1830.

I have received your letter of yesterday. The snow commenced in this country on the 17th of December, and it is not impossible that the passage and the journey of the messenger to Berlin may have been delayed.

Lord Heytesbury's private letter is most extraordinary. He must be persuaded that the Treaty of Adrianople is all right; and that our complaints are made solely for the purpose of deceiving Parliament. However, the letter which I wrote to him about a fortnight ago will undeceive him; and will show him that upon one point at least we must have an explanation. I hope that you will answer this last private letter.

I stated in my letter of yesterday the objections which I felt to the proposition to the Porte of the cession of the sovereignty instead of the alternative. I see that the terms used by the Porte in the acceptation of the Treaty of the 6th of July and of the Protocol of the 22nd March, have a more direct reference to the Treaty than I thought they had.

In respect to Prince Leopold, it appears to me quite impossible to adopt the *Projet de Protocole* No. 2, in relation to him. It may be very true that one of the reasons for proposing him is his riches, but this reason cannot be put forward in a public state paper. Prince Leopold is, and cannot divest himself of the character of the King's son-in-law; and it cannot be stated that he is not one of the royal family; any more than it can be stated that a man's son-in-law, or his daughter-in-law is not one of his family. Neither can it be stated with truth, that he is not a British subject; that he does not owe allegiance to the Crown of England; that the annuity which he receives is granted irrevocably, and totally independent of Parliament.

I confess likewise that I feel the strongest objections to any interference by the three Powers in the internal affairs of Greece; and most particularly to the establishment in that country of the Roman Catholic religion in its most odious form by a Protocol.

I think that we may alter the proposed Protocol in such manner as to render it consistent with truth, and entirely palatable to France. But before we do so I must see Prince

Leopold ; and must know the legal effects upon his position of the Act of Parliament which naturalises him.

As far as I can judge the repeal of that Act of Parliament would deprive him of his landed property in England, and, I believe, of Claremont. He might sell or convey away his landed property ; and Claremont would revert to the Crown. I don't think that this would signify. But we must not conceal from ourselves, nor from the Prince, that the repeal of the Act of Naturalisation would afford an argument at least to those who would wish to deprive him of his annuity.

If we had Polignac here as the French ambassador, I think that we should get the better of all these difficulties by the adoption of a different form of words in the Protocol. Situated as we are, with the King opposed to his ministers and in communication with the opposition to the government on the one hand, and the corps diplomatique on the other through his brother the Duke of Cumberland, and this corps diplomatique eager to excite an opposition to the government, our position is most difficult and critical. Monsieur de Laval aggravates all these difficulties.

I should wish to know to what Prince Leopold will consent in respect to the Act of Naturalisation, after he will know the effect of its repeal.

We can then proceed on secure grounds to amend the Protocol by the adoption of an entire new form of words.

I am just now going to Belvoir Castle. The Duke's birthday is on Monday ; and I shall be in town on Tuesday evening. But if you should think it desirable that I should be in town sooner, and will send me a messenger to Belvoir Castle, as soon as you will receive this letter to-morrow, I will go up on Monday.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

We cannot consent to the demand of the Isles du Diable et l'Ile de Skyro.

There are several reasons against the interference in the internal concerns of Greece, founded upon the nature of our alliance. Whatever is to be stipulated with the Prince Sovereign must be in the Treaty with the Ottoman Porte.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 2nd January, 1830.

I will not enter to-day into the question of the French propositions, as I am desirous of first knowing what your impressions may be. I should think there would be little difficulty respecting the description of Prince Leopold; it may be altered so as to be more correct in point of fact, and at the same time equally independent. But if we do not take care, there is danger of losing time, as well as the settlement of the whole question. Your statement is no doubt strictly correct of the course which we have pursued, and of our present position. At the same time, if it be possible, I am not less persuaded of the incalculable importance of settling the question by a decision without the alternative making any part of it. Absolute independence is unquestionably not contemplated by the Treaty; but it is to be observed that the Porte is not in the situation in which it stood when the Treaty was made. What might have been desirable when the Porte was possessed of its former power and influence may be very different now. The change is great which has taken place since the 22nd of March. All Europe expects the independence of Greece; very recently Austria has strongly insisted upon it; and if we establish the suzerainty we shall create a complicated state of relations much more injurious than at any former period. From the delay which has occurred, the Turks have had full time to learn the real nature of our position in the Conference, and will not fail to take advantage of it. General Guilleminot writes that he has learnt with certainty the determination of the Turks to adhere to the Protocol of the 22nd of March, in case they have a choice, in the hope of making us quarrel with Russia respecting its execution. Nothing is more probable than this determination; but should we be justified in getting into such a difficulty? We see how to avoid it in a manner more advantageous to Greece, to the Porte itself, and to all Europe. We have only to endeavour to arrive at it consistently, and this, I think, is well worthy of your best attention. The entire acquiescence of the Porte in the decisions of the Conference, after what had taken place, may in spirit, although not in express terms, admit of such a settlement. The provinces specified in the Protocol which we resign are a fair compensation. The advantages to all parties are innumerable. It is expected by all. We end at once, and for ever, at the earnest entreaties of our allies, this question which has produced so many difficulties, and which otherwise may still have so many in store, all for the benefit of an English prince!

Lieven, who was here to-day, started a fresh difficulty, supposing the alternative remains. He said that they had agreed to this arrangement with the full understanding that secret instructions should be sent to the ambassadors to support the second proposition in the strongest manner; but he observed that the objections made by the French government, and the alterations proposed by them, offered much less security for the adoption of that branch of the alternative which we desired. He talked mysteriously about his signing under very different circumstances from what he had anticipated; and seemed disposed to throw out hints that we were desirous of prolonging this state of uncertainty, and did not wish to avoid a misunderstanding with them. I took this up as warmly as possible;

showing that we were ready to adhere implicitly to what had been agreed ; and that the whole delay and difficulty had arisen from the French proposal. I gave him no encouragement to think that we should be able to change the course formerly proposed ; and, at all events, desired to concert with you whether it were possible or not. If it can be done with any degree of propriety, it is unquestionably most desirable to arrive at such a conclusion.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

The stipulations in favour of the Catholics are not so unreasonable, because the French government at present enjoys the right of protecting them in the same country. This right they give up in establishing a prince with absolute power, and a heretic into the bargain.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1538.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Belvoir Castle, 3rd January, 1830.

I have received your letter of the 2nd. I conclude that it is not necessary to make a concession upon the subject of the alternative before we decide upon the whole case.

I think that we may venture to take a few days to consider of an alteration in our proceeding which will expose us to very disagreeable discussions hereafter. I don't wish to delay longer than is necessary to look over the papers, which I have not got with me, and to see where we shall stand in discussion when we shall have adopted this alteration, and in what manner we can justify to the Porte, and to our own country this departure from that to which we had before declared our determination to adhere.

I assure you that I shall not be induced by Prince Lieven's ill temper, or murmured threats, to persevere in a course which you think inconvenient, and from which you wish to depart, if I should find that we can depart from it without exposing ourselves to disgrace in future discussions.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. John Williams to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

West Ashford, 3rd January, 1830.

It is not possible for you not to know that the great interests of the country are in a state of rapid decay, and that they have been brought

into this state by Peel's Act. Now, a diminution of the circulating medium being the cause of the general distress, an increase of it must be the remedy—that increase must not be effected by the issue of paper exposed to the effects of panic; it must be effected by the issue of paper exempt from those effects, and such paper should issue only from the Exchequer. Were 40 millions, consisting of 1*l.*, 2*l.*, and larger notes, thrown into circulation, they would restore the palsied energies of the country, and set the industry of it again in full play. They might be disposed of in the following manner: first, by paying off the debt due to the Bank of England; next, in calling in and paying off all Exchequer Bills, by which the interest payable on both would cease, and taxes to the same amount might be taken off. They would cost nothing, and, on finding their way back into the Treasury for taxes, they might be re-issued. Country bankers, if not permitted to issue small notes, should be allowed to give these government notes in exchange for their 5*l.* or larger notes; but I would certainly also advise the coining the sums of gold into six sovereigns instead of four, the imposing a seigniorage on all gold carried to the Mint to be coined, which would be equal to the difference between its mint and market price, and a reduction of the public expenditure to the lowest pitch to which it can be reduced consistently with the honour and safety of the country. Were the standard to be altered, the notes which I recommend should be exchanged for the present gold coin, which should be conveyed to the Mint and re-coined, in which case, assuming it to amount to 20 millions, there would be a gain to the public of 10 millions, as the 20 millions would be coined into 30 millions, and 10 of these would be retained as seigniorage. There is not an individual in town or country to whom I have mentioned my plan respecting government notes who does not approve of it. If the principle was extended in time of war, the greatest benefits would result from it; instead of borrowing, government might issue national paper, and supposing 100 millions to be added to the circulation, they might be withdrawn from circulation in a given time by a property-tax; for instance, a property-tax producing 10 millions annually, would, in 10 years, withdraw 100 millions added to the circulation, and bring the circulating medium back gradually to what it was before the addition was made. It must be needless to say that as the 10 millions were got back they should be destroyed. If, my Lord Duke, you consult those overgrown capitalists, whose interest it is to prevent an increase of the circulating medium, they will condemn my suggestions; they, therefore, are not the persons you ought to consult. We know, from experience, the good effects of an increase of the circulating medium; we know, too, from experience, the ill effects of having that increase in notes exposed to the effects of panic; your objection should therefore be to the quality, and not to the quantity of paper to be issued.

I am, my Lord Duke, your obedient servant,

JOHN WILLIAMS.

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his letter of the 3rd inst.]

Mr. Connor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Kilmallock, 3rd January, 1830.

It being generally reported and believed that it is the intention of his Majesty's government to lay on a property tax this next Session of Parliament, may I beg leave, with all respect, to call your Grace's attention to the manner in which much property in this country is circumstanced.

Many estates in this kingdom are so embarrassed by mortgages or annuities, that the owners receive only a portion of the income arising out of them; in such cases I would respectfully suggest that, in the first instance, the receiver or agent of such estates should pay the tax on the whole annual income, but that a clause should be introduced in the Act of Parliament compelling him to charge the owner of the estate with such part of the tax only as he would be entitled to pay, according to the sum he annually receives, and to charge the mortgagee or annuitant with the remainder.

A modified property tax would be a very popular one in Ireland, and I have reason to know from conversations I have had with several gentlemen on the subject, that a relief clause, such as described, would add greatly to its popularity.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord Duke,

with the highest respect, your Grace's humble servant,

GEORGE CONNOR.

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his letter recommending a property-tax in Ireland.]

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 3rd January, 1830.

I do not see that there is any particular reason for your coming to town before the time you propose. I presume that the French do not mean to insist upon the omission of the alternative, however much they may desire it; and we need not, therefore, embarrass ourselves with that matter at present. The case of Prince Leopold is different; for, with respect to him, they must have satisfaction. I have already prepared Laval for some alteration of the Protocol, and I suppose it may now as well stand still until you come. It is clear, in the meantime, that nothing can be done with the King; and if any considerable delay were to take place, additional opportunity for intrigue would be given in that quarter; and increasing clamours may make the French Ministry take fright, and endeavour to escape from their engagement by a dispute about terms.

As it seems desirable that you should see Prince Leopold without loss of time, perhaps you had better write to him to-morrow to propose a meeting on Wednesday; for, as he is not in town, you may otherwise lose a day. After all, I very much fear that Laval will never bring himself to consent to any material alteration without referring to Paris. He is likely to throw

every obstacle in the way; for Lieven imparted to me that he was quite indignant at the nomination, while Laval gave me to understand nearly as much respecting the other.

I will not fail to write to Lord Heytesbury upon the subject of his last private letter, and the strange manner in which he supports the representations of his government. You may recollect that I have already touched pretty sharply upon this topic. I send you the copy of a letter which I wrote to him ten days ago by the last messenger respecting the Lievens. It really seems to me that something should be done, in some way or other, to effect their removal if possible. It is not to be expected, with the real difficulties existing between the two countries, that anything should go on well when conducted by persons animated as they are. Whatever may be our precautions, the Emperor must believe the reports which he receives from them. What I have written does not commit us to any formal or official step whatever; but I cannot help thinking that if Lord Heytesbury and Matuscewitz manage properly, the thing may be done without producing any great sensation here or elsewhere.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Earl of Aberdeen to his Excellency Lord Heytesbury, G.C.B.

MY DEAR LORD HEYTESBURY,

Foreign Office, 22nd December, 1829.

It gave me pleasure to learn by your last letter that it was probable Count Matuscewitz would arrive at St. Petersburg before my despatch, No. 22, should have been communicated to the Emperor; and, at all events, that no answer would be returned until the government should be able to profit by his assistance. I trust, therefore, that such a view will be taken of the matter as may lead to an amicable conclusion. You are to understand that the despatch in question has not been communicated to any foreign Court whatever, and that, before we think of taking such a step, we shall wait to see the character of the Russian answer.

It seems quite impossible that anything like cordiality should exist between the two governments, when the representatives of Russia in this country are engaged in every intrigue which can possibly be set on foot to shake the King's Ministers. Their hostility is open and avowed; and there is no party so discordant with which they are not allied in the hope of promoting this object. Their connection with every party hostile to the government is such as to render official communication often very inconvenient. Confidence is impossible; and absolute silence is frequently necessary when we know what would be the immediate consequence of anything like freedom of intercourse. This hostility is principally, and very naturally, directed against the Duke of Wellington. I am given to understand that their language respecting me is different; but even if this be not done expressly for mischief, I need not say how utterly it must be rejected on such conditions. Count Matuscewitz is fully aware of the prejudicial effect which this position must have upon the business of the Emperor, and possibly may represent the matter in some way or other. You are clearly to understand that you are to make no complaint whatever; but you may probably have opportunities of speaking to Matuscewitz confidentially upon the subject. The removal of the ambassador from this country would unquestionably be a great advantage under present cir-

cumstances. If the *éclat* of an entire removal should not be desirable, there has long been a question of leave of absence; if this were speedily to take place, and to be reasonably prolonged, it might answer the purpose; especially if Matuscewitz were to reside here as Chargé d'Affaires in the interim. I throw out these suggestions as mere desiderata which you may keep in view, but upon which I give no instruction whatever. The whole must be left to your own discretion, and to the judgment with which you may avail yourself of any opportunities which may offer for promoting an object which I think of no small importance to both countries.

Believe, &c.,

ABERDEEN.

Sir G. S. Mackenzie to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

4, Coates Crescent, Edinburgh,
4th January, 1830.

MY LORD DUKE,

The enclosed communication, which I doubt not will attract your Grace's immediate attention, I request you to consider as private. Knowing the facts, your Grace can easily come at the whole without my name appearing at all.

As your Grace may like to see the opinion expressed by the best newspaper in Scotland on the late prosecution for libel (I have no connection with it), I send it.

I have the honour to be,

your Grace's very faithful servant,

G. S. MACKENZIE (B^r).

[ENCLOSURE.]

In the year 1727, one hundred and three years ago, trustees for the encouragement of manufactures were appointed, with a fund that has progressively increased to a large amount—it is supposed, to at the least 100,000*l*. It is not now necessary to give premiums for the promotion of industry in improving manufactured goods, for competition does all that is necessary. The above fund is, therefore, of no use, but to afford a thousand a-year to a secretary, who has little to do, and some hundreds to a clerk and inferior officers. There is an establishment for teaching drawing gratis, it is believed; and the trustees are in possession of some very fine casts from antiques. The sums distributed among manufacturers as premiums are trifling. The only useful part of the establishment may be transferred to the Royal Institution for the Fine Arts. Some years ago the trustees were induced to expend upwards of 20,000*l*. of their fund in erecting the splendid building in Edinburgh called the Royal Institution, apartments in which are let, at heavy rents, to the Royal Society of Edinburgh, the Society of Scottish Antiquaries, and the Institution for the Fine Arts, which last has recently obtained a grant of 500*l*. a-year from government; while the whole of the artists in Scotland have associated into an independent body, preferring this to the management of the directors of the institution, so that they can derive no benefit from the grant. It appears, therefore, that as premiums are not wanted now-a-days for any of the objects under the charge of the trustees, that body may in future be dispensed with; and as there are many objects in Scotland to which your Grace would willingly contribute a share of public money, did

you know where to find it, here is a fund at your disposal, the distribution of which will not affect any branch of the ordinary revenue, or interfere with its proper application. The objects to which your Grace's attention may be directed most usefully in the distribution of this fund are as follows :—

1. To do what is creditable to the country, and present their accommodations free of rent and taxes to the learned bodies which now occupy the building called the Royal Institution; and the rest of it to the body called the Royal Institution for the Fine Arts, leaving it to that body to continue or not, as they please, the present drawing academy.

2. To the Commissioners for completing the Edinburgh College buildings may be granted 20,000*l*. (They are in debt 18,000*l*.)

3. To the National Monument, 10,000*l*.

4. To the Royal Observatory of George IV., as a fund to pay an astronomer and assistants, &c., 10,000*l*.

5. To the Parliamentary Commissioners for Highland roads and bridges, for the express purpose of opening up communications in the more remote and poor districts, and building boat-harbours for the use of fishermen, and inns for the accommodation of travellers in these remote districts, 20,000*l*.

6. To aid in restoring the bridges carried away by the floods of 1829, 20,000*l*.

Such are the objects to which a now useless fund might be applied in Scotland—objects which it would be your Grace's pride to promote when means are found, and for the accomplishment of which the country would bless you. The salary of the principal clerk might be reduced one-third, and the rest allowed to him for life; and the other clerks of the trustees might also have an allowance. These allowances the learned bodies named might pay, if they received a grant of their accommodations. The late Sir William Arbuthnot was clerk, and his place has not been filled up. The present trustees are—The Duke of Athole, Lord President Hope, Lord Melville, Lord Glenlee, Sir J. Montgomery, Duke of Hamilton, Sir P. Murray, Sir J. Sinclair, Lord Justice Clerk, Gilbert Innes, Esq., Sir J. Hay, Lord Pitmilley, Alexander Osborne, Esq., Baron Clerk Rattray, Lord Abercromby, Sir A. Muir Mackenzie, Lord Chief Commissioners, Lord Meadowbank, Lord Gray, Lord Advocate, Lord Chief Baron, Earl of Elgin, Sir Robert Dundas, Sir H. Jardine. The business is managed by three or four resident in Edinburgh.

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his letter, and has made inquiry into the nature and circumstances of the fund to which he refers.]

Mr. H. Francis to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Norwich, 4th January, 1830.

I feel that I ought to apologise to your Grace for presuming to break in upon your valuable time, but the state of the country is such as to make it the duty of every member of society to take a part in endeavouring to point out what may tend to alleviate the severe sufferings, and relieve the degraded state of the poor of England. My occupations have been such of late years as to bring me in contact with the agricultural and manufacturing poor, as also with the farmer; and if amidst the observations I am about to make (and which I shall do as concisely as possible) I should

be fortunate enough to lead your Grace's great mind to any one point that may bring about a remedy for any of the distempers which society is now labouring under, I shall be amply rewarded. Simple means have under every circumstance brought about more real good than any complicated system. I venture humbly to submit whether the great evil of late years has not been in the misapprehension of the sources of real national wealth, for there are various circumstances that may bring about immense individual wealth, and by such operations impede the progress of national wealth, such as machinery, and the partial application of capital. But whether this be correct or not, too much stress has been put upon the pretended evils of a redundant population and over production. Now, any check to these is a positive impediment to national wealth; for in a well-regulated society the increase of population is very justly held to be the true source of national wealth and prosperity. A labouring class of people, enabled by their industry to gain an honest livelihood, through the wise regulations of a State, or more properly by the fostering hand of individuals, are the prime circulators of the wealth of a country. But, alas! what class of labourers in this country are now enabled to live by their labour? Pauperism, which forty or fifty years since was scarcely felt, except as to the impotent poor, is now a general system. What, then, has led to all this? or rather, what means of subsistence have been taken from the poor? In order to show this, I must briefly allude to the progress of society, as it regards the poor, since the Reformation. Prior to that important æra, the poor principally subsisted on part of the wealth of the Church; that source diverted, the necessity for the poor-laws arose; but these laws were then adopted solely with the view of providing labour for the sturdy poor, and sustenance for the wants of the impotent. From the time of Queen Elizabeth to the middle of the last century, the nobility and gentry principally resided in the country, and were led by inclination and principle to attend to the wants of the poor, and particularly the consequent provision of labour. And another important point was gained by their residence in the country, namely, the promotion of a quick circulation of the income they derived from their estates, and that on the spot from whence it was drawn. However, just and necessary wars (in which your Grace achieved, with consummate skill, such noble and gallant victories, entailing on the country a debt of perpetual gratitude) imposed upon this nation very heavy burdens; and the immense supplies requisite for the army and navy raised the price of corn and meat in an unprecedented degree. This necessarily made land of great value, and the wealth the provident farmer then obtained was laid out in the purchase or improvement of land of every description. Enclosures of the waste lands became general, and between the years 1790 and 1815 almost every common became enclosed; and wherever any land had most judiciously been attached to cottages, and there were small farms on the property sold, these lands were invariably detached, and the whole taken into the immediate occupation of the purchaser. This totally destroyed the little independence the poor man enjoyed, in which class I include the very small farmer, who generally, and most beneficially for the country, rose from an industrious and thriving labourer, and thus rendered this class entirely dependent on the poor-laws. And when the war terminated, of course the demand for corn and meat ceased, and the farmer was very soon

obliged principally to subsist on his capital. The manufacturing interest at first flourished exceedingly, and numbers of the country poor commenced weavers, thus plunging themselves in the depth of misery; and the poverty of the lower and middling classes was such as to slacken the demand for home manufactures. Thus the demand for corn, meat, and manufactures became all at once paralysed, and all the evil was attributed to over-production and redundant population. The fact is, the poor had been deprived of every means of supporting themselves, and they must remain in this degraded state, and consequently the whole country impoverished, till some plan is devised to better their condition. And what is better than to permit them to have the occupation of some of the land (torn from them), and from which it must be admitted the farmer in the present state of society cannot hope to derive any material benefit? In all cases where parishes have the means of town-lands, and the kindness of proprietors furnished the poor with the occupation of land, the poor's rate has been considerably reduced, and the income of the proprietor increased, not only by the reduction of the rate, but by an increase of rental. If this system were general, the prosperity of the country would rise like magic; we should hear no more from short-sighted politicians of redundant population and over-production; the comparative affluence of the poor would promote the consumption of corn, meat, and manufactures; a healthy, robust, and flourishing people would appear throughout the land, instead of a diminutive, squalid, and starving population; and it will then be clearly seen that it is not the overwhelming fortunes that have been made by individuals from machinery and the actual distress of the country, and are still uselessly accumulating, in a national point of view, that have added one atom to national wealth and prosperity, or that bear any proportion of the national burdens. In one parish, to my knowledge, where there was a considerable poor's rate, an opulent and liberal proprietor set out about forty acres of good pasture, divided into two pieces, and let to about thirty poor persons (heads of families) at three guineas each, goings for cows on this land, each piece (or enclosure) to be mown and fed alternately; and let with the cottages one acre of arable land, besides about one rood of garden-ground, which insured the wintering the cow, being ample provision for their family, and provided work for them when it could not be obtained elsewhere. This has enabled the labourer to set a better price upon his labour, which the farmer pays cheerfully, as he is relieved from the heavy burden of an excessive poor's rate. When this provision of land was made, there was a difficulty in providing the cow, which was obviated by the kindness of the proprietor of the land, who advanced 100*l.* as a loan, which enabled each occupier to purchase a heifer at about 3*l.* 10*s.* These sums were for the most part repaid in about two years. I beg to observe there are very few parishes in Norfolk where the poor have an opportunity of providing themselves with milk, even by purchase.* I am the owner of a small farm in a parish

* And in order to furnish a capital for loans to the poor for providing their cow and stock, a county rate should be sanctioned by Parliament. I say a county rate, because a great number of parishes are liable to no poor's rate by the present operation of the poor-laws, and have their labourers from

much oppressed with poor's rate, in which there is a considerable quantity of town-land. The parish is so burdened (which has arisen only within a very few years), that my farm of 90 acres paid 11*l.* to the poor's rate in six weeks. My tenant is the overseer, and he informed me, he expected, on making the next rate, to be obliged to seize the effects of several farmers for the rate, and who had lately been opulent, and were respectable men. In conjunction with the rector and several proprietors, we are arranging a plan for draining and improving the town-land. For the occupation of the poor on the above plan, this will be a fair experiment; and, if it answer, will be decisive of its beneficial effects. The operation of the poor-laws has pressed very heavily upon those who have provided the most labour for the poor. I have individually experienced it in employing more surplus labourers in a small parish in Norfolk, than would have paid my rate three or four times over; and this has been the case with many spirited farmers. This consideration has led a few parishes to endeavour to establish a system of making two rates, viz. a labour rate, and an impotent rate; in the former, the labourers are divided amongst all the occupiers in proportion to their occupations, and provision of labour taken in lieu of paying any money. The impotent rate is, of course, a general one, and collected in money. But this system, excellent in its operation, has generally failed, from one or two farmers not agreeing to, or ceasing to persevere in, the plan; and though accordant to the original principle of the poor-laws, still not able to be legally enforced. Would it not be right, I humbly submit to your Grace, for Parliament to legalize such an equitable and practicable system? Near Ely, in Cambridgeshire, I am proprietor of an estate in a parish which has a right of common, with six other parishes, over a tract of extra-parochial land, containing 800 acres. It is my intention to propose to a most liberal and public-spirited nobleman, the proprietor of a considerable part of one of these parishes, to endeavour to adjust their rights, so that at least one-third of the 800 acres may be allotted to trustees for providing the occupation of small allotments for the industrious poor of the several parishes. And here I shall take the liberty of observing, that if this 800 acres (which is pasture) turns out clearly to be extra-parochial, the Crown will be entitled to the tithes, and I presume would have an allotment of about one-eighth, that is, 100 acres; and if this were given up to the poor, it would provide employ for bettering the condition of near fifty families. At present this piece of land, though intrinsically good, is in such a bad state from want of draining and management, that it is of little comparative value to anyone, and tends to engender ague and feverish complaints. Should the system of giving the poor the occupation of land be sanctioned by Parliament, perhaps it would not be improper to enact that all parish lands, whether for the poor, the repair of churches, or for the roads, and, indeed, all corporation and charity lands, should be made subservient to furthering the system; and a facility might be given for exchanging portions of these lands for the convenience of occupation. I hope your Grace

parishes heavily burdened. And in case of sickness, and the want of work of such labourers, such latter parishes are obliged to maintain them, without a sufficient reciprocal benefit.

will pardon my prolonging this letter by alluding to the present disturbances in this city, which arise from resistance on the part of the operatives to lower their wages, or rate of work, and their destruction of work taken by persons at a reduced rate; and however improper their conduct, still their situation is much to be deplored, for if they reduced the rate of work, their earnings would be very trifling, and their masters would scarcely then be able to manufacture at a remunerating price, owing to the inroads made on fair trading by surplus capital, which have given rise to cheap warehouses and shops, such as Todd and Morrison's. They purchase large stocks of manufactured goods from distressed manufacturers and bankrupts, and send them into the market at very little above cost price, which depress the goods of the fair manufacturer to a ruinous price, and thus often expose his stock of goods to the prey of these harpies. It has been stated in a court of law, that Todd and Morrison return more than a million per annum!* Oh! that heavy taxation could reach such traffic. Allow me to say I have written these observations without the knowledge of an individual, humbly, and I trust with a pure motive; and I have ventured to address them to your Grace, as the country must, and do, look up to you alone for any great and decisive measure. Insignificant as I am, and I fear too presumptuous, still I will not conceal my name, but with profound respect subscribe myself,

Your Grace's obedient humble servant,

HEN. FRANCIS.

In 1824, when the Corporation of Norwich was distinguished by enrolling your Grace as a citizen, I had the honour as an Alderman, and then Sheriff of that city, to introduce your Grace to the assembly of Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council.

P.S. 5th January.—I this day met the rector and proprietors of the parish alluded to in my letter; we found that there were 93 acres of town-land, and we were unanimous in giving the farmers notice to quit the occupation of this land, and to let it in allotments to the industrious poor, so as to make way for surplus labour; and we have already employed many of the surplus labourers in levelling and improving this land, instead of making them allowances of money in idleness. But a difficulty occurred, which I have alluded to in my letter, namely, that the situation of this land is such as to make it inconvenient for the occupation of the poor, it being very desirable to have the allotments as near their dwellings as possible, in order that they may devote every spare half hour to their land, and thus to the utmost promote habits of industry and frugality; and the proprietors of land in the parish are desirous of making such exchanges as may promote this object. It is therefore very desirable that the legislature should give facility to such exchanges, which cannot be effected without an enactment, on account of the powers of trustees; and the tenure of the lands to be so exchanged, and in many cases exchanges cannot be effected at all; but it will be absolutely necessary and advantageous to sell some of the town-lands, and purchase more scattered lands

* The fact is, that the return is nearer a million and a-half.

convenient for the dwellings of the poor. All this is wanted to effect the object in view in the parish alluded to, and must be so in all cases.

On our investigation of the state of this parish, we found the necessity for another important enactment alluded to in my letter, namely, the legalising the system of making a labour rate and an impotent rate, for we find the farmers in general neglecting the cultivation of their land, and generally paying money for relief, instead of doing it in the shape of labour; and the allowance of meal money is so favoured by the magistrates in the neighbourhood of the parish alluded to, that they actually encourage a system of idleness. It appeared, also, in our investigation, that if a labour rate could be insisted upon, there was not more than a sufficient number of labourers in the parish to cultivate the land properly. An experienced farmer told me the land was not half farmed, and was deteriorating very rapidly; indeed, this is generally the case at this moment, particularly in parishes that are heavily burdened with poor. The only difficulty in the labour rate is with the very small farmer, who does all the work on his farm by means of his own family; and it would be oppressive to saddle him with a labourer. Some equitable scale might be adopted as to this class, as by their industry they keep their families off the rates. In conclusion, I beg leave to state, that I can substantiate all the facts I have ventured to assert for your Grace's consideration.

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his letter of the 4th inst.]

Mr. Compigne to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Reading, 4th January, 1830.

It is commonly reported that the reduction of the Four per Cent. Annuities is contemplated by your Grace. Upon this subject, as connected with the reduction of the National Debt, I venture to request that your Grace will peruse throughout the enclosed paper. I can hardly think that I suggest any better measure than what has perhaps already been determined upon by your Grace. But no man can do or think of everything, and, by possibility, my hint may not be useless. And, being one of the millions interested in the welfare of the country, I am sure your Grace will receive with condescension the opinion I presume to offer, whether it is useful or not.

The suggestion in part varies from my former communication, and in part repeats it, because I could not fully express my meaning without doing so; and I think, as now framed, it is more easily carried into effect.

I am extremely unwilling to take up the time of your Grace, but being fully sure of the soundness of the principle upon which the measure recommended is founded, I should not satisfy myself that I was acting rightly if I shrunk from laying it before your Grace.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

ALFRED COMPIGNE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

THE NATIONAL DEBT.

The whole kingdom is in expectation of some great financial measure, and, to use a familiar term, it is ripe to co-operate in any effort of the government that shall be founded in wisdom, for the gradual redemption, or reduction, of the debt of Great Britain, however great and comprehensive that movement may be. Towards the attainment of this great object it is stated to be the intention of the government to reduce the Four per Cent. Annuities to a stock bearing a less rate of interest. That such a reduction of the Four per Cent. Annuities is perfectly legal cannot be doubted, but the question arises, Is it for the best interests of the country to do so?

If the Four per Cent. Annuities are reduced to Three-and-a-Half ($3\frac{1}{2}$) per Cent. Annuities, the annual saving will amount to a sum not exceeding four hundred thousand pounds (400,000*l.*); but the whole, or nearly the whole, of this large sum of money comes from persons the least able to bear the loss, and mostly from persons who have already sustained a loss of income by the reduction of the Navy Five per Cent. Annuities. It is at best but a trifling measure as compared with the end proposed, and it is absolutely throwing away the power that the present public feeling gives, together with the present high value of the funds, to use that power for anything short of a general and effectual measure. Merely to nibble at the Four per Cent. Annuities is like a general who, in a great contest, should bend his whole force to the destruction of some 500 men out of one corps of the enemy, and preclude himself from pursuing a greater advantage, when, by a judicious and bold movement, he would weaken and finally altogether destroy his enemy.

Instead of reducing the Four per Cent. Annuities to a less rate of interest, I would say, do just the reverse. Consolidate the whole funded debt of 3*l.*, $3\frac{1}{2}$ *l.*, and 4*l.* per cent. annuities, and make them one fund, bearing interest at 4*l.* per cent. This may with much ease be effected, having the appearance of great advantage to the present holders of stock, but, in fact, without a scintilla of loss to the country even in the outset. There are two ways of effecting this: either by laying on a direct income tax of 10*l.* per cent., and at the same time passing an Act of Parliament to permit the exchange of the existing stock for another stock, which shall be declared free from the direct tax upon income (as presently described); or, avoiding the name of income tax, or any other obnoxious name, by passing an Act merely to allow the exchange of the present stocks (at a small advantage to the holders of 3*l.* and $3\frac{1}{2}$ *l.* per cent. stocks), in the same manner as the exchange now practised with regard to the long annuities, for a new stock (of course providing the usual clause for the indemnity of trustees), bearing, indeed, interest at 4*l.* per cent. per annum, but which stock shall be subject to an annual reduction of at least one-half per cent. (ten shillings in one hundred pounds), but it would bear a reduction of 1*l.* per cent. per annum from the capital stock. This small advantage which might be given to the holders of 3*l.* and $3\frac{1}{2}$ *l.* per cent. annuities might, in fact, defer for a year or two years, or even three years, the reduction as regards them, because the advantage immediately gained by them might be made to that amount, and the exchange would be well purchased by the country at a much greater amount; but when once the movement of reduction began, it would, without any extraneous assistance, instantly relieve the pressure of taxation, and annihilate the whole debt itself in one hundred years. The reduction of the interest upon the whole debt of Great Britain by this mode (at an annual reduction of 1*l.* per cent. per annum from the capital), without the aid of a general income tax, would be

about 320,000*l.* in the first year, the reduction of the capital being (in the same time) about eight millions; in the second year a further reduction of the same amount, and so on progressively, till in twelve-and-a-half years one hundred millions would be swept away; in twenty-five years double that sum, and so on till the whole debt disappears.

Yet, in what may be called this mighty operation, it would not be oppressive on any individual, however rich or however poor; and by the country collectively the reduction in the sum annually sent into circulation would hardly be perceptible; and as the measure must necessarily generate confidence in the government, it is quite certain that that confidence would be extended by one man to another in every branch of trade. And, besides this, it is scarcely less important that the value of the public securities, and with that the value of the currency, would be more certain, and not liable to the hitherto ruinous fluctuations.

If this exchange of stock be effected, one-half, nay, the whole, of the existing assessed taxes may with triumph be given up, and then what would be the feeling throughout the country? Every county, city, and town would join in one simultaneous act of gratulation, and expressions of joy and of gratitude to the government. A consequence of this measure would also be that it would operate as a recall to all absentees, and fill our now empty country houses. There is, in fact, no telling the extent of the beneficial effect that may not be expected to result from the lessening of the burdens now existing upon income, and a confidence in the operations of the financial measures of the government.

This plan is properly for a time of peace to redeem a debt, not to raise money for a war or for any other purpose. For those purposes, a direct taxation or a sale of Exchequer Bills is the readiest and best.

The operations here set forth, if coupled with some amelioration of the direct and often oppressive manner of raising the funds necessary for the support of the clergy (and, in fact, of all corporate and collegiate funds), would remove almost entirely the present burdens upon agriculture; but with the property of the Church, as now existing, it is scarcely possible to do any effectual good. The only way of avoiding difficulties almost inseparable from any other mode is this:—To give every possible facility for the sale of property in mortmain, whether tithes, or lands, or any other hereditaments, and to enact that the money to arise from those sales shall be invested in government security at interest; and this interest need not be higher than 2*l.* 10*s.* per cent. per annum. This would at once relieve the land, and at the same time improve the income of the Church; and when the money was once in the government fund it would not be difficult for the government to do any act which might be necessary for more equally apportioning the Church revenues among her clergy.

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his letter of the 4th inst.]

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 4th January, 1830.

In bringing before you the subject of the alternative, although I have expressed a very strong desire to arrive at the proposed conclusion, should it be possible, pray have the goodness to remark that I have given no

positive opinion upon this point. My object has been to engage you to look at the whole question fairly, and with the endeavour to overcome the objections which no doubt exist; but if, after such a consideration, you continue to be of opinion that we had better adhere to the proposition as formerly intended to be made, you may depend upon it that I shall not only cheerfully acquiesce, but that I shall really believe that no change ought to be adopted. However strongly I may urge the motives for receiving favourably the French proposal, connected as it may possibly be with the choice of the Prince, and the settlement of the whole question, I beg to assure you, once for all, that it is with an entire deference for your final judgment when fairly exercised.

I have never made any secret of an abstract preference for an independent State at all times, and, of course, the reasons are stronger now than ever; but while not disguising these wishes and opinions, I have never held out the slightest hope that our engagements under the treaty would enable us to pursue this course. Upon the present occasion, I have repeated to Lieven and to Laval that no one could doubt the superior advantages of their proposal as a matter of convenience to all parties, but that the difficulty in arriving at it with consistency and justice appeared to be insuperable.

To go to the subject of the Prince, which is more pressing in point of time, I enclose a *projet* of a statement to which there does not appear to be any great objection. It is formed by the omission of a good deal of the French description, and a small addition, for the purpose of explanation. It is declared in the Protocol of the 22nd of March that the Prince shall not be chosen "parmi les princes des familles qui règnent dans les trois états signataires du Traité." Some explanation must be given of this; and by interpreting a Prince of the royal family to mean a Prince in the succession to the crown, we shall get over the difficulty. We have sufficient latitude to explain this condition in any manner we may think proper. In this sense, the Spanish and Neapolitan Princes, and even the Prince of Lucca, would be considered, and I believe are so by the French government, as French Princes. In this sense, also, the Duke of Brunswick would be excluded, although Prince Leopold might not.

We may say with truth that the pension is independent of the Government and of Parliament, because we have no right to presume that Parliament will act in a manner contrary to the plainest dictates of justice. The physical power of Parliament it cannot be intended to deny. Whether this will satisfy Laval, I do not know; but it avoids all questions which bring into view the effect of the Bill of Naturalisation, and of the allegiance of Prince Leopold to the King. They take him, then, as an English subject, and reserve any change in his position for future consideration. We merely affirm these truths—that he is not a member of the royal family in the sense of being in the succession to the Crown; that he does not sit in the British Parliament; and that no power exists in any quarter, consistently with justice, to affect his pension.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

Mr. Hart Davis to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Conduit Street, 5th January, 1830.

I have been requested, in conjunction with my colleague Mr. Bright, to place the accompanying petition of the West India planters and merchants residing at Bristol into your Grace's hands, and to explain, in person, the hardships and most heavy pressure under which they suffer. The papers, which have already been laid before the Treasury (referred to in the petition), will spare my giving your Grace the trouble of reading them again in this letter. I would only add that the calamity of the West India planter is at its height, and if not speedily relieved, our colonies in that quarter of the world will be irretrievably undone.

On the part of this great interest which we represent, and in the name of my colleague and myself, I beg to recommend this petition to your Grace's most early, most serious, and most favourable consideration.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,
your faithful and obedient servant,

R. HART DAVIS.

Lord Burghersh to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Florence, 5th January, 1830.

I have this moment received Cardinal Albani's answer, dated Rome, the 31st of December, which I enclose. You will see by it that, for the reasons stated, the Pope has not thought right to nominate Mr. Weld, but, avoiding Florand, has appointed W. Abraam. You will see all the reasons the Cardinal gives for this proceeding, and as I feel it would be improper for me to give the slightest opinion upon them, I shall in my answer merely state that I have received the communication, and have forwarded it to you. I shall wait with anxiety for the answer you may make upon this subject. If you say nothing for the Cardinal, at least let me have a word for you. The whole subject is one of great importance. Priscilla is doing well, and has recovered from the effects of the overturn, which was as bad a one as could well happen, with the exception of broken limbs. My servant has not yet been able to stir from his room.

Believe me, your most affectionate

BURGHERSH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

ECCELLENZA,

Roma, 31st Dicembre 1829.

Il tempo trascorso fra la risposta da me data a Vostra Eccellenza, in data del 17 Nov^e ultimo, e l'arrivo in Roma di Mgr de Weld, al quale alludeva la mia stessa risposta, è stato posto a profitto dal Santo Padre, onde prendere in matura considerazione il partito che convenisse di prendere, tanto sulla vacante Sede di Waterford e Lismore in Irlanda, quanto sulla rispettabile persona dello stesso Mgr de Weld, che il Santo Padre ha veduto con sommo piacere tenersi dal Real Governo Britt^o in questo stesso conto, nel quale egli si dichiara di tenerlo, atteso il corredo di esimie qualità di cuore e di spirito che lo adornano,

la nobiltà della sua nascita e le sue relazioni di parentado col fiore de' Cattolici Inglesi.

La Santità Sua ha cominciato dal farsi render conto del sistema onde si provvedono nelle rispettive vacanze le sedi vescovili d'Irlanda, ed è venuta così ad apprendere che niuno se n'è seguito da lungo tempo, e niun altro potrebbe ora senza timore di gravi sconcerti seguirsene, fuorché quello di sciogliere i nuovi Vescovi sopra una lista di Candidati che dalle diocesi vacante si raccomandano. La diversità di metodi, tutti però dello stesso genere, i quali solevano tenersi nelle varj diocesi d'Irlanda per determinare i soggetti da raccomandarsi alla Santa Sede, davano però spesso motivi a disordini, e quindi tutto il ceto di que' Vescovi si unì ad implorare dal defunto Sommo Pontefice Leon XII. che volesse dignarsi di esaminare un piano di raccomandazioni, da essi proposto, uniforme per tutte le diocesi. Fu questo ponderato per ordine del Santo Padre dalla congregazione di Propaganda, e fu trovato degno della Pontificia sanzione con aggiungersi qualche modificazione che non ne concernava la sostanza. Il Sommo Pontefice non esitò quindi ad approvarla, e con analogo decreto ne prescrisse la operanza a tutte le diocesi d'Irlanda per le future vacanze. Ora è appunto in conformità di questo decreto che il clero della diocesi di Waterford, congregatosi nel modo e colle forme prescritte, ha fatto alla S. Sede la consueta raccomandazione, ed ha fra gli altri notato il nome di Mgr Florand, Vicario Capitolare di quella Chiesa, siccome il più meritevole di promozione.

Poste le cose in questo stato, Vostra Eccellenza ha troppo acume, troppo conosce la situazione degli spiriti in quella Isola per non riconoscere a prima vista che, per quanto viva sia la propensione del Santo Padre a secondare i desiderj di S. M. B^a così obbligantemente annunziati dal suo Ministro, non potrebbe nella presente occasione uniformarvisi senza porre in cimento o il suo proprio credito, se destinasse al governo della Chiesa di Waterford Mgr Weld quasi di proprio impulso, o la tranquillità stessa della Irlanda, se dichiarasse imprudentemente ch'egli si è indotto a questa nomina per suggestione del Governo Bric^o.

Il popolo Cattolico d'Irlanda, fiero dalla ottenuta emancipazione, crederebbe solamente cangiate le leggi eccezionali che degradavano la sua condizione, e sospetterebbe naturalmente che non si è cangiata la interna legislazione politica, di cui tanto si doleva, che per acquistare su di lui un più possente ascendente per mezzo dell'elezione de' suoi Vescovi. Un sospetto sì grave e sì pericoloso per la quiete dell'Irlanda acquisterebbe un peso più grave appunto per la nazionalità Inglese del nuovo prelato che si desse alla Diocesi di Waterford in persona di Mgr Weld. Assuefatti gl'Irlandesi ad aver sempre Vescovi nativi della loro Isola, anzi nel soffrendo bene spesso il governo spirituale di prelati che sebbene Irlandesi non siano però tratti dalla rispettiva Diocesi, non soffrirebbero certamente in pace un prelato estraneo non solo alla sua Diocesi, ma alla stessa nazione Irlandese.

Per altro le ragioni di tanto peso han fatto sentire al Santo Padre la dura necessità in cui egli era di non poter dare alla Sede di Waterford un Vescovo a lui raccomandato dal Gov^{no} Brit^o, non ha per questo scelto colui contro il quale lo stesso Governo si era pronunziato. Quindi nonostante che Mgr Florand fosse quello che più d'ogni altro si brama Vescovo dal clero di quella Chiesa, Sua Santità ha altri scelto invece di lui, per altro fra nomi raccomandati facendo cadere la sua nomina sopra il degno ecclesiastico Dr Guglielmo Abraam. Il Santo Padre si lusinga che S. M. Br^{ca} vorrà riconoscere da ciò, che si Egli fosse stato in circostanze di più fare a secondo dei suoi Regj desiderj, più sicuramente avrebbe fatto.

Io poi non deggio occultare a V. E. che la Santità Sua, bramosa di mostrare

a Mg^r Weld quanto brami di riconoscere in lui un nuovo merito segnalato nella fiducia che egli ha saputo ispirare di sè al suo Governo, si propone di averlo presente e di fargli gustare gli effetti della Pontificia considerazione.

Sicuro che l' Eccellenza Vostra, dotata di uno spirito eminentemente conciliatore, vorrà in questa occasione darne una prova novella ad obbligare la Santa Sede in modo straordinario, io non dubito ch' ella vorrà far gustare al suo Real Governo la sua intrinseca convenienza quanto ho avuto l' onore di significarle.

Mi prevalgo in tanto del presente incontro, ecc.

CARDINAL ALBANI.

(Translation.)

EXCELLENCY,

Rome, 31st December, 1829.

The time which has elapsed between the answer which I gave you, dated 17th November, and the arrival of Monsignor de Weld, to whom that answer alluded, has been profitably employed by the Holy Father in order to take in mature consideration the steps most fit to be taken, as well with respect to the vacant see of Waterford and Lismore in Ireland, as towards the worthy person of Monsignor de Weld, who, the Holy Father is happy to see, is held in the same great estimation by the British Government as by himself, on account of his excellent qualities of heart and understanding, of his high birth, and of his connections with the most distinguished English Catholics.

His Holiness has begun by getting a detail of the system by which the vacant sees are filled in Ireland, and has learnt that none has been followed for a long time past, nor could now be followed without great danger of disturbance, except that of choosing the new bishops from a list of candidates proposed by the vacant diocese. The different methods, all, however, of the same complexion, which used to be adopted in the different dioceses of Ireland, to fix upon the persons to be recommended to the Holy See, often created confusion, and thence the bishops all united in imploring from the late Pope Leo XII. that he would vouchsafe to examine a uniform plan of recommendation for all the dioceses. This was taken into consideration by order of the Pope, by the congregation of the Propaganda, and was found worthy of the Papal sanction, with some modification which did not alter its purport. The supreme Pontiff without delay, therefore, gave it his approbation, and with an appropriate decree he prescribed the observance of it to all the Irish dioceses on any future vacancy. Now, it is precisely in conformity to that decree, and according to the form prescribed, that the clergy of Waterford have made the recommendation to the Holy See, and, amongst others, have pointed out the name of Monsignor Florand, Vicar Capitulare of that Church, as the most worthy person to be promoted.

In this situation of things your Excellency has too much foresight, and is too well acquainted with the spirit in that island, not to see at one view that, notwithstanding the ardent desire of his Holiness to second the wishes of his Britannic Majesty so obligingly put forth by his Minister, he could not on the present occasion meet them without harm to his own credit if he appointed Monsignor Weld to the government of the church of Waterford, as if by his own impulse, or injure the tranquillity of Ireland if he imprudently declared that he had been induced to make the appointment through a suggestion from the British Government.

The Catholics of Ireland, proud of the emancipation they have obtained, would think the laws only changed which degraded their condition, and would naturally suspect that no change had taken place in the internal political legislation which weighed so much upon them, but for the purpose of getting a

greater ascendancy over them by means of electing their bishops. A suspicion of that nature, and so dangerous for the tranquillity of Ireland, would acquire a still greater weight by Monsignor Weld being an Englishman. The Irish, who are accustomed to have their bishops natives of their own island, and even often refractory against the spiritual government of prelates, though Irish, when they are not of their own diocese, would certainly not suffer peacefully a prelate, who was a stranger, not only to the diocese, but to the country.

However, if reasons of such weight have put the Holy Father under the hard necessity of not giving to the see of Waterford a bishop recommended to him by the British Government, yet he has taken care not to appoint the one against whom that government had pronounced itself. And although Monsignor Florand is the person most wished for by the clergy of that Church, his Holiness has chosen another instead of him; and, amongst the names of the candidates recommended, has fixed his choice upon that of the worthy ecclesiastic Dr. William Abraam. The Holy Father flatters himself that his Britannic Majesty will be persuaded from this, that if circumstances had permitted him to meet further his Royal wishes, he certainly would have done it.

I cannot help expressing to your Excellency that the Holy Father, desirous of showing to Monsignor Weld the pleasure which he has felt at the distinction which his merit has acquired him in gaining him the confidence of his government, has determined to require his presence, and personally to give him proof of his Pontifical consideration.

Confident that your Excellency, who is gifted with a spirit eminently conciliatory, will, on this occasion, give a new proof of it to the Holy See, and render it a high obligation, I do not doubt but you will make the British Government feel in all its extent the urgency of what I have stated to you.

I take this opportunity to reiterate, &c.

CARDINAL ALBANI.

[1539.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 8th January, 1830.

It appears to me that after Lord Stuart's despatch upon the article in the 'Quarterly Review,' we have no resource excepting to consider the case in Conference, or to complain of the breach of confidence to the two Courts. I think the last mode to be preferable.

This is the third instance in this Greek transaction of a breach of confidence. When the Treaty was signed; when the Protocol of the 22nd March was signed; the recent publication in the 'Quarterly Review' of all the documents on the subject, and particularly of one of which we have no copy.

I think that we ought to complain rather than go into Conference, because we are aggrieved; and because, in fact, we had never a copy of that particular document, and that nobody ever had a knowledge of its existence, excepting you and myself,

to whom it was read. None of the secretaries or clerks in your office could have betrayed this paper; and it can scarcely be believed by anybody that you or I could have been concerned in writing the article against ourselves.

I would send the complaint to Paris and to St. Petersburg; and there leave the subject, unless some further discovery should be made.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1540.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 8th January, 1830.

I have observed Lord Stuart's despatch upon the subject of his conversation with the Minister of Marine on our fleet in the Mediterranean.

Lord Stuart appears to have forgotten all that he ought to have said upon that occasion. He ought to have inquired whether their army had entirely evacuated the Morea.

He ought to have observed that the Greek affair was not yet settled. That the Greeks were still at war, notwithstanding our repeated remonstrances. That it was necessary to prevent their depredations upon our commerce as we did not respect their blockades.

That, moreover, we were bound to protect the Ionian Islands; and that as long as the revolutionary government of Capo d'Istria continued in Greece, it was necessary for us to be in strength in those seas.

That, moreover, the Russian fleet continued in the Mediterranean upon its war establishment; and that up to this moment we don't know what are the definitive articles of the peace between Russia and the Porte. Lord Stuart knows all this, and he might as well have given the Minister of Marine an answer at once, which would have prevented a repetition of such questions; instead of sending to know whether his list of the fleet was correct.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1541.]

To the Right Hon. Henry Goulburn.

MY DEAR GOULBURN,

London, 8th January, 1830.

I return the enclosed papers from the Bank.

I don't recollect to have used any expression which could convey the meaning supposed by Mr. Palmer. I think I said that the Bank, in calling upon us to give an opinion now as to what would be the best description of paper for the circulation of the country, were going too fast, as we must first see what would be the facilities for banking under the new charter. But I certainly never intended to reflect upon the Bank in anything that I said ; much less, to impute to that Corporation a desire to promote their own interests at the expense of those of the public.

In respect to the subject of the enclosed memorandum, there is no doubt that there is a strong feeling in the public mind against the Bank founding their issues of paper upon government securities. I don't think that anybody pretends that the Bank ought to hold no government securities, or that any have pretended to fix the amount or the proportion of the issues which should be founded on such securities. But the Bank is blamed whenever any addition is made to the amount of its securities in government paper, or in loans on real property.

Mr. Palmer's memorandum certainly throws new light on the subject of Bank issues on discounts. He tells us that the Bank of England are not the great discounters in London ; that they do not wish to come in competition with the private London bankers, whose deposits in general they hold ; that their rate of interest is therefore higher than that at which the London bankers will discount ; that even if they were to endeavour to keep their rate of interest at par with the London bankers, and to compete with them for discounts, the demand for such accommodation is very various and uncertain ; and that the Corporation of the Bank could not undertake to keep the circulation uniformly full and steady if they trusted to discounts, unless they were to make up the deficiency by purchases, or by advances on the deposit of bullion to the loss of profit by the Bank.

I don't doubt but that this is a correct statement. Still I would earnestly recommend to the Bank not to be in a hurry

to augment the amount of their government securities ; they will do much better to wait till the public mind will have become better informed upon the subject.

Believe, me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I may be wrong, but it appears to me to be impossible for the Bank to withdraw themselves altogether from the discount trade. Their own advantages depend upon their continuing it. The question comes then to be one of degree ; that is to say, how far the capital of the Bank shall be vested in government or real securities, and how far employed in discounts.

This is clearly a question for the Bank themselves, and not for government. All that we can do is to warn them of the prejudice in the minds of those to whose opinions the public attend upon this subject, against what is called their locking up their capital in such securities ; as that system occasions, as it is supposed, that want of facility in obtaining credit of which all classes so much complain.

RETURNING PETITIONS OF CERTAIN CREDITORS OF THE LATE
DUKE OF YORK.

Return this Petition. The late Duke of York's debts are an affair of private interest, in which the Duke of Wellington can no more interfere than he can in the private debts of any other individual.

Mr. Gunning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

6, Suffolk Parade, Cheltenham, 7th January, 1830.

I beg to submit to your consideration the following plan to amend the poor-laws : by it the accounts would be made clear, and a true statement shown of the expenditure.

The out-door relief is the great cause of the expense ; a fixed form should be made, stating age, name, &c., &c., and the cause of the want of relief. This list should be placed on the church-door every Saturday, so that the persons receiving relief might be fully known.

The accounts should all be passed every month by the vestries in open vestry, and every three months the accounts should be sworn to, and an abstract of the expenditure of each parish should be sent to the clerk of the peace of each county for the information of the quarter sessions, and a

general quarterly abstract should be sent by the quarter sessions to Parliament, in place of the yearly return now made by parishes.

The return to Parliament ought to be under separate heads: as county rates, gaol-rates, law expenses, out-door relief, and average expense of each pauper in the workhouse of each parish. This plan might be acted on immediately by an Act of Parliament for that purpose, without any alteration in the present poor-laws. It would soon show its advantage by the decrease of vagrancy, which would also tend to lessen crime, as, in my humble opinion, the police and poor-laws are much more connected in their operation than is generally supposed; and I believe the poor-laws might be extended to Ireland and Scotland, with great benefit to the nation, if the accounts were kept and passed as now recommended to your Grace.

Churchwardens by law are overseers. In many country parishes the clergyman claims a right to appoint his own churchwardens, which is a great evil. This person, and a few small holders, in general govern most country parishes. The minister and his churchwarden make rates and raise money at their own pleasure. This also requires your Grace's earliest consideration.

Noblemen and gentlemen of landed property have seldom time or inclination when at their country seats to go into detail as to the poor-rates, and if they did make enquiries, they could not understand the accounts as they are now kept: each parish should return the number of acres, stating poor lands, woodlands, arable, meadow, or marsh, &c.; with the number of houses and inhabitants. A constant attention to the poor-rates in a large parish in Kent for the last eight years induces me to say that the great evil and the cause of the great expenditure is the shameful manner in which all the accounts are kept. The plan now recommended to your Grace is simple and easy, and would give good security to the public for the sums of money raised for the relief of the poor.

The churchwardens' and surveyors' accounts ought also to be passed in the same manner.

The depressed state of agriculture now claims your Grace's attention. In place of Mr. Jacob's report and return of the number of quarters of corn that the Continent, &c., can supply to England, the average of taxes bearing on the foreign farmer should be ascertained. So long as taxes are required from the English farmers they must have a protecting duty, and, to prevent fraud, a fixed duty to be paid immediately on the corn being imported would give a better protection than the present averages.

If two shillings a bushel was fixed as a duty on all corn imported it would prevent fraud. The high duty on oats in proportion to wheat would give proper support to the Irish farmer. A good system of poor-laws, and a sufficient protecting duty on corn, would soon crown with success your Grace's efforts to add to the happiness of your native land.

The tithe-system requires amendment; it is connected with the present great distress of the agriculturists: a general composition of all tithes would prove a great benefit to society, and add to the comfort and respect of the clergy. The parish returns that I now recommend to your Grace would give great assistance to his Majesty's ministers in this matter: a fixed percentage on real rents might be the system to act on in paying

tithes. This arrangement would give no unfair advantage to the landed proprietor, and would give good security and much comfort to the clergy and all other tithe proprietors.

Having had the honour to serve under your Grace's command from Vimiera to Waterloo,

I beg to subscribe myself,
your Grace's most obedient and faithful servant,

GEORGE GUNNING,
Lieutenant, Half-pay, 1st Dragoon Guards.

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 9th January, 1830.

I have received your letter, and am much obliged to you for the information which it contains. I concur with you that if the poor-laws were really executed, there would not be much cause to complain. But the evil consists in the departure from the law.

Prince Leopold to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Claremont, 8th January.

Having turned in my mind the mode of emancipation which your Grace proposed yesterday, I feel convinced that it is at once the most dignified and the safest; I do not mean, therefore, as far as I am concerned, to subject myself to any other.

I remain, my dear Duke,
your Grace's most faithfully,

LEOPOLD.

Mr. Planta to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Wootton, 8th January, 1830.

The party here have been all very much surprised and amused by the paragraph in the 'Standard' of yesterday evening, announcing *the new administration*; and the surprise and amusement felt by Holmes and by me were much increased by a messenger, who arrived here at four o'clock this morning from our new editor of the 'Courier,' bringing the paragraph in the 'Standard,' and asking instructions as to how he was to treat it. We could only declare to him, in answer, our conviction of its entire falsehood; and we gave him a note to Mr. Drummond to enable him to make further enquiry, if necessary.

I have been much disappointed at not having the satisfaction to meet your Grace here, and Lord Chandos has more than once expressed to me his sorrow at not seeing your Grace. He seems in very fair temper with respect to the government.

I propose to return to London on Sunday next.

Ever, my dear Duke,
your Grace's faithful humble servant,

JOSEPH PLANTA.

[1542.]

To Lord Ellenborough.

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH, London, 9th January, 1830.

I return all the papers upon the batta question which you had sent me. I think that you ought to send all these papers in circulation.

I don't think that the Court have much reason to boast of their civil and military servants in Bengal. The Court give an order, their servants in India carry it into execution, without saying a word; indeed, I believe that the justice of the order was never contested by the Governor-General in any former discussions; and the Commander-in-Chief first sounds the alarm, the army manifest their discontent and approach to a state of mutiny, and the government declare as strongly as the Commander-in-Chief their disapprobation of the order, their ridicule of it, at the same time that they decline to suspend it.

This is modern support!!

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1543.] MEMORANDUM RESPECTING THE IRISH POST-OFFICE (SENT
WITH THE PAPERS TO MR. DAWSON).

9th January, 1830.

These papers contain the evidence and report upon transactions which all must concur are infamous.

In my opinion, all the parties concerned, that is to say, the Secretary of the General Post Office, the Treasurer, and all the inferior officers concerned, including the two country post-masters, ought to be suspended.

Persons should be appointed to perform the duty of their offices during their suspension, and Lord Rosse and Lord O'Neill both required to give their daily attendance at the office during this continuance of the suspension of its principal officers under them. The charges against each of the officers should then be extracted from the report and evidence and sent to him, and each should be called upon to defend, explain, or excuse his conduct.

In the mean time the Treasury should revise the system on which the Post-office in Ireland is conducted; direct the adoption of a new system, to be carried into execution by old or new

officers, according to the opinion formed of the conduct of each officer after the receipt of his explanation or defence.

WELLINGTON.

Lieut.-Col. Bowles to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Clarence Hotel, Cheltenham, 10th January, 1830.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bowles, of the Madras Cavalry, hopes he may yet be recollected by the Duke of Wellington. He has no favour to ask, other than the continuance of that good opinion which his Grace formerly entertained of him.

He submits two plans.

One for the use of spiral wheels to work under water, instead of the wheel-paddles used at present by steam-vessels.

Also a plan for the adoption of the treadmill to convict ships to turn paddles, as done by the steam-engine in steam-vessels.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bowles is induced to transmit these plans to the Duke of Wellington, that, referred by his Grace to the proper departments, they will obtain an attention which they might not do addressed to them simply by himself. A conviction of the great results to which these plans lead has emboldened him to submit them to his Grace's protection.

[ENCLOSURE.]

SPIRAL WHEELS WORKING UNDER WATER, SUBSTITUTED FOR THE PADDLE-WHEELS
USED AT PRESENT BY STEAM-VESSELS.

The advantage of wheels that should work altogether under water can scarcely need to be stated. They would be safe from injury by the waves striking them in bad weather, as well as, placed at a sufficient depth, be equally safe from injury by an enemy's shot. Neither would they be liable to be affected by the heeling of the vessel.

In presuming to treat this subject, I take my ideas from the principle of the windmill. In the one case it is the moving medium which acts on the fixed machine; in the other, the moving machine to be made to act on the fixed medium. It is the wind, or moving medium, which acts on the windmill. The object to be attained is, that the force of the steam-engine shall be made to act on the water, considered as a fixed medium, so as to propel the vessel through it.

The arms of an ordinary windmill placed under water, and forced round by a steam-engine, would necessarily drive the vessel through the water. Some alteration may be required, in order to increase the effect, in the angle of inclination of the sails of the arms, on account of the denser medium in which they are to move, as well as in the diminution of the angle of inclination towards the extremities, if even this last should be at all advantageous. Experiment must point out these details, as it has done in the case of the windmill.

I have said thus much of windmills with the intention only of illustrating to scientific men the principle on which my ideas rest. The long arms are obviously an unwieldy and awkward machine to have recourse to under water ;

we have, therefore, to seek some other more convenient form by which the principle may be applied. That of the common smoke-jack presents itself, with its numerous short arms. Such a wheel placed behind a vessel must propel it forward, or, placed before, draw the vessel after it. My object is to show the theory, leaving it to those who have practical acquaintance with machinery to determine its application. It will be readily perceived by them that the principle extends to the spiral wheel, and which appears to myself the most advantageous form of it.

I suppose a shaft, carrying a spiral worked round it of one, two, or three feet breadth, forming, in fact, a screw, which, acting on the water as it turns, drives, or may be said to screw, the vessel forward. Two of these spirals, of convenient length and power, may be placed, one on each side of a vessel, at any depth under water, and be made to turn round by a steam-engine. Or a short spiral of greater breadth, and making only a single circumvolution of its axle, may be placed before or behind the vessel.

If the treadmill be substituted for the steam-engine in convict ships, or other ships having a sufficient number of men on board, such a description of machinery might be adopted as might be easily fixed and unfixed; might be taken to pieces and stowed away when not wanted. It might be applied to all ships without any change in their construction.

There is, doubtless, a considerable loss of power in the principle of the spiral wheel: this, however, would be less, when experiment shall have demonstrated the most advantageous angle of inclination of the spiral to its pole or axle. But the question here is not of the positive loss of power, but of the comparative loss as to that of the wheel-paddles at present in use. This difference, I am persuaded, is very trifling, if it exists at all, or if it be not even in favour of the spiral wheel, certainly not unfavourable to an extent to be set off against the evident advantages of working altogether under water; and to which must be added that of the even and steady application of the force, instead of that perpetual battering and the shocks by each stroke of the present paddles, not simply rendering the motion unpleasant, but causing material detriment to the progress of the vessel, by communicating to it a percussory action against the fluid medium through which it has to open a passage.

The paddle-wheels at present in use can act but at one single point of their revolution with a direct horizontal force, propelling the vessel forwards. During all the rest of the time that the paddle is in the water it acts more or less obliquely, and wastes part of its power in raising the vessel during the immersion, and sinking it during the emersion. Also on every heel or roll of the vessel, one paddle-wheel sinking too deep in the water, and the other becoming too much raised, or altogether out of the water, a loss of force occurs, the cause of which is only very partially corrected by the shifting ballast. It is difficult to estimate this loss of power in a rough and deep sea.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BOWLES.

[Compliments to Lieut.-Col. Bowles.—The Duke has received his letter, and his scheme enclosed, for an improvement in steam-vessels. This scheme should be suggested to the Naval Department, with the details of which the Duke has no concern. The Duke cannot think that it is necessary that he should be himself the channel of communicating to the heads of the departments of the service the inventions of gentlemen.]

To the Duke of Buccleugh.

[1544.]

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 10th January, 1830.

The time is come at which the King's government must make preparations for the Session of Parliament; and one of the objects for their attention is to find noblemen and gentlemen to propose and second addresses in answer to the King's speech in both Houses of Parliament.

There is no person whose assistance upon this occasion would be so advantageous to the King's service as that of your Grace. Having stated that opinion, I am convinced that you will acquiesce in my proposition that you should move the Address in the House of Lords in answer to the King's Speech, if you should not have an insuperable objection to come forward upon this occasion; and that if you should feel such objection, and should decline to acquiesce in my proposition, you will excuse me for making it, in consideration of the importance which I attach to your assistance.

It is right that you should be informed that, although we have much to bring forward in this Session of Parliament, and of course to announce in the King's Speech, there is no measure among them upon which there can be any strong difference of opinion in the country, as in the last Session of Parliament.

If you should consent to what I have proposed, it will be necessary that you should be in town on the last day of this month, in order that I may have opportunities of conversing with you on the topics which will form the subject of the King's Speech and Address.

I beg you to let me have your answer by return of the messenger.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Prince Leopold.

[1545.]

SIR,

London, 10th January, 1830.

I had the honour of receiving yesterday your Royal Highness's note of the 8th instant.

I had in the afternoon a conference with the Duc de Laval. I communicated to him the proposed Protocol describing your Royal Highness's position in this country, of which he did not

disapprove. It is the same in substance as that which I read to your Royal Highness.

I likewise spoke to the Duc de Laval on the mode of treating the question of the Roman Catholics in Greece in the Protocol. I urged all the reasons for not adverting in the Protocol to any internal question, and particularly not to that of religion alone. The Duc appeared to feel the force of what I said to him, and he promised to despatch a courier as last night to his Court to state what I had urged. I desired that if the King should persist in wishing to say something about the Roman Catholics, he should confine himself to general terms, make it referable to his former rights of protection, and do it by a separate instrument.

Upon all this we shall receive an answer next week.

In the mean time Lord Aberdeen will go to Windsor tomorrow upon the subject of your Royal Highness's nomination.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1546.]

To Sir Thomas Strange.

DEAR SIR,

London, 11th January, 1830.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 7th inst., and your work upon the Hindu Law which you have sent me.

I am very grateful for this mark of your recollection and kindness.

The public are greatly indebted to you for this fresh service which you have rendered, by putting it in the power of others to acquire the knowledge of which the people of India had the advantage during the long period of time that you presided over the administration of justice in that part of the world.

This work undoubtedly gives you an additional claim to the consideration of his Majesty and his servants; which I am much concerned that I cannot acknowledge in the way that you desire.

I think that I have some reason to complain of my predecessors in office, that having admitted your acknowledged services, they should not have recommended to the King to reward them by elevating you to the dignity of a baronet; at the same time that they should have conferred that dignity

upon so many gentlemen as to render it impossible for me to augment the number. I hope, therefore, that you will excuse me if, finding it impossible to comply with your wishes, I decline to lay them before his Majesty.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—According to your desire expressed in your note of the 9th instant, I return the copy of your work first sent to me.

Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Cirencester, 10th January, 1830.

By a letter from Goulburn I find that you are assembled preparatory to the meeting of Parliament, which is sooner than usual. I will certainly be in London early on Thursday next, and sooner if you wish it.

I am sorry that Goulburn has confirmed the sad accounts which the newspapers have given of poor FitzGerald's health. You have been kind enough to beg him to reconsider his resignation; but I am afraid that, in the state of his nerves on the one hand, and the debates which will be taking place in consequence of the state of the trade on the other hand, his continuance in office will upset him, unless he resolves never to look at a newspaper while these discussions are going on—a resolution which he probably will not come to, or be able to adhere to if he should.

You have probably thought of a successor. Unless you should have a more extensive arrangement in contemplation, Herries appears to me to be the most eligible. His successor should have the character of a man of business and experience: neither a decided enemy nor vehement friend to what is called (foolishly enough) free trade; and there is no one who answers this description so well as Herries. It would be introducing no new person into the Cabinet, and you would have the Mint to dispose of as you like.

Your own, very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Poor Lord Redesdale was given over three days ago, and is most probably dead by this time.

To Lord Bathurst.

[1547.]

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST,

London, 11th January, 1830.

I did not write to summon you to attend the Cabinet which assembles in town on Thursday, because I knew that it would be inconvenient to you to attend, and that for the first few days there could not be much of importance.

We have, however, commenced our preparations for Parliament, and I am very glad to find that you will come up on Thursday. I intended to write to you this day to tell you that the West Indian question does require your assistance as soon as possible.

Mr. FitzGerald is very ill indeed. This is on many accounts a very inconvenient misfortune. It is not very easy to select a successor for him, or to fix upon the form of his appointment.

I hope that Lady Bathurst is quite well. Remember me to her most kindly, and

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1548.]

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 11th January, 1830.

I enclose a letter which I have received from a man whom I knew in Ireland, and of whom I knew no good. But there is certainly a great deal of truth in it.

Indeed, until we can get the absentees to reside on their properties, or to dispose of them by sale to others who will reside, or can get some money out of their pockets to be laid out in the country, we shall do but little good in Ireland.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

You will see that this gentleman understands his own interest.

Prince Leopold to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Ashridge, 12th January.

I fear this note will reach your Grace after Lord Aberdeen's departure; however, the same arguments may be used by you if he should fail. The King fancies, I believe, that I get a ready furnished state and the Lord knows what advantages, and that I am to be a king. Now I should wish that pains might be taken to convince him that these views are erroneous. I may, without boasting, say that the great Powers will owe me some obligations if I accept; it is entirely matter of feeling and of that better sort of ambition which sacrifices present comfort and enjoyment for an honourable and useful task. If I had not the conviction that I have the confidence of the great Powers, and my personal acquaintance with most of the leading people enabling me to hope that they will do justice to my

motives and intention, nothing in the world should induce me to place myself in so dangerous a situation. The King should be made to feel that he exposes himself in a manner unprecedented as a British king in acting upon a feeling of dislike which I can say, in truth, I have never given him cause for these fourteen years. I am at a loss to think that any Englishman in the face of justice, and of the policy of his own country, could take up the matter in opposition to the projected arrangement. That the head of the new government in Greece is not to be a king will perhaps have most influence. My dear Duke, happen what may, my best wishes attend you, and I remain,

Your Grace's most truly,

LEOPOLD.

The Duke of Buccleuch to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Dalkeith, 12th January, 1830.

I have just had the honour of receiving your Grace's letter of the 10th instant. I cannot but feel highly flattered with this mark of your attention, and also with the gratifying manner in which you have expressed yourself. Although it would give me the greatest pleasure to render every assistance in my power to his Majesty's government, I feel myself inadequate to the task you impose upon me, having neither talent nor turn for public speaking. Yet as you attach so much importance to my coming forward on this occasion (much as I should wish to decline it), I feel myself bound, if necessary, to lay aside my own feelings and to acquiesce in your request. From what your Grace mentioned in your letter I need hardly observe that if there is any strong line of policy to be brought forward, however great my wish would be to support your Grace and his Majesty's government, I could not undertake to give my sanction as a peer, and more particularly as the mover of the address in answer to the King's speech, to any measure in which I did not most perfectly agree. If any one else occurs to your Grace, as there must be many others more competent than myself to undertake this task, I beg that you will not consider yourself as at all bound to me. Unless I hear from you I shall make a point to be in London by the 28th, and shall endeavour to do my best upon this occasion, and to give all the assistance that is in my power.

Believe me, my dear Duke,

Ever yours most truly,

BUCCLEUCH.

Mr. Henchy to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR GRACE,

Douglas, Isle of Man,
12th January, 1830.

The suggestions I have the honour herewith to submit for alleviating in some measure the present public distress were intended to attract your Lordship's notice through the public press; but, upon reflection, it occurs to me his Majesty's government may have reasons for withholding its

assent, and that declining to notice a project apparently calculated to give relief may be seized on by the distressed and dissatisfied as a handle to defame and vilify government. As I do not yield to any of his Majesty's subjects in fidelity and attachment to his Majesty's person and government, I humbly hope my motive for privately addressing your Grace will plead my apology.

I have the honour to transmit herewith also a Manks newspaper, in which I have recommended emigration to the new colony.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

with the highest respect,

your Grace's faithful servant,

D. HENCHY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MY LORD DUKE,

At this period of unexampled distress permit a humble friend to your Grace's government to solicit your attention to the sums of money drawn from the Treasury of the United Kingdom and expended in foreign countries by half-pay officers and others, who hold pensions, compensations, and retired allowances; a circumstance by which the foreign trader and manufacturer is benefited, to the serious loss and disadvantage of home industry. To remedy this evil, and give back to the payers of the money all the return in the power of the receivers, the following suggestions are, with much deference, submitted to your Grace's consideration.

It is an undoubted fact that the majority of the individuals receiving half-pay and other annuities have no other fortune or means of support; many of whom have families, for the enlargement of whose present comfort and to secure their future independence these annuitants would cheerfully labour, had they capital or credit to begin with. Having neither, they are compelled, many against their inclinations, to migrate into foreign lands, where living and education are cheaper than at home, and there, in miserable inactivity, spend their little incomes with the melancholy feeling that, with their lives, the pittance their poor offspring has will cease, and involve them in all the horrors and misery which accompany poverty. Many of these faithful and meritorious servants of their country would gladly avail themselves of the opportunity that now offers to settle in the new colony on the Swan River had they means to do so—a step that would secure to their beloved country the benefit and advantage of their incomes and of their industry.

With confidence in your Grace's philanthropy and beneficence, it is here proposed very respectfully to show how their interests can be promoted and an important advantage given to the country by an immediate circulation of an immense sum of money, which will give employment and bread to thousands of poor honest industrious creatures. To illustrate which, permit me to request your Grace to suppose the number disposed to emigrate not to exceed 1800; though, should your Grace make the trial, it is probable the number will more than double 1800 of the following classes, *videlicet*: Lieutenants, up to Lieutenant-Colonels, of the Army, Lieutenants, Commanders, and Captains, in the Navy, Surgeons of the Army and Navy, Paymasters, Pursers, Storekeepers, Officers of the Commissariat, Storekeepers, and others of the Naval Civil Service, 960; discontinued Storekeepers, Clerks, and Commissaries of the Ordnance, in England and Ireland, 120; discontinued Officers of the Revenue and Excise, Stamp Office, Post Office, Victualling and Transport Departments, 500; discontinued Clerks of the Treasury, Barrack Department, and others, in

England, Scotland, and Ireland, not included above, 250; pensioners and others receiving annuities and compensations from the Consolidated Fund, 50 : total, 1800.

In the absence of official returns from which to calculate accurately, an endeavour is respectfully made to show your Grace the importance of the project by supposing the annual income of each person to average 100*l.* a year, and it will appear that 180,000*l.* is paid annually to the 1800 individuals.

Should your Grace deem it expedient to honour my suggestions with your approval and promulgate an order to every person of the above description under seventy years of age receiving incomes from his Majesty's Treasury, and desirous to emigrate to the British colonies, that government will supply each with a sum of money equal to the value of one-half the annual income paid to him by his Majesty's Treasury, upon the following terms, namely: 3½ per cent. for the interest, 4 per cent. to cover insurance, and ½ per cent. to cover the expense of managers, to whom the half annuities would be assigned for the purposes as above. The sum thus raised upon an annual 90,000*l.* will amount to 1,125,000*l.*

It is submitted that all, without reference to age, shall pay the 4 per cent. insurance. This arrangement will be an encouragement to those between fifty and seventy, and no loss either to the government or to those under forty-five years; as were it in the power of the latter to raise money from an insurance company, they would be required to pay, at least, 8½ per cent. The sum of 1,125,000*l.* thus raised would enable 1800 families of five each, or 9000 persons, together with 9000 labourers and artisans, to locate comfortably in the new colony, as will appear by the following calculation:—

	£.	
To passage for 9000 people, being the families of 1800 public servants, for berth, fire, and water, at 10 <i>l.</i> each	90,000	
Idem for 9000 labourers and artisans, at 8 <i>l.</i> each	72,000	
	—£160,000	to the shipping interest.
Provisions, &c., on the voyage for the first 9000, at 10 <i>l.</i> each ..	90,000	
Idem for the second 9000, at 7 <i>l.</i> each	63,000	
Provisions taken from England for 18,000 people, after landing for 180 days, at 8 <i>d.</i> each per day ..	103,000	
	—£256,000	to the agricultural interest.
Implements of husbandry, to be carried from England by 1800 families, at 30 <i>l.</i> each	54,000	
Furniture and ironmongery, &c., for 1800 families, at 120 <i>l.</i> each	216,000	
	—£270,000	to the manufacturing interest.
English seeds, at 10 <i>l.</i> each	18,000	
	—£18,000	to be added is the agricultural interest.
Total	£704,000	

By the foregoing calculation no less than 704,000*l.* would be put into immediate circulation, without reference to necessary outfit and freight, which may be reasonably calculated at 20,000*l.* more, which would still leave a balance on hand of 409,000*l.* to build domiciles and purchase stock for the emigrants, and build cottages for their labourers and artisans.

If your Grace be pleased to entertain these suggestions, it might be a further benefit to the country to have some of the large class of frigates now in ordinary to land their guns and munitions of war and transferred to the Transport Board, who would take out their heavy masts and yards, and replace them with such as are used in merchant-ships of the same tonnage. To illustrate which the following calculation is laid before your Grace for an example:—

Probable expense and gain to the public by employing four frigates each year :

	£.
4 Lieutenants, to command, at 8 <i>s.</i> each per day	584
4 Masters, to act as 1st Mates, at 6 <i>s.</i> each per day	438
12 passed Masters' Mates, for 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Mates, at 4 <i>s.</i> each	876
4 Boatswains, at 3 <i>s.</i> each	219
8 Carpenters, at 3 <i>s.</i> each	438
4 Surgeons, at 10 <i>s.</i> each	730
200 able seamen, at 2 <i>s.</i> each	7,300
40 Ordinary and servants, at 1 <i>s.</i> each	730
8 Cooks, at 2 <i>s.</i> each	292
8 Stewards, at 2 <i>s.</i> each	292
4 Clerks and Chief Stewards, at 4 <i>s.</i> each	292

296

Provisions for 296 people, at 1*s.* each 5,402

£17,593 for three years is 52,779*l.*
of four ships for three years, or
twelve ships for one year.

Supposing each ship to carry out 50 families of five each, and 250 labourers and artisans, and each ship to make but four outward voyages in the three years, thus 4000, the families of the public servants, and 4000 labourers and artisans, would be conveyed to the colony by four ships, and averaging each individual of the officers' families to pay 10*l.* for berth, fire, and water, and the labourers and artisans 8*l.* each, a sum of 72,000*l.* would be paid for passage alone, to which may reasonably be added at least 8000*l.* for freight of farming-implements and provisions, at only 2*l.* 10*s.* per ton; thus leaving 27,221*l.* to cover wear, tear, insurance, and fuel, and placing to the public credit the amount of the return freights, which would amount to at least 50,000*l.*, if your Grace would approve of the Transport Board entering into contract with the East India Company to bring their merchandise from China or their Indian possessions, which these ships might easily do in the nine months allowed for the out and home voyages.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

your obedient and faithful humble servant,

H.

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his letter of the 12th, and enclosure.]

Prince Leopold to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Ashridge, 13th January.

I am very much concerned that the result of Lord Aberdeen's conversation should have been so unsatisfactory. The conclusion of his Majesty is the strangest I ever heard, that he would consent, provided I relinquish my annuity. I cannot give up the hope that your Grace will be able to induce the King to change so singular a determination. It might be understood if he founded his opposition upon the impossibility of his giving his consent to so unfit an individual; but he lays himself completely open by his clause. And what advantage is he to derive from it? My relinquished income would not revert to him. The whole affair has been so much argued, that I can say nothing new on the subject. Perhaps you will just turn in your mind how "la capitalisation," which the French wish, would affect it; though this would be a measure which, considering the heavy expenses at first starting, would not be very desirable at the outset.

I go to-morrow to Gorhambury, and shall be in town early on Saturday. I feel very thankful for the trouble you take in communicating the passing events to me, and beg you to let me know the result of your conversation of to-morrow. My dear Duke, you have been in your life so often victorious, that I trust Providence will give you the victory also in this struggle, where justice and reason support you so strongly.

Believe me your Grace's most faithfully,

LEOPOLD.

Mr. Hunt to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

36, Stamford Street, 13th January, 1830.

I had the honour to receive your Grace's letter, dated the 12th instant, in reply to a communication which I made in my letter of the 19th ultimo, relative to a plan for repealing the taxes upon malt and upon beer, and for substituting a duty upon all barley made into malt.

From the length of time since I did myself the honour to address your Grace upon this subject, I was induced to believe that you had made up your mind upon it, or that you had abandoned all idea of entering upon it at this period, and I did not, in consequence of not hearing from your Grace, pursue the matter so as to make any minute detail of calculations thereon; but, in compliance with your Grace's request, I beg to forward, for your perusal and consideration the outline of my plan, which, if it has not now the merit of novelty, is, at least, clear, undisguised, and perfectly intelligible, and will, I have not the slightest doubt, if adopted by your Grace, prove efficacious and perfectly easy of accomplishment.

First. I propose that his Majesty's government should cause the repeal of all the laws which impose duties upon the making of malt and the brewing of beer.

Second. If this be thought too great a reduction of the revenue, the government should substitute a duty upon all barley to be made into malt; say 3s. per bushel.

In this case every maltster should have a barley room, wherein all barley brought to his malthouse should be deposited under the key of the excise

officer. All barley taken from thence into the malthouse to be entered and paid for at the rate of 3s. per bushel, instead of 2s. 6d. per bushel now paid upon malt.

Under this regulation any person might brew beer for sale without any other control than that of the excise officer inspecting his premises to prevent adulteration. Also any person might retail beer under the same regulations, provided each of the parties, maltster, brewer, and publican, took out and paid for a licence at the Excise Office, the latter still remaining subject to the inspection of the magistrates as to the character and good regulations of his house. It might be observed that a considerable increase might be made in the price of each licence. But that and all minor details may be easily and satisfactorily made.

On a rough calculation I would say that the increased consumption of malt under such liberal and equitable regulations would not be less than 2,000,000 quarters annually; this increased 1l. 4s. a quarter would at once give a revenue of 2,400,000l.; add to this the additional 6d. per bushel on barley and the amount of the licences, this duty of 3s. a bushel on malt alone would give a revenue of upwards of 6,000,000l., and would call into cultivation at least 500,000 acres of land that now is waste or applied to other purposes yielding little revenue. This measure might meet with the opposition of some landholders, farmers, and monopolising brewers, but it would be hailed with delight by eighteen-twentieths of the people, composing almost all the middle and industrious classes of the community.

If your Grace should feel disposed to investigate the merits or the practicability of this plan, my humble and gratuitous services are at your Grace's command, as I have no other object in addressing your Grace than that of rendering a service to my country by equalising those taxes that may be necessary to impose upon the people.

I am your Grace's most obedient and very humble servant,

H. HUNT.

[1549.]

To Prince Leopold.

SIR,

London, 15th January, 1830.

I went to Windsor yesterday and did not return till it was too late to write by the post.

I was with his Majesty for more than an hour, but was obliged to quit him *re infectâ* on account of his Majesty's indisposition. I am to return to-morrow.

I have completely removed all cause of complaint against the government. He was quite moderate, and in good temper at last. If I had been able to stay a quarter or half an hour longer I think that I should have settled the affair; and I hope to settle it to-morrow.

The first part of the interview was not agreeable.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. Richard Nicholson Magrath to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Chingleput, near Madras, 15th January, 1830.

I beg leave respectfully to present to your Grace's notice the accompanying production, of the deficiencies of which I am fully aware, yet hope that the importance of the subject of which I have endeavoured to treat may obtain for it some attention.

I have been led into the study of that subject from having been for nearly five years in constant expectation of entering the military profession. I was placed on the Duke of York's list in June 1825. It is not necessary to trouble your Grace with a relation of my claims. His Royal Highness thought them of so much importance, that (as I am informed on the best authority) my name stood high on the list at the period of his lamented death.

When Sir Herbert Taylor was in office, I offered myself as a volunteer for service in Sierra Leone; but Sir Herbert in a most kind manner dissuaded me from that measure, as he was in hopes of having me appointed in one of the next Gazettes; but unfortunately for me he went out of office too soon.

These hopes of a commission had induced me to leave the University of Dublin, in which I had been a student for two years, and had obtained some honours; and thus to relinquish the hope of entering any other profession than that of the army, and to devote my time and money to the acquisition of knowledge useful in that profession. I afterwards made a respectful application to Lord Hill, and had an interview with the Military Secretary at the Horse Guards; but scarcely any hope was held out to me. I suppose that in the hurry of office, his Lordship had not time to examine those claims which the Duke of York considered such as to entitle me to a commission.

Having got letters of introduction to some officers of rank in India, I was induced to leave Europe in 1828, with the hope of obtaining a nomination to a regiment in this country from Lord Combermere. In June last, I was honoured by a communication from his Lordship, stating, that but for the reductions then about to take place in his Majesty's regiments in India, I should have been nominated. Thus I am now obliged to live with my brother, who is in the medical service of the company, and whose allowances are very small.

My Lord Duke, these circumstances, and my zeal for that service in which many of my relations have bled, have made my education that of a soldier, at an expense far beyond my means; and I assure your Grace that this expense, and that of my voyage to India, have exceeded the sum of the purchase-money of an ensigncy.

I now appeal to your Grace, as the natural protector of every person connected with the army, and will feel ever most grateful for your interference in my behalf at the Horse Guards. I had intended to memorialise his Majesty, but I am persuaded your Grace's good feeling, as well as sense of justice, will induce you to take my very unfortunate circumstances into your kind consideration.

Earnestly hoping for a favourable answer, I am, with every sentiment of admiration and respect,

Your Grace's most obedient and humble servant,

RICHARD NICHOLSON MAGRATH.

PART FIRST.

SUGGESTIONS FOR SUPPORTING AN EFFICIENT ARMY AT A SMALL EXPENSE
TO THE STATE.

The opinion of that profound philosopher Adam Smith, that prosperity cannot be very permanent in a country which is not protected by a respectable armed force, is, I believe, adopted by every rational political economist. However, the great expense of supporting a standing army has often prevented European nations from entertaining, in time of peace, a sufficient force for their protection in cases of emergency.

Close and attentive consideration of this subject for a length of time has suggested to my mind a plan by which, to the best of my judgment, a perfectly efficient army might be maintained in time of peace for one-third the expense of the present system. I am well aware that such a proposal will meet with a great deal of opposition, both from those who fancy their self-interest concerned in the support of the existing establishment, and also from a class of persons who are habitually averse from everything which appears like innovation; yet, notwithstanding, I do not despair of being able to convince the rational and unprejudiced.

In the first instance I will explain what I propose, and afterwards give my reasons for supposing the adoption of the system desirable.

One hundred and fifty thousand infantry should be settled on 900,000 acres of land, allowing an average of six acres per man; that is to say, four acres for each private soldier, and a proportionate allowance for officers and non-commissioned officers. If this quantity of land were taken, at a rent of 30s. per acre, by government, the annual expense of the whole would amount to the sum of only 1,350,000*l.*; and averaging the expense of building huts for the troops, places of arms, stores, and hospitals, at 10*l.* per man, the first cost for this purpose would be 1,500,000*l.*; and allowing 5 per cent. for interest and repairs in the buildings, this part of the establishment would cost annually 75,000*l.*, which, added to the rent, makes 1,425,000*l.*

As it would be necessary for the troops to be away from their farms for three months in the year for exercise, the field pay of 1*s.* per individual, that is to say, 8*d.* to the private soldier, and a proportionate pay to his superiors, would amount to 750*l.* per day, which is 67,500*l.* for ninety days. Adding this to the former expense, the amount is 1,492,500*l.* I believe the clothing would not exceed 3*l.* per man, or 450,000*l.*; altogether 1,942,000*l.*; and allowing for contingent expenses for medicine, &c., the whole sum required for the support of 150,000 soldiers need not exceed 2,250,000*l.* per annum.

Of course this plan applies only to infantry. The necessity of constant attendance to the drill in corps of cavalry and artillery is too obvious to require any observation on my part; but I conceive the case is very different with the infantry. Experience has shown that when a soldier has once learned his exercise, two or three months in the year are quite sufficient to keep him in the necessary practice; and in this opinion I am borne out by that able writer Suasso.

It appears to me that the most desirable mode of organization would be in regiments of three battalions each; the first to consist of men who had passed a lengthened period of service, and would be no longer liable to be employed in foreign countries; and the remaining two to consist of men in the prime of life, and available for any service. The first battalion would naturally be the weakest in number.

It is unnecessary to enter into the details of the manner in which the hospitals and places of arms should be built, as that would depend entirely

on local circumstances; but I should suppose that small cottages about 12 feet square would be sufficient for each soldier (with permission to add as much as he pleased, in case he married and had a family), and situated on his own portion of the ground; the shares of which it would be expedient to arrange as nearly in the form of a regular cantonment as the nature of the terrain would permit.

A convenient sort of undress should be adopted for the soldiers, in which they could both work at their farms and parade in the evenings, once a week to be drilled in the more absolutely necessary parts of their movements, such as the facings, formations of three and four deep, and the wheelings. An adjutant and a certain number of non-commissioned officers should be kept on permanent pay, for the purpose of training the recruits of each regiment, under the surveillance of the commanding officer; and perhaps it would be necessary that the drummers should be kept continually to their duty, at least until they were of an age to hold a private's share of land, when they could parade once a week for practice, as is the custom in the staffs of militia, the drummers of which I have known to be fit for every duty.

When these troops would be sent on foreign service, of course they should receive the full pay, which soldiers on the present establishment receive; and their farms would fall into the hands of government, to be used as might appear most expedient; either to be rented out to the neighbouring agriculturists, or to be employed as the ordonnance lands are at present. In either case, they might be made to help in defraying the expense of the troops abroad.

This establishment would do away with a great objection which is often made to a standing army, viz., that the soldiers are unproductive citizens, for here are united disciplined soldiers and industrious subjects, which, it is to be hoped, are characters by no means incompatible.

Amongst other objections to this system, I have been asked, how could the duty of the country be done if all the troops were off duty for nine months in the year? My answer is, If the cavalry are not numerous enough for that purpose, a certain proportion of the infantry should be called out to assist them, taking it year about.

The proposition that a too long residence in the one quarter is injurious to the morale of a soldier undoubtedly holds good with regard to ordinary troops, because the mischief arises chiefly from their excess of leisure, but does not apply to men who are obliged to be constantly employed; and if, after the cutting of harvest every year, large bodies were assembled to perform a sham campaign on an extensive scale, as is, I believe, the custom in the Prussian armies, great advantages would accrue to both officers and men. The former would gain experience in the modes of forming outposts, planting pickets, conducting detachments and reconnoitring parties, and the various duties required on active service; and the latter would acquire that intelligence and those steady and soldier-like habits of obedience which render men essentially useful in the hour of trial.

An objection has been made that the share of land and allowances, which I suppose, are not sufficient for a man's support. I cannot say whether it would be so or not in England; but I am persuaded, from my own observation, that in Ireland a man possessing four acres, and the other advantages specified, could live much more comfortably than any other person in the same rank of life.

But I come now to the greatest objection that can be made against the adoption of this system in the British service. It may be said that it would be impossible to maintain such a species of force in addition to the troops required for colonial service; and that young gentlemen of family or fortune

would not accept of commissions in a service in which they were to receive farms in lieu of pay, and in which, from their quarters being fixed, they could not experience the pleasures usually expected in a military life.

In answer to the first part of the objection I would say, that I can see no reason why the British infantry could not be divided into infantry of reserve and colonial infantry; and I conceive that there could be no difficulty in obtaining recruits for the latter by offering a bounty a little higher than for the former. Of course it would be fair that the period for colonial service should be considerably shorter than for home. It might be expedient to draft men, after a certain length of service abroad, into the infantry of reserve; and probably many men of the reserve would wish to volunteer for five or ten years on colonial service.

With regard to the officers, the cavalry is still open for men of considerable fortune; and of course an exchange would be allowed between the two kinds of infantry; and I am certain that government can never be at a loss for a sufficient number of young gentlemen of family, although, perhaps, not of extravagant fortune, to officer any force it may be thought necessary to raise. For my own part, I must esteem very slightly the zeal of men who would decline entering the service of their country merely because the mode of life, under one system, was not so agreeable as under another.

Some one has suggested that every candidate should make one sham campaign as a volunteer, and undergo an examination in the necessary acquirements of a gentleman previous to receiving his commission.

I am informed that there are more than three millions of acres of red bog and flooded land in Ireland which is easily reclaimable, and would, if cultivated, yield ten millions' worth of annual produce; and it is said that the undertaking would require comparatively little capital. Perhaps it would be economical for the British government to drain this land for a military settlement. The 'London Encyclopædia' asserts that the expense of cutting canals for the drainage would, in a great measure, be repaid by the sale of the fuel raised from out of them.

In Hungary there is a military colony settled on government lands on the Turkish frontier, but I am not acquainted with the details of their system.

The advantages arising from the healthful mode of life which the soldiers would lead as agriculturists, and the active and manly habits they would acquire, are too plain to need any further remark; and it is natural to suppose their moral character would be excellent, which has no trifling effect on the conduct of men on service.

Even supposing that I am mistaken in respect to some of the details of this plan, yet the subject in general is of too much importance not to merit the attentive consideration of everyone who has the interest of his country at heart.

PART SECOND.

Organization of a National Guard, Militia, or Volunteer Body.

When the great body of regular troops is called upon to carry the war into the enemy's country, a necessity is imposed upon the nation to arm itself to be ready to oppose an invasion, or any sudden incursion of hostile foreigners; but unfortunately the volunteer corps, which have hitherto been raised within the British Empire, notwithstanding their undoubted courage and patriotism, have been, from the nature of things, proverbially ill-disciplined.

The desideratum appears to me to be a system which combines a cheap and efficient mode of arming the men with simplicity of drill.

It is, I believe, universally acknowledged that, for the purpose of fencing the pike is a superior weapon to the fixed bayonet, because it is longer, and the thrust is not so easily parried; and it is on this account that it has often occurred to me that a national guard might be cheaply and efficiently armed with that weapon and long pistols.

The extreme simplicity of the drill required for battalions of pikemen, organized according to the method I am about to explain, would enable them, after a very short period of instruction, to act in conjunction with the regular forces, much more usefully than the old volunteers possibly could.

The most convenient establishment would be in regiments of three battalions; the battalion divided into four companies of pikemen, each company consisting of 80 rank and file; and one company of Chasseurs or light infantry, from 100 to 120 strong. The light infantry should form two sub-divisions, one in rear of the right, the other in rear of the left, in order not to impede a charge in line. If called in from skirmishing in front of a column of attack, they should form on the reverse flank, if a single column and in rear; if a double, ready to act as circumstances may require.

My reason for preferring battalions on this establishment is, because being small, they are very movable; and instruction in little more than the deploy movements, the different wheelings of columns, and changes of front of lines, would be requisite.

It is not intended that pikemen should in any case act alone against regular infantry, but they should be always accompanied by some light cavalry (if the nature of the country permitted), about one weak squadron to each regiment; who, together with their own light companies, would be able to keep the enemy's musketeers from annoying them.

Columns of pikemen proceeding to an attack, and covered by a cloud of skirmishers, ought not to be uncovered until they were as close as possible to the enemy.

If a line of contiguous columns, formed at half-distance, supported by some squadrons of light cavalry, were to advance against any particular part of an opposing line, they must inevitably, in my opinion, succeed in defeating it; and certainly there are many cases in which such a movement might be effected without difficulty.

In positions of defence these troops should generally be placed in the second line; and after the regular infantry had galled the attacking force with their fire a change of lines might take place, and the pikemen, coming smartly to the charge with their formidable weapons, could not, I think, be easily repelled. But of course these details will depend chiefly on local circumstances, and the judgment of their leader.

In all probability it would be advantageous to have a certain proportion of the regular infantry armed and disciplined in this manner, for the purpose of charging on the key of an enemy's position, heading a storming column, &c. They would be the best adapted troops to form sortie parties, because on that service little musketry fire is wanted; and the superiority of a 9-foot pike, as an *arme blanche*, is evident. Perhaps, also, advantage might be derived from arming a few of the rear rank men with blunderbusses, loaded with large shot.

But I speak of such a force as a national guard, chiefly on account of the small expense of arming them, and the facility and quickness with which newly embodied men could be instructed in the exercise of the pike and the few field movements absolutely necessary.

Whenever the country was threatened with invasion, all the able-bodied men who could be spared might be collected and armed in their several villages or towns, and the business of drilling them might commence. Such

towns as were in the most exposed situations could be intrenched; and the troops placed in them (particularly if encouraged by the presence of a few troops of the line) would be very competent to make a steady resistance to any sudden or irregular assault of the enemy; in fact, if good traverses were placed in the streets, they might, by retiring from one to another, hold out to the very heart of the town, until they obtained a favourable capitulation, or were relieved.

Posted in a field covert-way, of my contrivance (see note at the end of this tract), they could scarcely be dislodged by any force. The light infantry should keep up a rapid and galling fire on the advancing enemy, until they arrive at the *abbatis*, or *trous-de-loup* at the foot of the glacis. They should then cease firing; and the pikemen, surmounting the glacis, and giving their pistol fire, could rush down on the enemy, and repulse them with immense loss.

The young gentry and better orders of people could be formed into squadrons of cavalry, and would probably be mounted at their own expense. This class, being generally good horsemen, from habit, could be easily drilled; and, from their knowledge of the country, would be very useful for patrolling; and could also be attached to the regiments of pikemen, to assist their light infantry in protecting them from distant fire, and to support them in various other circumstances.

If this mode of organization for militia and volunteers were approved of by government, perhaps it would be advisable to retain the weak staffs for the purpose of drilling them when required.

In advocating the pike as a useful weapon, I should be sorry to follow Folard in the desire of bringing back all the infantry to the use of that arm; but I think I am supported by men of judgment and experience in the opinion, that in many cases it is irresistible; and I would refer those who hesitate to agree with me to Maceroni's 'Hints,' whose reasoning is most conclusive in this respect.

If, then, it be allowed, that men armed with pikes (according to the arrangement I have explained) might be useful in various situations, surely such would be preferable to the old volunteers, who, it is universally agreed, were nearly altogether useless.

NOTE.

The time and labour expended in making durable revetements appears to me to be the chief objection to the frequent use of field works. I propose to remedy this inconvenience by making use of contrivance I shall endeavour to describe.

A long ditch might be dug about 4 feet deep (or according to the nature of the soil), the earth of which could be formed into a glacis, whose interior talus I should wish to have a slope, such as that which Colonel Pasley describes as recommended by Major Reid of the Engineers. There ought to be redans, or small tenailles with flanks, for the purpose of protecting these lines, at about 400 paces. Little time will be expended in the construction of such a glacis, and it may be considerably strengthened by means of an *avant-posse*, pointed at bottom, and well palisadoed. This glacis could not be breached, like a parapet, and the fire of the defendants would have full effect on the assailants while passing the *avant-posse*; but if time were wanted for the construction of one, I would strengthen my covert-way with rows of short pickets, a few paces from the foot of the glacis. In this situation fougasses would be extremely useful.

Such obstacles must greatly derange an attacking column or line, whereupon the defendants could charge the enemy vigorously down the glacis;

and it would require very steady soldiers to withstand the bayonet or pike in such a position.

On the edge of steep declivities, such as the sides of ravines usually are, it should be invariably adopted, for the bottom of the steep is more easily discovered from it than from the parapet of a common field-work.

In fortifying a small town or village, the field covert-way will be found useful in rear of the hedges or other garden fences in the outskirts of the place.

ADDENDUM.

OUTLINE OF THE DRILL OF PIKE-ARMED INFANTRY.—COMPANY DRILL AND PIKE EXERCISE, AS LAID DOWN BY SIR HENRY TORRENS.

Pistol Exercise.

The pistol is fastened in a waist-belt on the right side, to which also the pouch or cartouch-box may be attached. Standing at ordered arms, the recruit receives the word—*load*, upon which he makes a half-face to the right, seizes the handle of the pistol, and, pressing the pike firmly against the body, places the pistol in his left hand, and proceeds to load according to the motions of the firelock. At the word—*present*, he places the elbow firmly against the hip, at the same time cocking and pointing the pistol horizontally to the front.

This only applies to the front rank; the rear rank men must stretch out their arms to clear their front rank men completely.

If the firing is to cease, the men will replace their pistols (first reloading, if so ordered) without any word of command. Advancing, at port arms previous to a charge, they could give their fire without halting; and as soon as they had replaced pistols, come to the charge.

Regimental and Line Movements.

The general principles contained in the evolutions of Sir Henry Torrens apply equally to pike-armed infantry, and the practice requires but few modifications. However, there are some movements in which the regiments should be more particularly instructed as of primary importance, which I shall mention.

If the regiment were supplied with colours, they should be placed with the third battalion, which is posted in the centre, in rear of which the commanding officer generally remains; the majors or chiefs of battalion with their respective battalions. One adjutant can do the field duty of the whole regiment. Three centre sergeants are attached to the third battalion, who direct the march in line, as laid down in Section 70 of Torrens. The first and second battalions should have each two directing sergeants formed in the centre to assist.

In changing front to the rear, each battalion may countermarch on its own centre, as laid down in Section 91 of Torrens, if the new front is not intended to be permanent. The simultaneous wheelings of columns should be carefully practised, as it is in column that the troops will be generally required to move; and also the *échelon* march of sections. Squares may be formed very simply. Standing in line of contiguous columns, at the word—*form square*, the light companies, moving round by the right and left, will cover the front faces, overlapping the angles; No. 2 company will wheel, sections outwards, and form the side faces; and the third and fourth companies, closing up, will form the rear faces.

If in half-distance or open column, each battalion should close up to quarter-distance, in order to form square; and when in line, at the word—

form square, quarter-distance column in rear of the right company should be formed, and the rest of the formation will proceed, as above explained.

Generally speaking, the most advantageous manner of bringing pike-armed troops to the attack will be in line of contiguous quarter-distance columns, formed at half-distance, in order that the light infantry, when called in from skirmishing, may form in the intervals to support the charge by their musketry fire, and also to permit the supporting cavalry to advance when required.

When in reserve, they can be formed in mass, at close order, and, if required, take open distance, while prolonging obliquely to an enemy's flank or otherwise, and wheel by battalions into line of contiguous columns to the right or left, indifferently. And here, I may remark, is an advantage which troops organized in small movable columns of four companies have over those formed in larger bodies.

[Compliments.—The Duke has nothing to say to the selection of gentlemen to be recommended to the King for commissions in his army.]

Mr. Gleig to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Ash, near Wingham, 16th January, 1830.

A few hours after this letter reaches its destination, your Grace will receive from my publisher a copy of the 'Life of Sir Thomas Munro,' which I trust you will do me the honour to accept.

As little other merit besides that of compression and selection belongs to me, I may, perhaps, venture to express a hope that your Grace will find the book not unworthy of your perusal. It would, indeed, have been still more valuable had circumstances permitted me to wait for the letters which your Grace was so kind as to offer; but I shall not give up the hope of being able even yet to introduce them into a second edition, provided you can, without inconvenience, discover them.

Your Grace will perceive that I have returned no formal thanks for the permission given to print the letters from yourself, which form a part of the present selection. I have avoided doing so, because it strikes me that the public has no right to be made a party to such arrangements, and that no opening ought to be made for a suspicion, however groundless, that private and familiar letters underwent revision or correction before they were put into the printer's hands. Yet you will not, I am sure, believe that my sense of the obligation conferred is thought trifling.

I am, my Lord, with the greatest respect and admiration,

your Grace's most obedient and obliged servant,

G. R. GLEIG.

My letter can, I find, be delivered with the book.

[1550.]

To Mr. G. R. Gleig.

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 18th January, 1830.

I have received your letter of the 16th, and I assure you that I will read with interest the 'Life of Sir Thomas Munro.' I

must look over my papers for any other letters I have got in my house ; and I hope in the course of the winter to have time to do so.

Mr. Langridge to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Record Room, County Hall, Lewes,
16th January, 1830.

By the unanimous desire of the magistrates, who attended the Quarter Sessions which ended here on this day, I beg leave to enclose to your Grace their declaration on a subject which is now much discussed in the eastern part of Sussex.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

My Lord Duke,

your Grace's faithful and humble servant,

WM. BALCOMBE LANGRIDGE,

Clerk of the Peace for Sussex.

[ENCLOSURE.]

We, the undersigned magistrates acting in the eastern division of the county of Sussex, agree to the following resolutions, and request that the same should be transmitted by the Clerk of the Peace to his Grace the Duke of Wellington.

That the distress which exists in every part of the country, commercial as well as agricultural, demands the most serious attention. That, confining ourselves at present to the state of the occupiers of land and that part of the labouring population immediately dependent upon them, we see a very great depreciation in many articles of agricultural produce, a serious diminution of the capital of the farmer, inability to find profitable employment for a large portion of a numerous and still increasing population, and, in many instances, to supply them with the immediate means of subsistence.

That although a part of this distress may be attributed to the badness of seasons and to other local and temporary causes, yet much of it is independent of such causes, and its severity is greatly increased by the state of exhaustion and depression previously existing.

That we are sensible of the extreme difficulty of tracing the origin and causes, and still more of suggesting any effectual remedy for this distress ; but although the facts of it are in a great degree, yet we fear that they are not, to their full and real extent, known to his Majesty's government.

We rely on the disposition of that Government to do all that lies in their power to relieve it, as well as on their wisdom and firmness to avoid tampering with the resources of the country in a manner liable to produce permanent mischief. With these impressions we think that the Government may justly pause before they acquiesce in any proposal for an application to Parliament for the annihilation of so large and efficient a source of revenue as the whole of the malt and beer duties, amounting to nearly one-seventh part of the whole sum raised annually by taxation. At the same time, we cannot but be sensible that if a diminution of these duties could be effected without materially injuring the revenue (especially by such a modification of them as would enable the labourer to brew his malt liquor at home or to purchase it at a rate nearer its original cost than he is now enabled to do) it might pro-

duce considerable benefit to all classes. And we are not without hopes that, by a steady perseverance in a rigid system of economy, to which we are convinced that those who have the management of public affairs are well inclined to attend, and perhaps by some fiscal arrangements which may be made without breach of faith with the public creditor, such a diminution may be made in the public charge as to admit of a remission of taxation to be applied to these articles with some beneficial effect.

CHICHESTER.

GAGE.

CHARLES RD. BLUNT.

GEORGE SHIFFNER.

T. PARTINGTON.

GLOVER THORPE.

HERBERT B. CURTEIS.

J. HOPER.

ALEX. DONOVAN.

WM. COURTHOPE MABBOTT.

J. HARRISON.

ROBERT WILLIS BLENCOWE.

H. CAMPION.

WM. SEYMOUR.

F. H. FRANKLAND.

THOS. D'OYLY.

G. H. M. WAGNER.

Lord Chandos to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

West India Committee Rooms,
Saturday, 16th January, 1830.

By desire of the deputation that waited upon your Grace to-day, I send you a memorandum of what they understood to be the substance of the conference.

It is the opinion of the deputation that it must necessarily occasion the greatest dismay and dissatisfaction in all the colonies, and being anxious that this evil should not be aggravated by any inaccuracy in their report of the conference, the enclosed paper is transmitted to your Grace that you may point out any inaccuracy that may inadvertently have been made in it, before it is submitted to the West India Committee, which it is intended to do on Monday next.

I have the honour to be, with much regard,

Your Grace's very faithful,

CHANDOS, Chairman.

[ENCLOSURE.]

A deputation from the West India body having waited upon his Grace the Duke of Wellington,

The Marquis of Chandos observed, That they had attended by his appointment to receive the answer of his Majesty's government to the representation that was made to them in December last, on the subject of the sugar and rum duties.

His Grace the Duke of Wellington observed, That his Majesty's Ministers could only reply to the present application as they had already done on similar occasions, that the refusal of the Colonial Legislatures to adopt the regulations recommended to them by his Majesty's Ministers and Parliament stood in the way of any consideration of relief respecting the existing duties on produce.

The colonies had complied in no one instance with the wishes of government. That if they were even to adopt all the measures recommended to them, he

could not undertake to say that his Majesty's ministers would judge it expedient to reduce the duties on produce.

The deputation replied, That the present application was not connected with any political question betwixt the mother country and the colonies.

That it was grounded upon a statement not exaggerated, which showed the impossibility of the colonies existing under the present pressure of duties.

That they were prepared to show, if this were the fit time to discuss that point, that in some of the colonies every compliance had been made with the recommendations of government, with the exception of compulsory manumission, and that in every colony much had been done since 1823 towards improving the condition and comfort of the slaves. This had been clearly stated in a paper which had recently been presented to the Colonial Secretary by the agents for the colonies, founded on the authority of papers which had been laid before Parliament.

That the latest accounts from Jamaica manifest a disposition in that island to meet every reasonable wish of the government.

That the contention against the colonies is maintained by parties who have no stake in them, in opposition to those whose property and welfare are embarked in these possessions under the sacred sanction of Parliament; and the question is, whether under such circumstances the colonies are to receive relief and protection from his Majesty's government?

His Majesty's Ministers would doubtless take into their deliberate consideration the imminent risk now impending of the loss of a resource so valuable at this moment to the commerce and prosperity of the empires.

The Duke of Wellington observed, That his Majesty's Ministers had considered, and would consider the paper which had been submitted to them as the occasion of the present conference.

To the Marquess of Chandos.

[1551.]

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 16th January, 1830.

What I said in answer to your question to me was that I had read with attention the statement which you had sent me, but that I was not prepared at that time to tell you whether his Majesty's servants could propose to Parliament any measures, much less what measures, in consequence of that statement.

I added that I must say, as I had informed former deputations, two of which I had received since the last session of Parliament, that the conduct of the colonial legislatures in rejecting the measures proposed for their consideration by his Majesty's government, in consequence of the resolutions of Parliament, increased the difficulties in the way of adopting the measures which it might be wished to adopt for their relief.

In answer to an observation of Mr. Douglass, I farther explained that the grant of the relief required did not depend upon the adoption by the colonial legislatures of the measures proposed by his Majesty's government.

That the refusal to adopt those measures certainly created.

what might be called a political difficulty. But that even if they were adopted, it might not be in the power of his Majesty's servants to afford the relief required.

In answer to an observation of Mr. Hibbert, I said that the government had considered and would consider the statement which your Lordship had sent to me.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1552.]

To Prince Leopold.

SIR,

London, 17th January, 1830.

The King was not sufficiently well to receive me yesterday. I have heard again this morning. His Majesty's health is improved; and I hope to see him on Tuesday. I was not mistaken respecting the impression which I made on Thursday, and I should not be surprised if I were to receive his Majesty's assent without further difficulty.

Your Royal Highness shall know anything that I hear upon this subject. The Russian Cabinet support the proposition of the King of France.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Sir Christopher Baynes to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Bath, 17th January, 1830.

If your Grace should require any other tax for the public service I would in that case request permission to lay before you, with all deference, a measure which it is presumed would be found greatly productive as well as popular; it is as follows:—

1st. A tax of a percentage on all funerals, with the exception of those of poor persons.

2nd. A tax on monuments, gravestones, &c., as may hereafter be erected.

3rd. A tax in the form of a licence to all persons exercising the calling of an undertaker.

Although I take the liberty of addressing this to your Grace, I beg to observe that I am perfectly aware that all Bills of the foregoing description must originate in the House of Commons.

With every sentiment of respect,

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,
your Grace's most obedient and very humble servant,

CHRIS. BAYNES, Bart.

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his letter of the

17th, recommending taxes upon funerals, monuments, and those who exercise the calling of an undertaker.]

To the Right Hon. Sir George Hill.

[1553.]

MY DEAR HILL,

London, 18th January, 1830.

It has been stated to me that you were anxious to be employed in a government in the West Indies. I don't recollect your having mentioned this wish yourself; and if I am mistaken I hope that you will believe that the offer which I am about to make to you of a mode of gratifying that wish proceeds from the sincere desire to do what will be agreeable to you.

We hear that the government of St. Vincents is vacant. If you should wish to accept that government I will readily submit your name to the King.

I understand that it is one of the most healthy of the islands. It has a colonial legislature.

Let me have your answer as soon as you can with convenience, and

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The emoluments of the office are 4161*l.* per annum, of which only the sum of 433*l.* depends upon the grant of the colonial legislature.

[ENCLOSURE.]

STATEMENT respecting the SALARY and other EMOLUMENTS of
the GOVERNOR of ST. VINCENTS.

	£.
Governor's salary, as enjoyed by Sir C.	
Brisbane	3466
Fees as Chancellor and Ordinary by last	
Report (but variable)	262
Allowance of house-rent, but dependent	
upon the Assembly	433
	£4161

Out of the salary of 3466*l.*, the sum of 1300*l.* is out of the 4½ per cent. duties, and the remainder is made up by the colony.

The Colonial Assembly usually settles the *colonial* amount of salary for the life of the Governor; and it has been the practice in St. Vincents to fix, on the death of a Governor, what shall be the *colonial* salary of his successor.

[1554.]

To Sir Henry Halford.

MY DEAR SIR HENRY,

London, 18th January, 1830, 4 p.m.

Your letter of 10 a.m. relieved me from much of the anxiety which I felt upon receiving your note of this morning; and I sincerely hope that the King may feel no farther inconvenience from this derangement of his stomach.

It is very desirable that the public should not be misled upon the subject; and I conclude that you will return to town to-morrow morning.

If you should I beg you to call, as you pass my house, to let me know whether his Majesty will be able to receive me to-morrow. If you should not, I beg you to send off the messenger who will deliver this as soon as you will have ascertained how the King will be in the morning.

It gives me great concern to be under the necessity of troubling the King upon business at the moment he is indisposed. But the case, upon which I am anxious to receive his Majesty's pleasure, presses for a decision; and the necessity for sending for you last night renders it more urgent that we should receive the communication of his Majesty's pleasure, in order that the public may not be led to believe that the King is seriously indisposed.

If I should not see or hear from you by eleven to-morrow morning, I will set off for Windsor.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1555.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 18th January, 1830.

I return the French Protocol, corrected as I think it may be signed. This is the simplest transaction. We found it upon the desire of the Porte to diminish the extent of the cession to be made; and upon circumstances such as the war, the conduct

of Capo d'Istria, the state of parties in Greece, &c., rendering necessary a farther departure from the Treaty of the 6th July and the Protocol of March.

It is the only arrangement which can put an end to all questions, if it is agreed to.

I strike out *la plenitude du pouvoir souverain*.

I likewise strike out the article respecting foreign troops. We may agree among ourselves that one of us will send troops; but it is going a little too far for the three Powers to interfere in anything with the Prince Sovereign. Besides, it is most important that the union of the three Powers should cease when this transaction should be completed.

We ought all three to guarantee the limits fixed in the same terms, according to the forms of the Treaty of Congress, and let all other Powers do the same.

In respect to the article respecting the Roman Catholics, it can come into this Protocol only. My opinion is that it ought to be limited to a general concession of liberty of conscience and the exercise of religious worship, and to the right of all sects to offices, &c.

I don't believe that Prince Leopold will accept if the concession goes too far.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

According to the form of proceeding proposed in this letter, we make this proposition a fresh one, founded upon the desire of the Porte to cede less territory; and we avoid all the embarrassing questions arising out of former proceedings, as well as those which we should have to discuss with our royal master and with Prince Leopold respecting the alternative. You will likewise see that the Emperor must still come forward with his *adoucissements* of the terms of the Treaty of Peace.

I return with this the Russian Protocol. It would be more easy to alter that than the French version. However, having commenced upon the French version I continued. But I recommend to you to found your propositions upon the Russian one.

Right Hon. Maurice FitzGerald to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

18th January, 1830.

In the present complex state of parties it becomes interesting even to so unimportant a person as myself not to be misunderstood, though it is possible that your Grace may have naturally calculated on what I am about to avow.

I owe you weighty obligation for zealous and effective kindness on the most important effort of my life; but I hope I have also high public motives for saying it is my earnest wish to support your government.

I believe that a powerful hostility to your Grace's administration is arrayed in the country, excited by misrepresentation and founded on false pretences, and it is that conviction which induces me (however humble) to speak out at once, rather than wait to evince my purpose by my votes.

Ever, my dear Lord,

your Grace's most faithful and obliged

M. FITZGERALD.

[1556.]

To the Right Hon. Maurice FitzGerald.

London, 19th January, 1830.

I am very much gratified, my dear Sir, by your kind note and return you many thanks for it.

We shall have a troublesome session. But I think that the gentlemen of the country will come to view matters in their true light, and will not seriously endeavour to break down the establishments of the country, because the getting in of the harvest has been expensive to their tenants, or because their tenants paid last year large prices for lean cattle, for which they cannot now obtain adequate prices after they have been fattened.

In all other respects we have reason to believe that the country is improving slowly, as all great countries must improve; but certainly.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Excuse my having written this upon half a sheet of paper.

[1557.]

To the King.

London, 19th January, 1830.

I was very much concerned to be under the necessity of troubling your Majesty upon the nomination of the Prince

Sovereign of Greece when your Majesty was indisposed ; and I am very grateful to your Majesty for the assent which your Majesty has given to the proposition upon which it was my duty to submit to your Majesty the opinion of your servants.

As far back as the month of January, 1829, the Emperor of Russia named Prince Leopold as one of the candidates for this office.

In the Conference of the plenipotentiaries in London of the beginning of November, Prince Leopold was again mentioned ; and the King of France, in an audience which his Most Christian Majesty gave to Prince Leopold, to take leave, on the 20th of November, intimated his approbation of his appointment in case his cousin, Prince John of Saxony, should not accept.

His Most Christian Majesty has since, through his ambassador, proposed the form of a Protocol, to be signed by the plenipotentiaries in Conference, nominating his Royal Highness to be Prince Sovereign of Greece.

The Emperor of Russia has ordered his ambassador to support the nomination of Prince Leopold ; as Prince Frederick of Orange had declined.

I state over again, for your Majesty's satisfaction, the course which this transaction has taken ; although I have already submitted it to your Majesty verbally when I had the honour of an audience on the 14th instant.

All of which is humbly submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Burghersh.

[1558.]

MY DEAR BURGHERSH,

London, 19th January, 1830.

I have this day received your letter of the 5th instant, inclosing one from Cardinal Albani, to which I do not think it necessary to request that any answer should be given.

I earnestly recommend to you to be very cautious in all your communications with the Papal government, and to confine them to matters of private civility.

It would be very desirable, however, to know what is the

mode of appointing what is called a Bishop in Ireland, if that information can be obtained without a breach of law.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I am very happy that Priscilla is so well. She will have been much shocked by the death of Sir Thomas Lawrence.

The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Windsor Castle, 19th January, 1830.

MEMORANDUM.

The King cannot but deeply regret the selection made by France and Russia of Prince Leopold as the Prince to be placed at the head of the Greek kingdom.

Without entering into a detail of reasoning, the King considers Prince Leopold not qualified for this peculiar station.

Nevertheless, the two great Powers, France and Russia, having conjointly named Prince Leopold to be placed at the head of the Greek kingdom, the King, in deference to the desire of those two great Powers, gives his assent.

GEORGE R.

Mr. W. C. Lewis to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Notting Hill, Kensington, 19th January, 1830.

It is generally credited that your Grace would feel most happy to relieve the country from oppressive burdens, did the exigencies of the State admit of it; or could an efficient succedaneum be suggested, for the necessarily to be relinquished taxes and rates. Now, calculating upon the actual existence of such a disposition in your Lordship, and believing, as I do, that it is the duty of every honest man to assist, rather than murmur at, the executive authority in a time of trial, I beg leave to call attention to the practicability of—First, increasing the rate of postage within the precincts of London and Westminster from twopence to threepence—a measure already pursued in the outskirts, and even in the parish of Marylebone, and which will raise that branch of the revenue nearly one-half. Oppressive taxes equal to that increase may be repealed, while the employment of the town-post will not be diminished, as the alternative is the payment of two shillings, or a larger sum, to a messenger or porter. Secondly, the appropriation of part of the Church revenue to the maintenance of the poor (say a fifth or fourth of the tithes), and the abolition of poor-rates on the present system. That this was a duty devolving on the Church during the days of Catholicism in this country, and one of the objects for which she was enriched with such princely endowments by her munificent benefactors and temporal founders, I need not to remind your Lordship; it is, therefore, a mere matter

of equity to recall her to the discharge of obligations virtually stipulated for by the nature of her title-deeds.

I have the honour to remain

your Grace's most obedient servant,

W. C. LEWIS.

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his letter.]

Major F. B. Head to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Sutton, Surrey, 19th January, 1830.

I do not presume to request your Grace's perusal of the accompanying memorandum, but believing it to be the duty of every officer visiting a new country respectfully to offer to his government any information which, to the best of his imperfect judgment, may appear to be important, I beg leave to submit my memorandum to your Grace, as a humble tribute of the respect and gratitude with which I have the honour to remain,

Your Grace's most obliged, obedient, and humble servant,

F. B. HEAD.

[ENCLOSURE.]

A MEMORANDUM ENDEAVOURING TO SHOW THE POLITICAL STATE OF SOUTH AMERICA, THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH SUCH A STATE MUST PRODUCE TO OUR COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, AND THE VERY GREAT ADVANTAGES WHICH WE SHOULD DERIVE BY GAINING POSSESSION OF A HARBOUR ON THAT PART OF THE UNOCCUPIED COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA WHICH LIES BETWEEN BUENOS AYRES AND CAPE HORN.

The vast continent of South America (in length just equal to the distance from the earth's centre to its circumference) may be divided into three great compartments :—

1st. The Brazilian Empire.

2ndly. The Republics of Columbia, Peru, Chili, La Plata, &c.

3rdly. The country which remains in the possession of the unconquered Americans, commonly called Indians.

1. *Brazilian Empire.*

Without entering into any theoretical discussion whether the umbilical cord which connects the colony to its mother country ever should or should not be severed, it need only be observed that this political operation, natural or unnatural, has sooner or later always taken place; and that from this practical experience it would consequently be only reasonable to expect that the Brazilian empire (were it even an island) would eventually change, by a revolution, its Imperial for a Republican government; but when it is considered that the Brazils on three sides are, by a mere geographical line, separated from people who, being uneducated and uncivilized, admit of no distinctions in their society, because, in fact, no moral difference exists, and whose minds

* Afterwards Sir Francis Head.

are consequently hostile, beyond all description, to anything like a monarchical government, it is evident that the vast Brazilian empire is not only liable to political disorder, but that it is impossible it should escape from the infection of principles which the surrounding republics are so insidiously endeavouring to inoculate.

But besides this natural change in the form and system of the government, there is a calamity which may befall the Brazils of a most unusual, unnatural, and dreadful description; and although those who would suffer by it fearfully avert their thoughts from the contemplation of such an event, yet its possibility, and even probability, is but too evident to those whose judgment is unbiassed.

The calamity alluded to is the black population of the Brazils. It already exceeds by many millions the number of whites; while the licentious lives of the black females, and the artificial restraint which a more civilized condition imposes upon the white women, daily increases the disproportion. At present, all is quiet and tranquil; but without being carried away by any fanciful speculation of danger, is it not evident to anyone who will calmly reflect upon the above simple data, and who will also take into his consideration the implacable and merciless feelings which exist between black men and white ones, that as soon as the former become sensible that their power predominates, a simultaneous rising of the blacks, an unheard-of massacre of the whites, and the formation of a black government, are events which it is no idle speculation to anticipate.

Among the white inhabitants of America, the Creoles, to gain what has been called "independence," have already risen against the Spaniards; the son has fought against his own father. Why, therefore, should it not be supposed that the black man will also fight for his freedom, as soon as he finds that his arm has become strong enough to obtain it?

2. *The Republics of Columbia, Peru, Chili, La Plata, &c.*

These Republics have nothing to fear from those two events which threaten to disturb the Brazils, for their war with the mother country has been concluded, and there exists no black population to be afraid of. Still, however, their future prospect is also of a most unsettled description, for they are suffering under the misfortune of having gained their independence too soon, of having weaned themselves from the mother country before their religion had taken root, and before they had strength to go alone. Their dominions are so vast, and their population so small, that, compared with the nations of Europe, they are but political shadows, without form or substance. In fact, they can each hardly be said to form a nation, for they are but a few individuals, equal, or nearly so, and yet from temper and disposition, disputing as individuals always do.*

Their laws and their decrees are like a military parole or countersign, useful to-day, forgotten to-morrow; and from the peculiar nature of their situation, such must for a long time unavoidably be the case; for, even in England, where law is in theory as equally distributed over the country as the atmosphere, we know that in practice there are places where our laws are

* As the Commissioner of a Mining Company, I had personal communications with the President, Minister, Governors, and Deputies of Buenos Ayres, Salta, San Juan, Rioxa, Catamarca, Tucuman, Cordova, San Luis, Sta. Fè, Mendoza, and Chili; and it is from their conduct, and from documents and other evidence (which I am ready to produce), that I feel I am justified in making the above statements.

not as efficient as in others. The lone heath, for instance, is not reckoned as safe as the town; a by-road not as safe as a high road. There are places which are even supposed to be safe in daylight, and not safe in darkness; and if this is the case under the best laws, how inefficient must law become in the South American States, from any one of which a man can fly to vast uninhabited regions, knowing that to have offended the laws of his own republic is perhaps his best passport to the neighbouring government. A very remarkable difference exists, therefore, between the republics of North and South America. In the former it is true that a small population has had to contend with vast uninhabited regions, yet their inhospitable nature has actually tended to hold society together; for he who flies to the forest has cold, hunger, and wild beasts to contend with. But in the South American republics the case is diametrically different, for the genial climate, the profusion of animal and vegetable food, and the luxury of horses, have the direct contrary tendency, to dissolve every sort of social compact; for of what practical utility are laws from which anyone is able to escape? In North America, therefore, the climate and the wild animals keep men together; in South America, they both assist in scattering them like seeds over the face of the country; and while in South America the wisdom and necessity of this singular arrangement of nature is most evident, it also appears that the republics of that vast country must, for a very considerable period, remain in a most unsettled state.

3. *The Unconquered Country.*

The fate of the original inhabitants, the real owners of America, is the most unaccountable phenomenon which history has to record. The massacres of St. Bartholomew, of the Sicilian Vespers, &c., we are all willing to remember; and we even record trifling details of the assassination of individuals whose death is thus of greater importance than their lives. But while we learn this catalogue of crimes which human nature has committed, the annihilation of the inoffensive inhabitants of a whole world is an event which is scarcely known to one-half of mankind, and does not excite the sympathy of the other. The empires of Montezuma and of the Incas have passed away like a dream, and immense regions which were once animated by an innocent and a happy people are now as silent and as lifeless as the grave!

Between the latitudes of Buenos Ayres and Cape Horn there is, however, a country (of about twice the length of Great Britain) which remains in the possession of unconquered, uncivilized tribes, who owe their existence solely to their superior horsemanship, and to the superior swiftness of their horses. As these tribes have up to the present moment been completely unclothed, armed with no weapon but a lance, and as they have hitherto fought the inhabitants of the Republics with considerable courage and success, it is evident that the future is in their favour, for they never can be more naked or weaker than they have been. With better arms their attack would of course become more formidable, while their defence (the speed and management of their horses) would also gain additional superiority, if their enemies, from luxury or any other cause, should lose activity. At present, therefore, these tribes have everything to gain, and nothing to lose. Their enemies may be deprived of clothes, firearms, luxuries, &c., but from the naked American there is nothing to be taken but his life; for his country, under existing circumstances, can only be held by people whose roaming habits are similar to his own. But it is also evident that though the native American may become better armed, yet that he cannot materially improve his condition; for if he were to attempt to settle, if he were to dare to enjoy the blessing and luxury of civilization, his mobility would be impaired, his

possessions would be worth the expense of being attacked, and his tribe would thus be annihilated. It is, therefore, probable that these tribes for a considerable period will continue to live as they have hitherto existed—naked and houseless, dreaded by their immediate neighbours, and, to the rest of the world, unknown.

Having now endeavoured to delineate a mere but faithful outline of the present political state of South America, and having also ventured to speculate upon what for a considerable period will be the future condition (*mas à minos*) of the Brazils, the Republics, and the unconquered country, I wish to endeavour to show—

1st. The disadvantages and dangers which from the above causes may arise to the commercial interest of this country; and

2ndly. That in order to guard against the same, we should endeavour to gain possession of a harbour on that part of the unoccupied coast of South America which lies between Buenos Ayres and Cape Horn.

1. Every revolution or internal disturbance in South America has the effect of driving people of money and talent from the interior to the sea-coast, for perceiving that their own laws are not strong enough to protect their property, and that their own unsettled government offers no permanent employment for their abilities, they judge it advisable to quit a scene of provincial animosity, and to repair to the shores of that noble element which not only introduces them to an acquaintance and intercourse with Europe, but which also secures to them, if necessary, the means of escape.

A number of individuals thus assembling together from remote countries, which in the most peaceable times are jealous of each other, cannot be supposed to entertain any higher feeling than that of their own individual interest. It is true they find themselves commercial members of the same town, and their wealth or talents may even make them members of the same government, but the national character they have secretly neither reason nor wish to maintain; for they are members of its community only so long as it promotes their own narrow interests.

Now, supposing this to be true, is it not evident that when our vessels arrive, they may craftily be subjected to many inconveniences, and directly or indirectly to very serious impositions; for revolutions, real or artificial, may always be made to bend against the interests of our vessels; and with cargoes on board, and at such a distance from England, in what a disadvantageous position may they be placed? and yet it is hopeless for them to move, for in every harbour on the coast similar causes are producing the same effects.

But besides the inconvenience that may arise to our shipping from the artful combination of interests which may await their arrival in the ports of South America, the real quarrels between the different governments in this country may be productive of the most alarming consequences, for the moment a war is declared, the motley inhabitants of the ports join together to fit out privateers, which are manned by the refuse of human society; and these vessels belonging to wealthy aliens, who have no political responsibility, are no sooner afloat than it becomes evident that there are far richer prizes on the ocean than any which can belong to their feeble enemies; and to anyone who has had an opportunity of observing the principles upon which the Buenos Ayrean and Brazilian privateers were lately manned and equipped, it cannot but be evident with what avidity every trifling war among the South American States will hereafter be a pretence for fitting out vessels whose secret object will be piracy, a crime which, like assassination, it is almost impossible to prevent; and when it is considered that the coast of South

America is not only the destination of our ships trading with that country, but that it is almost viewed by our vessels bound to the Eastern world, the serious injury which such a dreadful system of piracy would produce is but too evident.

2. Now to guard against these evils it is suggested that we ought to gain a footing on the coast of South America, in order to possess in the new world a port and arsenal for our navy, and storehouses to which our cargoes might repair in case revolutions or impositions should prevent them landing at the points of their destination. In case of our ever requiring, for the purposes of war, or to check piracy, a large naval force in this part of the globe, the advantages of a port and arsenal need no comment; and by possessing storehouses to which our cargoes, if necessary, might repair, we should not only at once annihilate the insidious combinations which at present could be made against our commercial interests, but we should be at once enabled (without degradation) to enlist into our service these very weapons which at present may be turned against us, reaping (as in justice we ought to do) advantage instead of disadvantage from the inferior uncivilized state of these countries; for, at present, any or every South American government could annoy our trade, and even manage to prevent our manufactures from landing in the country; but if the inhabitants found it to be their interest, they would themselves send vessels to our magazines, they would themselves evade their own laws, and the weakness and narrow policy of these governments which might now be exercised against us, would in our favour become evident from the smuggling of our manufactures, which in peace or war would immediately take place. We should then be no longer at the mercy of the motley inhabitants of the South American ports, but it would be absolutely for their interest to receive our vessels with justice and liberality.

Now, having endeavoured to show the advantages of gaining a footing on the coast of South America, it is suggested that, for the following reasons, one of the bays or harbours which exist between Buenos Ayres and Cape Horn is the point which it would be most desirable to obtain:—

1st. Because the climate is highly favourable to the English constitution.

2ndly. Because the coast from Buenos Ayres to Cape Horn (1200 miles) being at present occupied by nobody, a solitary harbour might probably by purchase, treaty, or other means, be easily obtained.

3rdly. Because the whole of the surrounding country is uninhabited, excepting by those few straggling naked tribes who would themselves, for a considerable time, prevent it being occupied or invaded by any others, and who would consequently ensure to the station that uninterrupted solitude which would be highly favourable to the great naval and commercial purposes for which it is proposed.

4thly. That from the country being uninhabited, all that would be absolutely required would be the harbour and the ground in its immediate neighbourhood. This apparently simple requisition would probably excite little jealousy among the South American States; and yet, in point of fact, we should be as well off as if the vast surrounding country was attached to it, for it is most evident—1st. That in South America, land without population is worth nothing, and *bonâ fide* belongs to nobody; and 2ndly, that under whatever name of government the country might hereafter be peopled, it would become its interest to belong to, and to live under the protection of, the owner of the port, most particularly if that owner was his Britannic Majesty.

5thly. That the flat-roofed houses which would be built in the vicinity of the harbour, and a few guns judiciously placed, would form a fortress as

strong as those which are generally met with in South America, and quite strong enough to resist any attack that might be expected, and consequently that the expense of this settlement would be very trifling.

In case it should be objected that the ground in the neighbourhood of many of the bays and harbours on the coast between Buenos Ayres and Cape Horn is sandy and sterile, it may be observed, that in the climate of South America artificial irrigation at once gives life to any description of soil, and that the present apparent sterility of the coast might even assist us in getting easy possession of a valuable part of it.

In case it should be objected that there are no very good harbours for our vessels on this coast, it may be observed that there are at least as good as the "outer roads" of Buenos Ayres, which are situated above 100 miles up a river which is five times as broad as from Dover to Calais at its mouth, and twice as broad at Buenos Ayres; filled with sand-banks, exposed to hurricanes or "pamperos," and, after all, under the natural subjection of Monte Video.

In support of the foregoing project, of our getting possession of a part of the coast of South America, a few very general observations may be stated.

No one who respects the great arrangements of Providence can believe that the discovery of America was the effect of chance. As long as the old world was thinly peopled, while society was in its infancy, while the powers of man were feeble, like his own body, the world in which he was placed seemed well suited to his strength; and accordingly during this period, America was cautiously hidden from his sight; but now, when every element is conquered, when the winds are made to drive us, and the water to bear us, and fire to propel us, over land or water, and gaseous vapour to light us on our way—we are scarcely in possession of steam and other accelerating powers, which in the old world there does not appear to be room enough to exert, when the curtain of the west is raised, and we find ourselves gradually introduced to a new world, whose features (its mountains, rivers, and plains) are on a scale of magnificence suited to our improved condition. But to whom is this vast portion of the globe eventually to belong? Its original inhabitants have vanished, and immense regions of rich land are now possessed by people who have no power, education, or character to govern such countries, and no population, knowledge, or money to cultivate them. They obtained them, it is true, from the original conquerors, to whom they were ceded by Pope Alexander VI., upon condition that they should sow over "this heathen land" the seeds of the Christian religion; but instead of carrying this religious cultivation into effect, they cruelly and deliberately ploughed up the human race!

What political right, and what moral title, the descendants of such people can have to keep, from the honest intelligence and increasing powers of the old world, land which was so unjustly obtained, and which they themselves cannot use, is not the present question; yet their past history, the wretched state of internal warfare and disorder from which all these governments are now suffering, and the troubles and revolutions which apparently still await them, certainly do seem to foretell that it is not to them that this magnificent country is eventually to belong; and if we could once get a footing in that unoccupied part of South America which is so admirably adapted to the English constitution, is there not fair encouragement to believe, that by just dealings and sound policy, we should in population and civilization rapidly overtake those countries whose possession has been so unfortunately and so unprofitably employed; and, moreover, is it not possible that some of these infant republics, who are actually suffering from the want of a mother country, might hereafter find it to be their best interest to solicit the parental protection of the British government?

F. B. HEAD.

MEMORANDUM.—TOPICS FOR THE KING'S SPEECH.

[1559.]

21st January, 1830.

It is necessary that we should immediately turn our attention to the King's Speech. We may safely announce, as usual, the desire of all Powers to continue at peace with his Majesty. We may announce the fact of peace between the Emperor of Russia and the Ottoman Porte, without observations on its merits or demerits.

We may state that the King's efforts have been unremitted to settle the Greek question.

That his Majesty has concurred with his Allies, parties to the Treaty of the 6th July, in a plan of pacification and settlement which his Majesty feels confident will attain all the objects which his Majesty has had in view in the measures to which he has been a party, viz., the termination of the contest between the Porte and the Greeks; the permanent settlement of their future relations to each other; and the maintenance of the repose of Europe. That the King will direct that this arrangement shall be laid before Parliament as soon as it shall have been ratified.

The King has continued to feel the inconvenience of the state of his relations with Portugal, in consequence of the conflicting claims of the different branches of the House of Braganza to the sovereignty of that country. His Majesty has repeated his efforts to reconcile these claims.

Any other diplomatic transactions.

Finance.

Any measures that we may be prepared to bring forward upon the administration of justice in Scotland, in England, Wales, &c.; upon education, police, &c., in Ireland.

I doubt the expediency of saying anything about the state of Ireland; that state cannot be defined in few words.

The general state of the country; agricultural distress.

WELLINGTON.

Sir Howard Douglas to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

17, Montague Street, Portman Square,
21st January, 1830.

MY LORD DUKE,

I have the honour to transmit to your Grace some explanatory remarks upon the objects of the association which it has been proposed to form of

officers of the united services, under the patronage of your Grace and other eminent personages, which the general meeting requested me, as its chairman, to solicit.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,
your Grace's faithful and obliged humble servant,

HOWARD DOUGLAS.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The accompanying prospectus was drawn up, at the last meeting of the Provisional Committee of the proposed United Service Museum; and in this explanation of the objects of this association no mention whatever is made of his Majesty's name. The proposed association of officers of the united services is designed to give an impetus and direction to individual pursuits of an intellectual and scientific character, which are manifestly disposed to engage themselves in study and research, and which appear only to require regulation and direction to produce great individual and general advantages.

The objects of this United Service Museum are—

First. To establish a deposit for scientific and literary collections made by officers of the Army and Navy who have expressed a desire so to dispose of them for the general convenience, benefit, and instruction of their respective professions.

Secondly. To encourage generally, throughout the two professions, the pursuit of knowledge in every branch which their services in every quarter of the globe afford such ample and useful opportunities of cultivating, for their benefit and for that of the services.

Thirdly. To encourage all who may become members of the association to make research into the physical circumstances of the countries they may visit, and communicate the results in such manner as to prove useful to them and to the other associates of their professions, when disengaged from public duties; and thus to proceed in pursuits of learning, commenced in the public institutions of the country, and which it is of the utmost importance to the character and duties of officers and gentlemen should not be laid aside.

At the first meeting it was stated by Sir Herbert Taylor, that having mentioned the principle and object of the proposed association to the King, his Majesty had been graciously pleased to authorise Sir Herbert to express his approbation of both; but Sir Herbert stated most distinctly that his Majesty could not become its patron, and that Sir Herbert could not with propriety have mentioned the subject to his Majesty, if such had been the object.

The notice sent to the personages who were to be requested to honour the association by becoming its patrons, although printed for the convenience of the secretary, who was indisposed, was so entirely private, that only so many copies have been struck off as were necessary for those communications; nor have any been given, even to those persons who attended the meeting in which the resolutions were passed. His Majesty's name is not anywhere else mentioned, as will appear by the accompanying prospectus; nor was it even intended that it should be so mentioned, Sir Herbert Taylor having expressly stated that it would be improper to do so, in any public notice, as to patronage.

The United Service Museum is not a club. It is not a measure requiring any public provision of a pecuniary nature, or act of incorporation. It is only a pursuit requiring the encouragement of an association, and to be conducted on its own funds, for purposes extensively intellectual and scientific. The association was not devised to excite these, for these have been excited; but it is required to give an useful direction and to afford improving occupations

for them at a time when so much talent and enterprise are disengaged from professional pursuits; and it will no doubt be considered a most gratifying circumstance in the intellectual and scientific character of the services to perceive that their members are desirous of associating themselves together in a manner to enlighten and encourage research in learning and science, and to arrange and deposit their fruits for the benefit of the united services, in a special establishment from which politics, gaming, and the ordinary objects of a club, are expressly excluded.

To the Right Hon. W. Vesey Fitzgerald.

[1560.]

MY DEAR FITZGERALD,

London, 23rd January, 1830.

Peel will have told you how anxious I have been that you should continue to hold your office, notwithstanding your indisposition; and that I had been prepared to make an arrangement accordingly which would have relieved you at this moment from embarrassment or attendance to business. It has appeared, however, to be the opinion of your physicians that it was necessary that you should be entirely and permanently relieved; and that your own feelings and wishes coincide with this opinion. Indeed, it is probable that the latter has been founded upon the strong expression by you of the former; and that the physicians feel that until you shall be relieved from all care and anxiety respecting public affairs you have not a fair chance of recovery.

Under these circumstances I spoke to the King yesterday respecting your situation; and I informed his Majesty of the loss which he must sustain of your services. His Majesty expressed the anxiety which he felt respecting your health, and his concern, as well on the public account as on yours, that you should be obliged to withdraw yourself from his service; and he was most graciously pleased to agree to the arrangement which I proposed to his Majesty upon this occasion.

I can only assure you that I concur most cordially in the sentiments of the King which I have just conveyed to you. I have besides, as a colleague, to return you my best thanks for the cordial assistance which I have received from you in executing the arduous task in which we have been engaged.

I sincerely trust that the sacrifice which you and we all make at this moment will produce the effects expected from it, viz., that of accelerating the recovery of your health.

I would have gone to Somerset House to talk to you upon

this subject, only that I knew that I should disturb you by personal communication.

I hope, however, that if in your power you will receive me one of these days.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 23rd January, 1830.

I went in to the King at three o'clock, and was with his Majesty above two hours.

He was in high spirits and perfect good humour, and never alluded to any public subject except once, when he said he thought the reports of the general affairs in Ireland too favourable. He said nothing of the Duke of Cambridge.

I settled my immediate business about the Royal Academy quite satisfactorily, though he seemed when I first went in quite determined on a change.

He gave way in an instant, and was content to leave matters as they are.

Ever most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

Lord Mount Charles to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

29, Grosvenor Square,
24th January, 1830.

I beg leave most respectfully to tender to your Grace my resignation of the Lordship of the Treasury, which I have had the honour to hold under your Grace's government.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) MOUNT CHARLES.

[1561.]

To the Duke of Buckingham.

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 24th January, 1830.

I write to Lord Chandos by the King's desire to make him the offer of a Privy Council office; and knowing this circumstance will give you pleasure, and that Lord Chandos will be anxious to receive your sanction to his acceptance of it, I intreat you to give that sanction.

Nothing can be more satisfactory to the King's servants than to avail themselves of this opportunity of manifesting their respect and regard for one so near to you.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Chandos.

MY DEAR LORD CHANDOS,

London, 24th January, 1830.

In consequence of the necessity that Mr. Fitzgerald should retire from office, and the arrangements in consequence, I have received the King's commands to offer you a Privy Council office, which I trust will be agreeable to you.

You will probably come to London as soon as may be convenient to you after you will receive this letter.

There will be a Council at Windsor on Thursday, upon which occasion I should wish that you might be sworn into Council, as well as kiss his Majesty's hand on your appointment.

I send this to Wootton, but, as I have written a line to the Duke, I beg you to let him go on to Stowe in case you should be at Wootton.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR RESPECTING THE INTENDED ATTACK OF THE FRENCH AND THE PASHA OF EGYPT UPON ALGIERS. [1562.]

24th January, 1830.

The French ambassador called upon the Duke of Wellington on the 23rd January, and read to him a despatch from the Prince de Polignac on a plan for an attack upon Algiers and upon the other Turkish Regencies on the Coast of Africa, combined with the Pasha of Egypt.

After hearing the despatch read, the Duke observed that Europe had long suffered the inconvenience and even indignity resulting from the conduct of these Regencies in preference to the disadvantage of allowing any Power to conquer and settle them with a view to its own advantage, or indeed any change. That the proposition now made was this: That the King of France, having cause to complain of the conduct of the Regency of Algiers, and likewise of that of Tripoli, the Pasha of Egypt, Mahomed Ali, had offered his Most Christian Majesty the co-operation of his forces with a view to settle the government of these countries in the interest of the Porte itself. That the French ambassador having applied to the Reis Effendi, and having communicated this proposition to his Excellency, his Excellency had given no

definitive answer ; but that the Porte had not signed the firman authorising Mahomed Ali to undertake this service, which, however, that chief was still willing to undertake. The Duke described Mahomed Ali as being legally a servant of the Porte, but in fact aiming at and approaching to independence. That he was not, however, quite so independent as he pretended to be.

The Duke said that, with every respect to his Most Christian Majesty and his government, he could not but view this scheme as one tending to establish in the Regencies on the Coast of Africa a French system of government instead of a Turkish one. That he was quite convinced that it would be so viewed in this country and by every man of unbiassed judgment in Europe ; and that this would not be deemed a very desirable mode of getting rid of piracy.

The Duke added that it would not be understood why the Porte was not to be allowed to judge for itself of the expediency of introducing this new system into these Regencies ; nor why Mahomed Ali, of whose influence and power the Porte was avowedly jealous, should be employed in the execution of this scheme at this time in concert with the French government excepting for French objects. A discussion ensued on the nature of the answer of the Porte, which the Duke contended could not, for obvious reasons, be a positive negative, and must have been an affirmative if the Porte had been at all sensible of the advantages to the government of the Porte of the adoption of the system proposed, and likewise of the advantages to all Europe of the consequences of those measures in the suppression of piracy, &c. ; the Duke contended that the latter advantage had at all times been considered as insufficient to counterbalance the disadvantages of putting these countries at the disposition of any European Power ; and the Duke earnestly recommended to the French ambassador to submit to his Court the expediency of reconsidering this scheme.

In answer, the French ambassador said that there was no room for farther consideration ; that the scheme was on the point of being adopted and acted upon ; and that in all probability the negotiations were terminated.

The Duke observed that he must then have misunderstood the despatch ; that he thought that he had been called upon to give an opinion upon a proposition in contemplation, which

he had done at once upon the first hearing of it; but that if the scheme was determined upon, he would request the ambassador to give him a copy of the despatch, or a note stating that it was so determined, which the Duke would lay before his colleagues and upon which he would take the King's pleasure.

The ambassador then explained that the scheme was not positively adopted; but that it was considered very advisable; and that he did not think that which had been stated against it altered their view of it.

The ambassador then asked the Duke whether, in case the Porte assented to the plan proposed, this government would approve of it?

The Duke answered that it could not be expected from him to answer questions upon political transactions affecting important interests founded upon hypotheses.

If he did, he must likewise state hypothetical cases, which had better be avoided.

He must, therefore, decline to answer till the case proposed shall be clearly before him.

That which he anxiously wished was, that his Most Christian Majesty should obtain satisfaction for the injury done to him by the Regency of Algiers; and the Duke observed that his Majesty was sufficiently powerful to obtain that satisfaction by his own means.

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM SENT TO LORD ABERDEEN—SCRAP FOR A [1563.]
PROTOCOL.

24th January, 1830.

Considering the concessions made by the Ottoman Porte, her earnest desire that the delimitation of frontier should be altered, and the general state of affairs in the Levant, it appears to the ministers plenipotentiary in Conference that the measure best calculated to secure the general tranquillity and the prosperity of the Porte itself would be

* * * * *

WELLINGTON.

To the King.

[1564.]

London, 25th January, 1830.

I enclose a letter which I received in the night from Lord Mount Charles. I have no other information upon this subject;

nor any ground for the formation of an opinion upon his Lordship's motives for this step, excepting that I heard some time ago that he had sold his house in London and had taken Ampthill from Lord Holland; and that he intended to live in the country. He probably thinks that he cannot continue to sit at the Board of Treasury while he will live at such a distance from London.

I have considered it my duty to give your Majesty the earliest intelligence upon this subject.

All of which is humbly submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Mount Charles.

[1565.] MY DEAR LORD,

London, 25th January, 1830.

Your letter, which I received last night, has given me great concern.

I have forwarded it to his Majesty.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Buckingham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Stowe, 25th January, 1830.

I feel most sensibly the kindness of your offer to my son, and of the manner in which you have made it through me. I wish that I had sufficient influence with Lord Chandos to induce him to view the whole case in the light in which I view it myself. As he is coming up to London, he will, of course, enter fully into details with you. Of this I beg you to be assured, that my decided wish is to give you the whole and entire support of my family, and political influence, in any way in which you think they can be most useful to you; and that if, for any reason, official assistance is declined by my son, it is against my decided opinion and earnest advice. But Lord Chandos is the master of his own actions, and I can only deeply lament if they can in any respect tend to make you doubt for a moment the reality and strength of the truth and regard with which

I am, my dear Duke of Wellington, yours very sincerely,

BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOS.

Lord Chandos to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Stowe, Monday, 25th January.

I beg to thank you very sincerely for your kind letter, and I will defer any further remarks till I have the pleasure of seeing you to-morrow morning. Perhaps you will have the goodness to send to Pall Mall to say at what time in the morning it will be convenient to you to receive me. With great regard, believe me to remain,

My dear Duke of Wellington, yours most sincerely,

CHANDOS.

Lord Heytesbury to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

St. Petersburg, 25th January, 1830.

Your Grace's letter of the 15th December did not reach me till the 16th January, owing to the freezing of the Elbe. Having been sent by the common post, it was of course read, and probably copied, before it came to my hands. I conclude that such was your intention. Perhaps, however, your Grace did not recollect that it would also be read on its passage through Berlin.

All the arguments and explanations which it contained had already been advanced by me upon more than one occasion, but it was, of course a great addition to their weight, that they should come directly from the Duke of Wellington. I did not fail to point this out (having your Grace's authority to do so), and I trust they will be found to have had some effect upon the tone of the answer to the Despatch, No. 22, which may be expected in England nearly as soon as this letter. Count Nesselrode told me yesterday, "that this answer would be no more than a calm refutation of the strictures contained in Lord Aberdeen's despatch, which, if no disposition existed in England to push matters farther, might be placed in the archives of the Foreign Office by the side of the original despatch and there be forgotten." The existence of the despatch has been kept a most profound secret, and is not known to a single individual beyond the Council of ministers.

The communication from this Government, to which your Grace alludes, and which you still expect, with regard to the promised alteration of some of the stipulations of the Treaty of Adrianople, will hardly be made before the negotiations of Halib Pacha and Count Orloff be brought to a conclusion. As Russia, in return for a diminution of the indemnity, requires a change in the nature of the guarantee, to which change it is supposed that the Turks have no great disposition to accede, it is evident that this result must be waited for, before any official notification upon the subject can be given; and after all that has passed, it is, I fear, too much to hope that Russia will so abound in confidence as to put us previously in possession of her ultimatum in a more private manner.

With respect to another point of the Treaty—namely, the possibility of ships of war passing the Bosphorus without the knowledge of the Turkish Government, the right of visit being denied to it, the language here has invariably been, "that such a proceeding would be a violation of existing

treaties, and could only be attempted with sinister intentions, and that it is an offence to the Emperor to suspect him of any such intentions."

However, since the passage of the Bosphorus by the British frigate *Blonde*, I have heard it whispered, "that as our ships of war are allowed to pass the Bosphorus, in direct violation of an old Treaty with Russia, by which Turkey was bound not to allow the passage to foreign ships of war, Russia is fully entitled to make a similar demand, and to insist upon being put upon the footing of the most favoured nation."

I do not know whether your Grace will agree with me in opinion, but I cannot help thinking that the entrance of the *Blonde* into the Black Sea at such a moment was a very imprudent measure. I cannot understand what possible good could be expected to result from the voyage to compensate the inconvenience of stirring such a question in addition to the other embarrassments by which we are surrounded. It has furnished the Russian Government with an argument sufficiently plausible to captivate all those who do not look very deeply into questions of this sort, and to turn the tide of public opinion against us. I gather this from the conversation of my colleagues.

As I have written at length to Lord Aberdeen respecting the Lievens, it is unnecessary to trouble your Grace upon that subject, as he will, no doubt, communicate my letter. I have made no complaint, but I have been able to put matters in such a trim as to lead me to hope that you will shortly be relieved from their presence. It is only requested, for reasons I have explained to Lord Aberdeen, that secrecy may be observed upon the subject. In the meantime, however, your Grace may be assured that the intimate relations which they have established with a very great personage lately returned from Berlin, are far from being approved of here. This intimacy has been carried perhaps farther than your Grace is aware of. But these are delicate matters to talk about, when no sort of proof can possibly be brought forward.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

My dear Lord Duke,

your Grace's very faithful humble servant,

HEYTESBURY.

Since I wrote this letter I have learnt from Count Nesselrode that the affair of the *Blonde* frigate is not likely to lead to any unpleasant discussions. The Russian Government has satisfied itself with stipulating that, in order to prove its enjoyment of all the privileges granted to the most favoured nation, a Russian frigate shall also be allowed to pass the Bosphorus and to proceed to Constantinople, to bring away Count Orloff on the termination of his mission. It does not desire to exact any further concession upon this head. Count Nesselrode very fairly avowed to me that no arrangement could suit Russia so well as that actually existing, which refuses the passage of the Bosphorus to ships of war of all nations, without any exception whatsoever.

H.

Lord Conyngham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Windsor Castle, 26th January.

His Majesty will expect the pleasure of your company at dinner on Thursday next, the 28th. Your room and bed will be ready for you.

When last I saw you I had no idea that Mount Charles intended resigning his situation as a Lord of the Treasury. I presume his health is the motive, as he frequently mentioned he dreaded the close attendance in Parliament.

I have the honour to be, my dear Duke, yours most faithfully,

CONYNGHAM.

To Lord Conyngham.

[1566.]

MY DEAR LORD CONYNGHAM,

London, 27th January, 1830.

I shall have great pleasure in attending his Majesty at dinner on Thursday.

I was very much concerned to lose Lord Mount Charles's assistance; and I have written him an answer accordingly.

Mr. Peel desired me to let you know what members of the Cabinet would attend the Council and the Recorder's Report on Thursday. I enclose the list of those whose presence will be necessary. Others may attend, but I am not aware of any necessity of their doing so excepting as a general duty.

I enclose a letter which I believe I wrote to Lady Conyngham many days ago, and one from Lord Clarendon, who enclosed it to me. I cannot understand in what manner it came to be missent to the Grove, Watford, as it appears that the direction, Windsor Castle, Windsor, is more plainly written than usual.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Lord Chancellor; Lord President; Earl of Aberdeen; Mr. Peel; Sir George Murray; Mr. Herries.

To the Lord Chancellor.

[1567.]

MY DEAR LORD CHANCELLOR,

London, 27th January, 1830.

I think that we saw enough of the Order in Council yesterday to be well convinced that we can have no confidence in the moderation and discretion of the gentleman employed by the

Colonial Department to draw such documents. I looked it over, and I believe that I was the only member of the Cabinet who had taken the trouble of reading it; and it is amended in some important points.

But it is impossible for me, with all the pains that I can apply to it, to judge of the details of the clauses. It is very desirable, therefore, that you should look through the Order yourself as amended, or that, if you should not have time, you should impose the task upon somebody in whose discretion you can place confidence.

Observe that this Order in Council is specially for the *conquered* colonies; and is to be the model of legislation for the others.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1568.]

To the Right Hon. Sir George Murray.

MY DEAR MURRAY,

London, 27th January, 1830.

I wish very much to see the Ordinance as amended before it will pass the Council.

I must say in confidence that the gentleman who draws these papers for your office serves the government very ill. I wrote to the Lord Chancellor to beg him to look it over carefully; as it is impossible for the government to act upon this, or upon any question, in the spirit of an enthusiastic party.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Sir G. Murray to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Colonial Office,
27th January, 1830.

A fair copy is now preparing of the ordinance respecting slaves, according to the notes of alterations prepared yesterday, of which I made memorandums after the Cabinet. It may be that in some points the code goes farther than it would be desirable that it should, but I assure you that it will fall short, in several points, of principles most urgently pressed by the despatches of my predecessors in this office, and which despatches (having been printed) will be referred to in the Houses of Parliament, and treated as if they pledged the government.

I know that the West Indian party have been persuading themselves

for some time that the enthusiasm of the country had very much cooled upon the slave question, but I believe they are greatly mistaken.

Mr. Peel should know better than I do the prevalent feeling of the House of Commons, but judging from the line I have observed to be taken by Mr. Peel when slavery has been alluded to, I think he estimated the sentiments of the House more unfavourably to the West Indians than I had shown myself.

My notion of what is most desirable is, that government should be able to shape its own course without giving way to either party on this question; but I apprehend that our only chance of being able to do so will be by taking what may be called a liberal view of it.

Believe me, my dear Duke, sincerely yours,

G. MURRAY.

Mr. T. Hoseason to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Banklands, near Lynn,
27th January, 1830.

The present severe winter has brought so many healthy and able-bodied daily labourers upon the parishes, that it behoves every well-wisher to his country to suggest to those like your Grace (who have the inclination and most probably the means also) such an alteration in the present poor-laws as may improve the condition of the labourer, and at the same time become most beneficial to those by whom he ought to be employed in the parish to which he belongs, and who have to pay their proportion of the rates, necessarily levied for the support of such men and their numerous families.

At our magistrates' meeting on Monday last, the 25th instant, it was clearly and most satisfactorily proved that the overseers of the parish let out all labourers out of employ to their neighbours the farmers, and others, at the lowest possible wages, and then, if the man has a family, the difference is paid out of the poor-rate: for instance, if a good labourer has a wife only to support, the overseer will keep him in his own barn or let him out to other farmers in the parish to thrash corn, or other equally hard work, at from 5s. to 6s. a week, when the yearly labourers in the same barn, or employed upon the same work, are paid the customary wages of this district of Marshland, being 2s. a day, or 12s. a week.

If the labourer has a wife and two, three, or four children to support, he is still let out by the overseer at the same rate of wages, 6s. a week, and the extra money necessary for the support of his children is paid to him by the overseers out of the parish poor-rate, which is, generally speaking, 1s. a week for each child; so that the man gets 6s. a week for his hard labour and is paid 3s. more for his children, making only 9s. a week for the five to live on, to pay rent for his cottage, find him in fire and clothing for his family, and everything else. This is only 15½d. a day for five people to live upon, and the labourer himself working as hard as my labourers do, who receive, whether married or single, 12s. a week on an average.

The magistrates, as your Grace knows, have no power now to regulate the rate of wages for labourers in husbandry, which they had about twenty

years back; it is, therefore, out of our power to assist the labourer in any other way than by ordinary relief, where it appears to be absolutely necessary; they have no power to direct overseers to provide clothing of any description—no, not even to children, who in many instances are at this moment in the greatest distress, through the present inclemency of the weather.

My object in troubling your Grace with this detail of the misery under which the labourers in agriculture are at this time labouring is solely with a view to meliorate their condition by a new law, which will not only better provide for their wants, but be equally advantageous to all those who pay rates for their support.

I therefore propose that the mode of assessment for the poor, who are from various circumstances unable to work and support themselves from age, sickness, &c., shall continue as it now is; but to provide work for the able-bodied, hale and healthy labourer, a new law ought to be established suitable to all agricultural districts—let cities, corporate towns, and such like, remain as they are.

My opinion is that a labour-rate ought to be established, so as to authorise the overseers of the poor, under the authority of the magistrates in each district or hundred, to oblige every person assessed to the poor-rate to employ a certain number of men and boys, in proportion to the rate he pays, whenever such labourers cannot get work to support themselves and their families, as is the case at this moment, occasioned by the long continuance of frost and snow.

The overseers and churchwardens should be obliged to keep a book, containing the names of all labourers residing in their respective parishes, with the number of children, &c., in his family that he is obliged to provide for, representing who are able to work and who are not.

By such a list the parish officers will, upon every occasion, be able to ascertain the amount of rate necessary to be laid for the support of the infirm and destitute poor, in contradistinction from the able, hale, and healthy labourer, who is ready and willing to work for any one who will employ him.

To provide for the able labourer and his family, if he has any, a separate rate should be laid by the overseers and churchwardens, so as to oblige the farmer or other persons so assessed to employ the labourers sent to him by the overseer, at a less rate of wages by the day than is paid generally for the best sort of labourers, but at the same time sufficient for his support and his family; also, in times like the present, this rate of wages to labourers able to work, but out of employ, might be regulated by the magistrates according to times and circumstance, and the price of food, fuel, &c., at some special sessions, to be held for that purpose.

The daily wages paid to good ploughmen in this hundred is 2s., or 12s. a week; but to the same description of labourer out of employ the farmer ought not to be obliged to pay above three-fourths of that sum, say 9s. a week; and in the same proportion for women, boys, or girls, paying at all times less by one-fourth part for the labour of persons sent by the overseer of the poor than is generally paid to good labourers in the parish who are able to get work and support their families, without calling upon the overseers for assistance.

If the farmer or other person assessed to the labour-rate refuse to take

such labourers as are sent to him by the overseer, or do not choose to find work for them, they must pay the labour-rate, whatever it may be, in proportion to their rental upon which the assessment is made, by which payment the overseer is enabled to provide for this man and his family; but if such a law is enacted, as is now suggested to your Grace, very few men will pay the rate for nothing—they will much rather employ the labourers allotted to them, and find some work for them, than pay the overseer and let the men and boys walk about idle.

At present the farmer is getting his labour performed at half the price he ought to pay for it, and obliging all other persons who are assessed equally in proportion of rental with himself to pay the additional sum made up by the overseer for the support of the man's family, which is a most unjust and unworthy mode of providing for labourers out of employ; but, as the law now stands, we magistrates have not the means of preventing it.

All farmers, &c., can find work enough to do, even in such a season as the present, to employ all the labourers in their parishes; but they will not employ them because, as the law now stands, they can get their labour done at half-price, and they leave their neighbours to make up the difference of wages out of the poor-rate.

If every person in the parish was obliged to employ a certain number of labourers in proportion to his rental, not one-half the misery and distress would be felt throughout the kingdom that is felt at this moment.

This plan has been tried in several parishes in the hundred of Trubridge Marshland, and is, generally speaking, very much approved of; but as the magistrates have no means to enforce it, those farmers, &c., who had so long experienced the advantage of cheap labour (and making their neighbours pay as much as they did for poor-rates, who were besides in the habit of giving their labourers 2s. a day instead of 1s.), never would pay the labour-rate, but employed labourers who were happy to work for half-price, and to get the difference made up to them by the overseers of the poor; so that whilst I and many others pay 2s. a day for each labourer they only pay 1s., and yet I pay the same rate in the pound rental as they do.

From the experience I have had as a magistrate and a farmer also for the last twenty years, I am satisfied that such a law is absolutely required to prevent the whole of the labouring population of the country from receiving parish relief, and becoming thereby paupers.

A labour-rate should be laid once in every six weeks or two months during winter, and the daily pay to such persons as get employment through the overseers of the poor to be regulated in each district by the magistrates, in manner before recommended; it being clearly understood that this is not regulating wages generally, but merely a mode of providing for persons able and willing to work, but out of employ, and who have no means of existing but by parish relief. In districts where there are no arable lands, and where graziers are the only farmers, the magistrates ought to have the power of relieving them from a proportion of the labour-rate, upon proper application for that purpose; but all persons are obliged to pay poor-rates according to their rental or hiring, and for that reason the tenant that hires grass lands will take care to make his rent in proportion to the outgoings, so that very little will be his claim in the same parish for such exemption or abatement.

This is only my second time of intruding upon your Grace. The first was

on the subject of the corn-laws, and I have pleasure in observing that the law, as it now stands on that question, has answered as well as could ever have been expected. Nothing is wanted to make it perfect but the leaving out the sales made by one corn-merchant to the other, and only including in the average price which regulates the duty the corn sold by growers only; but as such a law cannot be made, we must be content with the law as it now stands, which I am sorry to say brings most of our foreign wheat into the average sales, from its being mixed with the British wheat of inferior quality, and thereby enhances the average price. If any alteration of the kind now propounded by me should ever take place, of course the present duty, upon the scale at present in use, must be lowered at 60s. the quarter.

The question of the poor-laws is almost as great a one as the one upon the corn-laws, so that it is tender ground to touch upon. My object is to improve upon the present law, without altering any one part of it; and if the plan now intimated to your Grace should meet with your approbation and attention, and thereby become serviceable to the country, of which you are, thank God, the Prime Minister, most happy shall I be in having brought such a measure into notice, and that a law should be passed in the present year, to that effect, under your auspices.

The plan has been acted upon in many parishes I know; but from its not being the law of the land it has been evaded by all those who wish to get cheap labour, and their servants' wages paid in part out of the general poor-rate.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord Duke,
your most faithful servant,

T. HOSEASON.

P.S.—If your Grace wishes for any other information regarding the plan of labour-rate upon which an Act of Parliament might be formed, I shall be most ready to attend to your wishes by sending the forms of books to be kept by the overseers, notices for laying rates, lists, to be sent to the overseer weekly of men employed by the farmers, &c., with any other forms that may appear to me necessary for keeping a clear and fair account of labourers so employed, and the amount paid under the head of a labour-rate; which is at all times to be kept distinct from a poor-rate, intended only for the relief of the aged, the sick, the lame, and the blind, who are not able to work and support themselves.

All honest men and good farmers wish to employ good men and good labourers, and enough of them, to do their work properly, so that such men will approve of such a Bill with heart and hand. Men of different principles must be made to do their duty, and not to tread under foot the labouring classes.

T. H.

To Mr. T. Hoseason.

[1569.]

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 22nd March, 1830.

I beg pardon for having so long allowed your letter of the 27th of January to remain unanswered. But I have had much

to occupy my attention during the Session of Parliament, and I have still much to do. I cannot therefore at present enter into the consideration of the measure which you have suggested respecting labour.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. W. Baldwin to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

38, Great Marlborough Street,
27th January, 1830.

MY LORD DUKE,

I beg to call your Grace's attention to a new source of revenue, which may be made available, to a considerable extent, without pressing in the slightest degree on the resources of the country.

The establishment of a society for the assurance of real property is now contemplated.

Real property by assignments, mortgages, deaths, and marriages, changes its owners once, on an average, in ten years. There is a necessity to examine the title on each of these changes; there is a chance also of some of the title deeds being lost.

The expenses of examining the title every time, and the serious result from the loss of a document becomes a very heavy tax on this kind of property.

It is for the purpose of saving this expense that the office would be established.

Its plan is, that on the payment of a small annual contribution, the title deeds would be examined and assured to be valid against dispute; they would be registered, and thus assured against loss; the conveyance of the property from one to another would be effected without any further examination, and of course with much greater facility; titles to estates would be rendered unexceptionable, and the cavilling of unwilling purchasers and the lawsuits incident thereto would be avoided.

It has been a subject of discussion whether importance should be given to this society by the subscription of a large sum of money, or by Act of Parliament.

It is for the purpose of obtaining the latter, under the sanction of the government, that I now address your Grace.

If the authority of Parliament would render the registers of this office (on their being made on oath) evidence in the courts of law, its importance would be increased sufficiently to be as a considerable duty on the effecting of each policy; if its powers were extended to enable it to act as a register office for the other counties in England, besides Middlesex and Yorkshire, it would not only be a most popular and much-wanted establishment, but it would soon form a very important branch of revenue.

The precedent of a duty being now paid upon policies of assurance, would prevent any opposition to this tax; the actual saving of money to the country would prevent any discontent.

If your Grace should deem this worthy of your attention, I will be pre-

pared to afford any further information you may want. As to my profession, I am a solicitor; as to my capability of conducting such an affair, I am the author of a small pamphlet on Assurance; as to my respectability, I am known to Mr. Richardson Bowditch, the member; and as to my duty to your Grace,

I am, your very obedient and most humble servant,

WILLIAM BALDWIN.

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his letter. As it appears to be the intention of the society to which he adverts to come before Parliament, the Duke will form his opinion upon their plan when he shall see it in the shape of a Bill.]

Lord Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Cavendish Square, 27th January, 1830.

I have intended these two or three days, had the weather admitted, to call on you, and will to-morrow. But you will be glad to hear that we have had for some time the lead in Waterford, and Mr. O'Connell's going there was rather a desperate game on the part of our opponents, and I suppose his vanity led him to make the trial of what his presence would do. You will see by the enclosed that it appears to have been a complete failure. None of the gentlemen of the county have been at his dinners, not even those that support Mr. Barran. If he fails with us, as I think he has, it concerns more than us, and will be of infinite general service. We have had a long and arduous contest, and during it many different aspects of fortune, but I now really hope we shall get well over it.

It is currently reported that a Mr. Abraham has been nominated from Rome, in the place of the late Bishop at Waterford. He was one of the three names sent to Rome, but not the first. He would be an excellent one for us. He has been rather violent in our favour.

Yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

At what hour can I see you to-morrow?

Mr. Stevenson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

26, Albany Street, Edinburgh,
28th January, 1830.

I had the honour of your Grace's note, and having previously applied to Lord Melville to support my application, his lordship had the goodness to say that if your Grace mentioned my name he would not fail to state my case.

I take the liberty to enclose a few notes, containing some facts which

appeared to me to be of importance at this time, and which are humbly submitted to your Grace's consideration.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,
your Grace's most obedient and faithful humble servant,

ALEX. STEVENSON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

NOTES.

From the county meetings lately held, a great clamour will be made at the opening of Parliament, and an attempt to show that the landed interest has suffered to a ruinous extent. But a few facts, chiefly drawn from the writings of one of the ablest advocates of the landed interest, will be sufficient to establish that in none of the great branches of national industry has the course of prosperity been so great or so rapid as in that of agriculture, and that the present temporary depression must be owing to other causes than the prices of grain.

The first fact is, that the rate at which land has been sold has tripled within no distant period; and the second fact is, that the rate at which the produce of land has been sold has increased almost fourfold.

In proof of these facts, reference may be made to Mr. Arthur Young's 'Inquiry into the Progressive Value of Money,' p. 99, and the following table of computations made by Mr. Young of the changes in the rate at which land has been sold at different periods:—

					Years' purchase.
Seventh century	..	..	..	..	10
Seventeenth century	..	..	..	..	16½
1712 to 1737	..	..	..	..	22
1778 to 1789	..	..	..	..	23½
1792 to 1799	..	..	..	..	27
1805 to 1811	..	..	..	..	28

Since the period when Mr. Young's account closes the rate may be said to have risen from 28 to 32, and in some instances to 35; but 30 years' purchase may be taken as the present rate; and even on sheep farms, where the depression is alleged to be the greatest, the present number of years' purchase is 30, at least it is so in Scotland.

In Mr. Young's work he has also given a progressive view of the rise in the price of corn. He takes three sorts of grain, wheat, barley, and oats, and, having classed them together, makes the number 20 as the representative of the average price in the seven years preceding 1810. Though this view must of necessity be a good deal a matter of guess, it is supposed to be rather under than above the actual prices.

					Wheat, Barley, and Oats classed together.
Fifteenth century	..	..	..	..	3
Sixteenth century	..	..	..	..	5
Seventeenth century	..	..	..	..	8¾
Eighteenth century	..	..	..	..	10¼
66 years, from 1701 to 1760	..	..	..	..	7½
34 years, from 1767 to 1800	..	..	..	..	11¾
14 years (repeating 10 years), from 1790 to 1803	..	..	..	..	14½
7 years, from 1804 to 1810	..	..	..	..	20

Taking these computations of the prices and produce of land into view, there is no body who have less reason to complain than the proprietors of land.

The whole clamour arises from the agriculturists not distinguishing betwixt money rent and real rent. If they were aware of this, instead of complaining of the present low prices, which have entirely arisen from a plentiful harvest, they would see in that bountiful dispensation of Providence new grounds of confidence in the increasing prosperity of the country.

The price of food regulates the price of all other commodities, and the component parts of it are the raw material, the labourer's wages, and the dealer's profit. It fixes the labourer's wages, because the wages of the lower ranks are the price of their maintenance; it marks the dealer's profit, because that grain corresponds to his stock in trade, the amount of which is composed of materials and wages, both of which are dependent on the cost of food. The real value of rent is measured by the quantity of commodities it will purchase. A fall therefore in the money rent of land occasions a relative fall in the value of all other commodities, and therefore the situation of the landlord is the same after the fall of the money rent as after he has given an abatement of rent as before. On the same rule if the money rent of land should have risen instead of fallen, the income of the landlord, though nominally more, would have been of no more utility to himself in the way of expenditure or accumulation, since the price of all commodities would have been enhanced in proportion. In short, it is a matter of serious consideration that from erroneous views of the simplest principles of political economy a plentiful harvest should be deemed a curse rather than a blessing. Were it not viewed with reference to the nominal amount of money it produced, it would be viewed as a blessing that instead of ten millions of quarters of wheat the country had this year produced twelve or fourteen millions, thereby increasing the real riches and general happiness of the people.

At the same time it must be a subject of the most anxious consideration, what with an export and import trade, increasing at a greater rate than any former period, so much misery should exist in various districts of the country, and that the cause as well as the remedy of this misery seems involved in so many difficulties and given rise to so many conflicting opinions. As to the cause, there is one remarkable fact which shows in the clearest manner that the present depression is entirely occasioned by the forced circulation of paper money, even though convertible into gold, and the general abuses of the privileges of banking. The fact alluded to is that though Liverpool, from its vast and increasing trade, both foreign and inland, would have been the first to suffer had the depression been general, instead of any falling off in the trade of that place or the surrounding districts, it has been steadily increasing, which circumstance can only be accounted for by their circulating medium being entirely composed of gold and Bank of England paper, which precluded all chance of a forced circulation of local notes. Until some regulation can be made by which, without at all interfering with the right to issue paper or the general privileges of banking, the extent of these issues can be controlled, there will be a periodical recurrence of these fluctuations and convulsions in trade which are made the grounds of so much ill-founded clamour, and prove a continual source of embarrassment and anxiety to the government. Any departure from Mr. Peel's Bill, which seems the object of all this clamour, "might be the strength in the beginning, but it would be weakness in the end."

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his letter.]

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 30th January, 1830, 11 o'clock.

Stuart Wortley has just been with me; in a very good temper of mind, and very much flattered by the offer you made to him.

He said he wished to speak to me quite unreservedly on two or three points, and asked whether I had any objection to give him an answer to his questions upon them. I replied not the least, and that I am sure you would be anxious to avoid the responsibility of all future misunderstanding by an unreserved explanation now. He put his questions in a very friendly manner.

1st. Was it the intention of the government to renew the charter of the East India Company now, and had the government a plan ready formed for the renewal of the charter?

I answered that the government did not mean to renew the charter this year. That they meant to move for a committee, in which the financial and commercial concern of the Company might be thoroughly enquired into. That the government had not matured any plan for the renewal of the charter, and that the whole subject was one open to free consideration.

2nd Question. Did we mean to depart from the principles by which the commercial policy of the country had been of late regulated?

I answered that I was not aware of a single measure being in contemplation involving a departure from these principles, and that I saw no probability whatever of any question arising on that subject by which he could be embarrassed.

3rdly. Might he vote on the East Retford question as he had hitherto always voted?

I answered that I did not think we were entitled on a question of this nature, viz. as to whether a forfeited franchise should be transferred to one place or another, to expect that he should alter a vote which he had previously given.

These answers he said were quite satisfactory to him, but I begged him to ask you the same questions in order that there might be no misunderstanding.

He said his father had not heard from you, and that therefore he had not yet any appointment with you.

I assured him that you had written to his father, and that there must have been some mistake in the delivery of the letter.

Pray write again.

I think you will like Wortley's manner, and the disposition which he manifests.

Not a word about Tories or junctions with any party.

Ever yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

To the King.

[1570.]

London, 30th January, 1830.

Mr. Wortley has accepted the office of Secretary of the Board of Control.

But Lord Chandos has declined, in a letter of which I enclose your Majesty the copy, to accept the office of Master of the Mint.

I cannot explain the causes of this decision, as his Lordship intends to support the government. I enclose the letters from the Duke of Buckingham and Lord Chandos, which I told your Majesty that I had received.

All of which is humbly submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

The Duke of Buckingham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Stowe, 25th January, 1830.

I feel most sensibly the kindness of your offer to my son, and of the manner in which you have made it through me. I wish that I had sufficient influence with Lord Chandos to induce him to view the whole case in the light in which I view it myself. As he is coming up to London he will of course enter fully into details with you. Of this I beg you to be assured, that my decided wish is to give you the whole and entire support of my family and political influence in any way in which you think they can be most useful to you; and that if for any reason official assistance is declined by my son, it is against my decided opinion and earnest advice. But Lord Chandos is the master of his own actions and I can only deeply lament if they can in any respect tend to make you doubt for a moment the reality and strength of the truth and regard with which I am,

My dear Duke of Wellington, yours, &c.,

BUCKINGHAM AND CHANDOS.

II.

Lord Chandos to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Stowe, Monday, 25th January, 1830.

I beg to thank you very sincerely for your kind letter, and I will defer any further remarks till I have the pleasure of seeing you to-morrow morning. Perhaps you will have the goodness to send to Pall Mall to say at what time in the morning it will be convenient to you to receive me.

With great regard, believe me to remain,

my dear Duke of Wellington, yours, &c.,

CHANDOS.

III.

Lord Chandos to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Stowe, Friday, 29th January, 1830.

The very kind and flattering manner in which you desired me to defer my decision respecting the Mint has induced me to re-examine most minutely all the circumstances which I have already stated to your Grace, and I greatly lament to say that my own situation in this county is so unpleasant, from the *peculiar* difficulties I have *now* to contend with, that I find myself *most reluctantly* compelled to decline your very gratifying proposition for my acceptance of office. I trust you will do me the justice to believe that no one can appreciate more highly than I do the many proofs of confidence and personal kindness that I have received from your Grace, and for which it will always afford me the greatest pride and pleasure to evince my gratitude.

I remain, my dear Duke of Wellington,

with every feeling of regard, yours, &c.,

CHANDOS.

To the King.

[1571.]

London, 30th January, 1830.

I trust that your Majesty will be graciously pleased to approve of my availing myself of this opportunity to draw your Majesty's attention for a moment to the relation in which your government stands towards his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland.

I have no reason to complain of his Royal Highness's opposition to, or want of confidence in, your Majesty's ministers, or of his personal hostility to myself, although I lament that his Royal Highness should think that he has cause for those feelings. But I complain that his is not fair political opposition. I complain of his reports of me personally at Windsor, and of his using your Majesty's name in communication with political characters in this country as well as abroad.

The consequence of his frequent long interviews with your Majesty is, that he is supposed to speak your Majesty's language, even when he does not use your Majesty's name.

If the only inconvenience attending this state of things were that the public confidence in your Majesty's government was deteriorated without cause, it would not be unimportant, inasmuch as your Majesty's service must suffer from such want of confidence in the stability of your administration. But it exposes your Majesty yourself to be misunderstood. Indeed it

is represented that your Majesty keeps in your service ministers in whom your Majesty does not confide, and whom you wish to dismiss from your Majesty's service.

All this is the consequence of the language of the Duke of Cumberland, and of his interviews with your Majesty.

The inconvenience which is felt, and to which must be attributed much that we now see going forward, may lead to a crisis, of which the consequence will be to occasion to your Majesty much vexation and trouble; and it may possibly prove injurious to the monarchy itself.

The disgrace of an individual like myself, and the breaking up of an administration, are trifles in comparison with the objects to which I have adverted.

I supplicate your Majesty's attention to this subject.

Your Majesty will see that I consider it no more than my duty to recommend Mr. Jelf to your Majesty to be preferred to be a canon of Christ Church.

I trust, therefore, that your Majesty will not be induced to believe that I write this letter upon this occasion for any reason excepting because it appears to me to be one likely to draw your Majesty's attention seriously to what is thus humbly submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

Major-Gen. J. Carmichael Smyth to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Government House, Bahamas,
30th January, 1830.

I trust your Grace will excuse my troubling you with the enclosed copy of a letter I have written to Lord Beresford on the subject of my battalion, and to which, if the spirit, and, indeed, the letter of your Grace's regulation of the 21st February, 1824, are adhered to, I have every reason to expect to succeed on the next vacancy. I do not presume to ask your Grace to interfere with the Master-General, but as the question is one which has been a good deal discussed, reference may, perhaps, be had to your Grace respecting your regulation of the date already quoted. My letter to Lord Beresford contains a short narrative, or epitome rather, of the whole of the alterations previously to your Grace's final, and, as I hope, permanent arrangement and decision.

I have written a good deal to Sir George Murray on the subject of the trade of these islands, and which I am convinced may be made, under proper management, the medium of a very considerable exportation of British manufactures, and of importation of the raw material and of bullion.

In 1824 we exported from hence British goods to the value of 58,000*l.*; last year only 6000*l.* This falling off is to be attributed to our own regulations, by which we either taxed the imported raw material very heavily, or allowed it to be imported free of duty, if bonded for exportation. Now the half-civilized people with whom we traded from hence, inhabiting the coast of Cuba and of the Spanish Main, know nothing about bonding; and finding themselves under more restraint, and not in possession of the same facilities for getting the value of what they had to dispose of, have left off dealing with us. It is much to be lamented, both as it affects the prosperity of these islands and the interest of the British manufacturer and shipowner. As, however, all these matters will be laid before your Grace by the proper authorities, and receive the benefit of your Grace's best attention, I will not presume to intrude farther upon your valuable time. I most sincerely pray that your Grace's health may not suffer from your constant and unwearied employment, and that your life may very long be spared, to the advantage of a grateful country.

I beg to add, that I am always,

with the sincerest respect,

your Grace's most obliged and most obedient servant,

J. CARMICHAEL SMYTH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Major-General J. Carmichael Smyth to Lord Beresford.

Government House, Bahamas,
24th January, 1830.

MY LORD,

By the death of General Fyers I am the senior general officer of Engineers, without a battalion. I take the liberty, in consequence, of respectfully intruding upon your Lordship with the following observations:—

2. Previously to the 20th December, 1814, the succession to the battalions in the Artillery and the Engineers was invariably by regimental seniority. On that day it was communicated, in an official letter from the Secretary of the Master-General, that his Royal Highness the Prince Regent was pleased in the name and on behalf of his Majesty, to approve of the general officers succeeding to the command of battalions according to their seniority; and in an answer to a reference of General Mann's upon the subject, Earl Mulgrave was pleased to enter into some explanation of the proposed change in the succession of battalions, pointing out its advantages; and concluded by saying, in a letter dated 25th December, 1814, that no part of the proposed new regulations met with his Royal Highness's more entire approbation.

3. Major-General Sir Benjamin, now Lord Bloomfield, succeeded, in February 1824, to the command of a battalion of artillery over the heads of several of his seniors in the regiment of artillery, in consequence of his being a senior general officer, owing to his having been an aide-de-camp to his Majesty. Had the regulation of the 20th December, 1814, still continued in force, I should, as a matter of course, have been entitled to succeed, as the senior general officer, to the next vacant battalion in the corps of Engineers, upon the same rule and principle as was acted upon in the case of Lord Bloomfield. When, however, Lord Bloomfield's promotion was notified, his Grace the Duke of Wellington, at that time Master-General, communicated his Majesty's further pleasure to the corps of Engineers in a letter to General Mann, dated 21st February, 1824, as to the mode in which the succession to battalions was in

future to be regulated; by which it appeared that whenever a vacancy should occur, the Master-General for the time being is to lay before his Majesty the name of the officer to succeed to the battalion from amongst the eight senior general officers, whether actually serving with the corps, or receiving unattached pay as a general officer, removed from the corps upon attaining the rank of a Major-General, under the operation of his Majesty's warrant.

4. There are but four general officers belonging to the corps of Engineers (not having battalions), of whom I am senior. I rely with confidence upon your Lordship's justice and impartiality, and if my claims and my services should not be found to be below those of the other three general officers, I trust your Lordship will not deprive me of the advantage of my senior army rank. It would, as is observed by the Duke of Wellington in his letter of the 21st February, 1824, be depriving brevet officers of a great part of the benefit resulting from their services, if the principle of promotion by army rank to the command of battalions was totally abandoned. In my own individual case, my superior army rank deprived me for many years of those regimental commands and stations to which I should have had a fair claim. Those years, however, the records of the Ordnance, and the repeated thanks of the Master-General and Board, prove not to have been idly or unprofitably employed. Upon the whole, I leave my case and my claims in your Lordship's hands, with the perfect assurance that you will do what is just and equitable. I have the honour to be, my Lord, with perfect truth,

Your Lordship's most obedient and most faithful humble servant,

J. CARMICHAEL SMYTH,
Major-General.

[1572.]

To Lord Clanwilliam.

MY DEAR CLANWILLIAM,

London, 31st January, 1830.

The Duke of Buccleugh moves the Address. Would you have any objection to second his motion?

I would not ask you to do anything which I admit I think will be disagreeable to you, if I were not in difficulties upon the subject owing to the persons upon whom I reckoned that they would not refuse, having refused, and others being at such a distance that I cannot communicate with them.

If you can comply with my wish I shall be much obliged to you, and you will relieve me from much embarrassment. If your repugnance is invincible let me know it. At all events let me see you to-morrow.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Charles C. Western, Esq.

[1573.]

SIR,

London, 1st February, 1830.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter, and I assure you that you do me justice in believing that I should not be induced to persevere in a system which is inconsistent with the interests of the country by any consideration of a personal nature.

I don't doubt that there will be shortly many opportunities of discussing the causes of the existing distress, and I will not now trouble you with my opinion, as you must be aware that I cannot with propriety write upon that subject.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Colonel Townshend.

[1574.]

MY DEAR COLONEL,

London, 1st February, 1830.

I cannot put my signature to the recommendation of your successor without expressing my sincere concern for the loss of your valuable services and assistance in the 1st Regiment of Guards.

Long before I had the honour of belonging to that regiment, I had observed your indefatigable exertions for its discipline, its good order, and its benefit, and during many years I derived all the advantage of those exertions in the services of the regiment for whose honour and benefit they were made. I am likewise aware that my illustrious and lamented predecessor esteemed your services as they merited, and that you enjoyed in an eminent degree his confidence, his respect, and regard.

All these considerations combine to occasion the sincere regret which I feel at this separation, which I don't doubt is equally felt by all interested in the honour and welfare of the 1st Regiment of Guards, and of the service at large.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. R. E. Butler to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR GRACE,

10, Essex Place, Dublin,
1st February, 1830.

The paper reports and policy of the times, perhaps of Europe, give to Prince Leopold the sovereignty of Greece.

Should the wisdom of your Grace's Cabinet be made a party to such a measure, I would use the freedom to apprise your Grace of a truth—and from facts—that the collective wisdom of England will repent of it ere long.

Your Grace, if disposed to lend your mighty power to this scheme of sovereignty in Greece, will read my letter over, will attend to me, and enquire of me why and wherefore. My reply will be brief. Because the collective wisdom of Greece is long opposed to a British system of government, and sighs for a Russian monarch or government. On my first visit to Athens, in 1811—how long before I cannot say—but at that date a plan was matured by a society of men from the different states of Greece, designating themselves “Lovers of the Muses.”

Cowardice, cunning and craft, want of courage or virtue, or the doubtful feelings of Russia upon so gigantic a task, alone precluded its completion until later times. Count Capo d'Istria and Pozzo di Borgo, agents at St. Petersburg, ministers, but above all the Adelphi (Greek brothers at Vienna), contrived a correspondence with the states of Greece, and even with some of the first men in our Ionian Isles; and through these such an abhorrence of our government there and at home was spread and generated throughout Greece, that our aid or protection would be supplanted for our wealth alone.

Any other power in Europe would be preferred that possessed our temper, courage, and resources, to give freedom to the men of Greece.

In 1811, 1812, and up to 1816—in September of that year I stole upon the designs of Greece and Russia by the only and surest means—speaking the modern Greek language.

It is not in the limits of a letter I could give your Grace an idea of the people of Greece.

The fields of Marathon, Plataea, Leuctra, and Salamis are as fresh in their recollection as if the glory of those days was but yesterday, without a single virtue coupled with the lofty boast. Long associated with Turkish habits, every vice is familiar to them, from the highest to the lowest among them. The higher orders receive education in Italy and France; but in the ancient and modern Greek languages Greece possesses many excellent schools at home. There is not a single work that ever reached us, from Homer downwards, that is not done in modern Greek translation. This language, which is not cultivated, coupled with their perfect knowledge of Italian and French, gives them a pre-eminence in diplomacy and scheming, so that, at your Grace's table, the rise or fall of empires could be well contrived in your face and hearing fearless of detection.

This modern translation of the ancient language, diffusing throughout Greece among all classes a spirit of knowledge, instead of a benefit proves a curse; it generates argument and faction; and I have seen the “Lovers of the Muses” themselves, in direct violation of a solemn oath, fiercely contending for the seat of empire when Russia and her princes were couching at the feet of France. Sparta would not give way to Athens; Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia claimed empire and renown; so that if the wisdom, valour, and eloquence of Greece and her mighty dead could be summoned from the tomb, war and the sword alone would decide the modern claim.

The wisdom, power, and wealth of England have done and can do mightier things than reduce subjects to obedience and reconcile them to kings. If

Prince Leopold is chosen and accepted by Greece—and mark it, I implore your Grace—it is because his regal fortune disposes the crafty Grecian to feel his royal highness will want less than Constantine of Russia, or Michael, and that, growing into wealth, a king may be called for and chosen at pleasure.

If my knowledge of the people of Greece, and their darling long-sought object throughout the face of the country, can be of any use to your Grace you shall have it without fee or reward, not in the language of travel writers, but from knowledge of their language, temper, and habits.

I am, with the deepest respect,

your Grace's devoted servant,

R. E. BUTLER,

Late 35th Regt.

Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 1st February, 1830.

I saw Bankes last night. He enquired whether I had seen you, and whether you had not expressed a wish that he should be in the chair of the East India Committee.

I answered that I did not understand you to express a wish from yourself on the subject; that you had mentioned to me his (Bankes's) wish to be in the chair.

I told him that I had given no assurance to any person with respect to being a member of the East India Committee, and that I did not feel myself at that time authorised to say anything on the subject of so important an appointment as that of the chair of the Committee.

He then mentioned his retirement from office—hoped it was not embarrassing me.

I replied that as he asked my opinion, I must say that I thought his conduct in retiring from office a second time, and pressing for the appointment of a successor just before the meeting of Parliament, very extraordinary conduct.

He then said, "May I speak to you in confidence?" I said certainly. He went on to say, I suppose you know the office which is intended for me when it is vacant?

I replied that I certainly did not know that any assurance had been given to him as to the future succession to any office, but that if it had, I thought his retirement from office at present was the more extraordinary.

I confess I think it is doubtful whether he should be in the chair of the East India Committee; but I have not said a word to any one on the subject, and have studiously avoided promising any one to be on the Committee until the whole constitution of the Committee can be arranged.

Ever most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

[1575.]

To the Duke of Clarence.

SIR,

London, 3rd February, 1830.

The King having yesterday in Council at Windsor settled the speech to be made by the Lords Commissioners to both Houses of Parliament, I beg to send your Royal Highness a copy of the same.

The Duke of Buccleugh will move and Lord Saltoun second the motion for an address in the House of Lords; the Earl of Darlington will move and Mr. Ward, the member for the City, will second the motion in the House of Commons.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Clarence to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Bushy House, 3rd February, 1830.

I am favoured with your Grace's letter of this day, inclosing the speech of the Lords Commissioners to be to-morrow delivered at the opening of the Parliament. I have read it with the greatest attention, and most highly approve of it in every particular.

I am also sensible of your Grace's polite consideration of informing me that in the Lords the Duke of Buccleugh will move, and the Lord Saltoun second the Address; and that in the Commons the Earl of Darlington moves, and Mr. Ward, the member for the City of London, seconds the Address. These four individuals are equally satisfactory to me, from their respective situations in the empire at large.

With these sentiments, your Grace will not be surprised that I request a proxy may be sent to me here to sign to the Lord Chancellor, to hold in my name.

For the present I shall not attend. But in the event of any peculiar attack on the King's government, I shall certainly take the same line I did last year, and decidedly, and in the most public manner, support the confidential advisers of the Crown.

I remain, my Lord Duke, yours sincerely,

WILLIAM.

Sir Charles Flint to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

3rd February, 1830.

The enclosed contains so much truth and good sense that I am induced to send it to your Grace. It contains the opinion of a large landed proprietor, and one of the most sensible men in Yorkshire.

At our last audit in December every rent was paid by the farmers on the Thellusson estate in Yorkshire, and not a sixpence of arrears left due.

But our rents are moderate, and yet some of them have been raised within the last twelve months.

I have the honour to remain, with great truth and respect,

my dear Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obliged and faithful servant,

C. W. FLINT.

[ENCLOSURE.]

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM YORKSHIRE, DATED 1ST FEBRUARY, 1830.

"With regard to the requisitions of us country squires and our public meetings, I attend none, for I think, like the late Duke of Portland's famous letter, they tend to make things much worse, and that some of my good neighbours will find it out at their next rent-day. The truth is, government are hampered enough, and can do but little if good faith is to be kept with the public creditor—and God forbid it should not! I never had a farthing in the funds in my life; but I would rather eat bread and water than see them robbed.

"There is but one remedy, and it is in our own hands—private, not public, economy. It is the mortgage-list that hurts the squires more than the low price of grain. If it were not for the interest to mortgagees, we might reduce our rents one-half, and still be richer, more hospitable, more charitable, and more happy."

[Compliments—thanks.]

To the Right Hon. J. W. Croker.

[1576.]

MY DEAR CROKER,

London, 4th February, 1830.

The most certain mode of preventing the House of Commons from putting down the office of Treasurer of the Navy, is to render it efficient, and to appoint an efficient person to fill it, before the House can have an opportunity of dealing with it.

This is exactly what we propose to do, but your acceptance is I understand postponed till you can feel your way respecting your re-election. In this I agree entirely. But I don't think that we can postpone to make the appointment beyond the time originally fixed.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. Thomas Kelly to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Ballymore, Co. Westmeath, Ireland,
4th February, 1830.

I again take the liberty of addressing you, and congratulate you on your success in carrying the Relief Bill, and by so doing you have laid the

foundation of the peace and prosperity of this country. As you have been the saviour of the British Empire in a military point of view, and of Europe also, I hope in your civil capacity that you will be able to extricate the empire out of the present distress, and considerably improve the impoverished condition in which you found it.

My Lord Duke, I hope you will excuse the presumption of so humble an individual as I am, in taking the liberty of suggesting to you what I think would considerably improve this country and the empire at large. The neighbourhoods of large and small rivers are most productive in pasture and meadow if laid dry; if the government brought in a bill to widen and sink these rivers, so that the water could not lodge on the land, but pass on to lakes and the sea; every estate that would benefit by the drainage to be made pay its moiety of the expense; by so doing, the proprietor of the land and the poor would both benefit from this, the one from the improved land, the other in employment.

Again, if the bogs were drained, and by the government having the power to hold and let the same to the poor cottier, at small acreable rent, free of tithe and taxes, till it would defray the expense of the drainage, —then let the cottier derive under the proprietor—I know many poor, who are not able to take a small arable farm, who would very willingly build a house on the borders of a bog if they were sure of getting employ, and if they got a few acres on the verge. There are two prime and very necessary accommodations to the poor on the verge of a bog, which are fire and water; and there are also close to bogs in general, manuring, gravel, and clay, which the bog requires in improving it, and for producing crops. Any further expense than drainage on what is called a red bog, at present I would not recommend to you and the government.

I have to observe to your Lordship there are many commons in all parts of Ireland that are of little service to the adjoining estates; a bill to enable the government to take these, and let them at a small rent to cottiers who would improve them, and bring them into cultivation, would be of service to the government and a great benefit to the poor. A vast number of the labouring poor are totally unemployed the winter quarter; the whole of what is called the temporary hands have nothing to do for that time. What is the consequence?—they congregate together, perhaps to the number of fifteen or twenty in a cabin, in the village, brooding over their hardships and misfortune, declaring they are able and willing to labour, but can get nothing to do. Before they depart, some one more evil minded than the rest, suggests that they shall combine; they go then and take out arms by all possible means they can, which they keep concealed; then any person who takes the farm of a man who has been ejected for non-payment of rent, they either destroy his property or himself, saying, If you had not taken the land, the landlord would be under the necessity of giving the farm at a reduced rent to the former tenant in being. They further say, Now this poor man and his helpless family are thrown on the world without any means of support, and his condition is as bad as our own. The burnings, the destruction of all kinds of property, and the murders that are done in Ireland, are generally caused by the aforesaid. I am of opinion if these poor people were located on the borders of the bogs and on the commons, they would be employed in the winter in improving and manuring their little spots, that crime would considerably decrease, and that they

would in a short time serve the country and the State. The millions who are now idle, if employed, would be able then to consume exciseable goods, and would be the means of opening and enlarging the market for British manufactures of various sorts.

My Lord Duke, I would also suggest to you a mode of keeping the peace in this country, at very small expense, and of taking out of the hands of those improper persons the concealed arms they have. Let every local magistrate have power to swear in for the night his tenants and respectable farmers' sons in his neighbourhood, and arm them to the amount of about ten, the magistrate will then be informed by these farmers' sons the bad and suspicious characters, and the people who are likely to have the arms concealed. The magistrate at the head of this party to be out at least two nights in the week, to make a general search. Any magistrate who would not act, to be broken of the peace. I will forfeit my existence, if the country be managed for a short time in that manner, if peace be not restored, nightly depredations and murders cease, and the lower orders, by whom all the harm is done, will be compelled to be quiet.

The farmers and their sons know well the bad and suspicious characters, and those who have concealed arms; but they are in dread of coming forward to tell the present authorities lest they would be murdered; they would be stigmatised as informers, and perhaps at fair or market, ten or fifteen or twenty miles from home, or in their own houses, lose their lives for it. But when called on by the magistrate or landlord authorised by the law of the land, then the lower orders would not have that malice towards them as if they came forward of their own accord. The magistrate to have a list of the farmers and their sons who are of good character and respectable in each parish. I have often heard them say—that is the farmers—they would very willingly go out in turn for the peace of the country.

I am of opinion if there were a compulsory support for the very old, the sick, and the young orphan, that it would relieve very much the middling tradespeople in cities and towns, and the farmers in the country, on whom the support of the poor destitute people generally falls. I have been a long time in England and Scotland. I saw the abuse of their system of poor-laws, the like of which I hope never will be introduced into Ireland. A legal support for the aforesaid is required; then the absentee property and the Church property would have to pay their moiety; at present they pay little or nothing, the poor are the supporters of the poor.

The lower orders here are very prone to the excessive drinking of strong spirits; it maddens and rouses in them all the bad passions, and at fairs and markets, where they generally take this beverage to excess, it is shocking to behold the dreadful disorder that takes place—quarrelling, fighting, and frequently murders are committed, to the disgrace of the country. I am of opinion if the duty were taken off the malt and beer, and this wholesome beverage substituted for whisky as much as possible, that it would greatly serve these people; it would also serve the agriculturist, and better the condition of the farmer, and add very much by way of comfort to the poor labourer who tills the soil. I think the government ought to reduce the licensed houses for selling whisky more than one-half, and in their stead to encourage those of malt liquor. Should the revenue suffer too much from so doing, I would recommend in its place an income-tax, the most just tax ever devised, to commence when the income is 500*l.*,

and not to be on income lower than that. The reason I think income under 500*l.* should not be taxed is, in this country there are few manufacturers and but few merchants; the great mass of the people live by agriculture. During the late war produce sold very high, the leases then expired, and after that time, up to a short time back, were let by the owner of the soil, at double, treble, and quadruple in some places, the rent of these lands before the war; therefore the soil possesses property or income increased in that proportion. Since the peace to the present time, the produce of the soil is coming down; and in few cases have the tenants got abatements, therefore those whose income is less, and comes up to 500*l.*, are farmers with dear land and large families, and not able to pay.

My Lord Duke, I have the honour to be, and remain,
your very humble servant,

THOMAS KELLY.

P.S.—My Lord Duke, upon reflection, I have further to inform your Grace that these unemployed labourers, cottiers, petty farmers, and servant-men, are mostly combined in every village throughout Ireland, and have a great quantity of arms concealed in their possession. It is dreadful the terror they cause to many gentlemen, gentlemen-farmers, and farmers, in all parts of the country: in many places they will not allow a gentleman or farmer to discharge or engage a herd-servant or labourer, but such as is agreeable to these village law-makers. If there be any person engaged by the farmer of good character, and inclined to serve his master, they immediately serve him with a notice to quit. If the master does not allow him to go, then they damage the property of the master or himself, or the servant. In most cases of this kind the employer must give way, which is a dreadful state the country is reduced to.

My Lord Duke, I would observe to you, if those people were employed, they would not have time for this systematic injuring. The large landed-proprietor, in many parts of Ireland, has large tracts of hilly, unproductive land, and mountain; if they would plant in it young timber, it would be very productive to them, and it would give a vast number employ. All kind of timber in Ireland is very dear in many parts of this country. Ash is as dear nearly as mahogany. In fact, the peace and prosperity of the country depends on giving the poor employ, as much as possible, to prevent them from drinking spirits, giving the magistrates power to swear in the farmers as especial constables for scouring the country by night and searching for arms. A Drainage Bill for bogs and rivers, locating the poor on bogs and commons, and a modified system of poor-laws, &c.

My Lord Duke, please to let me know if this come to hand, for I am desirous of giving you every information concerning this country, and for the benefit of the empire at large, over which you preside. May it be for many years!

[Received his letter.]

The Duke of Clarence to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Bushey House, 4th February, 1830.

I return your Grace the proxy signed and sealed, which I request may be entered to the Lord Chancellor.

I am very glad the sentiments of my letter of yesterday are agreeable to your Grace, and I remain,

My Lord Duke, yours truly,

WILLIAM.

Mr. J. S. Langton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Union Hotel, Cockspur Street, London,
4th February, 1830.

Trusting that the importance of the subject will be deemed a sufficient apology, I presume to offer for your Grace's consideration the following proposal, the adoption of which, I submit with deference, might be a means of placing great resources at the immediate disposal of his Majesty's government, without producing any injury, if not carried beyond such limits as prudence may dictate, with a due regard to the future encouragement of commercial enterprise and assiduity. I beg to propose a voluntary property tax, by which individuals, to an extent limited according to their rank and station, should be enabled to insure certain landed property to their heirs for ever by the payment of several years' purchase to the public service. The Ordnance Survey offers great facilities for carrying such a project into execution; and it can hardly be doubted but that the same spirit which prompts mankind to sacrifice so much for the benefit of their immediate posterity, will induce numbers, by a comparatively small sacrifice, to protect their representatives from ruin to the remotest generations. The details of this plan, which has been for some years under my consideration, are not entirely without their difficulties; and, if your Grace should deem it worthy of being investigated, I shall be most happy to contribute any information which it may be in my power to afford.

Perhaps this communication will not be deemed the less interesting as coming from one who is not only the representative of a man to whom history ascribes the foundation of English liberty, but who has, in his own person, been acknowledged by Parliament (10th Geo. IV., cap. 135) to have rendered no unimportant service to his country; as a proof of which, I enclose your Grace a letter, written by one to whose judgment, on subjects similar to that to which it relates, all the practical men in Europe have been content to yield up their own. Requesting that your Grace will be kind enough to cause the within letter, which its writer's death has rendered doubly valuable, to be returned to me,

I have the honour to be,

your Grace's very obedient servant,

JOHN STEPHEN LANGTON.

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his letter and returns the enclosure.]

Mr. J. J. Bagot to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Castle Bagot, Rathcoole,
4th February, 1830.

MY LORD DUKE,

My presumption in addressing your Grace on matters so well understood by many, and so little by me, may perhaps be overlooked by you in consideration of the motives which must induce me to take this unusual step.

I proceed at once to matter which I have long considered in all its bearings, but of which I have never as yet heard mention made.

If it shall be practicable to enact even one penny in the pound sterling stamp duty on the transfer of government debentures, a revenue exceeding one million annually could be raised, but felt as a grievance by no one; and many millions could be raised at once by a stamp duty of 2s. per cent. upon all government debentures.

These supplies might possibly lead to the diminution of the malt tax, and the tax on wheel carriages. The repeal of the latter would give employment to a multitude of artisans; certainly such was the effect a few years ago in Ireland.

The unequal pressure of taxation is often stated to be the cause of the disorganisation of society.

Every transaction relating to landed property bears a heavy stamp duty, whereas the fundholder is exempt from almost all, and is constantly enabled to defeat his honest creditors by transfers of stock, and by the creation of trusts. All sums so vested might be a fertile source of public revenue, and willingly paid for the security afforded.

An anonymous communication is generally severely criticised, therefore, without further apology, I have the honour to subscribe myself, with very great respect, though unknown to your Grace,

My Lord Duke, your humble servant,

JAMES JOHN BAGOT.

[Received his letter.]

Mr. M. FitzGerald to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

3, Devonshire Terrace,
5th February, 1830.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

I am sure you are convinced of the sincerity of my wish to sustain your government. If any doubt could exist on that point, I have, since I last wrote, taken a step in reference to my own more immediate political friends, which in their eyes at least renders my sentiments on that head tolerably clear. I do not say this for boast, nor to make any merit of it, but to entitle me to speak to your Grace with the more freedom. You will have been informed of the critical and extraordinary state of the House of Commons last night. On that point, and on the prospects before us within a very few days, I am exceedingly anxious to have an opportunity of speaking to your Grace, if you could spare me a little time.

I can relieve you from any apprehension that my purpose relates to any personal object whatever.

Ever, my dear Lord,
your Grace's most faithful and obliged,

M. FITZGERALD.

P.S.—I am equally free from any view of obtaining from your Grace any opinion whatever on your part.

Mr. Thomas Wright to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

74, West Smithfield, 5th February, 1830.

I take leave to state to your Grace that I have lately visited the manufacturers in the neighbourhood of Birmingham, and think it my duty to lay before your Grace the wretched state English workmen are reduced to, without the smallest hope of their being better. I therefore send your Grace, with this letter, a sealed bag, containing samples of hardware, with the ruinous prices annexed.

I have been for some months past endeavouring to procure an interview with your Grace, or with some person who would faithfully relate to your Grace the real cause of the present distress, and the sure and certain remedy for the same, but am sorry to say that I have failed in every attempt.

There are many nostrums offered, I have no doubt, to your Grace, such as taking off the malt and beer duty, &c., but I am ready to prove to your Grace they are all humbug (please excuse this rough word, which is so well understood at the present day), for I am certain my own labourers would not procure one drop of beer more than they do now, were your Grace to take off those duties, and all others of the like kind, which now appear to press heavily upon the lower orders of society.

If your Grace cannot conveniently spare time to give me an interview, perhaps your Grace would oblige me by naming some clear-headed friend who can fully comprehend, and who will faithfully communicate to your Grace what I can prove would relieve the country from its present distress; and it will be a pleasure to me to wait upon any gentleman for that purpose.

To convince your Grace that I am not the smallest of the class in the society I move, my last contract with the government for manufactured goods was for scores of millions in number, and in weight 375 tons.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

your most obedient humble servant,

THOS. WRIGHT.

[ENCLOSURE.]

THE CONTENTS OF THE BAG.

No. 1. Is a 6-inch ward round mortise-lock, with key, brass striking-plate, spindle, &c., at 1s. 9d. each.

No. 2. A $3\frac{1}{2}$ -inch bright inside box-lock, and key, at 1s. $7\frac{1}{2}d.$ per dozen, a fraction over $1\frac{1}{2}d.$ each.

No. 3. A curry-comb, 1s. $0\frac{1}{2}d.$ per dozen, a fraction over $1d.$ each.

No. 4. A rat-trap, $4\frac{1}{2}d.$ each.

No. 5. A 4-inch bright bolt with staple, complete, $1d.$ each.

No. 6. One $2\frac{1}{2}$ -inch brass drop padlock with thick pin, $3\frac{1}{2}d.$ each.

No. 7. One key for an 8-inch lock, $2\frac{3}{4}d.$ each.

No. 8. An iron heel-tip, $2\frac{1}{2}d.$ per dozen; this article reduced to the men. From $10d.$ to $2d.$ per gross for turning.

No. 9. A japanned thumb latch, with latch, handle, catch, and keep, 1s. $4d.$ per dozen, or a fraction over $1\frac{1}{4}d.$ each.

No. 10. An iron rim closet lock, $4d.$ each.

P.S.—May it please your Grace to ask the county members for Stafford concerning these things? and your Grace will find them grossly ignorant as to these matters.

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his letter. The Duke is quite convinced that it would be a waste of his time and the Duke's if he were to appoint a time to receive his visit and discuss plans, which must be stated in writing to be understood. The Duke begs, therefore, that he will state in writing what he wishes to communicate.]

[1577.]

To the King.

London, 7th February, 1830.

Your Majesty will have been informed of the course which the discussions in the House of Commons have taken upon the speech of the Lords Commissioners and the address. There is no doubt that many persons have purposely absented themselves, and that the views of all the parties opposed to the government are quite inconsistent with the public interests and safety.

Your Majesty's servants are doing everything in their power to collect their friends. But it is essentially necessary that we should have all the support which the government has ever had, and your Majesty's countenance.

I am concerned to have to inform your Majesty that General —, who fills an office in your Majesty's household, voted against the address to your Majesty in answer to the speech of the Lords Commissioners on Thursday. Others of your Majesty's household in both Houses were absent.

All of which is humbly submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

Sir T. B. Lethbridge to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

17, Portland Place, 7th February, 1830.

I came to town to attend Parliament, and have been in my place in the House both days, and supported my friend Mr. Peel; but the weather has so disagreed with me I cannot now leave my room, or I should have endeavoured to have seen you, to have stated what I know of the situation of the country, although I have no reason to doubt your information is general and pretty accurate. I can sincerely assure you the distress is so great among the agriculturists, and the discontent consequent thereupon so loud, that some little concession on the part of the government is more than ever required; and I do earnestly press it upon you to give way a little to this feeling, even if no relief can be afforded; and the earlier some manifestation of the sort can be made, the more easily will the spreading alarm and discontent be allayed. If you were to say public salaries should be lowered 10 per cent. throughout all the departments; that some of the present taxes should be reduced on malt and beer; house and window, for example; and the deficiency, if any, made up by a tax on absentees, I know this would give a turn to public feeling, the effect of which can hardly be imagined; and on the subject of the currency—if you were to say you approved of the formation of General Joint Stock Banking Companies in the country on the plan of the Scotch banks, I know it would produce much satisfaction among those who think the currency is too contracted, and which I firmly believe is the main cause of all our misery. I am about myself, in conjunction with a few other M.P.'s, to have a meeting on the subject of forming a General Provincial Joint Stock Bank, with a central bank in this metropolis, and I hope in a few days to be able to mention more fully the particulars to your Grace. It is well known what benefits these banks on this enlarged principle have conferred, and how much they tend to an enlargement of the currency.

I take the liberty of enclosing a letter addressed to me by Mr. Joplin, of the Stock Exchange, on the subject, and earnestly entreating you to ascribe this intrusion on your time to those motives of regard and attachment which will ever animate me towards you,

I am, my dear Lord Duke,

your faithful and obliged servant,

T. BUCKLER LETHBRIDGE.

To the King.

[1578.]

London, 8th February, 1830.

I cannot avoid laying before your Majesty my humble acknowledgments for the support which your Majesty has been most graciously pleased to manifest your intention of giving to your servants, by the orders which you have given to the Marquess of Winchester.

Nothing can tend so effectually to get the better of the

difficulties of the times, and your Majesty may rely upon the efforts of your servants to promote your Majesty's service, and everything which can tend to your Majesty's honour, as well as to your ease and comfort.

Which is humbly submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

Sir R. Gordon to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Constantinople, 7th February, 1830.

I take the liberty to send you a paper which has been communicated to me by a British officer of artillery, Captain Chesney, giving all the information which he has been enabled to collect during a three months' tour, upon the events of the last campaign in Turkey.

He gives also an account of the present state of the fortresses, and the capabilities of the Turks in the event of another war, which is replete with interest.

I have been induced to send this paper to your Grace, not only on the score of its merits, but because Captain Chesney is most ambitious that his name should be favourably known by you.

May I be allowed to take this opportunity of thanking you for the honour which has recently been conferred upon me by his Majesty? I recognise in it a mark of your protection, and I trust I need not say that I shall be studious to prove myself deserving of it.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

your very obedient and faithful servant,

R. GORDON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Captain F. R. Chesney to Sir R. Gordon.

SIR,

Constantinople, 5th February, 1830.

It will afford me much satisfaction if I can succeed in complying with the wishes expressed by your Excellency, to make such observations as have occurred to me during three months employed in visiting the seat of the late war, a journey undertaken for professional improvement, and which threw me a good deal with the Turks and Russians, who had been actually opposed to each other at the different places I was visiting, as well as those more indirectly concerned, viz. the Greek and Bulgarian population.

What had taken place, with the means on each side, was my first object, leading naturally to the consideration of what might have been done had the Turks been a little more prepared for the contest; or, were they to become so, in case of a future one. I will therefore endeavour briefly to sketch both one and the other.

The Principalities are nearly a dead level, and not defensible by a Turkish army; but what the Turks call Roumelia possesses two natural lines of

defence—the Danube and the Balkan—nearly parallel to each other, and both examined with much attention; the latter extends from the Adriatic to the Black Sea; its highest point (the pass of Gabrova) exceeds 5000 feet, varying as it runs eastward between this elevation and that of 3000, covered with oaks and beech-trees of large size. The breadth of the main range (exclusive of the lower hills on each side) is, where greatest, with the windings of the valleys, about twenty-one miles, and where least about fifteen, thus constituting a most formidable barrier, and when adequately defended it is scarcely to be forced, although by no means so strong as to permit any of the ordinary rules of defence to be neglected. The Balkan is not so strong as the passes in Spain or Italy and Switzerland, being about equal to the Hartz Mountains in Saxony, and some of the passes leading to the Caledonian Canal.

There are five roads crossing it at different points, all more or less practicable for Turkish waggons and heavy artillery. The most difficult is that from Rachova, direct to Sophia; the next so is the one leading from Turnova (capital of Bulgaria) by Gabrova and Shipka, over which the guns from Schumla (which is dismantled) were passing without particular difficulty, drawn by six bullocks each.

The easiest pass is by Aidos, where some pioneers speedily rendered it fit for the guns and material of the Russian army to proceed without delay.

The roads wind through the valleys of the Balkan, and along the hills when ascending (as at Gabrova for four hours); there is little rock, nor are the sides of the mountains unusually steep, being generally practicable for infantry to ascend and turn the flanks, unless the latter be secured for some distance on each side.

Schumla is at the extremity of the lower range, which projects northward about six leagues in advance of the grand one, and by this position it covers three of the roads or passes, viz. the one westward by Turnova and Gabrova, that south-westward by Karnabat and Yamboli, and the third by Kiupriguen and Aidos, the last less perfectly than the other two, yet with ordinary care it may be considered safe.

Schumla, now called by the Turks Gazé or Triumphant, may be deemed the advanced post of the Balkan, and the connecting link of the Danube as a pivot for operations and support to that line.

Its position is that of a deep mountain bay opening to the north-east, where it is shut in by a range of hills of only 800 feet high, whilst the rest of the contour has mountains of nearly 3000, and difficult of access both from the side of the town and the opposite.

Schumla closely resembles the shape of a horseshoe, with the opening secured by intrenchments from one side to the other of the mountains, which latter have at all times constituted its main defence. Their sides lie at an angle of 35° or 40° , and are accessible all over to infantry, or even Turkish cavalry; therefore the defence must have rested greatly on the strength of the garrison, for had the latter been weak and the enemy enterprising, there seems no unreasonable impediment in ascending the mountain by one of the three carriage roads crossing it; or of gaining the heights on other points of a circumference of ten miles, and, once on the top, the town lies open beneath, without any intrenchment whatever.

But when a moveable army takes post at Schumla as a centre of operations, no place can well be more important, opening, as it does, alike on Varna, the mouths of the Danube, Silistria, and Ruzschuck, all within three days' march, and therefore it ought not to be besieged with impunity; the Turks, however, lost all the advantages of this post by being unprepared to defend their first line, the Danube.

This river runs about two miles per hour. It is narrow (300 to 500 yards) from Widdin to Nicopoli, where it widens to about three miles, and so continues, until below Silistria it forms a delta, now in military possession of the Russians for purposes of quarantine.

The Danube was well protected by fortresses. The most western is Ada Kalé, an Austrian work, provided with bomb-proofs for 2000 men. This work is on an island, and is a formidable defence against this part of Wallachia.

The next work descending the stream is Widdin, on the right bank, with seven points towards the land and a line *en crémaillère* towards the water; it seems to have been planned by an Austrian engineer. It has a deep, wide ditch (wet or dry), a revetment of 40 feet, planks of the bastions long, faces short, ravelins imperfectly covering the shoulders of the bastions, and armed with guns each side. There is a covert-way and glacis, also an ancient castle serving as a respectable citadel. The arsenal is well provided, and the place altogether very formidable.

The suburbs are defended by lines running from the Danube on one side to the other, consisting of a narrow, deep ditch, flanked by small, round bastions here and there, with a parapet of hurdles retaining the earth; almost the invariable practice of Turkish works, taken, as they say, from the Poles. These lines would resist a *coup de main*.

Ten leagues below Widdin is the small town of Lour, defended by similar lines with the addition of loopholes, through baskets placed on the parapet, touching each other almost. This work was thrown up during the war to defend the river at this place.

For the same object two small forts were erected at Rachova, above the town (open), but being commanded decidedly the Pacha abandoned the place on the approach of the Russians, who crossed the river and took it from the inhabitants after a very serious loss, on which account they carried away the women and children (800) prisoners to Russia.

Along the Danube, nearly at equal distances dividing the space, are the fortresses of Nicopoli, Systof, Ruzschuck, Silistria, and Ibrailon, with Varna in rear, and the lesser places of Isaacga, Tulcha, Machzin, and Hirsova, all on the right bank save Ibrailon, nearly of equal size, and of a construction precisely similar, with little variation as to strength.

The Turks have not advanced much in fortification since they invented bastions. These they now make small and flat, connected by exceedingly long curtains, which imperfectly flank the faces of the adjoining bastions instead of the flanks doing so, as in other systems. There is a revetment of 18 feet high, with an earthen parapet, the inside of which is supported by a row of strong palisades, and the outside (in a line with the revetment) by hurdles of 7 feet, making the whole height about 25. The ditch is wide and shallow, the counterscarp low, and no ravelins, covert-way, or glacis, consequently, the gates of the town are a good deal exposed, and the whole of the parapet and part of the revetment could be seen at some distance, both at Varna and Silistria.

Opposite Widdin is Khalafat, as a sort of *tête de pont* in stone, and taken by the Russians.

Opposite Nicopoli was Eski Kalé and Yeni Kalé, two small forts carried by the Russians, after serious loss, having surprised the latter, owing to a deserter who gave them the intelligence leading to its capture by storm.

Nearly opposite to Ruzschuck, at four miles' distance, is Guergova, composed of three separate works. The first, an ancient castle on an island, sixty yards from the left bank, and forming an harbour with the second—a

pentagonal stone work rather strong. Outside of this fort is the town which the Pacha fortified two years ago by works precisely similar to those of Silistria, Varna, &c., running from the Danube to the Danube. In this place Hamet Pacha, with about 4000 men, resisted the Russians during the war; not only defending the place but (as they described his sorties) giving them no rest.

About two years before hostilities commenced, Colonels Berg, Ruger, and some other officers, were sent to Constantinople, and, returning through different passes of the Balkan, they made military notes, constructed a map, and submitted a plan of campaign.

General Geisman also proposed one in 1826, in substance, to carry Schumla by a *coup de main*; or, failing in that, to mask it and cross the Balkan, sending by sea a corps under the General, to land at Domon Deré, near the capital, to cut off its supply of water, so as to cause its surrender.

Other plans were submitted at this period by those who were aware that Turkey was to be attacked, all more or less founded on those of Baron Valentine, published twelve years ago; but the one adopted approached that of Colonels Berg and Ruger, though less bold, making the fall of Schumla, Silistria, Varna, and Ruzschuck a necessary base for the future year's operations.

In pursuance of this plan the Russian army crossed the Pruth on the 8th of May, composed of two *corps d'armée* and part of a third, nearly 160,000 men, and entering the provinces without provisions, they put the resources of the Principalities under contribution, making the peasants bring what they possessed to certain places without receiving payment. The provisions were shortly consumed, and it became necessary to draw supplies from the Pruth by means of forced labour. The peasants were soon reduced to want, and died on the road, as did their cattle, owing to a murrain, which covered the road with carcasses, speedily followed by disease and plague—the latter first manifested at Bucharest.

The Turks had scarcely time to garrison imperfectly some of the places on the Danube, and were only beginning to assemble troops at Schumla, when Wallachia was already occupied by their enemy. General Kleish (as the advance of Geisman) entered Bucharest 12th of May, and on the 16th operations commenced against Ibrailon under the Grand Duke Michael, followed by the Emperor. The 17th of June the Russians stormed, and were repulsed with heavy loss; but during a suspension of arms to bury the dead, the place capitulated, as was supposed, by means of gold: at least, so it was stated by the Pacha of Guergova, when the Russians endeavoured to bribe him to surrender that place.

Machzin, Isaacza, and Hersova speedily surrendered with 2700 men in all; but Tulcha, opposite Ismael, held out, and retarded the Russian army from crossing for a time, although the Turks had nothing prepared but sixteen gun-boats, manned by Zaponojay (originally from the Dnieper), who, being tampered with, their chief, Gladhay, and some of his people, joined the Emperor and assisted the troops to cross instead of obstructing them.

In May the Turks assembled at Schumla. The—

17th Cassaje Nemen arrived with 800 Artillery.

			Cavalry.	Infantry.
22nd Osman Pacha	2,000			
27th Hussein Pacha	8,000			8,000
27th Halit Pacha	..			11,000
			Dellis.	
2nd June Hemin Pacha ..	3,000			
3rd Tzaad Pacha	..			8,000
Albanians	..			4,000
Total	13,000			31,800

The energetic Hussein Pacha commenced strengthening the place, employing 4000 Turks and 4000 Christians to throw up a chain of bastioned field-works in advance of the old line, which he accomplished in forty days. The intrenchments take the shape of a grand front of a fortification, with its flanks resting on the crests of the mountains, ending in a fort. There are eighteen bastions running across the valley ($2\frac{1}{2}$ miles wide); they are mined; and in advance there is a double chain of detached redoubts at 300 and 500 yards' distance from the main line. These works are enclosed in the rear, and occupy some ground which would be advantageous to the enemy. The whole of the intrenchments do the greatest credit to the talents and exertions of Hussein Pacha.

The Russian army, assisted by the only people the Turks had employed for its defence, reached the right bank without difficulty, and moved simultaneously against Varna, Silistria, and Schumla: 12,000 men moved towards the first, and 40,000 under General Roth to the second; whilst Count Wittgenstein, with 24,000, arrived at the third, just as the works were finished. Besides these three operations, two corps were sent, the one towards Widdin, and the other to Guergova, to contain those places.

Count Wittgenstein was met, for the first time, by the Turks three leagues from Schumla, when he repulsed them, with the loss of 2000 men, and drove them into the fortress, so panic-struck that they abandoned the redoubts outside, and he might have entered and carried the place.

The Russians commenced throwing up works immediately, and on the 22nd of July the Emperor Nicholas arrived with 18,000 men; on the 27th he left for Varna with 8000 cavalry, and on the 27th of August 10,000 were detached to Varna, which were replaced by a greater number from before Silistria after the siege had fairly begun. The force near Schumla thus remained about 40,000, and were engaged in a succession of serious affairs during their stay, attended with serious loss to both, and sometimes to the advantage of one, and sometimes to the other. The Turkish cavalry went out at night and seldom returned without bringing some prisoners. The Russian redoubts were also attacked more than once, and one carried on the heights of Estranga, the garrison put to the sword, and the guns moved into Schumla by hand in face of the Russian army.

Once the Russians attacked the western heights and carried one of the two forts, but the second was maintained until reinforcements arrived and drove the Russians down the hill. So warm were these frequent affairs for some distance around Schumla that the Russians threw up a chain of redoubts to secure their communications with Varna, Silistria, Pravodi, &c.

At Silistria the Russians were not more fortunate. They appeared before that place on the 7th of July, and had a contest with the garrison of several hours before they got possession of the heights. The besieged repeated these sorties, and maintained counter-approaches throughout the siege. At the end of October the force from before Schumla arrived, and after a bombardment of two days without effect the siege was raised. The Turks were reduced from 12,000 to 9000, the loss of the Russians being rated at 8000 or 10,000 men.

Of the three sieges, Varna only was successful. The operations commenced about the 15th of July on the north-west side, where some inequalities afforded cover, but on the west some rising ground would have enabled a breach to be formed in the course of a few days had this been the object instead of mining. Some formidable sorties were made from the place in the first period of the siege, and counter-approaches maintained nearly till the last, but the ill-directed efforts to relieve the place failed, after much bloodshed.

Two mines were sprung with some success, and this gave Yussuf Pacha an opportunity of going on board to treat for the surrender of the place, and, as the Captain Pacha would not agree to give it up, he passed into the Russian camp with part of his garrison; some of the rest held out in the old castle, where the Captain Pacha made some terms, and on the 11th of October the Russians took possession of the place and 6000 prisoners, after nearly three months before this miserable place and a heavy loss.

In little Wallachia there was a more brilliant affair against the Pacha of Widdin. General Geisman (who had regular accounts twice a week from Greeks in that fortress) was quite aware that the Pacha was coming to attack him with about 13,000 men; they met at Bailisk on the 27th of September, when the contest between the cavalry of the Pacha and the Russian infantry in square, lasted most of the day without any decided result. At this moment Count Geisman determined on the bold step of attacking the enemy with his 5000 men, lest they might be sacrificed had he waited till next day to be attacked. At sunset the Russian General ordered the artillery to redouble its fire, as if covering his retreat, and the Turks, thinking it real, had commenced preparing their coffee and supper (without any advance posts), when the Russians advanced in three columns to the attack after nightfall. The surprise was complete, and increased by some hay taking fire in the midst of the camp, as well as the Pacha's tent, the Turks had not time to form, with the exception of the regular troops, who stood for a time, and then fled towards Widdin, leaving behind seven guns; the other fifteen were carried to Khalafat, and thence to Widdin, abandoning the former place to the Russians. Four hundred and ten Albanians were made prisoners, and 300 killed on the field.

The Russian army retreated and crossed the Danube in a dispirited state, having suffered severely at Schumla, Silistria, and Varna, the only object gained—and that at much expense of life, if not by treachery—the cavalry was dismounted, 30,000 horses having perished in 1828, and thousands of men by plague and effects of climate; 10,000 men were left as a garrison for Varna, with a corps of observation towards Pravodi, until the works could be put in a state of defence. Matchin, Hersova, Tulcha, and Ibrailon were also repaired during the winter, and every possible exertion made for the ensuing campaign, especially by bringing up two fresh *corps d'armée*.

The Turks remained almost inactive during the winter, and, instead of recruiting their ranks, they permitted the greater portion of the soldiers to return home, and the garrison of Silistria especially, quitted the place, all but 2000 regular troops.

On the 8th of March Count Diebitch arrived at Yassi to take the command, and began to arrange the plan of operations with Colonel Berg and Lepanto, a Spaniard. Particular attention was given to the means of transport by sea, and 120 vessels were hired for this purpose. During the month, three vessels of the line and thirteen transports landed a force to take possession of Missivai, and about the same period Sizopoli was taken by the Russians, placed in a state of defence, and maintained, although Hussein Pacha made some exertions to dispossess them.

The Turkish force seems to have been rather less in the spring of 1829 than it had been in the autumn of the preceding year, and the garrison of Silistria was changed, and replaced in the spring by 8000 Albanians, making, with the regular troops, 10,000 instead of 12,000.

The first affair in the spring was at Koslugee, in April, at four leagues from Schumla; after two hours' fighting the Russians retreated, having lost 400 killed and 200 wounded. On this occasion two of the new regi-

ments distinguished themselves by charging the Russians, who retired on Pravodi.

Early in May the Russian army commenced operations with parts of five *corps d'armée*, the whole about 150,000 men, including those already at Varna and in Wallachia. Upwards of 45,000 crossed at the islands near Silistria, and moved to the attack of that place. The Pacha met them on the heights, near the town, with the greater part of his garrison, and after a sharp action, which lasted six hours, the Turks retreated into the garrison, leaving the Russians masters of the trenches and batteries of the preceding year, which the Pacha had most unaccountably neglected to destroy, consequently the siege was renewed precisely where it had left off. The batteries were instantly animated, and a fire opened on the fortress in the course of an hour's time. The Pacha made another sortie the following day, and two grand ones subsequently, usually about 6000 men, and so well planned, that the Turks retired under their guns with little loss, whilst the Russians suffered severely. The guns were not, however, spiked, when the Turks gained them for the moment.

The third corps was detached to cover the siege of Silistria towards the Valley of Koslugee, at the entrance of which the Grand Vizier was encamped. On the 17th of May he marched to attack the Russians simultaneously on three points, viz. Eski Amandlar, Dovna, and Koslugee, all in his part. He moved himself against the first when he attacked General Roth in a redoubt, and was repulsed. General Roth then moved out to intercept the Grand Vizier, who, seeing this, made a furious attack on the two battalions formed in squares, and supported by eight guns. The Russians remained firm, and repulsed nine successive charges, but in the tenth the two battalions were broken—one entirely cut to pieces, and the other nearly so—being saved by two other battalions coming to their support at the moment. The Russians lost 1000 men, and four pieces of artillery.

The troops detached towards Dovna succeeded in preventing any troops moving from thence to the support of the others. The force sent to Koslugee had a more serious affair, driving the Russians from that place with loss.

After Dovna, &c., the Grand Vizier made a movement towards Pravodi, on which he could make no impression with his cavalry, and he retired to Schumla with the four guns just taken and some prisoners.

Become aware of the importance of Pravodi, and his error in not recovering it during the winter, he determined, if possible, to regain it now, and for this purpose he marched from Schumla with all his garrison, except four battalions left with Ibrahim Pacha.

The Grand Vizier took post on the heights, and commenced the siege of Pravodi, attacking the forts with his cavalry without any serious impression. There were in the garrison nearly 10,000 men, and the Grand Vizier had 35,000, according to the belief of those who were in that place, of which the Grand Vizier peaceably continued the siege in security, whilst Count Diebitch planned and executed, with infinite skill and success, his manœuvres to cut him off.

Pravodi lies in a deep, narrow valley, running east and west, and forms the base of a triangle, of which one side is the valley of Koslugee, and the other that of Mackoffsky; the apex of this triangle is at Madara, beyond Kouliffsky, and these valleys (particularly Pravodi and Mackoffsky) are enclosed by mountains on both sides of 3000 feet high. Count Diebitch, quite aware of the position of the Grand Vizier, commenced a march from Silistria to cut him off from Schumla, by the only road leading thither from Pravodi, and the corps of Rudiger and Roth were desired to anticipate this

movement by enclosing the Turks in the defiles of Pravodi (with the garrison of that place closing them in rear) until the main army could arrive. Whilst these plans were in progress, Ibrahim Pacha summoned the Grand Vizier to his relief, who accordingly moved in that direction. Believing that only the corps of Rudiger and Roth were in his front, he proposed to fall upon them and moved parallel to both, separated only by the mountain chain, along which some of his troops moved to keep them in sight.

Very early, on the 11th of June, the Grand Vizier arrived at Mackoffsky, where he found the Turkish cavalry posted with six guns, and supported by infantry in the rear. Cassaje Nemen immediately planned an attack of cavalry, masking five guns, until the moment of attack, which proved quite successful. The cavalry being routed—400 killed and five guns taken—the rest of the Russians were covered by the infantry, which took up a post on one side, so that the Turkish army passed onwards, until it crossed the mountain and descended into the defiles of Kouliffsky, formed by a succession of wooded hills, separated by deep ravines. The valley is about 1600 yards long, and in breadth varying from 200 to 600 feet. The narrowest part was that occupied by the Turks, who had very little room either for their artillery or infantry. At the Russian extremity the hills are rather lower, with a plateau close to the village of Kouliffsky, on which five battalions were posted in checkered squares, supported by ten pieces of artillery, with orders to maintain their ground at all risks until the other troops could arrive. Beneath and beyond the Russian plateau is the valley of Koslugee, with the village of Madara; on the other side of which there is a succession of gentle hills crossing the Schumla road in the shape of a crescent, and inclosing the valley of Pravodi. The Grand Vizier, on seeing the Russian detachment, placed his artillery on one of the hills below the mountain, and instantly advanced to the attack, notwithstanding the extreme difficulty of this broken ground.

At 8 o'clock A.M. cavalry and infantry mixed advanced over the broken ground, and attacked the Russians with such impetuosity that two, if not three, squares were broken, and cut to pieces in their ranks as they stood, to the amount of 1600, with six guns. The Turks had nearly cleared the plateau, and the remainder of their opponents were giving way, when a reinforcement arrived most opportunely; the Turks were repulsed, and their attack returned, but repulsed. During these two affairs the Grand Russian army continued to arrive, and to form on the hills in succession, for which they had sufficient room. Towards noon the Turkish infantry made a grand attack, advancing by the valley on the left, beyond the plateau, thus very nearly opening the passage to Schumla. The Russians with difficulty supported this attack, which they also returned; the Turks repelled it, and a cannonade commenced on both sides, greatly to the disadvantage of the Turks, who were closed within a narrow space without room to deploy more than half their troops and about twenty pieces of artillery; but they remained firm, maintaining the contest without losing ground up to 4 o'clock, when four caissons blew up, killed some, and the rest took flight towards Mackoffsky, leaving behind them forty-eight Turkish guns, five Russian, and all the material. At the village of Mackoffsky the fugitives were met by the garrison of Pravodi, on which they turned to the right, and crossed the wooded mountains towards the Kampshich, in order to regain Schumla. The Russians had rather the superiority in numbers, being nearly 40,000 men, with 100 pieces of artillery, and a more advantageous position.

At the commencement of the battle the Grand Vizier sent orders to Schumla for the garrison to come out and make a diversion in his favour by attacking the rear of the Russians, for which purpose they came out, but did not follow

it up; and, on meeting a slight check, they returned to Schumla, entering the lines, and abandoning the redoubts entirely; therefore, if Count Diebitsch had pursued them he would easily have carried the important post of Schumla, either on the evening of the 11th or morning of the 12th, when the Russian army was within five miles of the place, and the double object accomplished of cutting it off from thence and defeating it. But Count Diebitsch did not put this finishing stroke to his brilliant march and well-combined manœuvres, and merely detached a force to the Kampchich to intercept the Grand Vizier, who cut his way through, and reached Schumla by a circuitous road on the morning of the 13th, followed by the infantry in small detachments, as they could make their way through the woods, during the next ten days, at the expiration of which time there were 30,000 men assembled under the Grand Vizier, who had lost about 3000 men in the battle, and the Russian loss was little, if anything, less.

After the battle Count Diebitsch blockaded Schumla, waiting the result of the siege of Silistria, which advanced slowly, the besieged opposing every step, and maintaining their counter-approaches until a fourth parallel was established, and the Russians descended by galleries into the ditch, where they remained eighteen days in an old, unflanked cunette, mining the scarp, exposed to grenades thrown down upon them, and a heavy loss each day. Five mines were prepared by the Russians, two of which made practicable breaches and the third one partly so. The Turks had countermined and also constructed an intrenchment all along the side attacked, with thirteen guns mounted on it; but a false attack having caused them to spring their mine prematurely (by which they lost 200 or 300 men), the Pacha was induced to capitulate, chiefly for want of powder to stand an assault, all that was wanting to complete the most brilliant defence. The Russians entered the place on the 29th of July, after a heavy loss, during the two sieges—that of the garrison exceeded 3000 men.

Count Diebitsch was to have besieged Ruzschuk, and maintain the line of the Danube until the following spring; but the battle of Kouliffsky altered his purpose, and, being perfectly aware how greatly the Turks were dispirited by its loss, as well as the state of dissatisfaction existing at Constantinople, on account of the janissaries and other reforms, he determined on the bold and daring step of passing the Balkan, in preference to the alternative of retreating as a defeated army to the Danube once more. His plans being formed, and the troops arrived from Silistria, he blockaded Schumla so closely, that the Grand Vizier recalled his detachments from the passes, in expectation of an immediate attack. In order to deceive him still more, Count Diebitsch retreated on Yeni Bazaar, six leagues on the road to Silistria, where he turned suddenly towards Dovna and Kiupriguen, in order to pass the Balkan; each soldier being provided with four days' provisions, with ten more carried in the waggons attached to each regiment: ten thousand men were left under General Krassansky to watch Schumla, with orders to assault the place in case of the Grand Vizier's pursuing the Russians. The moment the Vizier learnt where Diebitsch was gone, he detached 10,000 men to intercept him at the pass; but Kiupriguen (furnished with only 120 men) had offered no real resistance, and the Russians were already through, and on their way to Selimnia, when the detachment arrived. The Russians took Selimnia with little resistance, moving from thence to Aidos, and eventually to Adrianople, which they entered with 3000 men, followed by 6000 next day, quietly holding the ancient capital instead of retreating on Bourgas, as was fixed in case of any disaster. The Turks were quite ignorant that only 40,000 had passed the Balkan, and that of these 10,000 were in the hospital in the course of the first ten days: had

they been aware of the real force of the enemy, and simply showed front from place to place, the army must have retreated towards the sea for provisions, if not altogether. Peace followed the entrance into Adrianople; both parties being really unfit for any serious operation, with this simple difference, that the state of the Turks, and the alarm at the capital lest there should be a popular movement to replace the janissaries, in case the Sultan persevered in the war unwisely under existing circumstances.

Immediately after the signature of the peace, the Pacha of Scodra, who had been very dilatory in taking the field (and who would not do anything when there), marched to Philippopoli with 25,000 men, declaring that he would renew the war. This movement gave considerable uneasiness to the Russians in their then weak state at Adrianople, where they were anxiously on the alert, and two additional corps, of 15,000 men each, were hurried from Wallachia; the one under Geisman crossed at Rachova, and, led by a Greek, he forced and turned the pass of Auratza (feebly defended by the Scodra's wild followers), marching to Sophia, whilst Kisselez marched towards Gabrova, where he halted, on finding that peace had not been interrupted.

Had the Pacha of Scodra been really sincere, he could have turned the scale at any time, even after the Balkan was crossed, by forming a junction with the Grand Vizier, near Yamboli or Silimnia; the latter would then have had between 50,000 and 60,000 men to follow the rear of the Russians, and still leaving some troops in Schumla. Such, however, was not the object of the Pacha, and his conduct in remaining idle near Widdin during the winter of '28 and spring of '29, is supposed to have been caused by the desire to re-establish the janissaries the first opportunity, and that his march towards Adrianople (or, as he gave out, Constantinople), had really that object in view. Nor was he the only individual who hoped that the exigencies of the Sultan during the contest would cause the old system to be restored.

Turkey was a divided country when Russia attacked her in 1828, and exhausted besides by six years' contest in Greece, regular troops had been organised never exceeding 35,000, chiefly boys, who had been chosen as likely to come into the new plans better than grown men, which would have been realised if Russia had given more time to complete their organisation. Half-drilled and half-grown! the surprise is that they did so much during the campaigns, and that Turkey herself could resist at a moment that one army (the janissaries) had been destroyed without time to replace it by another; added to which, she had lost the command of the Black Sea, with the additional evil of a general indisposition to join the new troops in the field, for which reason the levy *en masse* failed greatly, compared with the times of the janissaries, who would, if existing, have forced the people to take arms, instead of which the remains of them were looking for a favourable moment to restore themselves to power, encouraged, at least indirectly, by the Russians, through the Greeks, who served them as spies, a system still unknown to the Turks.

Some pains taken to ascertain the number of the Turks have produced the firm belief that exclusive of the Pacha of Scodra, there never were 100,000 irregulars in the field, or 40,000 regulars. The Bosnians (amongst their bravest men) only advanced to their own frontiers; and of the Servians, some of the Mussulmans alone took up arms, and that, like the Albanians, late in the year 1828. That the force in the field appeared much greater to every one is not surprising, because the Pachas rate their contingents at what they are commanded to bring, and not the actual numbers moving, from which a large deduction must be made for the Bulgarian or other attendants in the shape of servants, always following a Turkish army.

The greatest defect of this mass is its disjointed nature. As an army,

the irregulars have no unity of action. The people follow, and hold to their own Pacha, who acts for himself on some separate object which he may think good, whilst his men are too apt to believe that the fate of a battle depends on his own individual exertions. When called upon to serve, the Turk (who finds his own arms, horse, and accoutrements) receives a small sum, between ten and fifteen piastres, on setting out, after which he is supported by the towns, country, or villages, where he may happen to serve, for which reason the Turks must always be liable to disperse after a defeat; and their not having done so to a greater extent during the late campaigns proves at once that those who served were hearty in the cause, and that they met few serious checks. Their aggregate number seems to have varied very little, being, however, rather less in '29 than '28.

The constant sickness in the Russian army materially befriended the Turks, who have remained throughout the war comparatively free.

The Russian soldier has no blanket or flannel to resist the changes of temperature; and his portions of meat and bread are greatly diminished before they pass through the contracts of the officers of the regiment; these circumstances, added to general want of cleanliness, and the absence of real care when he is sick, have caused the Russian army to be followed by putrid fevers and the plague, attended by dreadful mortality.

According to the statement of the medical chief at Bucharest (in December), 18,000 people had died of the plague in that place, of whom 12,000 were Russians. At Varna the officers admitted that 10,000 had perished in the same way. At Silistria the mortality was scarcely known; and there were scarcely any troops for the garrison duty in January, the place being almost deserted.

In Pravodi, five men survived of two battalions, and the town was burnt to the ground in consequence. Three thousand houses, one of which remains occupied by a single company.

At Craiova, the corps of Geisman suffered severely (though he did not mention the exact number).

In the hospital of Adrianople, 6000 sick were reduced to 1100 in the space of two and a-half months; nor has the disease ceased as yet, at Varna, Bourgas, Silistria or Yassi; and has, it appears, also been carried into Bessarabia by the two portions of the army which have lately marched thither from the Principalities. The actual force remaining under arms is about 40,000, between 20,000 and 22,000 of which are on the south side of the Danube and Balkan, greatly disorganised, as may readily be conceived after such heavy losses, their moral force being less than their physical at this moment. The total loss of the Russians in the two campaigns has been admitted to exceed 160,000 men and 50,000 horses—30,000 in 1828, and 20,000 in 1829.

In this reduced state, the Turks might still succeed in driving them out of the country, if they do not quit it at the promised period; notwithstanding the immense advantages they possess in holding Varna (carefully fortified), Silistria, Bourgas, and the eastern passes of the Balkan, with the posts lately fortified at Selimnia, Casan, Aidos, &c., where some of the Greek population are in arms, and a corps of 500 men in the pay of Russia at Selimnia. In this part of Turkey, the Russians are stronger than they would be elsewhere, having been joined by the inhabitants, some of whom (under the name of Newcassowzy) came from Russia in the time of Catherine, and settled near Silistria, Selimnia, and other places in the latter quarter, still speaking the Tartar language. Some were gained by the Russians, others were put to death for being faithful to the Sultan; but the arming at Selimnia

(where the people are mixed, of Greeks and Newcassowzy), according to the relation of a priest from that place, was caused by revenge! The Turks, in their mistaken ideas of defence, destroyed a line of villages at the south foot of the Balkan, and in return the Greeks took up arms, when the Russians appeared across the Balkan, and committed murders on women and children of the Turks; also burning their houses, which step has so committed them, that they will quit the country with the Russians in great numbers, unless the means pursued by the Sultan and his general amnesty should succeed in placing them in a feeling of security with the Turks as to the future.

In other parts of European Turkey there has been no disposition to join the Russians, or take up arms, save in one instance, the village of Aribajalar, near Silistria, where the Turks burnt the Bulgarian houses, supposing they were gone to join the Russians, which was not the case; but on the appearance of the Russians afterwards, they destroyed the houses of the Turks, and sixty of them took arms.

Elsewhere there has been no disposition amongst the Bulgarians to join the Russians, nor would they do so in case of a future war. The Greeks are more disposed that way, yet it will require much encouragement, with every chance of success, before they venture on more than underhand assistance.

Whatever contests may arise, the Bulgarian will most likely remain passively cultivating the soil, attending his flocks, and enjoying that rough portion of plenty which his cottage (sunk in the ground) always affords. As far as means go, he is well off compared to other peasantry, and his ideas do not seem to go beyond eating and drinking; after paying his taxes and exactions from the Pachas, coming in all to one-seventh or one-eighth of the produce.

The Greek is more advanced in intellect, and at least desires a change; but the peace has been a disappointment to him, the promises or hopes from Russia have vanished, and the Greek is less likely to join now than he was eighteen months ago.

Of the general population of Turkey it is difficult to speak confidently, because for many reasons it has never been known with any degree of accuracy. Even the bishops and priests cannot guess the number of their parishioners. The estimate made from the houses (in the towns and villages of the large tract of country lately passed) gives the belief that there are 8,000,000 in that part of European Turkey from which the Sultan still draws men; and that of this number, one-half are Greeks and Bulgarians, the latter in the proportion of two to one Greek. The exactions of the Aghas and misgovernment complained of in Asia have not been met with in Europe; nor is it believed that they do exist to any crying extent. The greatest evil is the Harrache, exacted equally from the beggar, find it where he may. The general disposition of the Turk is fidelity to the Sultan, with hatred to the Russians, and a readiness to go to war in his own way when called upon, and to which he is much better disposed since the peace than before, owing to the burning of Rachova (when the women were carried to Russia), the cruelties at Yeni Kalé, and the total destruction of every house between Schumla and the Danube as far as the sea. It is therefore presumed that a call to free the country would be largely obeyed just now, suspecting, as the common Turks do, that the Russians will not readily quit the soil; and, should this ever be the alternative, and a man of energy and great patience be appointed Grand Vizier (one who would avoid a general battle in spite of the clamours of the multitude), the game would be his own in time. The first object is to secure the capital, which nature has almost done already. At Buyuck-Checkmedge,

20 miles westward, and Kutzuck-Checkmedge, about 14, there are two lakes running inwards about 6 miles, nearly meeting at the apex of the triangle. The sides of these lakes have a range of fine hills not to be attacked in this quarter; and these hills run all the way to the Black Sea, almost without intermission, having a deep valley, generally speaking, in their front throughout this extent. A short portion of labour by *corvée* in scarping some of the hills, and strengthening the weak points, would render this one of the finest positions in Europe, and to the Turks and her armed population invaluable! for, moderately-well defended (as the Turks are accustomed to do in position), the capital and its sources of water would be secured.

The irregulars placed here, and an army of 40,000 or 50,000 men operating westward of the Russian position, would soon reduce them to such difficulties that they would gladly quit the country, and that without even the necessity of fighting a battle. The position in question seems to be capable of resisting any moderate force, and a large one could not exist for any time without the assistance of a very large fleet. The position is liable to be turned by sea; but to maintain the command against the Turkish fleet at the same time, the line of battle-ships could not be *armé en flute*; and all the transports could scarcely carry 14,000 men, and for this small force there is no very good landing-place. The Bay at Fanaraki, at the entrance of the Bosphorus, would not contain more than one-half after the batteries were carried. In this view, therefore, of the formidable position which could be constructed, there would be little danger save in the case of a large army leaning its left flank upon such a fleet as would convey its provisions, stores, guns, &c. Such an attack must succeed, and the defenders of the position would retire step by step to the capital, defending a succession of very favourable hills as far as the gates of the city; but the loss of the capital (without insurrection) would not involve that of the Empire; and as the Russians cannot resist the climate, ultimate success would attend the Turks if they were to use all their endeavours to recover their country.

In the event of a war when the enemy is on the other side of the Danube, the Turks ought to be able to offer an effectual resistance even without the command of the Black Sea.

It is presumed that she could, without extraordinary exertions bring into the field 40,000 regular troops and 13,000 cavalry (chiefly armed with lances, which would be a formidable weapon in the hands of the Turks, who, on several occasions, have broken into squares with the sabre only), and as the fortresses on the left bank, and some on the right of the Danube have been levelled, the Turks should strengthen those that remain, by simply adding some ravelins and a covert-way; after which they would stand a considerable time, when garrisoned with irregulars, of whom there could be 80,000 found for their defence and the protection of the different passes of the Balkan. Thus prepared, the army might take post on the Danube, pushing the cavalry into Wallachia to secure some of the resources, and retreat before the enemy to the river, where they should be opposed; but, as the mouths of the river are now in the hands of the Russians, their crossing below Silistria is a matter of certainty, and then there is no fortress until at Varna and Schumla. But there are some favourable positions which would at least cause time to be lost. The last to be taken up is near Pravodi, which, by covering the head of the Lake of Dovna, may be said to protect all the space between Schumla and Varna (nearly one-half of which is filled up by Lake Dovna at the foot of the mountains). The post near Pravodi would cause the enemy to indicate which point he seriously threatens; or, if this continued doubtful, there would

be troops enough, when driven from the mountains of Pravodi, at once to secure the passes, and provide for the defence of Schumla. The time thus occupied would (without firing a shot) consume all the provisions the enemy could transport by land, therefore he must either besiege places on the Danube (in the face of the army), to secure his communications, or, at all risks, endeavour to force the Balkan, trusting to his fleet for supplies, and for the means of escape if defeated. To force the Balkan adequately defended by an army seems almost impossible: but if it were done, or the army outwitted, the position of the Buyuck-Checkmedge would still save the capital—even in the worst case, namely, the army being passed and cut off from a great defence and obliged to act upon the enemy's rear, whilst he is moving against the position, where he would be placed between two fires, and cut off from all supplies, except by sea.

Schumla is now more important than ever, owing to the mouths of the Danube being in entire military possession of the Russians, for which reason they should strengthen the place, instead of carrying, as they have done, all the guns to Adrianople.

Were the places on the Danube put in order (and some of the Pachas readily listened to a hint of their weak points), and well garrisoned, also Schumla, it is fair to expect that the Russians would always exhaust their troops between the foot of the Balkan and the River Danube.

The vice of the Turks is want of forethought and preparation. The Pacha of Silistria (who defended the place gallantly) left the batteries and trenches of 1828 ready for the enemy in 1829, and fought a battle to maintain what with ease he could have levelled during six months' absence of the enemy. At Ruzschuck, too, the batteries of 1812 are still existing on points where some might again be useful; and near Schumla several of the Russian redoubts remain, and will do so, unless it were hinted to the Turks who are ignorant, or, at least, careless of the consequences.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

your most obedient humble servant,

F. R. CHESNEY,

Capt. Royal Artillery.

Lord Plunket to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Dublin, 8th February, 1830.

It has not been in my power to attend, in pursuance of your wish expressed in your note of the 15th January; but I send by this post my proxy to Lord Maryborough, with a request that he will place it in your Grace's hands.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

your Grace's faithful servant,

PLUNKET.

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his Lordship's letter and is much obliged to him.]

Mr. N. Chater to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

4, Thames Bank Place, Millbank,
8th February, 1830.

MY LORD DUKE,

I beg leave to thank you for your polite attention in acknowledging the receipt of my letter dated the 20th ultimo.

I should be unwilling again to intrude upon your valuable time were not the importance of the subject a sufficient excuse.

It appears to me that the real cause of the distress of the country is but little understood; I judge from what has passed at the late county meetings, and again from his Majesty's address to the two Houses of Parliament. I will pass over the nonsense that has been talked at the county meetings respecting the currency, &c., and will confine my observations to that part of the Speech from the Throne which would lead the world to suppose that the distress is but partial and transient.

The very reverse is the fact, and the exports having been to a greater amount the last year than any one previously, together with the large capital now in the market unemployed, will materially assist in elucidating this point.

In my former letter I particularly alluded to the enormous trade carried on by our merchants and manufacturers during the war, and the vain endeavours that have been since made to continue such trade.

Until the year 1825, when credit received such a check, although the facts were the same they wore a different aspect.

Long previous to 1825 our legitimate trade (by which I mean such a trade as yielded a fair remunerating profit for the capital and labour employed) had ceased to exist, and had been substituted, by a fictitious business, the consequence of the unlimited credit, then so easily obtained. This kind of business, which caused capital to change hands rather oftener than was agreeable, had one advantage, and, I believe, only one—viz. it kept the people actively employed—while the capitalists were playing at shuttlecock with their money.

That our real trade had been actually lost became then but too apparent to all persons engaged in it. What was to be done?

A. B. had sunk 100,000*l.* in plant, machinery, &c., &c., which, if he had sold off and retired from business, would not have fetched him 50,000*l.* This he must have put into the funds and received 3 per cent. for; rather than do which, he continues to manufacture to the same extent as when all the world were his customers, and thinks himself happy if he obtains 2½ per cent. upon his capital.

It follows, as a matter of course, that so soon as A. B. could withdraw either part or all of his capital, without loss, he would do so, and invest it in the funds at 3 per cent.

This for the last four years has been gradually effected wherever it possibly could, and consequently there is now an immense unemployed capital in the country.

Should A. B. have been unfortunate enough not to have been able to have withdrawn his capital, he, in 1830, finds that at a forced sale of his plant, &c., &c., which cost 100,000*l.*, he would not realise 20,000*l.*; consequently if in 1825 it was to his advantage to carry on the concern at a

profit of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., it is now still more necessary to carry it on even at 1 per cent. profit.

It is by such a forced trade as this that our exports have kept up their appearance; and it is not to be conceived that our capitalists have put up with such a loss without previously grinding every shilling out of the workmen's wages a starving population would admit of.

To keep the people actively employed is the only possible means of continuing a country's prosperity.

A debt of 800,000,000*l.*, an enormous unemployed capital, and a starving population, are three things future generations will never believe to have co-existed; in fact, they cannot co-exist for any length of time.

If an individual had an unemployed capital, and yet was in debt, to pay the interest of which took one-half of his income, and if he did not discharge either all or such part of his debt as he could with his unemployed capital, he would be considered a madman.

That the discharge of the debt would be a real benefit to the capitalist, and a blessing to the people, I endeavoured to prove in my former letter, and will not now occupy your time by recapitulation.

Free-trade would then in reality exist, it would no longer be necessary to protect one class by the injury of another, and all temptation for the people to rise, *en masse*, sponge in hand, would be done away with.

We hear much about our surplus population, but in a well-regulated community no such thing could exist. When the people are actively employed, they are also actively consuming: and were it not for the artificial state of things, caused by the debt of the country, an increased population would become a blessing, instead of a curse, to the nation.

The utter impossibility of employing the capital of the country to any advantage, which now exists, and the large amount that is absolutely lying idle, renders the present moment a most favourable opportunity for discharging the public debt.

When this was proposed by Mr. Ricardo some few years ago, the unfortunate manner in which the proposition was worded frightened the agriculturists into the idea that their land was to be sold to pay the debt.

The idea was ridiculous, for there can be no doubt that out of all classes of his Majesty's subjects they, in particular, would be most benefited.

It must also be recollected that at that time the scheming mania was in existence, and capital was not then, as now, lying idle. At that time people would sooner have paid 50 per cent. upon their incomes than have given up one-fifth of their property; but I much doubt, if a candid and cautious inquiry were made upon the subject now, if that would still be found the case.

I am quite aware of the caution necessary in making so great an inroad upon the established customs of the people, and also that it would require all the abilities and influence of a truly great man to carry it into effect. That the country is not likely again to find such another character at the head of its affairs is the cause of my addressing your Grace at the present moment.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient servant,

NATHL. CHATER.

[The Duke has received his letter of the 8th inst.]

Mr. James Perry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

27, Exmouth Street, Clerkenwell,
8th February, 1830.

MY LORD DUKE,

Supposing the resolutions of the West Indian interest, Lord Chandos in the chair, as inserted in the 'Times' of this morning, to be before your Grace, I beg to be allowed to suggest the following hints:—

1. It is a false premise to argue upon a ratio between the price and the duty. The argument should be upon the ratio between the consumption and the duty. For

If the consumption does not fall off, what odds is it how high the duty may be? The point at which taxation ought to stop, is when it begins to have a prohibitory operation; and the repeal of duty, the same inversely.

All distress arising, while the ratio between the consumption and the duty remains equable, is at all times caused by circumstances foreign to taxation.

2. The West Indian interest is, if I may use the term, oppressed more by the system of English agency, than by any operation of the Crown. Take a proof:

A. is a planter, who borrows, upon mortgage of B., 20,000*l.*, who is an agent, or merchant, in England.

Now B. takes good care to secure to himself the following advantages, besides colonial interest:—

A. shall not import a single article, even for housekeeping, but through B. Upon which B. gets $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. commission; $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. making insurance; gives six months' credit, but receives fourteen, sixteen, or eighteen months' from his tradesmen, and pockets the discount.

All the produce of A. must be consigned to B.

$2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. commission on that.

2 per cent. guarantee (if any).

Interest on duties.

$\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on acceptances; also on receiving bills.

Further, A. finds the ship, and the capital so invested meets its profit in * the freights out and home.

These things, perhaps, your Grace may think worth inquiring into. It is possible also that it may appear that very large and improper advances, as well as overtrading outlays, have been made upon the first issue of the small notes; and that the stress laid upon the paper side of the currency question is because a persistence in cash payments can scarcely fail, ultimately, of producing half-a-dozen moderate West Indian houses in lieu of any one that shall be now in existence of overgrown dimensions.

I wish it had been possible to place these ideas before your Grace without becoming individually troublesome; but I could not reconcile to my mind any trespass without mentioning my name. I will therefore assume the permission of saying that I am, with great truth, and sincere good wishes,

My Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obedient and very humble servant,

JAS. PERRY.

[Compliments.—Received his letter.]

Prince Leopold to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Claremont, 9th February, 1830.

I have considered the Protocol of the 3rd inst. It appears that, if its spirit be duly executed, it will effect as follows :

(1.) It will establish an armistice and, *de facto*, peace between the contending parties, provided peaceable means suffice to carry this purpose.

(2.) It will give birth to a Greek State, and promise it political independence.

(3.) It will have traced out for this State boundaries, weak in a military, poor in a financial point of view.

(4.) It will have found a Sovereign for the new State.

Further I conceive the provisions of the Protocol will not go, and of most of the points of vital importance to him who is to govern this new State, it contains nothing. Before I can give, therefore, my adhesion to the Protocol, I must inform myself if the consecutive treaty will contain such provisions as are essential to the existence of the new State, and without which, born as it is under circumstances unknown in history, it would probably live a very short period. Because, though I cannot but conclude that the Powers are prepared to do more for Greece than is contained in the Protocol, it is necessary that I should make myself acquainted beforehand with their further intentions, in order to guard against being told hereafter that the Powers do not mean to treat with me on any point, that the thing is done, and that I must take it unconditionally as it is.

Consequently, before I communicate further with the plenipotentiaries on this subject, I beg that your Grace, as English Minister, will be pleased to give me satisfactory explanations on the following questions :—

(1.) In what position will my adhesion to the Protocol place me with respect to the consecutive treaty ?

(2.) Has your Grace any doubt that the new State will be acknowledged by all the European Powers ?

(3.) Does your Grace apprehend that the guarantee promised to the new State will be but partial, or at least not so ample and satisfactory as the future head of the Greek government must necessarily wish and expect ?

(4.) What contingent will the Powers furnish till the Greek government has become stable ?

(5.) For what period and on what conditions will this contingent be given, and will it be allowed to remain longer, should circumstances make its presence desirable beyond the fixed period ?

(6.) What protection is Greece to have in case of foreign aggression ?

(7.) What aid is Greece to have in case its resources should fail to such a degree as to make it impossible to carry on government. I must beg your Grace will be in your answer to this point very explicit, as I understand that the provisional government has till now only existed by foreign subsidies, which I am told are henceforth to cease ?

(8.) What will be the spirit of the policy of Great Britain in its future relations with the Greek State ?

There remain, moreover, some points which I am obliged to urge to your Grace. The principal of them is Candia. As I can see nowhere that it is English policy to separate Candia from Greece, I am afraid that the

hidden interest, which caused this separation to be determined on, will augur no good to the new State. The exclusion of Candia will cripple the Greek State, morally and physically, will make it weak and poor, expose it to constant danger from the Turks, and create from the beginning innumerable difficulties for him who is to be at the head of that government. Because Greece never will be made to understand and appreciate the exclusion of Candia, and out of this circumstance alone a perpetual source of political irritation will flow. Other effects, not less dangerous to the tranquillity of the new State, must arise from the same cause; for is it likely that the Greeks, henceforth in an improved condition, should slacken in their sympathy for their countrymen and fellow-Christians? or is it more likely that the Candiotes, with the accomplishment of the Greek cause before their eyes, should forget that they are Greeks themselves? But what am I to infer from these propositions for the entire pacification of Candia, a point of the greatest moment to the Greek government? Certainly not grounds of confidence that its inhabitants will peaceably return under the Turkish dominion. And what mode of pacification will then remain? In my opinion nothing but the force of arms, as to effect a peaceable emigration of so numerous a population I take to be wholly impracticable. But in case force of arms be the only practicable mode of pacifying Candia, what must I be prepared for? That, probably, at the time when I am going out to govern Greece, in consequence of a certain treaty, events may happen which will make it appear—to the Greeks at least—that that same treaty sanctions the bloodshed and murder of their brethren. I need not dwell on what in such a case the feelings of the Greeks, an ignorant, passionate people, would necessarily become towards me; nor will I fatigue your Grace by hinting the innumerable incidents which may arise out of these difficulties, and over which I can have no control, but which, notwithstanding, may commit me with the Powers, and brand my character in the eyes of Europe. If, therefore, your Grace's resolutions about Candia cannot be shaken, I shall, in case of my adhesion to the Protocol, to guard in some degree against the enumerated collisions, require something more than the mere publication of a Turkish amnesty. I should beg that the Powers themselves will come to such solemn engagements and arrangements as will put the security of the Greeks, remaining under the Porte, not only beyond doubt, but will make the infringement of the amnesty, on the part of the Turks, impossible. And I should further beg that the Powers will seize this opportunity to obtain an improved civil condition for the Greek inhabitants of Candia and Samos, for which purpose the provisions of the second Article of the Treaty of July 6 furnish to them ample means.

If Lord Aberdeen has endeavoured to turn it to my prejudice, that from mere newspaper information I must have been prepared for the exclusion of Candia, I was, from all the information I could collect on that subject, certainly not prepared to find the projected north-western boundaries of the new State such as they appear, since I have had opportunity of examining the map annexed to the Protocol. In my opinion these boundaries are, in a military point of view, so weak and insecure, that I beg your Grace to be prepared to hear to-morrow, in my conference with your Grace, the strongest objections against their final adoption.

It will be on a satisfactory answer to these queries and doubts only that I can come to a final resolution.

If in the progress of these transactions my nomination be communicated to the Greeks, I should ask it, as a favour, that the Powers will grant them the permission to object to my person, should they feel inclined to do so.

It occurs finally to me, that the third paragraph of the Protocol might hereafter, by some of the Powers, be understood in one sense only. To make, therefore, future misunderstandings on this head impossible, I beg to state to your Grace distinctly, that I do construe the sense of this paragraph to be, that I shall be at full liberty to give, or not to give, such institutions as, compatible with a monarchy, I shall in time find necessary for the welfare of the new State.

I cannot conclude without directing your Grace's attention to the uneasy position I am in. To avoid jealousies and their attending perplexities, I have abstained, till now, from consulting anybody. I am, however, fully sensible of my own inadequacy to grapple with an object of such vital importance to the happiness of a whole people as well as to myself. But I shall not ask advice of any person before I have received your Grace's answer to this letter, and before I have named to your Grace the individual by whose judgment I should like to be assisted.

With sentiments of the highest esteem,

I remain, my dear Duke,

your Grace's most faithfully,

LEOPOLD R.

To Prince Leopold.

[1579.]

SIR,

London, 9th February, 1830.

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's note; and I will attend your Royal Highness at Marlborough House to-morrow about one o'clock.

Lord Holland gave notice in the House yesterday of an intention to make a motion on Greece on Friday.

It appears by your Royal Highness's note that you were yesterday informed of this intention. I have been informed that his Lordship makes the motion only because your Royal Highness has not accepted the situation proffered to your Royal Highness by the three Powers parties to the Treaty of July, 1827.

I am convinced that your Royal Highness will consider this circumstance as an additional motive for your Royal Highness's early determination upon the course which you will follow.

In whatever situation your Royal Highness may be placed, the good opinion of this country must be important to you.

As Prince Sovereign of Greece, your nearest neighbour as Protector of the Ionian Islands will be his Majesty; and it is very important to the interests of the country which you are to govern, that it should not be believed in this country that your Royal Highness is capable of endeavouring to attain any objects by the aid of political parties here.

I will not write all that I feel upon this subject. But with that frankness which I hope will ever characterise my proceedings, I earnestly entreat your Royal Highness to lose no time in taking a course which shall render it impossible for any man to impute to your Royal Highness the use of such means.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1580.]

To Prince Leopold.

SIR,

London, 10th February, 1830.

Since I had the honour of attending your Royal Highness this morning, I have considered the several points adverted to in your Royal Highness's letter of yesterday upon which your Royal Highness desired to have my opinion.

I trust that the answers contained in the enclosed Memorandum will be satisfactory to your Royal Highness, and will enable your Royal Highness to give your final answer on the propositions submitted to your Royal Highness by the ministers of the sovereigns parties to the Treaty of July, 1827, assembled in conference.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM.

London, 10th February, 1830.

1. "It will establish an armistice and, *de facto*, peace between the contending parties, provided peaceable means suffice to carry this purpose."

2. "It will give birth to a Greek State, and promise it political independence."

In respect to the four points enumerated by his Royal Highness Prince Leopold, in his letter of the 9th instant, I consider them all attained by the Protocol. Of course the sovereigns parties to the

3. "It will have traced out for this State boundaries, weak in a military, poor in a financial point of view."

4. "It will have found a sovereign for the new State."

Treaty of July, 1827, must take care to establish peace between Greeks and Turks. I beg leave humbly to differ from his Royal Highness's opinion in respect to the 3rd article.

The weakness or strength of a frontier is to be measured by the strength of the Power by which it is to be defended, compared with that of the Power by which it will probably be attacked. In this view of the frontier proposed for the new State, I entertain no doubt that it is as strong as is necessary for its defence. But it must besides be considered that the territory will be guaranteed.

I cannot conceive that any small addition to the districts which are proposed to constitute the new Greek State would greatly improve its finances.

I conclude that the further points, upon which his Royal Highness requires information, are enumerated under the eight heads which follow; and in the last paragraphs of his letter.

1. "In what position will my adhesion to the Protocol place me with respect to the consecutive Treaty?"

When his Royal Highness will have answered the letter, which has been written to him, and the necessary measures upon the Protocol will have been adopted at the Porte, his Royal Highness

will be the Prince Sovereign of Greece, as therein defined, upon the conditions therein stated.

There must be a Treaty between the three Powers and the Porte; and possibly a Treaty with the Prince Sovereign of Greece may likewise be necessary in order to execute this arrangement.

But I cannot undertake to say that this Treaty will contain anything that is not now found in the Protocol excepting a general guarantee.

2. "Has your Grace any doubt that the new State will be acknowledged by all the European Powers?"

2. I have every reason to believe that the European Powers will recognise the new State, as soon as the Porte will have agreed, by treaty, to the cession of the territory.

3. "Does your Grace apprehend that the guarantee promised to the new State will be but partial, or at least not so ample and satisfactory as the future head of the Greek government must necessarily wish and expect?"

3. It is the interest and the wish of every State in Europe, that the Greek State should be independent. The three Powers parties to the Treaty of July must give a guarantee of the territory described in the Protocol. Other Powers will be invited to accede to this Treaty.

4. "What contingent will the Powers furnish till the Greek government has become stable?"

4. Under the Protocol each of the three Powers has bound itself not to send forces to Greece, without the consent of the three. The Independent Sovereign of Greece must judge for himself of the diplomatic applications which he must make in order to obtain

the aid of a military force, if such should be required, to enable him to establish or maintain his authority; or to defend his frontier. However inclined all Powers may be to give the Sovereign of Greece assistance, it must be impossible for any Power to stipulate for the amount of such assistance till required by the Independent Sovereign of Greece.

5. The answer to this is included in the answer to No. 4.

5. "For what period and on what conditions will this contingent be given, and will it be allowed to remain longer, should circumstances make its presence desirable beyond the fixed period?"

6. "What protection is Greece to have in case of foreign aggression?"

6. Greece once established, and her boundaries guaranteed as proposed, she will have the same right to assistance and protection against foreign aggression, as any other State in Europe; of which there are many which exercise an independent action in all their concerns, external as well as internal, although in the neighbourhood of some of the most powerful States in Europe.

7. "What aid is Greece to have in case its resources should fail to such a degree, as to make it impossible to carry on government? I must beg your Grace will be, in your answer to this point, very explicit, as I understand that the provisional government has till now only existed by foreign subsidies, which I am told are henceforth to cease."

7. The government of this country has never given any pecuniary aid to Greece; and I should only deceive his Royal Highness if I were to hold out any hope of such aid. I will moreover add my opinion that such aid is not required.

8. "What will be the spirit of the policy of Great Britain in its future relations with the Greek State?"

8. I answer distinctly that the policy of this country towards Greece will be dictated by the desire to cultivate all the relations of friendly neighbourhood; and to promote the internal peace, happiness, and prosperity of Greece, and all the just objects of the Prince Sovereign.

His Royal Highness may rely upon it, that the King's servants of this day do not act from the personal motives and feelings imputed to them by their opponents. But even if it is supposed that those now honoured by his Majesty with his confidence, could so misconduct themselves, he may rely upon it that the permanent policy of this country towards Greece must be friendly, if Greece should be really independent; and conduct herself as an independent Power.

In respect to Candia, his Royal Highness's letter embraces two objects; first, the possession; next, the pacification of that Island. In regard to the first, the Sovereigns parties to the Treaty of the 6th July determined, by the Protocol of the 22nd March, 1829, that they would not demand the cession of it from the Porte.

Upon the second point, the

easiest way of coming to a conclusion is, to exclude from the discussion all harsh terms, such as "Force of Arms," "Shedding of Blood," and "Murder."

If his Royal Highness will be pleased to peruse the details of the war in Candia, he will see much more reason to complain of the Greeks, particularly of the Greek government, than of the Turks.

If Candia is to continue to be a Turkish possession, it is necessary that the inhabitants of the Island, whether Turkish or Greek, should submit themselves to the Turkish government, and that the Turkish government should be there supreme, and without the interference of any other authority whatever.

Precaution has been already taken to prevent acts of revenge for what is gone by; and good offices will not be wanting to prevent any cruel exercise of authority. But this country cannot undertake to exercise a control over Turkish authority in Candia; nor can it consider the Porte as an independent Power in that island, if such control is exercised by any other Power whatever.

I conceive that his Royal Highness has construed correctly the third paragraph

of the Protocol. The three Powers do not take upon them to define what shall be the institutions compatible with a monarchy by which the Greeks are to be governed.

[1581.]

To the Right Hon. Sir George Murray.

London, 10th February, 1830.

MY DEAR MURRAY,

I return the Corfu despatches.

The family of Capo d'Istria being discontented subjects of his Majesty, and John Capo d'Istria having upon more than one occasion manifested his hostility towards this country, it is very desirable that Sir F. Adam should continue to observe closely all that this family and particularly the head of it do or engage in. It must be observed likewise that Greece being so near the islands, the population so similar and so nearly connected with those in the Ionian Islands, the Lord Commissioner must continue to observe closely all that passes there. But he must abstain from exercising any influence over, or even holding any communication with, any party whether exercising the powers of government or not.

His only intercourse, excepting with individuals to receive the communications which they may think proper to make to him or the officers employed by him, ought to be with the organised officers of the Greek government whatever that may be. There is no other safe or even honest mode of proceeding.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Of course the Lord Commissioner must keep the Secretary of State informed of all that he hears.

Prince Leopold to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Claremont, 11th February, 1830.

I received last night your Grace's memorandum in answer to my letter of the 9th instant.

I have not time to say more than two words respecting the necessary subsidies. I beg to be allowed to differ from your Grace's argument on

this point. The precedent that England has never till now given subsidies to Greece, would only hold good if this State were not called into existence under circumstances quite unprecedented. The adopted boundaries of the new State make precaution, in a financial respect, on part of the Greek government, doubly necessary. Should your Grace's opinion that such aid will not be required be verified by time, so much the better for Greece, and so much less harm for the Powers, as then the promised pecuniary aid will not be required.

I enclose a copy of my answer to the plenipotentiaries, which I have despatched to Lord Aberdeen, and remain, with sentiments of the highest regard,

My dear Duke, yours most faithfully,

LEOPOLD.

To Prince Leopold.

[1582.]

SIR,

London, 11th February, 1830. 10 P.M.

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's letter of this day, and the enclosure. Lord Aberdeen had already sent me the copy of the letter which your Royal Highness had sent to his Lordship.

I have nothing to add to the expression of the concern with which I perused that paper, excepting the assurance of the high consideration and respect with which I am

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Wynford.

[1583.]

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 11th February, 1830.

Since I had the honour of seeing your Lordship yesterday I have seen the Lord Chancellor, and have spoken to him and the Lord President on the subjects on which you conversed with me.

The Lord Chancellor says that there is no instance of the appointment of a Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords excepting by a Commission which must include the names of those Lords and others holding certain judicial offices, the holders of which have usually been included in that Commission.

The Lord President says that the usual practice has been for the Master of the Rolls to sit in the Privy Council on Saturdays, and I understand that Sir John Leach is not unwilling to continue that practice.

In ordinary circumstances this assistance is absolutely necessary to the jurisdiction of the King's Privy Council; and the King's servants would not think it proper to give up the claim to that assistance founded upon long practice, notwithstanding that, owing to your assistance, they are not in want of it at the present moment.

They had therefore thought it proper to refrain from asking for your assistance on Saturdays. It is needless to assure your Lordship that they will be most happy to avail themselves of it on any other days in the week that you can attend.

The Lord President tells me that he had fully explained himself to your Lordship on this subject.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1584.] MEMORANDUM UPON THE COURSE TO BE TAKEN UPON PRINCE LEOPOLD'S DEMANDS.

12th February, 1830.

It is necessary that the government first and the conference afterwards should decide upon the course to be taken upon Prince Leopold's demands.

The first can be complied with as far as the guarantee goes. The form of the guarantee to be given, and the extent of it, will be considered in another part of this paper.

The promise of support will be understood in the guarantee.

In respect to the second, it appears to me that his Royal Highness interferes very unnecessarily in that which is the business of the three Powers parties to the Treaty of the 6th July, 1827.

I don't think that we can consent to more than is stated in my paper of the 10th to his Royal Highness.

The third demand must be positively refused.

The fourth must be refused.

The fifth must be refused in this stage. This point will be discussed in a later part of this paper.

The mode of proceeding for the ministers in conference appears to me to be as follows:—

They would go to the Porte with the Protocols, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, and having obtained the consent of the Porte, a Treaty

would be proposed between the three Powers and the Porte, to carry into execution the measures arranged by the Protocol.

Another Treaty should then be drawn, to be executed by the three Powers with Prince Leopold, which should recite the Protocols 1, 2, and 3, and the Treaty with the Porte; and the three Powers should recognise Prince Leopold as Sovereign Prince with the boundaries as expressed, and should guarantee to him those boundaries and possessions. The words of that guarantee should be well considered. All Powers should be called upon to adhere to this Treaty in the same manner and according to the same forms as they have to the Treaty of Vienna.

Prince Leopold would then stand thus. The Porte would have made the cession by Treaty. The three Powers would have recognised his Royal Highness as Prince Sovereign and guaranteed to him by Treaty his possessions, and all the other Powers of Europe would by adherence to the treaty have equally recognised his sovereignty, and guaranteed his possessions. If Prince Leopold requires military assistance at present, he might make a treaty for it with any single Power, not one of the Powers, or with any number of Powers, including or excluding the three Powers, or with the three Powers for their assistance, or for their assistance combined with the assistance of others.

It is quite obvious that these treaties with Prince Leopold can be concluded only after the Treaty shall have been concluded with the Porte, or the Porte shall have positively declined. But in the mean time the objects of them may be defined and entered upon a Protocol.

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM FOR LORD ABERDEEN RESPECTING THE PRO- [1585.]
POSED FRENCH ATTACK ON ALGIERS, ETC.

12th February, 1830.

It would be desirable that we should let the French government know what we have done in respect to the Pasha of Egypt's operations.

We ought likewise to remind Prince Polignac of the measures adopted by us when we bombarded (not attacked) Algiers in

1816; and to suggest that something of the same kind should upon this occasion be done by the French government; or some official communication be made which should satisfy those who feel an anxiety upon this subject, that his Most Christian Majesty has no intention of establishing French garrisons on the coast of Africa, or of settling that country in a view to French interests.

WELLINGTON.

Mr. G. Cowen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Carlisle, 12th February, 1830.

I am encouraged by your Grace's acknowledgment of my letter of the 8th instant to lay before your Grace such facts as are within my immediate knowledge in confutation of assertions which are reported in the newspapers as being made in both the House of Commons and House of Peers.

It is asserted that manufacturers and others engaged in business are driving a losing trade and expending their capital.

In the business in which I am engaged, cotton spinning, this assertion is not true. We have a fair living profit at the present moment, and have had for nearly twelve months. Previous to that time, for the period of nearly two years, our trade was certainly profitless, but it has been gradually improving, and now affords a fair remuneration for capital employed.

The business which stands next to spinning is manufacturing into cloth. Weavers' wages are certainly low, but there is, I am informed by those who purchase from us, a fair demand for goods at prices which remunerate the manufacturer. But as weaving is a business extensively carried on in all countries, and is common to men, women, and children, those men who follow it as a trade are ill-paid for their labour. Women and children are, however, not worse off than workpeople of other trades.

There is at present full employment for all descriptions of hands in Carlisle employed in manufacturing.

Many of the cotton mills are working night and day.

There has been no reduction in any description of wages in Carlisle excepting weaving.

Agricultural labourers are paid here at present 10s. to 12s. per week.

Calico printing (which is not termed manufacturing) is not so brisk as it was in the spring of last year, but the same rates of wages continue to be paid without full employment.

Immediately in the neighbourhood where I reside there have been three farms vacant at the present term. The smallest has been let at the old rent, 70*l.* per annum; the next was let in public for 108*l.* per annum, the previous rent of which was 90*l.*; the third has been let for 175*l.* in place of 170*l.*, the old rent. The farmers are all men of experience, with sufficient capital for such undertakings.

I would, however, beg to state to your Grace that farmers who have grazing farms are those who complain the most, and I believe they have

not been remunerated for their last year's grazing. I was in company yesterday with one of the most extensive and experienced men in Cumberland as a grazier, who declares that his business does not at present remunerate the farmer. Farms under tillage pay better. The present price of corn is considered a remunerating price by Cumberland farmers generally, although there are some who complain of the contrary. There is, however, no reduction of rent, and there are no farms vacant. My statement of the three farms will afford your Grace a criterion by which to judge of all farms in Cumberland when a vacancy occurs.

From the facts herein stated, whatever may be the situation of other districts, your Grace will easily discover that distress is not general in Cumberland. It is, indeed, at present very partial, being confined almost entirely to weavers, who have large families of very young children, with nothing but the father's earnings to support them.

In Glasgow, where we hold stocks of yarn, there is much more doing than there was twelve months ago. The demand for yarns for export was never more extensive than within the last twelve months.

Fearing that my communications are too trivial for your Grace's notice, I shall here conclude by assuring your Grace that I have no interest to serve but that of truth in writing to your Grace, and if I can imagine that I in the smallest degree add to your Grace's information in obtaining a correct knowledge of the state of the country, I shall be amply rewarded.

I again most respectfully beg to subscribe myself, my Lord,
your Grace's most obedient, most humble servant,

GEORGE COWEN.

P.S.—The wages of house and agricultural servants of all descriptions are about the same as for the last seven years.

I am, &c.,
G. C.

[Compliments to Mr. Cowen.—Returns thanks for his communication of the 12th inst.

Send his letter to Mr. Peel, Mr. Goulburn, Mr. Herries.]

Rev. H. M. Wagner to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Brighton Vicarage, 13th February, 1830.

I take the liberty of enclosing, for your Grace's perusal, a letter, for the accuracy of which I can vouch, having made a reference to the books of the Savings Bank. From it you will perceive that the deposits during the late severe season have exceeded the amount of the sums which have been withdrawn. This fact, at a time when the distress is so much spoken of, may be worthy your Grace's notice. In giving this information, however, I should add, that a considerable distribution of soup and

coals has been made amongst those classes which were thrown out of employment during the prevalence of the frost.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord Duke,
with the greatest esteem and respect,
your Grace's obliged and devoted servant,
H. M. WAGNER.

[ENCLOSURE.]

REV. SIR,

Brighton Savings Bank.

From the interest which you, as vicar of this parish, manifest in the welfare of this institution, I feel persuaded that you will learn with pleasure that since the 28th November last we have received no less a sum than 4553*l.* 3*s.* 2*d.*, while the amounts withdrawn in the same period are only 3859*l.* 6*s.* 5*d.*, leaving a balance in favour of the investments of 693*l.* 16*s.* 9*d.*

Large as has been the amount deposited, not more than 30*l.* have been lodged by any individual, and during these eleven weeks above a hundred persons have added their names for the first time to the list of our previous depositors.

I beg to subscribe myself, Rev. Sir,
your very obedient servant,

GEO. S. A. WYER, Actuary.

[Compliments.—The Duke is much obliged to him.]

Mr. Farren to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

No. 7, Lodge Place, Hanover Gate, Regent's Park,
13th February, 1830.

MY LORD DUKE,

If a séjour and travel of four years in Asiatic and European Turkey, directed by an unwearied desire to ascertain its character, influences, and resources, assisted by a knowledge of its language, and entirely unconnected with any of the biases of party spirit or commercial gain, prompted me respectfully to lay before your Grace the considerations which those circumstances had induced in regard to the ill-judged nature and pernicious consequences of the Treaty of July the 6th, and the interesting and important station which that Empire and Greece now occupy in the foreign relations of this country, and the consideration of the Cabinets and nations of Europe, a perusal of the desultory opinions expressed in both Houses on the opening of the Session in regard to these subjects would have been my plea for two days ago addressing your Grace upon their fallacy and ignorance.

The debate of last night has, however, laid before the public, in digested form, the views of those who, having taken a prominent part in the Parliamentary discussions on this subject, might be supposed to have given it their studious reflection.

A careful perusal of those views (apart from every consideration extrinsic to the actual state of Greece and Turkey, in relation to the interests and engagements of this country and Europe) so convinces me of the very pre-

judicial and superficial reflection under which they have been formed, and the erroneous and commonplace premises on which they have been founded, that I am at a loss to conceive how men of education, judgment, and integrity, could venture in the great assembly of the nation to tamper with the public mind and their own reputation, by the confident expression of such crude, inconsistent, and ill-founded arguments and assertions, on a subject of so much delicacy and difficulty, and universally regarded as involving late and prospective contingencies of national treasure, life, and influence.

The character, however, of those views, the hackneyed and brainless effusions of the public papers, the whole history of this subject during the last seventy years, and the very enactments of the Treaty of July, prove how very partially the real state and influences of those countries in relation to Europe is understood, and how much misconception prevails in regard to them.

To this fact, as relating to the general circumstances of Greece, I venture, my Lord, with earnestness, to assure you that much, very much, of the same ignorance prevails, even amongst well-informed men, in respect to the moral, political, and commercial capabilities of Turkey; and that hitherto connected with her only by those circumstances, whose character and history I traced in the paper I had the honour of addressing to your Grace on this country's relations with her, and separated by the prejudiced distinctions of religion, language, society, and habits, which the cursory flights of travellers across that country, and the defective mode of diplomatic intercourse at Constantinople, which I referred to in that paper, and can fully prove, are ill-calculated to disperse, Turkey has, for the last half century, caused much inquietude to the government of this country, though possessing vast, cultivatable, and accessible resources for her interests and industry; and amongst other absurd impressions which these circumstances have given rise to, it is dogmatically assumed that because no great ostensible advantage has hitherto resulted from our connection with her, she is incapable of yielding any.

Error is more widely propagated, and the public mind more misguided by the use of vague phrases in respect to general and important subjects than perhaps by any other cause; and thus "the wisdom of our ancestors," "no Popery," and others of this sort, have served most extensively as time-saving signs for the opinion of those who, inflated by some crude notion of their import, have never given themselves the trouble to reflect upon the elementary particulars or relations of which these sentences are compounded.

With respect to Turkey, indeed, my Lord, the popular idiom of her being morally and politically extinct, is one of those current sayings which it is much easier to assert than to explain or prove.

In respect to finance, the treasury of the Sultan, if not rich, is unembarrassed, and it is universally acknowledged that the resources of the country are such as will admit of a vast extension of national revenue, which may be obtained by the adoption of very simple measures, whose operations would be advantageous instead of onerous to the people.

The moral and physical qualities of the Turks offer great elementary resources for her military power, which has hitherto (and here at least a

partial distinction must be made) been restricted by an ignorance of the means of organising them.

Her commercial resources are vast, and the character of all classes of her subjects is essentially commercial.

I speak from personal authority, and a free and domestic intercourse with the people, that a friendly, communicative, and hospitable feeling prevails towards those Europeans who are willing, or able by a knowledge of their language, to cultivate their intercourse; and this, I believe, is nearly as much as one European expects from another.

With regard to the population of Turkey, it is perfectly true that the separation of the Mohammedan and Christian subjects diminishes the national power; but though cordially hating the Turks, the Christians are so divided amongst themselves by sectarian distinctions, that they derive little or no power from this circumstance; while those very peculiarities which distinguish the Turks from all the rest of Europe are now, to a certain degree (and by a proper direction of the moral principles allied to them, may be rendered progressively), a cause of interest, union, and strength.

Thus, upon a cursory glance of the elementary resources of Turkey, she possesses most available means for taking a respectable and self-maintaining place amongst the States of Europe; and her weakness, so far from being, as is ignorantly and inconsiderately asserted, that of one whose powers are absolutely exhausted, is the weakness of a state possessing great means without the judgment to direct them usefully.

Were the state and being of Turkey unconnected with the interests of England, these are considerations which might be left wholly to the discretion of political philanthropy; but identified as she is with the general system of Europe, and the policy of this country, and unquestionably liable to be very powerfully affected in the course of time by those changes which the East of Europe is undergoing, it is of practical importance to consider how far she is susceptible of amendment, and this country may consistently promote the means for that re-establishment on which the unembarrassed security for our policy and her integrity must best repose.

After much and frequent reflection on this subject, but with unaffected deference to the opinion which your Grace may have formed of that paper, I venture again to express my belief that, consistent with the comprehensive analysis I submitted on the interests of Great Britain in the state and being of the Ottoman Empire, it is perfectly consistent, safe, and practicable, as it is also expedient for this country to promote the means for that re-establishment by adopting in the spirit of encouraging intercourse towards Turkey—of friendly advice—and diplomatic facility, those measures which in that paper I ventured to lay before the consideration of your Grace; and I now name them with a feeling of modesty, which is no further associated with confidence than as it may evince the unaffectedness of their expression, and acquire for them your Grace's reflection by proving that they are the result of studious meditation, and directed to the welfare of my country.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

with most profound respect,

your Grace's obedient servant,

J. FARREN.

[Received his letter.]

Mr. D. Gunning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Maryport, Cumberland,
13th February, 1830.

The only apology I think due to your Grace for this obtrusion is, that I conceive it is the bounden duty of every man well disposed towards the government to give every information in his power of the actual state of that part of the country he resides in; and without entering too deeply into the subject, so much the topic of conversation, namely, the present distress of the country, I will simply state that of all parts of the United Kingdom, the county of Cumberland has the least reason to complain, with the exception of Carlisle, where the cotton manufacture is carried on to some extent. I admit in that branch of business wages are reduced to the very low sum of 4s. per week; with this exception, I challenge any man to prove that actual distress exists in any other part of the county.

The landowners, generally speaking, are receiving as high rents as they did during the war, when the Carlisle bushel of wheat sold as high as three guineas, and at the present time not more than 19s. can be obtained.

Many farmers have embarked large sums in shipping, which are still profitable; for instance, a settlement of a brig about 235 tons registry, for one year, took place in this town the other day. She went out in ballast twice to the British colonies for timber, and once to Dublin during the winter with coals; her original cost, when victualled, was 4500*l.*; and notwithstanding the depreciation on shipping, she divided 640*l.*: this one of many I could mention, such as the Dykes, Cumberland, and others. The shipowners are certainly not making the splendid fortunes they did during the war, for at that period many ships cleared their prime cost during the first year; if they expect those golden days during peace, they will be sadly disappointed.

Let any person observe the dress, &c., of the wives of shipowners, shipwrights, and mechanics of every description, and if he can perceive any distress, it must be in their minds, not in their pockets.

A labourer obtains 2*s.* 6*d.* per day, a shipwright from 15*s.* 6*d.* to 18*s.* 6*d.* per week, besides frequently an allowance of ale; I naturally ask, can these people be in distress?

There is a certain gentleman in this town going from house to house obtaining signatures to a petition to Parliament, setting forth the distressed situation of the shipping interest of this part of the country, which, I understand, is to be presented in the Commons by Sir John Lowther, and seconded by Sir James Graham. I can assure your Grace it is not worthy of credence, it is a misrepresentation of facts; and I know many who have signed it never heard it read, and few expect anything from the result. I admit that the certain gentleman is distressed, although he is engaged in shipping: he cannot attribute it to that; if he will look into Chancery, he will find a more plausible reason for his present difficulties.

This town consists of about 4000 or 5000 inhabitants, with from thirty to forty public-houses. Observe the rapid fortunes they are making. Their houses on market days are filled to overflowing, and seldom does a farmer or his servant return to their families but in a state of intoxication; and yet there are men to be found to come forward at public meetings and state that these unfortunate people are in deep distress.

I do admit there is considerable distress in some of the manufacturing districts in both England and Scotland, but why a county meeting was called in Cumberland is not for me to say; were I to give an opinion, it was perfectly unnecessary.

In this and the adjoining parishes no increase whatever has taken place on the poor-rates; but particularly in this parish a deduction has appeared in consequence of an alteration in the management; this is the best criterion to judge by.

My Lord Duke, if information is acceptable to your Grace such as I can give, the acknowledging the receipt of this letter will be an inducement to me, in future, to forward the earliest and most correct intelligence on this and other subjects.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most devoted and obedient servant,

DANIEL GUNNING.

[Compliments.—The Duke has received his letter.

Circulate to Mr. Peel, Mr. Goulburn, Mr. Herries.]

[1586.]

To Lord Wynford.

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 15th February, 1830.

If I told your Lordship that it was not legal, or in the power of the King, to appoint a single Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords, according to the opinion of the Lord Chancellor, I was guilty of a gross error and misrepresentation of what his Lordship had said to me.

His Lordship told me that there was no instance of the appointment of a Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords, excepting by a Commission which must include the names of those Lords and others holding certain judicial offices, the holders of which have usually been included.

I reminded your Lordship, when I had the honour of seeing you last, of what I recollected of the conversation between your Lordship and myself.

That conversation was founded upon the notion of your being Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords. But I am convinced that your Lordship has too much candour to believe that because I talked to you of being Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords, I therefore intended to assure you that an arrangement should be made which would be unusual.

Indeed, if your Lordship recollects, I told you that you informed me in Bedford Square, that you could not attend in

London, unless you should receive an allowance for the performance of the duty of Deputy Speaker. If then I had informed your Lordship, in that same conversation, that you were to be the only Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords, I must have given ground for the conclusion, either that you would be paid a salary, which I am convinced that your Lordship will do me the justice to admit that I did not give, or that the Lord Chancellor should sit in the House of Lords upon every appeal, and that his Lordship should never be relieved by any of those noble and learned lords or judicial characters who have, at all times, but particularly in latter times, relieved him.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. Hogg to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Kettering, 15th February, 1830.

I beg leave to enclose to your Grace, in another cover, a statement of the poor-rates paid in each parish of the three hundreds in the Kettering Division, in which I act—which rates are compared with the land tax and the assessed taxes, in order to show your Grace where the root of the evil, the depression of the country, lies.

The land tax is paid by proprietors of lands and the clergy. The assessed taxes are paid chiefly by gentlemen of large property; a small part only of these taxes rests on farmers and manufacturers.

The poor-rates, so much greater in amount than both, are paid chiefly by occupiers of lands; a very small part of these rates pressing on proprietors and manufacturers.

While these burdens of poor-rates rest on the occupiers of lands, the poor and the labourers must have from them but a bare subsistence. The home trade cannot find a demand, and the proprietors of lands, &c., must have a very decreasing income.

Under your Grace's administration all subjects of his Majesty enjoy equal political rights. The three kingdoms require to be assimilated, in order to the prosperity of all his Majesty's dominions.

This assimilation will be complete when Ireland partakes of the education of its people, as Great Britain educates its people. And when England, in the support of the poor, is assimilated to Scotland. Till this is done, distress will rest on the three kingdoms, as on diseased limbs of the body politic.

The diminution of taxes will not reach the root of the evil. The taking off certain taxes will be felt very partially by maltsters, victuallers, &c.; not by the middle and lower classes generally. This is the case in the diminished leather tax.

The root of the distress of the country is in the burdens lying on the occupiers of lands for the support of the poor; and the cause of these burdens is the wrong sense and interpretation put on the word "poor."

Poor now includes the young, healthy and idle, and the profligate; not the aged, the sick, the impotent, &c., as stated in the original law, 43 Eliz. A legal parliamentary remedy is needed to confine relief to its first recipients, and to make an outlet for the healthy unemployed, as is practised from North Britain.

But the present system of poor laws is like a wall of brass round each parish, enclosing them till the inhabitants are ready to devour each other, and are yet hungry.

Scotchmen leap over this wall; or, rather, there is no such wall to enclose them. The English poor laws should be broken down, enclosing only the aged, the impotent, the sick; and God bless them with all Christian help at all times.

I beg leave to add that there is property and money in the kingdoms sufficient to raise a good property tax; which is now thought by very many to be required to be raised instead of other taxes. From this property tax several millions of the national debt might be annually liquidated; and the interest of the unpaid stock much reduced.

And while the currency remains in its present state, the safety and prosperity of the nation would follow. But the distress of the country is not reached, will not be relieved, until the occupiers of lands are relieved of the unnatural, unchristian burdens arising from the support of the young, the healthy, the profligate, the idle.

And these will abound till the poor laws are new modelled in Parliament. I repeat, the root of all distress is in the present state of occupiers of lands under the poor laws.

I have the honour to remain

your Grace's most faithful servant,

JAMES HOGG.

[ENCLOSURE.]

COUNTY OF NORTHAMPTON.—A COMPARATIVE VIEW of the LAND TAX and the ASSESSED TAXES, with the POOR RATES, of the THREE HUNDREDS, in the KETTERING DIVISION, for the YEAR ending at LADY-DAY, 1829.

		Poor Rates.		
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.		
ROWELL HUNDRED—				
Land Tax	2,216 11 9	9,586 2 0		
Assessed Taxes	2,074 8 0			
CORBY HUNDRED—				
Land Tax	2,729 11 0½	11,125 8 3		
Assessed Taxes	2,897 2 1			
HUXLOE HUNDRED—				
Land Tax	2,360 1 8½	12,266 18 5¾		
Assessed Taxes	2,307 11 6			
TOTAL	14,585 6 1	32,978 8 8¾		

COUNTY of NORTHAMPTON, DIVISION of KETTERING.—LAND TAX, &c., for the
YEAR ending LADY-DAY, 1829.

PARISHES.	Land Tax.			Assessed Taxes.			Poor Rates.		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
ROWELL HUNDRED—									
Arthingworth	96	17	4½	80	7	3	359	16	11
Barford	14	0	0	{ Only a Lodge House; included in Glendon.					
Bowden, Little	67	5	4	109	6	2	288	19	6
Braybrooke	59	15	2	77	16	7	673	5	5½
Clipstone	66	11	3	110	16	9	1369	4	6½
Desborough	143	11	5	53	19	11	877	9	7
Draughton	..	..	..	23	9	4	187	4	1
East Farndon	89	12	8	33	9	4	295	15	8
Glendon	0	13	4	73	9	9	70	11	5
Harrington	126	19	0	74	7	2	229	10	5
Haslebeeche	117	6	4	106	2	2	217	10	9
Hothorpe	0	8	2	24	1	7	67	7	1½
Kelmarsh	316	11	0	166	12	11	217	8	10½
Leddington	51	4	4	93	10	2	241	11	4½
Maydwell	..	..	..	129	17	10	103	8	11
Marston	76	19	11	69	8	8	249	14	3
Oxendon, Great	34	10	8½	91	13	9	501	15	8
Oxendon, Little	Included in Little Bowden.								
Orton	33	2	0	14	10	3	201	8	2
Rowell	232	10	9	129	19	5	1807	1	4½
Rushton	208	8	0	152	7	1	669	1	4
Sibbertoft	146	9	10	54	7	5	367	17	11½
Sulby	183	16	0	261	10	7	154	14	7½
Thorpe Lubbenham	59	0	0	21	9	9	{ Included in next Parish.		
Thorpe Underwood	33	6	8	4	10	0	163	8	0
Thorpe Malsor	57	12	6	117	4	2	271	16	0
CORBY HUNDRED—									
Ashley	96	4	8	73	1	10	420	14	5
Blatherwicke	99	5	9	176	15	9	188	19	10
Bulwick	124	14	3½	153	11	0	319	12	3
Brampton	186	5	0	83	16	7	41	13	1
Brigstock	214	1	10	222	10	0	1136	13	3¾
Carlton	129	16	6	153	17	7	76	16	0½
Corby	96	10	11	57	3	6	1187	11	4¾
Cottingham	65	2	9¼	73	15	9	545	6	0
Deene	111	0	0	367	4	0	187	18	8½
Deenthorpe	91	10	8	12	0	7	125	10	0
Dingley	15	1	3	160	16	6	208	19	9
Finshade	..	..	..	92	6	9	29	9	0
Geddington	147	1	9¾	47	5	9	547	0	5
Grethon	192	12	11½	103	7	8	916	0	4¼
Harringworth	297	12	5	52	10	10	330	8	3¾
Laxton	48	14	4	128	8	6	48	16	11
Middleton	41	16	11	82	7	0	661	0	0
Newton	134	10	0	23	8	3	137	2	10
Oakley, Great	76	4	2	99	19	0	418	0	10
Oakley, Little	46	7	2	4	12	4	96	9	7¾
Rockingham	0	2	5	198	9	6	289	17	10
Stanion	83	16	9½	24	15	6	223	6	11
Stoke Albany	47	11	4	38	8	2	593	12	2
Sutton Basset	34	16	0	13	5	2	218	14	6½

COUNTY OF NORTHAMPTON, DIVISION OF KETTERING.—LAND TAX, &c., for
the YEAR ending LADY-DAY, 1829.

PARISHES,	Land Tax.	Assessed Taxes.	Poor Rates.
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
CORBY HUNDRED— <i>continued</i> .			
Wakerley		30 17 8	64 7 7
Weekley	74 1 0	183 16 6	212 9 11½
Weldon, Great	115 19 10	58 7 6	435 14 1
Weldon, Little	40 2 6	51 10 6	461 11 5
Weston	37 4 0	48 9 5	271 9 1
Wilbarston	81 3 9	80 3 0	730 1 6½
HUXLOE HUNDRED—			
Addington, Great	74 9 1	36 12 9	302 5 0
Addington, Little	63 8 0	27 7 6	270 10 3
Aldwinckles	91 2 8	55 1 0	279 6 1½
Barnwell All Saints	75 16 9	20 17 0	110 6 10
Barton Seagrave	12 12 0	199 10 9	186 17 7¾
Burton Latimer	176 12 2	90 1 2¼	1023 10 9
Cranfordes	123 18 2	130 6 4½	392 7 1½
Denford	148 1 1	22 17 7	389 19 9
Finedon	249 11 3¾	172 2 3¼	1148 1 6½
Grafton	88 0 9	49 11 6	195 18 2½
Irthlingborough	266 3 9	125 0 4	1139 7 2
Islip	44 5 10½	86 10 3	511 1 10
Kettering	476 8 7½	587 14 3	4184 9 7½
Lilford	105 3 8	133 0 1	168 14 9
Lowick	22 2 2½	238 2 7	401 16 4
Slipton	2 6 6	7 19 6	143 12 1
Sudborough	101 4 0	85 5 9	465 13 8
Twywell	63 5 1½	61 1 6	119 17 6
Warkton	102 0 6	59 6 6	389 3 8
Woodford	73 9 6	119 2 10	443 18 7½

[Received his letter and enclosure.]

[1587.]

To Lord Beresford.

MY DEAR BERESFORD,

London, 16th February, 1830.

I was very sorry to learn that you were unwell; and particularly so that I have never had one moment's leisure to be enabled to go and see you.

I don't think that you can remove your second colonels: they afford an opening for promotion to the junior ranks which it would be very injurious to the service to lose.

You would save a trifle by keeping the promoted colonels on the pay of lieutenant-colonels.

The saving would not occur this year; and when it would all

be made, would amount only to the difference between the pay of ten colonels and ten lieutenant-colonels.

Neither do I think it advisable to reduce the officers' establishment of a troop of horse artillery. In truth the artillery ought not to be reduced as the army might. If you touch the horse artillery you should abolish it altogether in peace. It could easily be re-established in war if required.

In fact, upon the present establishment, any company of artillery might at any time be made a troop of horse artillery.

In respect to the King's tents, my opinion is that you ought to send the bill to the Lord Chamberlain. This will bring the matter regularly before the Treasury. In truth the charge ought not to have been incurred without previous reference to the Treasury.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

To the Governor and Deputy-Governor of the Bank of England. [1588.]

GENTLEMEN,

Downing Street, 16th February, 1830.

We have the honour to submit to you our opinion that it is highly expedient to take some further measures for improving the system of banking throughout the country.

We request your concurrence in those measures principally on the ground that any arrangement which may tend to the improvement of the banking system, and may facilitate credit without impairing the stability of the circulation, cannot but be beneficial to the Bank of England.

By surrendering, as the Bank did in 1826, their exclusive privilege as to the number of partners in banking establishments beyond a certain distance from the metropolis, the Bank manifested a desire to assist the views of the government and to satisfy the wants of the country.

The restrictions, however, with which the concession then made by the Bank was accompanied, have in a great degree defeated the object for which it was sought, and the intention of the Bank in making it.

The concession which we deem to be essential is the withdrawal of those restrictions which, in pursuance of the Minute of the Treasury of the 25th January, 1826, were introduced at

the suggestion of the Bank into the 7th George IV. cap. 46, which in the first place prevented joint stock banks from drawing on, or paying in London, bills or notes of a less amount than 50*l.*, and, in the second, subjected the members of such societies to unlimited responsibility.

As, with respect to the first, the Bank have refrained from enforcing it against some of the societies established under the 7th George IV., we do not apprehend that they can feel any objection to give legal effect to an extension of that relaxation which their forbearance evinces their willingness to admit, and which they have not found on experiment prejudicial to themselves.

With respect to the second proposition, the obvious advantage to be derived from the establishment of banking companies upon the most extended and secure foundation, strongly suggests the expediency of obtaining by concession from the Bank of England the power of fixing some limitation to the extent of responsibility which the members of such companies shall incur.

If the Bank shall agree in this general view of the subject, many important points of detail would remain for future consideration.

It may be proper, however, now to state that our present impression is that companies with limited responsibility should be established only by Charter from the Crown. That the extent of responsibility should not be limited merely to the amount subscribed; that a fixed portion, if not the whole of the subscription, should in the first instance be paid up, and that such other measures should be adopted as should tend to secure their prudent management.

Such banks would of course, like others, be restricted from any issue of notes under 5*l.* in value.

In proposing this measure for the consideration of the Bank of England, we do so in the confident belief that it will be found not inconsistent with the substantial interest of the establishment.

The Bank have undoubtedly the right to insist, during the remaining period of their Charter, upon their exclusive privilege, and might therefore, for the present, resist this projected improvement of the banking system.

They have however, on so many occasions, manifested a disposition to promote by all means in their power the interests

of the community, and they must so strongly feel the advantage of contributing under present circumstances to confer additional facilities on the commercial transactions of the country, that we rely upon their ready acquiescence in the present proposal.

We have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

HENRY GOULBURN.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Argyll House, 16th February, 1830.

I have already stated, so explicitly, all that has passed upon the subject of Candia, that I am rather surprised to find you have been misled by Prince Leopold's letter.

Nothing whatever has been agreed to respecting these Greeks, except in strict conformity with your Memorandum. Even in consenting to employ good offices at the Porte to prevent the "cruel exercise of authority," I have expressly declared that this is not to be by means of any mutual engagement, but that each Power is to act separately and independently, according to its own discretion.

If Prince Leopold chooses to take this as sufficient, so much the better. It is true that the Duc de Laval, in the interview with Prince Leopold, made rather stronger professions, although of a general nature; but he was perfectly aware of my decision, and, I have no doubt, is prepared to agree to it. At all events, nothing has yet been written, and, of course, nothing would be agreed to by me without your having approved of it.

I have thought it essential to set you right upon this subject without delay, otherwise you might reasonably be surprised at that part of Prince Leopold's letter which alludes to it.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 16th February, 1830.

I have this instant received the enclosed letter and note from Prince Leopold. I send them to you before communicating the note to Lieven and Laval. You will see that he now stipulates for pecuniary assistance, and troops also; but that he has given way upon the subject of limits.

I am to see the French and Russian plenipotentiaries again to-morrow.

Could the two thousand French troops, now in the Morea, be made to answer the purpose for a few months? When Prince Leopold put this question to me, I declined to give any answer.

Yours most sincerely,

ABERDEEN.

[1589.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 16th February, 1830.

I have perused the papers which you have sent me, which I confess have surprised me much. I considered all the points settled in such manner as that we could subscribe to them; and (excepting the money and the troops) according to my Memorandum sent to Prince Leopold in concert with you and Mr. Peel.

It appears, however, that his second article in particular is conceded, and that he does not consider the money as compensation for the troops.

I never saw any difficulty about troops, if they were not the troops of the three Powers only. The Cabinet, however, overruled my opinion principally on account of the fear of meeting the discussion on the Constitutional Question. They likewise thought it better to guarantee money to pay troops than to supply troops.

The Prince now demands money and troops; and you desire to know my opinion whether the French troops might be allowed to remain. The Cabinet must decide this question. My opinion is that we ought not to consent to the French troops remaining, particularly considering that we have been deceived upon this subject for more than a year.

It should be explained to Prince Leopold clearly in writing, if necessary, that the guarantee of the money is given to him that he may raise troops; that he has plenty of time to raise them; that he may get them if he pleases, when Sovereign of Greece, from any Power of Europe, not one of the three Powers.

My opinion is that the concession of the Prince's Article, No. 2, is an admission on the part of the three Powers that they had not performed their duty by the Greeks in Candia and Samos; and it in fact vests Prince Leopold with a Protectorate of the Greeks. I cannot agree to that in any manner.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Duke of Northumberland.

[1590.]

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 16th February, 1830.

You will have heard of the extraordinary efforts making in Parliament, in concurrence with the complaints of distress in the country, to obtain a reduction of the establishments and expenses of the country.

We have long been acting systematically in a course of reduction of expense. But we are determined to retain what is necessary for the public service and for the maintenance of the honour of the Crown and of the country.

There is one point, however, upon which my colleagues and I cannot form a decision without reference to your Grace's opinion.

It is the salary of the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. You are aware that the salary was raised during the Duke of Richmond's administration from 20,000*l.* to 30,000*l.* per annum (Irish), and it has so continued ever since. If I recollect the matter correctly, this augmentation was originally suggested by me when I was chief Secretary in Ireland, although carried into execution subsequently. The ground upon which I suggested an augmentation was that great part of the expense, I think at that time as much as a fifth of the salary, was occasioned by the necessity under which the Lord-Lieutenant laboured of lighting and firing the whole castle.

We are perfectly aware that the salary of office is no consideration to you, and that you would prefer to serve without salary if your services could be thus accepted. But I wish you to consider, and let me know confidentially your opinion what ought to be the salary of the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. In all these cases it is my opinion that we ought to consider the permanent benefit and convenience of the King's government. It may be convenient to the King to appoint a nobleman to be the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland who has himself a small fortune; and although on the one hand it is not right or proper that the Lord-Lieutenant should save money out of his official salary, it is not reasonable on the other to expect a nobleman should ruin himself and his family by undertaking to perform the duties of an office, of which the salary, together with his own means, would not defray the reasonable expenses. I wish, therefore, that you would assist me with your opinion what you

think would be a fair salary for the office under existing circumstances.

The sum which occurs to us is 20,000*l.* sterling. But we wish to avoid fixing that or any other sum, or even to determine upon any reduction, until I shall hear from your Grace.

Pray present my best respects to the Duchess, and

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1591.] MEMORANDUM FOR LORD ABERDEEN RESPECTING THE
ARRANGEMENTS TO BE MADE FOR THE FINAL SETTLE-
MENT OF THE NEW GREEK STATE.

17th February, 1830.

We have made great sacrifices in order to extricate ourselves from the Treaty of July, 1827. We must take care to avoid entering into new engagements which will equally involve us with our two ALLIES in questions with the Turks, or in a defensive system for Greece; or which will give the other Powers of Europe ground for the belief that Independent Greece is a Dependency of the three Powers; or, in other words, of France and Russia.

I am convinced that we have only to take up just and fair ground upon all remaining points; and *to maintain it* in order to arrange them all to our satisfaction.

There is no objection to the first point in Prince Leopold's paper. But we should take care (and avow that it is our object) that the Act of Guarantee should be so drawn as that all the Powers of Europe might be parties to it.

We ought to avow that we do this in order to put Greece out of the keeping of the three Powers. If we cannot attain this object we ought not to guarantee.

In respect to the second point, we ought to answer that we consider that our Protocol of the 22nd March, 1829, attains all the objects of the Treaty of July, 1827.

We are bound to take care that the stipulations of that Protocol are carried into execution.

We will exert our influence and good offices at the Porte to prevent any cruel exercise of authority; but we ought to object to entering into a new engagement to use our good offices in

concert with the other two Powers. That would be an engagement similar to the Treaty of July, 1827.

We ought particularly to object to this renewal of a Treaty of Interference with the Porte upon the demand of the Prince Sovereign of Greece; and as a condition of his acceptance of the sovereignty.

In respect to the fourth point, I have always thought that it would be necessary that the Prince Sovereign should have the assistance of troops. The Cabinet did not approve of that idea, and preferred the guarantee of a separate loan in order that he might hire troops. Prince Leopold insists upon troops and money.

I feel the same objection to a joint employment of troops with France and Russia as I do to the guarantee of the territory with those Powers alone, and to the 3rd article in respect to the Greeks of Candia and Samos. It is still the Triple Alliance. We shall still be in the hands and at the disposal of our worst enemies in Europe; and all our movements under their direction.

My notion of the force for the Prince Sovereign was that it should be composed of the troops of five or six Powers. But if that is not approved by the Cabinet, and their objection should be to the employment of our troops in this manner, I would then propose that we should pay money instead of giving troops, and that the occupation should be by four or five other Powers.

We may rely upon it that if we take up our ground and maintain it firmly, our propositions are so reasonable, and tend so manifestly to establish the real independence of Greece, that they cannot be rejected without disgrace to our ALLIES and Prince Leopold.

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 17th February, 1830.

I enclose the project of a Protocol which has been left with me, but respecting which of course we could not agree.

They insist strongly upon fulfilling the expectations which have been held out to Prince Leopold of the assistance to be given by the troops of the three Powers. In answer to the notion of this being a continuation of the alliance, they would propose that by the same act or treaty which

grants the troops for a stipulated time, the alliance should be declared at an end, and that its whole action had ceased.

They are prepared to give their guarantee of the loan, provided we decline to have anything to do with it.

I have proposed an alteration for the article respecting Candia.

Perhaps, if there should be time to-day after dinner, we might have some discussion respecting this matter, unless you think it better that it should be deferred.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[1592.]

To the King.

London, 18th February, 1830.

I have had some conversations with Lord Wynford, and the Lord Chancellor has had others, and letters have passed, of which I enclose your Majesty copies, respecting his Lordship's desire to be Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords, and to be paid in that capacity.

The first point appears to be decided. There is no instance of a commission to a Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords which did not include the names of Lords holding high judicial offices, and others, such as particularly the Chief Baron, not being Peers.

The dissatisfaction of his Lordship now turns upon a salary not being granted to him as one of the Commission of Deputy Speakers, which his Lordship states was promised to him.

I perfectly recollect that I waited upon Lord Wynford, by your Majesty's command, in Bedford Square, at the time that his Lordship resigned his office of Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. His Lordship spoke to me upon the subject of a salary for the services which he would be able to perform, and was willing to perform, as Deputy Speaker. I stated the doubts which I entertained that it would be possible to augment the expenses of the House of Lords by the grant of such salary; and his Lordship answered that he could not keep his establishment in London unless he should receive such salary, that if he had not his establishment in London his attendance could not be constant, and that he should come up from his house in the country only occasionally when it was necessary to give his vote, when he would sleep at the house of his son, in Hanover Square.

I have reminded his Lordship of this conversation, of which the above is the substance, and indeed in part the very words; and I think it will show clearly that a salary for the Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords was never considered by me as an arrangement at all probable. In fact Lord Wynford has since parted with his establishment in Bedford Square.

As Lord Wynford has declared his intention of calling your Majesty's attention to this subject, this statement and the enclosed papers are humbly submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Wynford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD DUKE,

Leeson's, 21st February, 1830.

On reading your Grace's last letter a second time, it appears to me to require an answer, because, although your Grace candidly admits several things—for which admissions I am obliged—yet there are inaccuracies in it which it is proper, for your Grace as well as myself, should be corrected. The Lord Chancellor was mistaken when he told your Grace that there was no instance of an appointment of a Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords “except by a commission including the names of the lords and others holding judicial offices.” The journals will show that there is no instance of any commission including more than one name. Lord Gifford was appointed alone; and, although he had the lucrative office of Master of the Rolls, he was to have had a salary for his services in the House of Lords. I thought I was to have been placed in the same situation as Lord Gifford. Sometimes two appointments have been made, the person whose name is in the first appointment being to sit in the absence of the Lord Chancellor; and the person whose name is in the second appointment being to sit in the absence of the Lord Chancellor and of the person first appointed. The Lord Chancellor, the other night, told me that Lord Tenterden held the first appointment. Had I been told this before I resigned I would not have given up my situation; but I will not give offence to an old friend, and therefore I told the Chancellor I would take the second appointment, provided Lord Tenterden was not to interfere when I could sit. Your Grace will perceive that the appointment of one person to sit in the House of Lords in the absence of the Chancellor—and which appointment was promised me by the King, and to which promise your Grace assented—is not the promise of a thing unusual, as your Grace has been led to suppose. I admit that no assistant of the Chancellor has had a salary, because no assistant (except Lord Gifford) ever sat three or four days a-week. Lord Gifford died before the salary was settled, and a compensation has been made to his family. Certainly the word ONLY was not used in our conversation in Bedford Square. I then told your Grace that the King had promised that I should be Deputy Speaker; your

Grace assented to that promise, and on the faith of that promise I resigned my office of Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. It is for your Grace to decide whether his Majesty's sacred promise is to be kept or not. For remuneration I knew that I was to rely on the justice of Parliament. I had only to expect from his Majesty's Ministers that, when they had an opportunity of judging of the nature of my services, they would propose to Parliament to make me some compensation ; and a very small one, in addition to my pension, would have satisfied me.

I am sorry that I cannot have the honour of accepting of your Grace's invitation. An injury of my hand obliges me to avail myself of the services of the son of

Your Grace's obedient servant,

WYNFORD.

[1593.]

To Lord Wynford.

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 22nd February, 1830.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 21st inst.

I was no party to making any promise, excepting that you should be appointed Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords. I spoke with doubt of a salary for the performance of the duty of that office. In conversation with your Lordship, I have already stated the purport of what passed with your Lordship upon that subject ; and I have referred in my letters to what you said upon that occasion, viz., that if a salary was not given to you, you could not keep your house and establishment in town ; that you could not attend constantly in the House of Lords, and that when you should attend, you would sleep at your son's house in Hanover Square. Your Lordship has acted accordingly.

I spoke advisedly when I talked with doubt of the salary to the Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords. I never could have contemplated any other appointment of your Lordship as Deputy Speaker excepting the ordinary one. If I had, I must have made up my mind to deprive the Lord Chancellor of the assistance in the House of Lords which his predecessors have had, particularly in latter times ; as your Lordship stated to me that you could not attend regularly unless you should be enabled to have an establishment in town by receiving a salary.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Prince Leopold to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Claremont, 24th February, 1830.

I have forwarded to-day my adhesion to the plenipotentiaries, and this affair is therefore concluded.

I shall be in town on Saturday. Would 12 o'clock on that day suit you to see me? if not, any time on Sunday morning which would better suit your convenience.

Believe me, in the meantime, with sentiments of the highest regard,

My dear Duke, yours most faithfully,

LEOPOLD.

To Lord Wynford.

[1594.]

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 26th February, 1830.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter in Lady Wynford's handwriting.

I have already told your Lordship verbally and in writing what my recollection was of what passed in conversation between your Lordship and me in Bedford Square.

I never heard of any difference of opinion between your Lordship and me respecting the distresses. That difference can consist only in the degree in which such distresses may be stated to exist. There can be none respecting the desirableness, nay, the necessity, of everything being done that can be to afford relief.

In this view of the case I put out of the question such party questions as were mooted last night in the House of Lords. I conclude that your Lordship is not desirous of mixing yourself up in such discussions. However, if you should think it proper to do so, you cannot alter the respect with which I have always been your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. J. Abercrombie to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY LORD,

Devonshire House, Thursday morning.

The communication which you did me the honour to make to me yesterday took me entirely by surprise, that I could not, in prudence, give a prompt and decisive answer. Subsequent reflection suggested some points on which doubts occurred to me, and I thought it was my duty to see Mr. Peel, whose explanations have been quite satisfactory; and it only remains for me to express my readiness to discharge, to the best of my ability, the duties of the office* to which you have been pleased to recommend to the

* Chief Baron of Scotland.

King that I should be appointed. I beg to assure your Grace that I feel most sensibly the handsome and gratifying way in which the arrangement has been proposed to me; and it is particularly agreeable to me that the circumstances and duties of the office to which I am about to be appointed are such as to enable me to meet your proposal with unmixed satisfaction. I am sorry that my answer should have been delayed longer than I anticipated or wished, but the circumstances which I have stated will, I hope, satisfactorily explain the cause.

I have the honour to be,

your Grace's most obedient and faithful servant,

J. ABERCROMBIE.

Prince Leopold to the King.

SIRE,

Marlborough House, le 27 février 1830.

J'apprends avec le chagrin le plus profond, par Lord Aberdeen, que Votre Majesté croit avoir des raisons d'être mécontente de ma conduite.

Si Votre Majesté daigne passer en revue les quinze années qui se sont écoulées depuis qu'Elle a daigné me faire appeler dans ce pays-ci, Elle y trouvera des preuves uniformes de respect et de déférence à Ses Augustes volontés. Dans les circonstances actuelles j'ai été guidé par les mêmes sentimens; un manque de respect vers Votre Majesté, de ma part, n'a pas existé, et ne pouvait pas exister. Si j'avais entendu que Votre Majesté avait exprimé quelque déplaisir relativement aux négociations, j'avais également entendu qu'on avait pu prouver à Votre Majesté, de la manière la plus satisfaisante, qu'on avait été loin d'oser Lui donner les raisons les plus éloignées de mécontentement. Pour moi individuellement, j'avais toujours formé la résolution de ne pas entrer dans la carrière pleine de sacrifices et de difficultés qui m'était offerte, sans avoir l'approbation et la puissante protection de Votre Majesté. Je ne puis pas Lui donner une preuve plus éclatante de la sincérité de ces sentimens qu'en résignant, avec pleine confiance, la position dans laquelle les négociations m'ont placé, entre les mains de Votre Majesté.

Je me conformerai aux Augustes volontés que Votre Majesté daignera me faire connaître à ce sujet, et La supplie d'agréer l'hommage du profond respect avec lequel

J'ai l'honneur d'être, Sire, de Votre Majesté,

le très-humble et très-obéissant sujet et beau-fils,

LEOPOLD.

Prince Leopold to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

I have received a letter from Lord Aberdeen, in which there are some misconceptions. Before I answer, I wish to have some conversation with your Grace. I send you this note to Windsor; not being sure, by your own account, to meet you at Osterley this evening.

I remain, with the highest and sincerest regard,

my dear Duke, your Grace's most faithfully,

LEOPOLD.

To Prince Leopold.

[1595.]

SIR,

London, 3rd March, 1830.

Since I had last the honour of an interview with your Royal Highness I have made enquiry regarding the possibility of your Royal Highness making to the Commissioners of Woods and Forests a transfer of your possessions of Claremont, to be resumed at the pleasure of your Royal Highness, the Commissioners in the mean time paying the expenses attending the keeping up the place out of the revenues of the estate forming part of the possession vested in your Royal Highness under the Act of Parliament. I find that it would be impossible to adopt this measure, or for the Woods and Forests to interfere with this possession excepting so far as, and in the manner in which, they are authorized to interfere by law.

I have likewise enquired respecting the practicability of the Treasury taking Marlborough House off your Royal Highness's hands. This measure is likewise impracticable unless a very large expense should be incurred as well immediately as eventually. The means of defraying this expense do not exist without first applying to Parliament, and it is not probable that Parliament would be disposed to grant those means at present, the house not being required, in order to avoid the incurring a larger expense in five years hence when the property will come into possession of the Crown.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Sir Richard Birnie.

[1596.]

DEAR SIR,

London, 4th March, 1830.

I enclose a letter from the person who was imprisoned some days ago upon the information of a police officer for his conduct towards myself in Parliament Street. This person appeared to me to be insane. He first passed me, and in a certain degree jostled me, between Downing Street and Parliament Street. I crossed Parliament Street, and he being on the right of the street crossed over, and nearly jostled me again.

He then waited till I came up to and passed him, and having again overtaken me he asked me some question respecting the time at which the park would be shut up.

Whether he would have time to go to Lambeth and back, and should find the park still open. This was done rather in a tone of violence than in that of a person who wanted information. I answered him that I could not give him the required information, and he continued to press his question in the same tone. All this time he was inconveniently close to me; and all but jostling me. So much so that I told him that I could hear him and that there was no necessity for his approaching so near.

When he arrived at the turning to Westminster Bridge I told him that that was his way to Lambeth.

He appeared to be becoming more violent when the police officer came up and took him away.

If this man was not insane his conduct was certainly very unjustifiable.

I remain, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1597.]

To Colonel —.

MY DEAR —,

London, 5th March, 1830.

I have received your letter, and I assure you that you do me great injustice if you believe that I am not anxious to forward your views.

In respect to the Government of St. Vincent's it is in the gift of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It is true that he has allowed me to recommend to him a gentleman to be appointed to fill that situation. But if he had not done so, and if the arrangement above referred to were not still under consideration, you could not be selected for that office, as there is a rule in the Colonial Office that officers shall not be appointed to fill the offices of governor of one of the colonies, of rank inferior to major-generals.

I don't know what ground you have for stating that *my personal objection closes Europe against you*.

The diplomatic appointments of the government are made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. If I am to get one it must be by solicitation; and I must say that it is a little too hard upon me to be told by an old friend that he cannot succeed in obtaining an office from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs because I have a personal objection to him.

It will be but justice to Lord Aberdeen, as well as to me, that you should explain yourself upon this point. I know nothing of Lord Aberdeen's arrangements about Greece or Turkey or the East of Europe, and you have my authority for saying that I can have no feeling towards you excepting good wishes and regard.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Thomas Clarkson, Esq.

[1598.]

SIR,

8th March, 1830.

I have received your letter and statement, and your petition to his Majesty as agent of the Committee of Thread Lace Manufacturers, and that of the inhabitants of the counties of Buckingham, Bedford, and Northampton. The Secretary of State for the Home Department is the officer whose duty it is to present to the King the petitions of his subjects.

If you wish that I should deliver the petition to the Secretary of State I will do so; or I will dispose of it in any other manner that you may direct. I must apprise you, however, that the King will necessarily refer the petition to the Committee of the Privy Council for the Affairs of Trade, and you are already acquainted with their opinion upon the subject to which it relates.

There are several points discussed in your statement and in the petition.

One of these is that the King should receive the nobility and gentry of the country at a certain number of Drawing Rooms, and should direct that those who appear at the Drawing Rooms should be dressed in Buckinghamshire lace.

I am convinced that you will upon consideration see that, even if the King had a residence in London at which he could habitually receive the public, if the state of his health permitted him to reside in London, and it suited his Majesty's convenience to receive the nobility and gentry at Drawing Rooms, he could not require them to wear Buckinghamshire lace.

If the use of lace is the fashion it will be worn whether the King orders the use of it or not. If it is not the fashion it will not be worn, though the King might order the use of it.

But I beg you besides to observe that even if lace be worn

it does not follow that the lace used would be manufactured in Buckinghamshire.

I understand that lace is manufactured elsewhere at a lower price by the use of machinery, and it is impossible to expect that any order or even fashion can compel the use of the more expensive lace.

Another object of your statement and of the petition is to obtain an increase of the duty upon foreign lace, and of the use of a stamp to mark the lace manufactured in Buckinghamshire.

There are proofs now before the public that large quantities of lace manufactured in England are exported to France and there fraudulently introduced. Lace in this country must consequently be both better and cheaper than in France. The existing duty must consequently be sufficient to protect the lace manufacturers in England from the competition in the English market of the lace manufacturers abroad.

In respect to the use of a stamp on English lace the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade are decidedly of opinion that there is no measure which can be adopted which would be so injurious to the trade in lace as the use of such a stamp.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1599.]

To Lord Conyngham.

MY DEAR LORD CONYNGHAM,

London, 8th March, 1830.

I have received your proxies and am much obliged to you.

The Duke of Richmond is very unwell, and it is possible that we shall not have his question on Thursday.

I will let you know if it should be put off.

I am sorry that Lord Roden has given his proxy to Lord Liston; the latter nobleman is in opposition to the King's government I believe.

I assure you, my dear Lord, that the transaction of the King's business becomes a most difficult and arduous task, almost impossible to be performed. If something is not done to convince the public that the King does feel an interest in the measures of his government, or rather in the rejection of those measures proposed by their opponents, some misfortune will

happen which will occasion to his Majesty a great deal of trouble and vexation if not followed by other consequences.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Stuart de Rothesay.

[1600.]

MY DEAR STUART,

London, 8th March, 1830.

I return Mr. Sinnett's letter. This gentleman is one of those who speculate upon inventing plans and projects for government when they have nothing else to do. There are thousands of them at present in England ; as well as I believe elsewhere ; the offspring of the march of intellect. Their object is money ; which, please God, they shall not get from the Public Treasury. The mode of acquiring it is an audience. They would depart from the audience pretending to be under the impression that the plan is to be adopted, and then would commence a new era in their fortunes. The projector would have a grievance. Either his plan is not adopted, and his time and trouble have been employed in the public service to no purpose, or something upon the same subject being done, his ideas have been borrowed by the stupid minister, and he ought to be rewarded to the full amount that Mr. Palmer has received and has claimed from the public for improvements in the internal carriage of the mails.

This is the outline of the case of the whole race of projectors. I therefore never receive any of them. I never ask for or encourage them to send their plans. I am the recipient of them very much against my inclination.

You had better tell Mr. Sinnett that you sent me his letter ; but that I returned it without requesting you to give him any answer.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Lauderdale.

[1601.]

MY DEAR LORD LAUDERDALE,

London, 10th March, 1830.

Since I received your letter I have seen Lord Arbuthnot, and have spoken to him respecting the transfer to his son of his half-

pay company. He is convinced that the regulations of the service will not allow of this arrangement unless his son will consent to settle in some of the colonies.

Indeed he has just spoken to me respecting the purchase of a half-pay company for the same son. I have, since I saw him, recommended this arrangement to the General Commanding the Army in Chief.

I was in hopes we should have seen you before now, and I still hope that you will come up soon.

Matters have been in a curious state since the last Session of Parliament. But I have latterly been in hopes that they were improving. I never doubted that if the Duke of Cumberland had not come to England, or if coming here events had not occurred at a very early period which irritated his temper and occasioned a quarrel between him and the government, not only we should have carried the Roman Catholic question without difficulty, but the measure would not have been attended by any lengthened difference with the friends of the government. The measure might likewise have produced in Ireland more important results even at this early period. It is likewise probable that we should not have heard quite so much upon the distresses of the country, and what we should have heard would not have been exaggerated. However, as I told you before, I hope that we are improving, and that we shall by degrees get quite right.

The King was very ill during the month of January, and I don't think that he has recovered so easily as upon former occasions. He is better however, and he is well upon his legs. I hope, therefore, that if we can keep him quiet the warm weather will set him up entirely.

We are employed in the House of Lords in a Committee to enquire into the government and trade of the East India Company. I don't think that this Committee will discover anything that is new. It will have the effect, however, of making the truth public.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Conyngham.

[1602.]

MY DEAR LORD CONYNGHAM, London, 12th March, 1830.

Lord Holland last night gave notice to the House of Lords that the Duke of Richmond would make his motion on Thursday next.

I shall be very much obliged to you, consequently, if you will attend; and if you will have directions sent to the other Lords of the Household.

The Duke of Richmond is quite well. He has been out, and Lord Holland told me that he would certainly bring forward his motion. But I will take care to let you know if I should hear of any alteration.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1603.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, London, 15th March, 1830.

I recommend to you that you should look at a letter from Baron Bülow to the King of Prussia, before you see Prince Leopold this day. It will show you what he is doing, and what his objects are. I wish that I had seen it before I went to him yesterday. I should have approached him, having already the knowledge of his views and intentions, which I acquired during the interview.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1604.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, London, 15th March, 1830.

It appears to me that we must consider well our proceedings in respect to the letter from the Emperor of Brazils to the King. If I recollect correctly this letter is dated in June, and was delivered to you on the 11th of March, after the bearer of it had been in England for a month.

Our object is to gain time for the return of the Emperor's answer to our last offer of negotiation, sent from hence in December, before we take any step respecting the Regency at

Terceira. If it is necessary, I am ready to say at once that I will not recognise the Regency at Terceira. But others may not be of my opinion; and it is as well to gain time.

We have reason to suspect every communication purporting to come from the Emperor of Brazil. But this one is peculiarly liable to suspicion, from its date; the want of notification from your minister in Brazil, that a gentleman was coming with such a letter; the length of time which has elapsed since the gentleman arrived in England and before he presented himself to you.

It appears to me, then, that you should let this gentleman know that you intend to inquire about this letter before you should deliver it to the King.

The only place of inquiry is Rio de Janeiro; and you must have the answer to your communication of December before you can receive the result of the inquiry.

This mode of proceeding will have the additional advantage of enabling you to point out to the Emperor Don Pedro, that the mere nomination of persons to be Regents does not constitute the Regency of a kingdom to be recognised by his Majesty. They must have a territory or a people to govern, and means at their disposal to maintain themselves and to govern and protect those placed under their rule, not merely revolutionary, but such as foreign Powers can recognise as legitimate.

According to this mode of proceeding, we shall very easily get the better of this difficulty.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1605.]

To the Duke of Northumberland.

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 16th March, 1830.

I have received your letter with the enclosure from Lord Donoughmore, and I am very much obliged to you for this communication. Lord Donoughmore's sentiments appear to concur very much with those of the noblemen and gentlemen of the same party attending in Parliament; and his course would be very much the same as theirs, that is to say, that he would very frequently oppose the views of the government.

The truth is, that there are at present five distinct parties in

Parliament. The Whigs are in two parties, those attached to Lord Grey, and those attached to Lord Holland and Lord Lansdowne. Both these are more or less hostile to the government; the latter the most so. Mr. Huskisson's party is likewise decidedly hostile to the government; as likewise a party of Brunswickers, kept together principally by the manœuvres of the Duke of Cumberland and his supposed influence with the King.

Against all these is the party of government, which is stronger than them all; and as all these parties prefer the government to any other (excepting possibly the two first which might easily unite, and the third which would unite with any of the others against the government), I conceive that we are more than a match for the whole united.

From this statement your Grace will be able to judge of the value of Lord Donoughmore's declaration.

You will have been surprised at some proceedings in the country lately, particularly in Hertfordshire, in Kent, &c., in a sort of apparent co-operation between the Aristocracy of the country and the Radicals. I confess that I cannot account for these proceedings. But they will show you what the state of parties is. However, the government appears to gain in confidence every day; and I entertain no doubt that the country will be satisfied with the measures of the session.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Rev. —.

[1606.]

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 21st March, 1830.

I did not send you any answer upon the subject of your desire to be appointed my domestic chaplain.

The fact is, that I have no domestic chaplain, and my reason for having avoided to appoint any is, that I disapprove of the privileges which such appointment gives to a clergyman of the Church of England.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1607.]

To Lord Downshire.

MY DEAR LORD DOWNSHIRE,

London, 22nd March, 1830.

I have to apologise for having suffered your letter of the 4th instant, enclosing that of the 25th of February from Mr. McMullen upon the Irish coal-duties, to remain unanswered for so long a period of time. But as you will have perceived the government, during a part of that time, must have had under consideration that portion of the taxation of the country; and that in proposing to Parliament, as the King's servants have done, the repeal of certain taxes leaving those upon coal, they did so upon full consideration of the subject.

The truth is, that Ireland stands upon better ground in respect to coal than any part of England supplied with coals by sea; that is to say, all parts of England, including this great town, excepting those parts of the country of which coal is the produce.

I assure you that there is nothing of which the King's servants, in compliance with the known wishes of Parliament, are so anxious as that every measure should be adopted which it is possible to adopt, to cultivate the resources of Ireland; and to give that country every advantage.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Lord F. L. Gower to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Br. House, 27th March, 1830.

I find that Lady F—— has taken an earlier opportunity of speaking to you on a subject of some importance to me than I thought she would have found. I think it right that I should add some comment on what she communicated, to prevent any possible misconception of my views and feelings in the matter, and to put you in possession of accurate information with regard to them. It is now nearly two years since, in consequence, I may say entirely, of your good opinion, I obtained an office, the great advantages of which, to anyone starting in public life, are too numerous and obvious for me now to advert to them. It is impossible for anyone to rate them at a higher value than I do, from experience. With regard to my continuance in this office, I am most anxious and determined to consult, in the first instance, and in preference to every other consideration, be it what it may, the interests and convenience of your government and that of Mr. Peel. If, however, the time should arrive when, with every attention to those interests, my present situation could be advantageously filled by another, there are considerations, purely

of a personal and domestic nature, which weigh with me so far, that instead of being displeased with such an arrangement, I should be gratified by its adoption.

It is right, however, that you should be aware of another circumstance, which, if the convenience of government should ever come into question as connected with this subject, may add to the difficulties which often attend official changes. I have reason to think that the continuance of the present Lord-Lieutenant in office depends more immediately than I could wish upon mine. It is quite impossible not to be much flattered by this conviction, but it is also painful to me to think that if circumstances should enable me to take the course most consonant to my own inclinations, his official career might be interrupted, or, if continued, be rendered for the moment less agreeable to him than it now appears to be. At a rough calculation, I should guess that he would remain in Ireland, in the natural course of events, till the end of the next Session of Parliament. If, before this, any arrangement should present itself which would meet my wishes, I should certainly be unwilling to delay it till that period. I have thought it right to communicate with you on the subject before I made any similar communication of my feelings to the Lord-Lieutenant, which might by possibility affect his own views; but when I learn yours, I owe it to him to be explicit and confidential on the whole subject. The circumstance to which I have adverted is in itself a sufficient indication of the personal and private terms on which our official connection has placed us. I approve of his public conduct, as much as I am satisfied with the private relations which have grown up between us; and I am most anxious to show my sense of the obligations I am under towards him on every proceeding.

Believe me, my dear Duke,

yours most faithfully,

F. LEVESON GOWER.

MEMORANDUM UPON AN AMNESTY FOR PORTUGUESE SUBJECTS. [1608.]

30th March, 1830.

1. All political offences committed or supposed to have been committed by Portuguese subjects since the are pardoned; and those charged with such offences, or convicted thereof, are absolved from all their legal consequences. Those in confinement shall be set at liberty; the property, whether movable or immovable, of all those whether charged or convicted shall be restored to them; and they may return in security to Portugal on the following conditions:—

2. Those who may think proper to return to Portugal are to enter Portugal by Lisbon, Oporto, Figuiera, Elvas, Almeida, or Braganza; and are to take the oath of allegiance to his Majesty before the magistrate of the town by which they shall enter the

kingdom. This magistrate will give to each a passport to the place of his abode and a certificate that he has taken the oath of allegiance.

3. Such as may think proper to remain in foreign countries, or as are required not to enter Portugal by 4th article of this Indulto, must within six months take the oaths of allegiance before the minister plenipotentiary of Portugal accredited at the Court of the country in which such Portuguese subject may be, or before such Portuguese consul, if there should be no such minister plenipotentiary.

4. The following persons, although enjoying all the advantages of the 1st article of this Act of Grace, are required not to re-enter Portugal for two years, unless his Majesty should be pleased to give his permission at an earlier period.

5. This Indulto extends to all the dominions of Portugal, whether on the Continent or in the Islands. Those charged with or convicted of political offences in all such dominions and places are pardoned on condition that they appear before the civil magistrate within , and take the oath of allegiance to his Majesty.

WELLINGTON.

[1609.] MEMORANDUM UPON MONS. EYNARD'S DEMAND OF 700,000*l.* AT 4 PER CENT., OR A GUARANTEE FOR 28,000*l.* PER ANNUM, FOR PRINCE LEOPOLD.

2nd April, 1830.

It appears that Mons. Eynard now requires for Prince Leopold a guarantee for 28,000*l.* per annum, or 700,000*l.* of capital at 4 per cent. interest from each of the three Powers.

We are willing to give a guarantee for 500,000*l.*, to be borrowed in seven years, as stated in our Memorandum. Our view was to supply the Prince with the means of procuring for himself troops, having always told him that we could not supply him with money or guarantee for him a loan.

It is quite obvious that we have consented to guarantee loans to a larger amount than is necessary to afford his Royal Highness the means of procuring troops. I have never supposed it necessary that the Prince should have more than from four to six thousand men. Supposing our contingent to be 1500 men, their cost would be about 36,000*l.*, whereas we give him the

means of borrowing 80,000*l.* the first year, and 70,000*l.* for the six following years ; or 44,000*l.* the first year and 34,000*l.* in each of the following years more than is necessary for defraying the expenses of the troops.

Supposing the Emperor of Russia does what we have proposed to do, he will equally find the means of supplying the Prince with a sum amounting to 44,000*l.* in the first year, and 34,000*l.* in each of the six following years.

The sum supplied by the King of France will be greater, inasmuch as his Most Christian Majesty gives the service of his troops, about 1500 men, now in the Morea.

These supplies will be in addition to the means of paying his Royal Highness's troops, and to his own personal means, enjoyed under his treaty with, and the laws of, this country.

The question for his Royal Highness, Mons. Eynard, and his Royal Highness's advisers to consider is this : Considering all that has passed upon this subject, as well in this country and at Paris as elsewhere ; considering that his Royal Highness never made any difficulty upon the subject of money till after the Protocol was submitted to him for signature ; that he was repeatedly told by me both before and since the signature of the Protocol of the 20th February that this country could neither lend nor guarantee loans of money, and that in point of fact the article of the Protocol respecting money refers only to the payment for troops ; and considering what the resources of Greece itself are ; is it fit that his Royal Highness should decline to accept the sovereignty on the grounds that he has not the means of settling his government ?

It is quite obvious that for seven years at least the Allies will furnish him with the means of procuring any money that it is possible that he can require. We know that there is at this moment a clear disposable produce of revenue in Greece amounting to 300,000*l.* per annum. It must be expected that this produce will increase.

There is besides at the disposal of the government at this moment large tracts of land, which must give the Greek government the means of making any pecuniary arrangements that might be necessary.

I am quite certain that we should not be justified in going farther than we have done. We have done everything that can in reason be required from us. It will be for the Prince

and his advisers to determine whether he ought after what has passed to persist in the course which he has announced in his last letter to Lord Aberdeen.

WELLINGTON.

Sir John Malcolm to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Bombay, 4th April, 1830.

I am just returned from Cutch, after having visited the whole line of our western frontier, on which I have obtained information that will, I trust, be very valuable. I have besides, by visiting every station, been able to make many reforms that will promote both economy and efficiency. The six or seven months I have yet to stay will be devoted to the winding-up of my government, and I shall leave this in a steam-vessel for Suez about the end of the year, and see you, I hope, in February, in as good, if not better, health than when I left you. I do not anticipate you will before that have finished with Indian affairs. It is a vast subject, and to my view the difficulty of governing this country is increased a hundredfold by the late successes of our arms. I hope the changes in our system of rule, which are called for by changes in our condition, will not be hastily decided upon. On them will depend much of our future strength and stability. It is, however, a subject upon which I shall early give you my sentiments.

I was obliged by your kind note to Lady Malcolm about my son. He joins the Queen's at Poonah, and as that corps is commanded by Colonel Willshire, a very strict officer and excellent drill, I trust the youngster will be well *entered*. I have had glorious sport lately in Cutch and Kattywar.

I am your Grace's most sincerely,

JOHN MALCOLM.

Sir John Malcolm to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Bombay, 5th April, 1830.

I send you copy of a short letter I sent you through Persia. The points on which I mean to write you are: the modifications required in the frame of the local governments; their future positions, particularly that which is supreme (the progress of Russia and of steam will materially affect this question); the early receipt of intelligence by the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, with the power of rapidly conveying orders to every part of India, will be primary considerations that sooner or later must plant the Governor-General on the western side of India. You have commenced well with his Majesty's courts of law; but much is required before the good work of limiting them is completed; but it must be done, or we shall incur more hazard from these establishments than ever we yet have from our enemies in India.

I remain your Grace's most sincerely,

JOHN MALCOLM.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

India Board, 10th April, 1830.

I send you the papers which have been selected and copied relative to the Hyderabad question.

Sir W. Rumbold was permitted by the Bengal government to go to Hyderabad, and the orders of the Court of Directors were so far relaxed by Lord W. Bentinck, that Sir W. Rumbold was permitted to enter into an engagement for himself only, and not for others, that no new pecuniary transactions should be entered into.

Do you wish to have the correspondence and minutes, &c., upon this point, and subsequent to the arrival of Sir W. Rumbold at Hyderabad? They are voluminous, and, it seems to me, unimportant.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

I have received the warrant for Lieutenant Clane, with the King's signature.

[ENCLOSURES.]

EXTRACT from MR. JONES's Report on Transactions at Hydrabad,
16th Jan. 1826.

When the Aurungabad contract was under consideration at the Council Board, the Resident was directed, among other matters, to state whether he considered any guaranty to be implied on the part of the British government? His answer affirmed that there was no assurance or understanding, express or implied, which could possibly be construed into a pledge on the part of the British government to *enforce the fulfilment of the Nizam's engagement*, and that the only security which the house possessed was the good faith of Rajah Chundoo Lol, and the degree of influence which the Resident might consider himself called upon to exert in their behalf, in case of a failure on the part of the Nizam to adhere to his agreement. But the precise understanding which the house entertained on this material point will best appear from their own words. "We have never understood," say they, "that a guaranty of any sort was afforded to us by the British government, or that any pecuniary liability whatever on the part of the Honourable Company was involved, either in the encouragement which you gave to the arrangement, or in the support which we expected from you, for our security in the conduct of it. But we must observe that, in a country where there are no regular Courts of Judicature, we never could have established an extensive mercantile concern, without the conviction that we should receive from the Resident that support which is essential to the transactions of any British merchant in this country; and that we conceived ourselves justified in looking for that support in consequence of the letters which the supreme government was pleased to address to you on the subject of our establishment. We beg to add that we *have no security for the liquidation of the orders granted to us on the revenues of certain districts beyond the good faith of the minister, and such an eventual support from your influence, as from the justness of our demands, and the public utility of our agreement, you may deem it proper to afford us.*"

A similar reference was made by Mr. Russell to the house with respect to the 60 Lac Loan. Their answer, dated 19th May, 1820, is as follows:—"By the sanction which we require from the Resident, we do not mean to imply

any security by which the British government would be responsible for the money we should lend to the minister; all we require is, the certainty that the Resident will use his *influence to prevent our being defrauded*, or any misappropriation made of the revenues of the talookdars, on which we are to have assignments. *We shall never require that influence to be exerted beyond the point to which the Resident can go without making it a subject of discussion between our government and his Highness the Nizam's.*

The government prevailed upon the Nizam to relinquish the annual pesheush or tribute formerly payable to him for the Northern Circars, in consideration for an immediate payment of the sum of Hyderabad rupees 1,16,66,666—which sum, either with or without the *cordial* assent of Chundoo Lol, has been appropriated as follows:—

To the liquidation of certain pecuniary demands of the British government on his Highness the Nizam . . .	36,26,232
To Messrs. W. Palmer and Company . . .	78,70,670
Balance 20th November, 1823 . . .	1,69,762
	1,16,66,666 (fractions omitted).

The sum paid, as above stated, to W. Palmer and Company was about 20 lacs short of the amount of their claims on the Nizam's government in the month of November, 1823. The said sum of 20 lacs, or thereabouts, was estimated as little more than enough to set against the bonus and the allowances to the Palmer family, which charges were deemed to be not fit to be recognised either by the British government or by that of Hyderabad.

By this somewhat hasty proceeding, the Bengal government not only sanctioned but actually settled and paid all the charges in the accounts of Messrs. Palmer and Company, with the exception of the *bonus* and the *pensions to the Palmer family*, and thereby closed the door against any further scrutiny into the correctness of their charges and pecuniary transactions.

In July, 1820, neither the supreme government nor the Resident contemplated such a degree of interference in the Nizam's internal administration as has been since exercised.

From Mr. Jones's Report it would appear—

(1.) That the sanction of the Bengal government, or the countenance of the Resident, was in some shape or form given to all the pecuniary transactions of the house of Palmer and Company with the Nizam's government.

(2.) That the sanction thus given did not entail upon the Bengal government any the slightest degree of pecuniary responsibility to the house.

(3.) That it did not imply a promise to enforce the payment of their claims on the Nizam's government, nor even to exert a degree of influence which should produce irritating discussions between the two governments.

(4.) That the assurances of support to the house had reference merely to the abstract nature of their dealings, and involved no pledge to procure, by means even of moderate influence, the payment by the Nizam's government of whatever sum the house might demand on account of their several loans, and still less on account of their commercial dealings, the whole of which were, therefore, liable to minute investigation.

(5.) That, however, the Bengal government, in their eagerness to terminate the dealings of the house with the state of Hyderabad, have actually paid, without sufficient examination, all the demands of the house, whether for money lent, for goods sold, or for interest, with the exception of the bonus

and of the allowances to the Palmer family; and in so doing have, in effect, relinquished the right of scrutinizing the general charges as stated in the detailed accounts delivered in by the house.

(6.) That the sanction to the 60 Lac Loan having been given, without first ascertaining the terms upon which it was made, the Bengal government had no just ground to declare that the sanction was violated or invalidated by the subsequent discovery of the bonus which had been granted by the minister who had been left to make his own terms with the house, and who distinctly declared that, even with that addition, the money was obtained on lower terms than it could have been procured from other money dealers. And, lastly,

(7.) That under the circumstances which have been stated respecting the allowances to the Palmer family, it is at least doubtful whether the Bengal government have not overstepped the legitimate bounds of their interference in arbitrarily determining to strike out of the accounts of Messrs. Palmer and Company disbursements actually made by the direction of the Nizam's government.

COPY of a LETTER to Bengal in the Political Department, dated the
12th March, 1828.

We have received your several letters in this department of the dates noted below* on the affairs of Hyderabad.

It is not our intention at present to enter upon a detailed review of the series of proceedings to which you have drawn our attention in these communications, as well as in your previous letters, the receipt of which was acknowledged in the 99th paragraph of our despatch from this department, dated 21st January, 1824.

With more particular reference to your letter dated the 28th July, 1826, wherein you evince some anxiety to be informed whether the proceedings which you adopted on the receipt of our despatches, one from the Political Department, dated the 3rd August, 1825, and another from the Public Department, dated the 15th February, 1826, were such as we intended; we have no hesitation in returning an answer in the affirmative, qualified, however, with one exception of some importance. We regret, indeed, that the circumstance of the opinion given by the twelve judges in the House of Peers as to the legal construction of the Act 13th Geo. III. cap. 13, section 30, having been transmitted, unaccompanied with instructions, should have occasioned to you some temporary embarrassment. The omission in our despatch of the 3rd August, 1825, arose from our taking it for granted that you would give to the more authoritative declaration of the law by the judges the same publicity which you had previously given to the opinion of the law officers of the Crown and Company, and was so far supplied in our despatch of February following, as to leave no room for doubt respecting our intentions, which were in part fulfilled by your determination to publish the opinion of the judges in the 'Government Gazette,' and to transmit it to the different political residents and agents, with instructions that it should be promulgated to all whom it might concern.

Your orders to that effect were conveyed in a circular letter, dated the 26th July, 1826, addressed, among others, to the Resident at Hyderabad, who

* 31st October, 1823; 5th December, 1823; 25th October, 1825; 28th July, 1826.

was, in another letter of the same date, furnished with a copy of our orders from the Public Department, dated 15th February preceding; and Mr. Martin, in a letter to your chief secretary, dated the 25th August following, thus replied to the latter communication: "In obedience to the orders conveyed to me in the 3rd paragraph of that letter, I have made the necessary communication to the minister and also to the members of the house, who are at Hyderabad, and their trustees." And in another letter from the Resident, dated the 15th November, 1826, to the same address, he says, "A communication, however, has been made both to the Nizam's ministers and to the officer presiding in native court of justice, of the opinion, contrary to that before announced to them, which has been delivered by the twelve judges; but I have confined myself, as I apprised you, to a statement of the fact of that contrariety, without undertaking to determine the legal inferences which ought to be deduced from it, and on which the parties interested in the question must be left to form their own judgment."

We regret that you thought it necessary to accompany your communication of the opinion of the judges to Mr. Martin with the copy of a letter from our Advocate-General, in which doubts are thrown upon the extent of the authority to which that opinion is entitled.

We have consulted the law officers of the Crown and the standing counsel of the Company, and we entertain no doubt that the answer given by the judges in the House of Lords has practically the effect of concluding the question, and that, while the law remains unaltered, a loan contracted out of the British territory cannot be considered as illegal on account of any rate of interest reserved on it, which rate is not prohibited by the laws of the country where the loan is made, and where the lender is domiciled.

Our decided wish is that the trustees of Messrs. W. Palmer and Company, and the debtors of that firm, should stand in the same situation they would have occupied if the opinion of the law officers had not been taken and promulgated respecting the extent of the application of the Act 13th Geo. III. cap. 13, section 30.

It may, however, be questioned whether the relation in which the trustees stand towards the debtors of the late firm has not been rendered less favourable by the use which has been made of the opinions previously transmitted. Although the same publicity has, under your orders, and conformably to our intentions, been given to the opinion of the twelve judges, as had been before given to the opinions of the Attorney and Solicitor-General, and Mr. Serjeant Bosanquet, viz., by publishing it for general information, and by imparting it to the representatives of the firm, the ministers of the Nizam, and President of the court of justice at Hyderabad, yet a simple communication of this sort cannot have removed, as it was desirable it should have done, the impression created by the promulgation at an earlier period of a contrary opinion formally adopted and laid down as a rule of conduct by our government. On turning to Mr. Swinton's letter to the Resident at Hyderabad, dated 17th October, 1823, we find that the Resident was not only interdicted in consequence of the opinion of the law officers of the Crown and Company from giving any facility to the recovery of claims on which a higher rate of interest than 12 per cent. per annum was demanded, but was instructed as follows, and though the instruction *was exclusively* prospective, it could hardly fail, if known, to have considerable influence on past but still unsettled transactions. His instructions were: "As far as possible to restrain all secret attempts on the part of any British-born subjects at Hyderabad to engage in usurious loans. You are hereby directed to communicate to the Nizam's government, and to the officer presiding in the native court of justice, as well as generally to all

native dealers in money, that the British government considers all such transactions on the part of British-born subjects to be illegal, that the securities are void, and that the parties taking such illegal interest are liable to punishment in an English court of law. In the event of any open contravention of the law, you will consider it to be your duty to report the circumstance for the information of government, when the necessary measures will be taken for the removal of the offender from his Highness's dominions, and for such further punishment as the case may require."

Our object in the present paragraphs is to remove any just cause of complaint by the trustees of William Palmer and Company on the ground that the recovery of the debts of the late firm is obstructed by the use that has thus been made of a law opinion which has since been overruled, and it is our desire that you issue such orders to the Resident as you may deem expedient in order to remove the impression created by the communication of the 17th October, 1823.

We approve your having so far relaxed your preceding orders as to allow the trustees to have access to Mooner-ool-Moolk in his private capacity as a debtor of the late firm.

EXTRACT from Public Letter to Bengal of 25th June, 1828.

"Sir William Rumbold, Bart., has been permitted to proceed to India for the purpose of arranging his affairs.

"You will distinctly understand, however, that this permission is granted subject to the same conditions and restrictions as were prescribed in the case of Mr. George Lamb by our despatch from this department dated 15th February, 1826.

"The sole ground on which this permission has been granted to Sir William Rumbold is to enable him to recover debts from individuals, but by no means to afford the opportunity of endeavouring to establish claims on the Nizam's government. We cannot, therefore, too strongly impress upon you the necessity of paying particular attention to our instructions on that subject in the above-mentioned despatch of the 15th February, 1826, and in others of subsequent dates, and of giving correspondent instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad with reference to the present case.

"There is one point, however, which is noticed in the despatch of 15th February, 1826, viz., the possibility of applications to the Nizam's government for its assistance to enforce the claims of Messrs. Palmer and Co. upon individuals, and which applications are required to be preferred through the Resident. We are aware that for the recovery of private debts recourse to the minister, as the superintending and controlling authority over the local courts of justice, may, in some instances, be necessary, and as we do not wish to interpose any obstacle to the recovery of any such debts if justly due, we do not object to the trustees or partners of the house having access to the ministers for that purpose, provided such communications do not take place without the knowledge and sanction of the Resident, and provided also that he be present on such occasions, if he shall think fit. We trust that he will insist on knowing the nature and full extent of all such communications, that he will take care to limit them to the sole object of the recovery of private debts, and, above all, that he will prevent the grant of any territorial assignments to the Nizam's government, and will take care 'that the accruing revenue of the state be not liable to any charge, nor pledged in any respect' for the liquidation of debts alleged to be due to Messrs. Palmer and Co. or the partners individually.

"We also prohibit you from appointing Sir William Rumbold to any office or employment under your government; and should he obtain or solicit any office or employment under the government of his Highness the Nizam, or any other native prince, you will not fail to instruct the Resident to remonstrate against such employment."

EXTRACT from Political Letter to Bengal, dated 9th April, 1823.

2. "With reference to our letter to you from this department, dated 28th November, 1821, we transmit for your information and guidance copy of a case which we have caused to be submitted to his Majesty's Attorney and Solicitor-General and the Company's counsel, regarding loans by British subjects to native princes in India, with their opinion thereon.

3. "You will observe that we are advised by these high legal authorities, that the restriction contained in the 30th section of the Act 13th Geo. III. cap. 63, which restrains the rate of interest to twelve per cent., extends to contracts made as well in those parts of the East Indies which are not under the government of the East India Company, as in those which are: that the same restriction extends to loans made to native princes and governments in the East Indies, as well as to those made to individuals, whether the contracts for such loans be made or carried into execution within or beyond the territories under the government of the East India Company: that the same restriction extends to loans made under a licence from the governments in India, pursuant to the 37th Geo. III. cap. 142, sec. 28, and that it is not lawful for a mercantile or banking partnership, consisting partly of natives of India and partly of European-born subjects of his Majesty, to make a loan to a native prince, contrary to the provisions of 37th Geo. III. cap. 142, sec. 28, whether the contract for such loan be made or carried into execution within or beyond the territories under the government of the East India Company; that, in either case, the contract of the house would be void; and that the European-born partners would be liable to be prosecuted for a misdemeanour.

4. "We desire that you will cause this explanation and instruction to be made public, and that you will institute prosecutions against all persons in any way contravening the law as thus explained."

CASE FOR THE EAST INDIA COMPANY.

(13th Geo. III. cap. 63, sec. 30.)

"And be it further enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that no subject of his Majesty, his heirs and successors, in the East Indies, shall, upon any contract which shall be made, from and after the said first day of August, 1774, take, directly or indirectly, for loan of any moneys, wares, merchandize, or other commodities whatsoever, above the value of 12*l.* for the forbearance of 100*l.* for a year, and so after that rate for a greater or lesser sum, or for a longer or shorter time; and that all bonds, contracts and assurances whatsoever, made after the time aforesaid, for payment of any principal or money to be lent, or covenanted to be performed, upon or for any usury, whereupon or whereby there shall be reserved or taken above the rate of 12*l.* in the hundred as aforesaid, shall be utterly void; and all and every such person or persons whatsoever, who shall, after the time aforesaid, upon any contract to be made after the first day of August, 1744, take, accept, and receive, by way or means of any corrupt bargain, loan, exchange, shift, or interest of any wares, merchandizes, or other thing or things whatsoever, or by any deceitful way or

mean, or by any cover, engine, or deceitful conveyance for the forbearing on given day of payment for one whole year, of and for their money or other thing above the sum of 12*l.* for the forbearing of 100*l.* for a year, and so after that rate for a greater or lesser sum, or for a longer or shorter term, shall forfeit and lose for every such offence treble the value of the money, wares, merchandizes, and other things, so lent, bargained, exchanged or shifted with costs of suit, one moiety thereof shall be given to the said United Company, and the other moiety to him or them who will sue for the same in the said Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William in Calcutta, or in the Mayor's Court, or in any other of the said United Company's settlements where such offence shall have been committed, by action of debt, bill, plaint or information, in which no essoin, wager of law, or protection shall be allowed. And in case no such action, bill, plaint or information shall have been brought and prosecuted with effect within three years, that then it shall and may be lawful to and for the party aggrieved to sue and prosecute for recovery of all sums of money paid over and above such rate of interest."

33 Geo. III. cap. 52, sec. 67, enacts, "that all his Majesty's subjects, as well servants of the said United Company as others, shall be, and are hereby declared to be, amenable to all courts of justice, both in India and Great Britain, of competent jurisdiction to try offences committed in India for all acts, injuries, wrongs, oppressions, trespasses, misdemeanours, offences and crimes whatsoever, by them or any of them done, or to be done or committed, in any of the lands or territories of any native prince or state, or against their persons or properties, or the persons or properties of any of their subjects or people, in the same manner as if the same had been done or committed within the territories directly subject to and under the British government in India."

37 Geo. III. cap. 142, sec. 28: "And whereas the practice of British subjects lending money or being concerned in the lending of the same, or in transactions for the borrowing money for, or lending money to, the native princes in India, has been productive of much mischief, and is the source of much usury and extortion; and whereas the wholesome orders of the Court of Directors of the United Company of Merchants trading to India have not been sufficient to restrain and repress the same; and whereas it is highly desirable that such practices should be prevented in future: Be it therefore enacted, that from and after the first day of December next, no British subject shall by himself or by any other person, directly or indirectly employed by him, lend any money or other valuable thing to any native prince in India, by whatever name or description such native prince shall be called; nor shall any British subject, either by himself, or by any other person, directly or indirectly employed by him, be concerned in the lending any money to any such native prince; nor shall any British subject be concerned either by himself, or by any other person, either directly or indirectly, in raising or procuring any money for any such native prince, or as being security for such loan or money; nor shall any British subject lend any money or other valuable thing to any other person, for the purpose of being lent to any such native prince: nor shall any British subject, by himself or by any other person, either directly or indirectly, for his use and benefit, take, receive, hold, enjoy, or be concerned in any bond, note, or other security, or assignment, granted or to be granted by any such native prince after the first day of December next, for the loan or for the repayment of money or other valuable thing, without the consent and approbation of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, or the consent and approbation of the Governor in Council of one of the said Company's governments in India, first had and obtained in writing. And every person doing, acting, or transacting, or being concerned in any actings, doings and transactions, contrary to this Act,

shall be deemed and taken to be guilty of misdemeanour at law, and shall and may be proceeded against and punished as such, by virtue of this Act, before any court of competent jurisdiction; and all bonds, notes, assignments, or securities for money, of what kind or nature soever, taken, held, or enjoyed, either directly or indirectly for the use and benefit of any British subject, contrary to the true intent and meaning of this Act, shall be, and the same are hereby declared to be null and void, to all intents and purposes."

53 Geo. III. cap. 155, sec. 55: "And be it further enacted, that for and during the continuance of the possession and government of the said territorial acquisition and revenues in the said United Company, the rents, revenues, and profits arising from the said territorial acquisitions, after defraying the charges and expenses of collecting the same, shall be applied and disposed of, to and for the uses and purposes hereinafter expressed, in the following order of preference, and to and for no other use or purpose, or in any other manner whatsoever, any Act or Acts of Parliament now in force to the contrary notwithstanding (that is to say):—In the first place, in defraying all the charges and expenses of raising and maintaining the forces, as well European as Native Military, Artillery and Marine, on the establishments in the East Indies and parts aforesaid, and of maintaining the forts and garrisons there, and of providing warlike and naval stores. Secondly, in payment of the interest accruing on the debts owing, or which may be hereafter incurred, by the said Company in the East Indies or parts aforesaid, including that portion thereof for which bills shall be demanded payable in England, and for which provision shall at all times be made by consignments or remittances to England as the said Court of Directors, with the approbation of the said Commissioners for the affairs of India, shall from time to time direct. Thirdly, in defraying the civil and commercial establishments of the said Company at their several settlements there. Fourthly, towards the liquidation of the territorial debt of the said Company, or of the bond debt at home, or to such other purposes, subject to the provision hereinafter made, as the said Court of Directors, with the approbation of the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India, shall from time to time direct, any Act or Acts of Parliament to the contrary thereof notwithstanding."

"Your opinion is requested—

"First. Whether the restriction on the rate of interest for the use of money, by 13th Geo. III. cap. 63, sec. 30, relates to contracts made in countries or states in the East Indies, which are not within the territories under the government of the East India Company?

"Second. Whether the 13th Geo. III. cap. 63, sec. 30, extends to loans to native princes or governments, as well as to loans to individuals? Whether the contracts for such loans to native princes or governments are made, or carried into execution, within or beyond the territories under the government of the East India Company?

"Third. Supposing a loan to be made by a British subject to a native prince in India, with the consent and approbation of the Governor in Council of one of the governments in India first had and obtained, in writing, without any specification of the rate of interest for such loan, would the rate of interest be limited by 13th Geo. III. cap. 63, sec. 30, whether the contract for such loan were made or carried into execution within or beyond the territories under the government of the East India Company; and in either case can the Governor in Council of any of the Company's governments in India legally authorise the lender to take a rate of interest exceeding twelve per cent. per annum?

"Fourth. Supposing a mercantile banking house to consist of natives of India and British-born subjects of his Majesty, in partnership together, is it lawful

for such house to make a loan to a native prince, contrary to the provision of 37th Geo. III. cap. 142, sec. 28, whether the contract for such loan be made or carried into execution within or beyond the territories under the government of the East India Company? and, in either case, would the house, or the several partners, natives or British-born, be subjected by any such loan to any penal consequences or forfeitures?

"The power of the Company's government in India to raise money by way of loan is neither limited, defined, nor regulated by any Act of Parliament or charter; the exercise of such a power has been repeatedly recognised and implicitly sanctioned by many Acts of Parliament.

"Your opinion is requested:—

"Fifth. Whether the Company's governments in India may lawfully make loans out of money arising from territorial revenues to native princes, or may they raise money by loan to be lent, on the part of the Company, to native princes; or may they guarantee to persons willing to lend money to native princes the payment of either principal or interest of the money to be lent? And whether, in such case, they may consistently with the appropriation by 53rd Geo. III. cap. 155, sec. 55, of the rents, revenues, and profits of the territorial acquisitions in the East Indies, apply a sufficient part of such rents, revenues, and profits, to the discharge of the principal or interest of such loan?"

"First. Referring to the above statutes of the 13th Geo. III. cap. 63, sec. 30, and the 33rd Geo. III. cap. 52, sec. 67, we are of opinion that the restriction on the rate of interest extends to contracts made as well in those parts of the East Indies which are not under the government of the East India Company as in those which are.

"Second. That the restriction of the 13th Geo. III. cap. 63, sec. 30, extends to loans made to native princes and governments in the East Indies, as well as to those made to individuals, whether the contracts for such loans be made or carried into execution within or beyond the territories under the government of the East India Company.

"Third. That if a loan be made by a British subject to a native prince in the East Indies, with the consent and approbation of the Governor in Council of one of the Company's governments, first had and obtained in writing, pursuant to the 37th Geo. III. cap. 142, sec. 28, but without any specification of the rate of interest to be taken for such loan, the rate of interest will be limited by 13th Geo. III. cap. 63, sec. 30, whether the contract for such loan be made or carried into execution within or beyond the territories under the government of the East India Company; and that the Governor in Council could not, in either case, legally authorise the lender to take a rate of interest exceeding twelve per cent. per annum.

"Fourth. That it is not lawful for a mercantile or banking partnership, consisting partly of natives of India and partly of European-born subjects of his Majesty, to make a loan to a native prince, contrary to the provisions of 37th Geo. III. cap. 142, sec. 28, whether the contract for such loan be made or carried into execution within or beyond the territories under the government of the East India Company, that in either case the contract of the house would be void, and that the European-born partners would be liable to be prosecuted for a misdemeanour; but we have some doubts whether the native partners would be subject to any punishment.

"Fifth. We are also of opinion that the Company's governments in India cannot, consistently with the directions of the 53rd Geo. III. cap. 155, sec. 55, appropriate the territorial revenues of India in the way of loan to native princes; and as they cannot lawfully do so directly, they cannot lawfully borrow money for the purpose of being lent, or guarantee the payment of

either principal or interest to the lenders, so as eventually to charge the territorial revenues with the burthen of such loans.

“(Signed) R. GIFFORD.
J. S. COPLEY.
J. B. BOSANQUET.

“Lincoln's Inn, 30th Aug. 1822.”

EXTRACT from a Political Letter to Bengal, dated 3rd August, 1825.

“We herewith transmit a copy of an opinion delivered in the House of Lords on the 27th of June last by the judges, in answer to a question put to them respecting the construction of the Act 13th Geo. III. cap. 13, as to the limitation of the rate of interest to be taken for loans made within the dominions of an independent native sovereign in the East Indies by British subjects.

“Question put to the judges on the East India Company's Affairs Bill.

“‘Whether, according to the true construction of the 30th Section of an Act passed in the 13th year of the reign of his late Majesty, entitled “An Act for establishing certain Regulations for the better Management of the Affairs of the East India Company,” the same limits the rate of interest to be taken for loans of any moneys to twelve pounds for one hundred pounds by the year, such loans being made or advanced within the dominions of a native independent sovereign by British subjects domiciliated and residing within such dominions’?”

“‘Answered in the negative.’”

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

COPY of LETTER to Bengal, dated 13th September, 1826.

Your instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad, dated 7th October, 1825, to which you have drawn our attention in your letter in this department dated 25th October, 1825, appear to contemplate the existence of unsettled claims of Messrs. W. Palmer and Co. on the government of the Nizam. In those instructions we find it observed that with certain exceptions (the bonus and personal allowances especially) “the Governor-General in Council is willing so far to extend the authority already vested in the Resident, to be the channel of communication between the trustees of the creditors of the late firm of W. Palmer and Co., and Rajah Chundoo Loll, the acting minister of his Highness the Nizam, as to authorise him, after examining into the claims of the former, and being satisfied that they are just and unexceptionable, to interpose his advice with the minister for the discharge of such claims (supposing them to be admitted by the minister) when the state of the Nizam's finances may admit of it.”

The bonus on the 60 Lac Loan, and the allowances to the members of the firm and their families, with the interest thereon, having been disallowed, and the house having, in answer to the Resident's application for a statement of their pecuniary transactions with the Nizam's government, excepting the late loan and “the provision of funds at Aurungabad for the payment of troops,” declared that they had “no transactions with the Nizam or his government but those in favour of which the exception had been made, and such as had arisen out of the advances to the troops at Aurungabad.” No such claims can possibly exist.

The interest on the bonus of eight lacs was estimated by the government of your predecessors at five lacs and a half, and the allowances of the Palmer family, with the interest thereon, were estimated at five lacs, in all eighteen lacs and a half; leaving an apparent claim of the house for one lac and a half at the time of the final settlement, exclusive of the subsequent charge of

interest; the final balance claimed by the house, in the account dated 5th November, 1823, Rupees 21,16,805, being composed with a trifling difference of the 20 lacs reserved by order of the preceding government for eventual disallowances, and of interest brought to account subsequently to the date of that order.

The accumulation of interest on the bonus was correctly estimated, but the amount of the allowances to the members of the firm and their families, and the accumulated interest thereon, were very greatly understated. Calculated at 12 per cent. half-yearly from the commencement of the respective charges to the 1st Zecand 1238, and at 12 per cent. yearly from that date to the 1st Rabbeeoolawul 1239 (5th November, 1823), the interest amounts on the list of allowances given by the house in page 831 of the printed papers, to rupees 9,05,896, and on the bonus to rupees 5,95,345; in all with the principal of the bonus and allowances rupees 26,60,041, being 5,43,236 more than the final balance claimed by the house. Mr. W. Palmer's allowance of 24,000 rupees for 1230, which appears in the account at page 592; is omitted in the list in page 831. The interest on this sum is rupees 1,32,060. Mr. William Palmer also received an allowance of rupees 3840 for sepoy. This can only be regarded as an addition to his personal allowance. This amounts with interest to rupees 1,66,480. The allowance to Mr. Hastings Palmer commences in the list on page 831 with the year 1231, whereas it appears in the accounts (pages 592, 699, 700) that an allowance to him commenced in Fusby year 1222, corresponding with Hegira 1228, and that rupees 28,000 was issued to him apparently on that account previously to the Hegira year 1231. The interest on this sum is rupees 1,90,224. The allowance of Mr. Robert Palmer is not given in the list.

ALLOWANCES to the Palmer Family and Mr. G. Rumbold.*

Allowances of the Palmer family in page 831 of the printed papers	Rs.	
		3,58,800
Compound interest on do. to 1st Zecand 1238, at 12 per cent. half-year	8,57,254	
Ditto continued on do. to 1st Rubbeeoolawul 1239, at 12 per cent. per annum	48,642	
		<u>9,05,896</u>
Mr. W. Palmer's allowances for 1230, omitted in p. 831, but entered in the Hyderabad account, page 592 ..	24,000	
Interest on do. (at the above rates)	1,32,060	
		<u>1,56,060</u>
Carried forward		14,20,756

* This amounts with interest, to rupees 2,51,921. Mr. G. Rumbold's allowance and the interest on it amounts to rupees 1,35,338, making with the sums stated, a total of rupees 35,88,064. The sum which has been paid to the house is therefore between fourteen and fifteen lacs more than the sum to which they were entitled, admitting all their charges with the exception of those above specified.

	Rs.	
Brought forward	14,20,756	
Mr. W. Palmer's allowance for sepoy, 3840 per annum	35,520	
Interest on do. (at the above rates)	1,30,960	
	<u>1,66,480</u>	
Mr. Hastings Palmer's allow- ances omitted in page 831, but entered in Hyderabad account, pp. 592, 699, 700 ..	28,000	
Interest on do. (at the above rates)	1,90,224	
	<u>2,18,224</u>	
Mr. Robert Palmer's allow- ance	64,800	
Interest on do	1,87,121	
	<u>2,51,921</u>	
		20,57,381
Mr. G. Rumbold's allowance	42,000	
Interest on do.	93,338	
	<u>1,35,338</u>	
		21,92,719
Bonus on the 60 Lac Loan	8,00,000	
Interest charged on the bonus	5,95,345	
	<u>13,95,345</u>	
		35,88,064
Final balance claimed by the house 1st Rubbeeoolawul 1239 (5th November, 1823)		21,16,805
		<u>14,71,259</u>
	Rupees	

EXTRACT from Public Letter to Bengal, 15th February, 1826.

"We have received a petition from Mr. George Lamb, late a partner in the firm of Messrs. W. Palmer and Co., of Hyderabad, requesting our permission to proceed to India for the purpose of assisting in the elucidation and arrangement of the affairs of that house, with such authority, countenance, and support, as we may think fit to extend to him, pledging himself to adhere to whatever restrictions we may be pleased to order.

"Under the circumstances of the case, as they have been brought before us, we have not thought that we should be justified in withholding our permission from Mr. Lamb to return to India.

"In the event of your permitting Mr. Lamb to proceed to Hyderabad, you are to impose such restrictions, both as to the term of his residence and his conduct while there, as you may deem expedient.

"There are two restrictions, however, on which we think it incumbent on us to insist, and with which you will not consider yourselves as at liberty to dispense.

"First. That neither the house, nor any individual member of it, be suffered to continue or renew pecuniary dealings under any pretence whatever, whether by cash advances or commercial credits, with the Nizam's government.

"Secondly. That the British Resident be strictly interdicted from employing, directly or indirectly, his official influence either for or against the prosecution of any claims which they may advance on individuals subjects of the Nizam, and from being in any manner the channel of communication

between them and such individuals. And as after the most minute examination of the accounts of Palmer and Co. with the government of his Highness the Nizam we find that every claim on that government for the recovery of which the assistance or influence of your government was in the remotest decree pledged has been more than liquidated, we cannot conceive that any such claim as would justify your interference can now be established; but should any claim of a different description on the Nizam's government, or application for its assistance to enforce the claims of the house upon individuals, be preferred, we require that it be preferred through the Resident; and this we require, not for the purpose of his interference, but in order that our government may be apprised of the nature and extent of the claim.

"We further direct that the Resident be instructed to take care that, towards the liquidation of any claims of the house, whether upon individuals or the Nizam's government, no territorial assignments be granted, and that the accruing revenues of the state be not liable to any charge, nor pledged in any respect.

"We wish it to be distinctly understood that it is not our intention by the permission which we have granted to Mr. Lamb to return to India, subject to the foregoing conditions and restrictions, to signify the slightest disapprobation of the order issued by you on the 31st July, 1823, requiring him to quit Hyderabad and proceed to Europe, an order which, though issued under circumstances which we had not contemplated, was, nevertheless, conformable to our positive and repeated injunctions.

"We conclude that you have given the same publicity to the opinion of the judges on loans by British subjects out of the British territories in India (communicated to you in our letter of the 3rd August, 1825), which you formerly gave to that of the Attorney and Solicitor-General on the same subject."

MEMORANDUM.

By the 5th Article of the Treaty with the Nizam of the 12th October, 1800, his Highness ceded to the Company territory to defray the expense of the subsidiary forces stationed within his dominions; and by the 12th Article of the same Treaty his Highness engaged, in case of war, to provide a contingent of 6000 infantry, and 9000 horse, to be employed against the enemy.

This contingent not being found available for service in the Mahratta war of 1803-5, measures were adopted with the view of placing a portion of the Nizam's troops on a more efficient footing, by forming them into regular corps, and appointing European officers to command them. This measure was resorted to in anticipation of the operations against the Pindarries, which were undertaken in 1816-17, and his Highness's troops were on that occasion found to be of material service.

Sir Charles Metcalfe, in a Minute of the 13th May, 1829, states, that "above forty lacs per annum, out of the Nizam's revenues, are appropriated to the maintenance of a force commanded entirely by British officers;" and as this is the force on which the British government alone could rely, in the event of a future war, to co-operate against the common enemy, agreeably to the provisions of Treaty, the British government may be said to be interested to that extent in the due appropriation of the Nizam's revenues.

It should, however, be stated that the authorities in England have been opposed to the policy of this species of interference in the internal arrangements of our native allies, and that the system is only tolerated from the difficulties which oppose a sudden alteration.

It is in the contemplation of the local government gradually to reduce the number of European officers to be employed with this description of force, in which case there will be a proportionate reduction of expense.

From Mr. Secretary SWINTON to W. B. MARTIN, Esq., Resident at
Hyderabad.

SIR,

Fort William, 5th September, 1828.

I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a despatch from the Honourable the Court of Directors, under date the 12th March.

2. Upon a reference to the 9th paragraph, you will observe that a doubt has arisen whether the "simple communication" of the opinion of the twelve judges may have removed the unfavourable impression created by the promulgation at an earlier period of a contrary opinion by the Attorney and Solicitor-General and Mr. Serjeant Bosanquet, accompanied as was this latter communication, by an instruction from the Government, which, as the court observes, could hardly fail, if known, to have considerable influence on past but still unsettled transactions.

3. In the 8th and 10th paragraphs the Honourable Court have clearly explained their intentions. They state it to be their object to remove any just cause of complaint by the trustees of William Palmer and Company, that the recovery of the debts of the late firm is obstructed by the use that has been made of a law opinion which has since been overruled; and they have expressed their decided wish that the parties should stand in the same situation they would have occupied if the first unfavourable opinion of the law officers had not been promulgated.

4. You will be pleased to report, whether from any complaint on the part of the trustees, or from any other source of information, you have reason to believe that the doubts entertained by the Honourable Court are well founded.

5. You will have the goodness to state the grounds upon which your opinion may be formed; and in the event of your giving confirmation to the apprehensions entertained by the Honourable Court, you will be pleased further to state for the consideration and final decision of the Governor-General in Council, the steps which you may deem best calculated to give effect to the wishes conveyed in the accompanying despatch.

I have, &c.,

G. SWINTON,
Chief Secretary to Govt.

G. SWINTON, Esq., Chief Secretary to Government, Fort William.

SIR,

Hyderabad Residency, 27th September, 1828.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 5th instant, together with its enclosures.

2. I have no hesitation whatever in stating my opinion that the doubts entertained by the Honourable the Court of Directors with respect to the continued existence of an impression unfavourable to the interests of the creditors of the late firm of Messrs. William Palmer and Company, in consequence of the opinion of the law officers of the Crown and Company which was first promulgated, are entirely without foundation, and that the notification of the subsequent opinion delivered by the twelve judges has operated to restore the parties to the relative position in which they stood antecedently to that promulgation.

3. My reason for entertaining this belief is, that considerable sums of money have been recovered by the trustees through the instrumentality of the court of justice in the city, including interest at the rate of 24 per cent. per annum, which has been the usual rate of it in the Nizam's territories, and the enclosed copy of a decree which has been recently passed in favour of the trustees, and which they have officially transmitted to me, awarding the pay-

ment of interest at the same rate, will, I trust, satisfy the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council of the accuracy of the grounds on which my belief is founded.

I have, &c.,

W. B. MARTIN, Resident.

(Translation.)

DECREE attested by the Seal of the Court, and dated on the 23rd Sufur 12.44, Hizrie.

The trustees of the firm of Messrs. W. Palmer and Company having brought an action in this court against Durgah Kollee Khan Buhadoor, the son of the late Ameen-ool-Moolk Buhadoor, for the recovery of the principal sum of rupees 35,584.3, with interest at the rate of 2 per cent. per mensem, after hearing the pleadings of both parties, the demand of the plaintiffs has been proved, and it is therefore ordered by the court that the above-mentioned Buhadoor pay to the trustees of the firm the principal sum, with interest at the rate above specified.

(A true translation),

W. B. MARTIN, Resident.

The Duke of Wellington to the Duke of Northumberland.

[1609.*]

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 8th April, 1830.

When I was at Windsor yesterday, Lady Conyngham sent me a letter from a Mr. Nugent Comyn, respecting a brother of his who is under sentence of death in the county of Clare for having set fire to his house. I answered that the consideration of cases of this description belonged exclusively to your Grace, and I had already given the same answer to an application made direct to me by one of the members of the family. It was stated to me, however, yesterday, that the man had not set fire to his house in order to defraud an insurance office, but that his object was to prevent it from falling into the hands of the lord of the land on which it had been incautiously built, the lease being out. I think that if this fact be true it is scarcely possible that the Judge should have pronounced a sentence of death, and, at all events, he will report the case to your Grace in the usual course. But this fact having been stated to me, I don't think that I ought to do otherwise than communicate it to you, being satisfied that you will do what may be proper upon the subject.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Sir F. Watson to the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

SIR,

Windsor Castle, 10th April, 1830.

I am honoured with the King's commands to acquaint you that his Majesty having been pressed with the most urgent petitions in behalf of Comyn, who is now under sentence of death for setting fire to his house, and awaiting execution on the 14th instant in Ireland, his Majesty feels disposed to exercise towards this individual his Majesty's high prerogative of mercy; and his Majesty not knowing where a letter would reach you in time to give effect to his Majesty's wishes in this case, has written express to the Lord Lieutenant to signify his pleasure that execution be stayed, and that the sentence of death be commuted for any other punishment that the Lord Lieutenant and the Judges shall decide.

I have, &c.,

FREDERICK WATSON.

The Duke of Northumberland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Dublin Castle, 10th April, 1830.

I have this morning received your Grace's letter relative to the very painful case of Mr. Comyn.

I think the best reply which I can make to it is to transmit to your Grace the enclosed statement of the entire transaction, as furnished to me *confidentially* by the Law Officers.

When your Grace has read it, you will not be surprised, that with all my anxiety to find a reason which might justify me in interfering to mitigate the sentence, I have determined to let the law take its course.

How could we punish the humble "Whiteboy," if an offender of this kind be suffered to escape?

I can assure your Grace it has *been a real grief to me* to come to this decision, but I should feel myself unworthy of the office which I have the honour to fill, if, with my views as to the state of society and crime in Ireland, I should depart from it.

May I request your Grace to forward the enclosed statement to Mr. Peel, who will transmit it to Lord Francis, where its circulation (being strictly confidential) should stop?

I have the honour to remain, my dear Duke,

Ever yours most sincerely,

NORTHUMBERLAND.

The Duke of Northumberland to the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR SIR,

Dublin Castle, 10th April, 1830.

I have duly received the packet which you addressed to me from Drayton, and feel particularly obliged to you for the kindness which pervades the communication.

The case of Mr. Comyn has, I can assure you, engaged my most painful attention, and I have anxiously looked around me and consulted with the Law Officers for any argument which might satisfy me that the

capital part of his sentence should be commuted. No such argument, moral or legal, has been presented to me; and I fear that nothing in the state of Ireland generally, or in the county Clare especially, could justify me in mitigating the sentence of a man who first opposed his landlord in the just resumption of his property, by forgery and perjury, then deliberately and maliciously burned his (the landlord's) house; and lastly, swore against three innocent men as the perpetrators of the felony for which he is now convicted.

If these worst features of "Whiteboyism" be pardoned in a gentleman (merely as such), we shall in vain attempt to restrain the vindictive passions of the more humble tenantry, whose conspiracy to obstruct the due demise of land is perhaps the greatest evil of this country.

I have requested the Law Officers to furnish me with an authentic statement of the entire case, which I shall forward in the first instance to the Duke of Wellington, begging his Grace to impart it to you, who I hope will do me the favour to send it to Lord Francis Leveson Gower.

It is right to add that this document should be considered *strictly private*, and have no further circulation.

Permit me to express a hope that the alarm which summoned you to Drayton may by this time have happily subsided.

I have the honour to remain, &c.,

NORTHUMBERLAND.

To the Duke of Devonshire.

[1610.]

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 11th April, 1830.

I have to apologise for having suffered so much time to elapse without giving you an answer on the subject of Sir W. Rumbold's affair, on which you placed a memorandum in my hands some time ago in a committee room in the House of Lords. But the documents are so voluminous, that I could not collect them even in the space of time in which you might reasonably have expected an answer.

The opinion of the Crown lawyers when taken upon Sir W. Rumbold's transactions, was published in India, and communicated to the Nizam's government. The opinion of the twelve Judges was equally published and communicated to the Nizam's government; and so well understood at Hydrabad as that the Resident, in answer to an enquiry upon the subject by the supreme government in Bengal, enclosed the copy of a record of the court of justice, giving a decision upon a cause in favour of Palmer and Co., and allowing them twenty-four per cent. interest upon the principal debt.

There is no point upon which it appears that the Court of Directors have given more frequent and positive directions

than upon this. These orders have been repeated and enforced by the supreme government in Bengal, and the Resident at Hyderabad has reported their being carried into execution.

Believe me, my dear Duke,

ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[1611.] MEMORANDUM.—ENQUIRIES TO BE MADE RESPECTING AN ANONYMOUS LETTER.

11th April, 1830.

1. See the list of officers on the half-pay of the 73rd Regiment, and of officers on half-pay who have served in the 73rd Regiment, and enquire whether there are any of them who answer the description given in the letter.

2. Send the letter to General Cameron at Plymouth; desire him to enquire whether there is a sub of the 94th Regiment living in the Long Room Barracks.

3. If there is no such person, request General Cameron to endeavour by enquiry quietly conducted, and particularly at the Post Office, to ascertain who the writer of this letter is.

4. A discovery of the writer might be made in the Commander-in-Chief's office. It is scarcely probable that this subaltern of the 94th Regiment has not applied to the Commander-in-Chief.

5. It is not unlikely that the letter is from a woman. It looks like a woman's hand-writing, and the words "subaltern of the 94th Regiment of the line" are not those that would be written by an officer.

6. If the enquiry should be made at the Post Office, Plymouth, it would be necessary that the postmaster should take a note of the direction of any letter in the same hand-writing and inform of it immediately, in order that enquiry might be made from the person to whom the letter would be addressed as to his correspondent.

7. Indeed, if we could communicate the hand-writing to the Post Office in London at the same time that we should to the Post Office at Plymouth, much time would not elapse before we should discover the writer of this letter.

8. It would be very desirable to give Sir Richard Birnie and

Colonel Rowan copies of this letter, particularly if we can discover in or belonging to the 73rd Regiment any officer resembling the person described, the police might meet him about the parks, the Treasury, or Hyde Park Corner.

WELLINGTON.

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

[1612.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 11th April, 1830.

I send you a Memorandum upon the West Indian Intercourse question, written after the perusal and consideration of the Act of Parliament, and all the documents upon the subject.

I recommend that those who are to decide upon this question should do the same.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM UPON THE INTERCOURSE BETWEEN THE WEST [1613.]
INDIAN COLONIES AND THE UNITED STATES.

11th April, 1830.

I have perused the papers on the subject of the intercourse between the United States and the British colonies in the West Indies, upon which it will be necessary that the Cabinet should come to a decision, in order that an answer may be returned to a note from Mr. Maclean to Lord Aberdeen.

Adverting to the ground taken by Mr. Canning and by Lord Dudley in their correspondence with Mr. Gallatin, and to the nature of Mr. Maclean's proposition, as well as to the state of our information regarding the existing mode of supplying our West Indian colonies, and to the necessity in which the United States find themselves, or will shortly find themselves, of altering their commercial policy, it might be convenient for their government to avoid giving any definitive answer at the present moment.

Mr. Maclean's proposal is in fact the same as that made by Mr. Gallatin to Lord Dudley, viz., if the United States should repeal their laws imposing discriminating duties upon British ships, will Great Britain recall the Order in Council of July, 1826? We might postpone answering that question on the grounds stated by Lord Dudley.

As far as I can judge from a perusal of the documents, I should say that it is our interest to maintain the prohibition.

The West Indies do not complain of the scarcity or of the dearness of the supplies which they receive under the existing system; and the Memorandum received from Mr. Fitzgerald states some reason for believing that the traffic with the British colonies in North America is more convenient to the West Indian planters than that with the United States. He likewise states that the duties which they would have to pay upon supplies direct from the United States would exceed the expense incurred by the circuitous channels by which the supplies which they require now reach them.

This view of the case is strengthened by the prices of freight stated in those documents. It would certainly be true if the measure proposed by Mr. Courtenay was adopted, viz., an addition of 50 per cent. to the protecting duty proposed in the Act of the 6th George IV.

It is not true, as stated by Mr. Maclean, that the Americans ever took any produce from the British West India Islands. It is positively stated by the Board of Trade that they did not; and it is curious enough that the West Indians in stating their grievances have not complained of the loss of the United States as a market for any article excepting rum, for which article they state that the market of the United States is irretrievably lost.

Under these circumstances we may safely assume that for the West India Islands, at least, the restoration of the intercourse with the United States is not important.

If we look at the case of our North American colonies, we shall see how important it is that we should maintain our Order in Council. The appendix to Mr. Fitzgerald's paper will afford much information upon this subject. But if the Cabinet will take the trouble of reading the 'Report of the Committee of Commerce and Navigation of the 6th February, 1830,' by Mr. Cambreling, they will see the most undoubted proofs of the effect produced on the prosperity of these colonies, and particularly on their navigation, by this Order in Council.

It is very rare that a commercial arrangement of this description adopted under the circumstances which occasioned that which I am considering, has produced so little inconvenience and so much advantage. But considering what that advantage is, and in what quarter and upon what class of

persons, and in what degree it is operating, we ought to pause before we should adopt any measures which should alter our system.

I confess that the perusal of all these documents has left me strongly under the impression that the object of the government of the United States is to deprive our North American colonies of the advantages which they enjoy under the existing system, and thus to shake their attachment to this country.

In truth the United States have lost but little, if anything, by the operation of the Order in Council. They now supply our West Indian colonies with nearly as much lumber and provisions as they did in 1825-26. They now supply by a circuitous communication through neutral islands in the West Indies, or through the North American colonies, what was before conveyed directly to the place of consumption; but equally in American shipping.

The American agriculture, commerce, and navigation enjoy nearly the same advantages. But besides these advantages, still enjoyed by the people of the United States, the British North American colonies and their navigation derive advantages under this system, and it is of these advantages that the government of the United States are anxious to deprive them, and this country of the consequent attachment of the people of those colonies.

Upon the whole, then, I would recommend to the Cabinet to persevere in the course which we have adopted, but not to give a more decided answer than Lord Dudley did in 1827.

The only argument in Mr. Maclean's paper which is worth attending to is founded upon an assertion that the Order in Council is injurious to the West Indies, and that notwithstanding that it is so, it is adopted with a view to injure the United States.

The contents of this paper, and the documents referred to, will show that the operation of the Order in Council is injurious to neither the West Indies nor the United States.

But supposing its operation to prove injurious to the United States, we might refer to the history of the transaction; point out that after the Act had passed we waited a year, that the subject had been under discussion in Congress, and that we did not act till we knew that Congress had, in fact, declined the boon proffered by the Act of Parliament.

That it is a mistake to suppose that there was any ground

for negotiation. There was none. Congress could accept or decline. They took the latter course, and we were under the necessity of acting accordingly.

Since the year 1826 a new state of things has arisen, as well in the British colonies as in the United States. We cannot wish to discuss these matters now. But it is certain that no hostile feeling, no desire of discussing the views which the United States may think fit to take of their own commercial interests, or of retaliating supposed injuries done to the commerce of this country, can with justice be attributed to this government.

WELLINGTON.

[1614.]

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 12th April, 1830.

In consequence of some uneasiness expressed at Windsor respecting the execution of Mr. Comyn, as it was understood that he had burnt his own house, under the erroneous notion that he had a right to do so, I wrote to the Duke of Northumberland to draw his attention to that view of the case, of which, however, I told him that I was quite certain that a report would be made to him, if there should be any ground for pardon afforded by it.

I enclose the report of the case which the Duke has sent to me, which he desires that I will give to you; in order that after perusal you may give it to Lord F. L. Gower, upon which the Duke has, in my opinion with great propriety, determined to allow the law to take its course.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1615.]

To the Duke of Northumberland.

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 12th April, 1830.

I have received your letter of the 10th respecting Mr. Comyn.

I entirely concur in your decision to allow the law to take its course.

I have disposed of the enclosure in your letter as you have desired.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

[1616.]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 12th April, 1830.

Lord Calthorpe has in the course of this session had some communication with Lord Tenterden respecting the means of procuring subjects for dissection, and I enclose the heads of a bill which the former has sent to me, to which it appears that Lord Tenterden will agree.

I beg you to look it over and let me know what you think of it.

The efficiency of the police, and the measures taken to guard and to light churchyards at night, have rendered it so difficult to obtain subjects as that I understand that some establishments for teaching anatomy have not had a subject for months.

It appears to me that a great step would be taken if we could only establish that it was not illegal for a man to have a dead body in his possession. The rest would follow.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Lord Aberdeen.

[1617.]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 12th April, 1830.

Ever since the letter was received from Mr. Barker respecting his interview with the Pasha of Egypt, it has appeared to me that it is desirable that we should encourage his confidence in, and his communications with us.

My notion is that we should endeavour to secure his fidelity, and eventually, if necessary, his active service and assistance for the Porte.

This object can be attained only by a good deal of address, and I don't know that Mr. Barker is equal to the performance of the service, or who else is. But it appears to me that we might convince the Pasha that his only chance of safety is by his fidelity to the Porte; that he might thus insure our protection, and the permanence of his own power and that of his family.

We might hint to him that if he were otherwise than a faith-

ful servant of the Porte, the British government, and the Porte in the Mediterranean and in Syria, and the British government in the Red Sea, would be found more than a match for him.

If his assurances and conduct were satisfactory we might take steps to conciliate the Porte towards him, and eventually do some good.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1618.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 12th April, 1830.

I did not know that you were out of town till the French ambassador called just now to speak to me upon a new contract which he said he had under consideration for transports.

He said that you had given him an opinion that a contract entered into at Paris and carried into execution at Toulon was not illegal. I read and explained to him the clause of the Act; I told him that the King's servants were not the interpreters of it, that we must obey it and carry it into execution if a breach of it should be brought to our knowledge; and when we found ourselves under the necessity of declining to give a license (if the demand for a license should be made, which it had not) we could not say, or authorize anybody to say, that the Act would not be carried into execution.

That, moreover, supposing that we were to decline to carry the Act into execution, that would not prevent anybody that pleased—the clerk of the merchant with whom the contract should be made, or the master of any transport, or any common seaman—from giving information before any magistrate, not that the contract was made at Paris, but that the vessels were equipped as transports within his Majesty's dominions.

I told him that Irving's first refusal was because he found that the law was too well drawn to be evaded. It must be broken; and that Messrs. Irving and Co., being a respectable house, did not think proper to be guilty of a breach of the law.

He said that he was afraid that the house with whom the French government had now contracted would follow their ex-

ample. I told him that if they pretended to character they certainly would, particularly after the example set by Irving. But that he must see that we could do nothing to extricate him from the difficulty.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To Sir George —.

[1619.]

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 13th April, 1830.

I have received your letter of the 11th instant, and return the enclosures.

I proceed to write to you very candidly and freely upon the subject to which your letter refers. I have been intimately acquainted with nearly all the public men, whether professional or otherwise, who have distinguished themselves in my time, and they all very naturally and with good reason look to me who have been running the same course, in the same ranks with themselves, to forward their views for public honour and reward.

Unfortunately, however, I have succeeded to the office which I have the misfortune of filling, after the most extravagant waste of public honours and rewards of all ranks, descriptions, and degrees by my predecessors.

If any man will only take the trouble of looking at the number of peers, baronets, &c., created and advanced since the King's accession to the throne in the year 1820, he will admit this truth, and if he will study the list he will see that many have been promoted to these honours who had no claim excepting one of private friendship, while others have been omitted whose services might have been considered as deserving consideration by those ministers under whose auspices they were performed.

These last are of the class whose claims have devolved upon me for consideration, at the moment at which it has become my duty to urge the King to avoid granting these honours, unless the grant of them should be essentially necessary for his service, or to reward services performed at the moment.

From this statement you will see that my situation is not very desirable in a consideration of any of these questions.

In respect to your case, your object being to obtain an Irish peerage, there is an additional difficulty in the way, and that is the necessity of recommending that that dignity should be conferred exclusively upon an Irish gentleman resident in Ireland. If we cannot enforce residence in Ireland we must at least endeavour to encourage it, and this can be done only by prevailing upon the King to adhere to the rule of granting Irish offices, honours, and distinctions, only to those resident in that country. I have invariably adhered to this rule.

From this statement you will see that however I may wish to do anything that might be agreeable to you, I am so situated as not to have it in my power, without a violation of the rule and practice which the public interest has rendered it necessary to recommend to the King, and to which I have invariably adhered.

I assure you that although my respect and regard for you have induced me to enter farther into details with you upon this subject than I have with others, you are not the only old acquaintance, companion, and friend to whom my sense of public duty has rendered it necessary for me to give a similar answer.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Brighton, 13th April, 1830.

To my great surprise I have this morning received the inclosed letter from Sir Frederick Watson, informing me that the King has thought fit without receiving the advice or opinion of the Secretary of State, or any responsible minister, to write express to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, ordering him to remit the capital sentence upon Comyn.

From Comyn's connection with the county of Clare, and his former station in that county, it is pretty evident to what influence this proceeding on the part of the King is attributable.

I have received many applications on the subject of this convict, some, among the rest, transmitted through Vesey Fitzgerald. My uniform answer to him and to every one has been, "I will not advise the King to interfere in the slightest degree with the discretion of the Lord Lieutenant." I wrote to the same effect to the Lord Lieutenant, and the same post which brings me a letter from the Lord Lieutenant, proving this Comyn to have committed the triple offence of perjury, forgery, and arson, and informing

me that he has resolved that the law shall take its course, brings me one from Windsor, apprizing me that the King has actually signified his commands for the remission of the capital sentence.

This is quite intolerable. I have written a letter to the King, of which I send you a copy.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Right Hon. Robert Peel to the King.

SIR,

Brighton, 13th April, 1830.

I have had the honour of receiving a letter from Sir Frederick Watson, informing me by your Majesty's commands that your Majesty had written express to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, signifying your Majesty's pleasure that the sentence of the law should not be carried into execution in the case of a person of the name of Comyn, capitally convicted at the last Assizes for the county of Clare.

I feel it to be my painful duty humbly and respectfully to submit to your Majesty, that had your Majesty been pleased to consult me on this occasion, one which I consider of deep interest to the administration of the law in Ireland, I could not have advised your Majesty to command the remission of the capital sentence.

The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland has informed me by a letter received this morning that his Grace has given the most serious consideration to the case of Comyn, that he has consulted with the Law Officers of the Crown upon it, and that it is his opinion that on account of the very aggravated character of the offence of which Comyn was convicted, on account of the State of Ireland generally with reference to that offence, and of the county of Clare in particular, the law ought to be permitted to take its course.

His Grace adds: "If the worst features of Whiteboyism be pardoned in a gentleman (merely as such), we shall in vain attempt to restrain the vindictive passions of the more humble tenantry, whose conspiracy to obstruct the due demise of land is perhaps the greatest evil of this country."

I feel myself bound humbly to state to your Majesty my concurrence in these observations of the Lord Lieutenant, and my apprehensions of the serious consequences which will arise (should the capital sentence of the law be remitted in the case of Comyn), either from the infliction of that sentence upon more ignorant and deluded offenders, or from its commutation for a punishment of less severity. I will, with your Majesty's gracious permission, forbear from making any further communication to your Majesty connected with this subject, until I shall have again heard from the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.

I am, Sir, with the most dutiful respect,

Your Majesty's most humble servant,

ROBERT PEEL.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 13th April, 1830.

Before leaving town to-night, I write a few words to say that the Duke de Laval has been here, and has informed me that he has put an end to the contract which had been entered into for the transports. He showed much regret and disappointment, but less irritation than formerly.

The consul at Marseilles has written to make a demand on the part of English merchantmen to engage in the French service as transports, in the same manner as during the French expedition to the Morea, under the French flag. An instruction will be prepared to inform him that the government cannot sanction the employment of any British vessels against a state with which the King is at peace, either as transports or in any other manner.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 16th April, 1830.

I enclose two letters from Lord Stuart, neither of which is perfectly clear; but it would appear from that respecting Prince Leopold, that there is some chance of his obtaining from Russia and France the amount of loan which he requires. At the same time it is not easy to understand from the terms of the letter, whether this disposition on their part will ultimately depend upon our agreement or not, to act in the same manner.

If you should see no objection, it seems rather desirable that we should have a Conference, and draw up a Protocol for the purpose of recording this business of the loan. The Protocol might commence by reciting the article of the former Protocol, in the execution of which we should make our proposition to guarantee the loan to the extent, and in the manner described in the minute delivered to Prince Leopold, and which might form an *annexe* to the Protocol. The other Powers would declare their willingness to concur in the proposition, probably without reference to the manner of its execution. But if France and Russia should at last decide upon complying with the demands of Prince Leopold, they would no doubt prefer doing so by some separate act, and we could scarcely expect that in the Protocol of the Conference they should be represented as acting differently in this respect from ourselves.

It seems desirable also that we should establish in the Protocol the principle of the separate guarantee; and that the three Powers do not act conjointly in this matter. Although this distinction is fully understood and admitted, it is very easy, from the use of general terms, to fall into mistake upon the subject, as Lord Stuart has done in his letter.

There would be no necessity to communicate this Protocol immediately to Prince Leopold; or before we saw the probable result of the Paris negotiation. It is only in the event of a determination on his part to draw back, that there might be some advantage in having his refusal to such a proposition as we should have prepared. If, on the other hand, the

affair should first be closed by his absolute resignation, it might be difficult for us to make this or any other proposition of the kind.

I have not summoned the Conference, nor will I do so unless you think the suitable moment is arrived for taking this step. We can perhaps afford to wait for the mail of Monday without any inconvenience.

It is not unlikely that we may hear from Constantinople in the course of next week. This would not affect our proceedings with respect to the loan; although the answer, whatever it might be, would render a meeting of the Conference necessary, as well as a Protocol of the decision to be adopted in consequence.

If we are to follow up your suggestion respecting the Pacha of Egypt, which seems highly important, the present is the moment in which it can be done most usefully. The situation of the person employed will be one of considerable delicacy, and will certainly require a good deal of address. Mr. Barker, I believe, is a good sort of man, and has the advantage of long knowledge of the Levant, and of Egypt; but I fear that he has no influence with the Pacha, nor is he at all likely to acquire any. The Pacha and his son, I understand, both attend very much to Mr. Briggs of Alexandria; but he is a merchant, and may be too much in their power. A military man of character and ability would be the best suited for such a mission. Would you recommend Cooke for it, or is there any other to whom you think it could be better entrusted?

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

[1620.]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 14th April, 1830.

I received last night your letter of yesterday, and was much concerned to find that his Majesty had taken so inconsiderate a step. I was in hopes that I had tranquillized the anxiety expressed at Windsor on Wednesday respecting Mr. Comyn's case; and had taken the best measures to set right the misrepresentations which had been made on that subject.

I now enclose an original letter to me from the Duke of Northumberland, and the copy of one to you; and I send them by messenger that you may be relieved from all anxiety upon this subject as soon as possible.

The Duke of Northumberland appears to me to have done exactly as he ought, and I recommend you to bring the whole case under the King's view, and to advise him to allow the law to take its course.

I am going to Windsor this morning in order to see how the King is. There is some doubt about his coming to town. If he does not we must have a bulletin of his health. I will let

you know by post how I find him, if I should return in time. If I should be too late I will send you a messenger, if there should be anything of importance to communicate. If I should not send a messenger you may rely upon there being nothing of importance.

I will say nothing about Mr. Comyn unless they should talk to me about it, and then only to censure their folly. I will not state the case, nor what the Duke of Northumberland has done.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I desire the messenger to call at your house for letters, and he will probably take down the original letter from the Lord-Lieutenant.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

The Duke of Northumberland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Dublin Castle, 12th April, 1830.

I have just time to save the post, and transmit to your Grace the copy of a letter which I have this morning received from Windsor, and of the answer which I have thought it right to forward through Mr. Peel.

Your Grace will, I think, be aware that I am placed in a most embarrassing situation.

I remain, &c.,

NORTHUMBERLAND.

II.

The King to the Duke of Northumberland.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Windsor Castle, 10th April, 1830.

Having received a petition from the respectable inhabitants of the county of Clare in favour of Peter Comyn, now under sentence of death for burning his house, and there being some favourable circumstances in his case, I am desirous of exercising the best prerogative of the Crown—that of mercy—in saving his life, leaving to your Grace the commutation of punishment you may think fit.

My eyes being indifferent I make use of an amanuensis.

Your sincere friend,

GEORGE R.

III.

The Duke of Northumberland to the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR MR. PEEL,

Dublin Castle, 12th April, 1830.

I was very much surprised this morning by the arrival of a King's messenger from Windsor, bringing the accompanying box of the Colonial Office, with a label addressed to me and marked with the royal initials.

There being no habitual intercourse between that office and this government I was obliged to force the lock, when I had the honour to find a letter from his Majesty. I have now to request that you will tender my most humble duty to his Majesty, informing him that in pursuance of his Majesty's commands I have directed a respite to be made out for Mr. Comyn for such a period as may enable his Majesty to come to a more regular decision on the subject grounded upon the purport of the authentic statement which I lately transmitted to you.

I must, however, respectfully take leave to remark that my opinions, anxiously and carefully formed, remain unchanged; and that although it is most painful to me to come to such a conclusion, I shall deplore any commutation of the sentence as tending to countenance the opinion so mischievously circulated, that in Ireland individual interest is above the general law.

I have, &c.,

NORTHUMBERLAND.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

[1621.]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 14th April, 1830, $\frac{1}{2}$ past 6 p.m.

I have just now returned from Windsor. The King is very unwell, but I saw him, and I don't think that he is so unwell as he is represented to be by the residents of the palace.

He has some disorder in his chest, which Sir Henry Halford says is not water; and his pulse is irregular, which it has been for fifteen years. But there is something like spasm attending this irregularity.

He complained when I saw him of pain in the lower part of his belly, and about his loins, and said he thought he was going to have a serious fit of gout and rheumatism. He did not look very ill, nor was he out of spirits. He was in very good humour, notwithstanding that he had taken above 250 drops of laudanum in the last 36 hours.

While I was there he determined that he would not go to town, and desired that the levee and drawing-room, and the celebration of his birthday, might be postponed for a fortnight. I stated the necessity of having a bulletin of his health issued,

which will be done to-morrow, and I will have the postponement of the levee and drawing-room announced at the same time.

I did not talk to him about business of any kind. I understand, however, that he is quite prepared to receive and act in conformity with any suggestion that may be made to him respecting the affair of Mr. Comyn.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1622.]

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 15th April, 1830.

I have received your letter of last night. You will experience no difficulty in settling Mr. Comyn's affair.

It is very difficult to discover exactly in what manner any transaction occurs at Windsor. But I believe that in this case his Majesty himself interfered; those about him having been satisfied with the assurances which I had given on Wednesday, that the Lord-Lieutenant should be made acquainted with the favourable circumstances stated in the letter given to me. It is certain, however, that that letter and other letters were given to the King to read. It is unfortunate that Sir W. Knighton was absent on the day that the King wrote to the Lord-Lieutenant. If he had been at Windsor he would have prevailed upon the King not to write. The letter was written by Sir F. Watson.

I have heard of the King this morning. He had passed a quiet night, and was asleep at six o'clock. I have not yet got the bulletin, but Tierney went down early this morning, and I hope to have it in time for this evening's paper. I will have it published if it should arrive in time, and at all events I will send you a copy. At the same time that the bulletin will be published the Lord Chamberlain will announce the postponement of the levee and drawing-room for a fortnight.

I am going down to Stratfield Saye, but direct to me here.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

To the Duke of Clarence.

[1623.]

SIR,

London, 15th April, 1830.

Your Royal Highness will have seen the bulletin of the state of the King's health, and will probably have received accounts of his Majesty from Windsor Castle, and will have observed that the levee and drawing-room have been postponed for a fortnight. Under these circumstances I would submit to your Royal Highness's consideration whether it would not be proper to postpone the honour which your Royal Highness and her Royal Highness the Duchess of Clarence declared your intention of doing the Duchess of Wellington and me, of dining with us on the 23rd April.

I sincerely hope that the King will be able to have his levee and his drawing-room. But if his health should not improve between this time and next Friday, your Royal Highness would not wish to dine in public, and the postponement of the dinner at that period would be liable to misconstruction, and might create public uneasiness.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—Lest your Royal Highness should not have seen the bulletin of the King's health, I enclose a copy of it.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

[1624.]

MY DEAR PEEL,

Stratfield Saye, 17th April, 1830.

I return the enclosed letter.

I see that the funds rose again yesterday evening. I think that the King's case affords grounds for apprehension, and I was glad to see that they represented it fairly in the bulletin. When I saw the King on Thursday he thought that he was likely to have a fit of rheumatic gout; but the symptom of gout I understand disappeared that night. I heard from Halford this morning, from Windsor at seven yesterday evening. The King was then nearly in the same state. Sir M. Tierney had been there during two days, and Halford says that he thinks there is some embarrassment about the chest. Halford thinks that it is not water, and I must say that it appears to me that the King is not like a man labouring under dropsy.

Indeed, if he had not consented to the issue of the bulletin, I should have come away under the impression, from his appearance, manner, and temper, that the real disorder was a desire not to attend the levee and drawing-room.

However there is certainly some serious spasmodic affection of the chest. He has for years had a derangement of the pulse; but this symptom of course aggravates the new one.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1625.]

To the Right Hon. J. C. Herries.

MY DEAR MR. HERRIES,

Stratfield Saye, 17th April, 1830.

I have received your note of the 15th, and have perused the papers in the box.

The opinions contained in the paper which I sent to Lord Aberdeen on Mr. Maclean's proposition were founded on the notion that the West Indians felt no interest in the question. I received this notion from the perusal of Mr. Fitzgerald's paper, from the facts stated therein in respect to the comparative prices of lumber and provisions in the West Indies in different years, and from the absence of all complaint upon the part of the West Indians in their discussions with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and myself in respect to their grievances throughout the last year and in the commencement of this session, and in the papers which they sent us. Indeed, the only occasion in which the intercourse with the United States is mentioned is to complain that the supply of the United States with rum is irretrievably lost.

It appears, however, from the papers which you have sent me, that the West Indians do complain, although they admit the fact stated by Mr. Fitzgerald in respect to the plenty and comparative cheapness of the supply of lumber and provisions. But of what do they complain? One complaint is that they have not a market in the United States for their produce; and the remedy for that grievance is that for every shipload of certain descriptions of lumber and of provisions to be imported, duty free you will observe, into the West Indian colonies, the trade of the United States should be obliged to take away a similar quantity of the produce of those colonies.

The other complaint is, that certain articles, the produce of North American colonies, are admitted duty free into the West Indian colonies when imported from British North America, but are taxed when introduced into the West Indian colonies from the United States; and the remedy proposed is, that British West Indian produce should be admitted into the North American colonies duty free, but that West Indian produce from any other part of the world should be taxed to the amount of 25 per cent.

These are the complaints made, and the remedies suggested in the papers which you have sent me; and I beg you to consider whether there is anything in Mr. Maclean's paper to justify a hope that the first ground of these complaints can be removed, or whether it is consistent with your commercial policy or with the scheme upon which you propose to found the settlement of this question, to hold out to the West Indian colonies any hope that you will admit all the produce of the United States into those colonies duty free, excepting two or three which can be produced in the North American colonies; or that you will admit West Indian produce into the North American colonies free of duty, and lay a duty upon all other produce of the same description amounting to 25 per cent.

We cannot expect to obtain for the West Indians either of the markets which they require. We must endeavour, then, to obtain for them the supplies which they require at the cheapest rate and with the least sacrifice of other interests created by the Order in Council of 1826, and of the political advantages derived from the encouragement of those interests, and of the consistency, honour, and character of the country.

We read a great deal in these papers of the expenses of the circuitous voyages, of transhipment, double commission, &c. It would be very desirable to see an account of these expenses, and to compare them with the duties upon the produce of the United States laid on by Act of Parliament upon their importation into the West Indian colonies, and with the schedule of the duties as proposed by yourself, which you did not enclose in your letter to me, and with that proposed by Mr. Courtenay. This information will enable us to form an opinion as to the effect upon the interests of the West Indies of any decision to which we may come.

In respect to the measures which the United States may

adopt upon this subject, I confess that I think that we may feel perfectly at our ease.

They have already done their worst in respect to the imports of British manufactures and produce into the United States.

Any man who will read Mr. Cambreling's report with attention, will see that they cannot venture to prohibit or to tax the exports of their own produce which we require.

We have only to continue tranquil, and to pursue our own course, and thus render ourselves by degrees independent of them. We must observe, that since the Order in Council in 1826, which it is now admitted was justified by their conduct, they have completed their tariff; yet the enactment of the tariff was justified by our Order in Council. If we concede now upon this demand of Mr. Maclean's, those who were the principal instruments in pressing and obtaining the adoption of the Order in Council being no longer in office, we shall be accused of having made an improper concession; and we shall, in fact, have the appearance, and shall be liable to the accusation of having been forced to concede by the operation of the tariff.

There is nothing more clear to me than that the United States must give up their tariff. Let them do so. Let us see what will be the effect of that measure.

I have taken the trouble of reading all that has been written upon this question, and my opinion is formed after that perusal. I wish other members of the Cabinet would do the same, in order that whatever may be finally decided may have the advantage of being fully considered by everybody.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1626.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Stratfield Saye, 17th April, 1830.

I return Lord Stuart's letters, the meaning of which I do not understand.

It appears, however, that Mr. Eynard is of opinion that the engagement of the Allied Powers to guarantee to Prince Leopold loans to the amount of 1,500,000*l.* will be sufficient to enable Prince Leopold to carry on his government; that the

King of France is not indisposed to go farther; and that the Russian ambassador at Paris has assured Prince Leopold of still farther assistance from the Emperor. I still think it will turn out that I was right, and that Prince Leopold is still desirous of going to Greece, or rather of getting away from England; and I think that we may now reckon upon his fixing the time for his departure.

I think, therefore, that the time is come at which you might communicate formally to the Conference your recent correspondence with Prince Leopold upon the subject of money.

I enclose the draft of the form in which I think that this measure ought to be carried into execution. It is in strict conformity with what I understand were the verbal explanations of the meaning of the Protocol, though certainly not with its recorded expression.

After inserting a note to this purport, I conceive that we have nothing further to do with loans of money by any other of the Powers.

I should think that in this Conference you had better not touch upon other points still remaining for settlement, and that you should agree to no joint resolution upon the subject of money.

It is very difficult to find an officer qualified to undertake such a negotiation as is proposed with the Pasha of Egypt, who would go there. But I'll inquire. In the mean time, if you think that the negotiation ought to be undertaken, it would be advisable to intimate to Mr. Barker that his despatch had been received and had given satisfaction; to desire him to communicate that information to the Pasha, and that an early opportunity would be taken of sending an answer.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

[1627.]

Adverting to the article of the Protocol of the Conference of the 22nd March, 1829 [in which the three Powers, parties to the Treaty of the 6th July, 1827, engaged to guarantee a loan or loans of money to his Royal Highness the Prince Sovereign of Greece to enable his Royal Highness to pay troops],* and

* Probably the words of the Article might here be inserted with advantage instead of these words.

to the understanding which then prevailed in the Conference, that each of the Powers should adopt its own separate arrangement to carry into execution its engagement under this article, the undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's Plenipotentiary, now lays before the Conference the annexed letter, which his Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State received from the Prince Sovereign on the , and the answer which he conveyed by desire of his government.

WELLINGTON.

[1628.]

To the Earl of Aberdeen.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 18th April, 1830.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me see our proceedings upon Algiers at the period of our expedition. It appears to me that we must have informed the French government of our exact intentions. They were parties to the Conference.

Indeed, the Prince de Polignac seems to have made a strange mistake in thinking that we can allow France to seek safety from domestic troubles in foreign conquests, even on the coast of Africa. Neither Bonaparte nor the Directory behaved worse than the French government have in this case.

We must see what their claims are to establishments on the coast of Africa. Lord Bathurst says that they have none.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

It appears to me that it might be desirable to write an ostensible despatch to Lord Stuart upon this discussion with the Duc de Laval, which he might show to Prince Polignac.

The French government are quite mistaken in supposing that any of the quarrels between Bonaparte and Europe were to be attributed to their fears of revolutionary principles. They were apprehensive of his conquests, and they therefore leagued against him.

He must see that, even if we were so disposed, this country would not allow us to consent to France making conquests on the coast of Africa. If the Dey of Algiers is to be attacked and destroyed, it ought to be to give the country to the Sultan

to be better governed, and not to be dealt with by a Conference of European continental Powers.

If the French government feel inconvenience from the mode in which we urge them to explain themselves upon this subject, they must attribute our conduct to their own want of frankness in not explaining to us at once their object, the necessity for their hostile operations, their means of execution, and their end.

We learnt all from others before we heard one word from them.

To the Duke of Northumberland.

[1629.]

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 19th April, 1830.

I did not write to you in answer to your note enclosing the letter which you wrote to Mr. Peel on the case of Mr. Comyn, because I am convinced that in such delicate cases it is best that the correspondence should be confined to one channel. But I was not the less thankful for your letter, nor the less gratified by the judicious course which you took upon receiving the letter from the King upon Mr. Comyn's case. I will add, likewise, that your sending me the copy of your letter to Mr. Peel was most opportune, as he happened to be out of town and I was in town. I sent off a messenger immediately with the copy addressed to me, and went to Windsor myself; by which means we were enabled to settle the affair at a much earlier period than we should otherwise.

You will have seen that the King has been unwell. As usual, the factions are endeavouring to shape this indisposition according to their own fancy. The real truth is, that he has an occasional embarrassment in his chest, which affects his breathing and is at the moment very distressing. He is otherwise not in bad health. His digestion and secretions very good, and his appetite *too* good, and he sleeps a great deal.

The physicians are decidedly of opinion that there is no water in the chest. They think it most probable that he may be too fat, and they appear to me to be endeavouring to reduce him.

I enclose you the copy of the bulletin of this morning. I was yesterday at Windsor, but did not see the King. He was asleep from twelve till half-past five. I saw him on the preceding Wednesday, when I certainly thought him so well that

if he had not consented to have a bulletin of his health published, which he certainly does not like, I should not have thought it necessary to postpone his levee and his drawing-room.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 17th April, 1830.

I mentioned to you the other day that we might shortly expect an impudent proposition from the Portuguese government. It is inclosed; and the question now is, how to deal with it. When the Brazilian minister made a demand, founded on the same article of the Treaty, to obtain the expulsion of Asseca, no answer was returned; and no further notice taken of it. I have communicated the letter of the Portuguese consul to Zea, who had no knowledge whatever of the proceeding, and was much surprised at the demand. He said that if he might venture to give an opinion, it would be that the answer, if any, should be severe in expression; for that nothing but fear would bring the Portuguese government to their senses.

With respect to the letters of marque, there is no reason to suppose that any have been issued, or that the Regency will have recourse to this measure. In addition to the assurances of Palmella before his departure I may mention that M. de Mascarenhas has been with me to-day, and, in answer to my inquiries, has denied on his word of honour the existence of any such intention. He added, that he and Palmella would both consider it as an act of piracy, to which it was impossible for them to assent. Whatever may be the intentions, or the conduct of the Regency in future, it is pretty clear therefore that they have no thoughts at the present moment of acting in this manner. M. de Mascarenhas informed me that he was in daily expectation of receiving orders from the Regency to open an official communication with this government. I told him that I did not wish to lead him into error, and that he had better reflect well before he adopted this measure; that at present we had no actual knowledge of the Regency but from public report, and it might be possible for us in consequence to say nothing; but if he were to proceed in an official manner a decision must be come to by us of the nature of which I was far from being able to inform him; and still less able to lead him to expect that it would be agreeable.

We have received to-day our long expected mail from Brazil. In consequence of the absence of Don Pedro from Rio, no answer had been returned to the communications of the three ministers, so that we must still wait for the arrival of the next packet. From the observation of M. de Salmon, it appears however that war is out of the question, which would be the most embarrassing decision to deal with. We can scarcely expect to receive an explicit answer of any kind; and in their difficulty, it seems very possible they may decline to do anything more than to refer us to the Regency of Terceira for the settlement of all matters connected with Portugal. Next to a declaration of war, the renewal of the proposi-

tion of marriage would be, under present circumstances, the least desirable of all things. Mr. Aston does not state fully the reasons which induce Marechal to think that the Brazilian government are not disinclined to return to this notion. We may probably learn more from Esterhazy.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Priory, 18th April, 1830.

Just before leaving the office yesterday evening the Duke de Laval brought me a despatch which he had received from his government, and which contained the additional explanations we desired to have respecting the expedition to Algiers. After he had read the despatch, I requested him to furnish me with a copy, to which he made some objection; and said that although he supposed it might have been intended, yet as he was only ordered to read it, he could not take upon himself to do more without further instructions to that effect. I told him that we had already received abundance of verbal assurances, and that we had no desire for anything additional of this kind; but that we had always expected, and had been led to expect, a written explanation more precise and full than we had already received. He admitted this; but said that he must write to Paris, and trusted that he should receive orders to give it in the course of the week.

The despatch contained assurances sufficiently explicit in answer to our inquiries. They expressly renounce all desire of territorial acquisition or aggrandisement, and limit their views to the re-establishment of their fishing stations on the coast, as possessed under former Treaties. They repeat their desire, in the event of the destruction of Algiers, to concert with their allies respecting the manner in which its future condition may be best settled; and although they think it premature, before the result of the expedition is known, yet if we desire it, they are perfectly ready to explain to us now what their notions are upon this subject.

This is the satisfactory part of the despatch: but the whole is written in a tone rather of expostulation and complaint; and I took the opportunity of drawing the attention of the Duke de Laval to two or three points which, if they were to form part of the communication, would probably require some official notice from us by way of answer. The first was a complaint of the hostile conduct pursued by some of the diplomatic agents of England, especially at Constantinople, Madrid, Alexandria, and Tunis. I gave him to understand that if this complaint were made it must be answered; and that, in fact, it was unfounded. At Constantinople, the only part taken by the English ambassador was to urge the departure of Taher Pacha, in the hope of persuading the Dey to offer suitable reparation to the King of France; a measure dictated by the desire of peace, and as friendly to France as to Algiers. The ambassador had acted in conformity with instructions from his government, of which M. de Laval had himself been informed. At Madrid, the English minister, when asked by M. de Salmon respecting the truth of the reported

hostility of the English government to the expedition, had been unable to give any positive answer; but had only expressed his disbelief, and had written for instructions. At Alexandria, the consul had taken no part, until he was ordered by his government to declare to the Pacha that if he should undertake hostile operations of the nature intended, without the authority or command of his lawful Sovereign, it would be impossible for his Majesty to regard such a proceeding with indifference. M. de Laval had also been informed of these instructions. With respect to Tunis, we had no knowledge whatever of anything having passed on the subject.

The next point in the despatch which would require some observation was an incorrect reference to my answer to the inquiry of Mr. Addington which, although it denied all hostility to the expedition, and wished that it might succeed in obtaining for the King of France all the satisfaction to which he was justly entitled, limited those wishes to this result, in opposition to the general success of measures of the precise nature of which we were ignorant.

Another point to be noticed was the doubt which appeared to be cast upon the fact of explanations having been given by the British government respecting the expedition of Lord Exmouth; because such explanations were not to be found preserved in the Foreign Office at Paris, or in the archives of the French Embassy in London. The fact was undeniable nevertheless.

The despatch concluded by some allusion to indemnity. I could not help observing that, although we did not pretend to define the precise extent of the reparation which the King of France might exact from the Dey of Algiers, it was impossible not to see that such a condition might be the means of rendering all the assurances they were disposed to give us of comparatively little value. The Duke de Laval complained of the manner in which we were inclined to treat the French government, and said that what they did must be consistent with their dignity and character. He knew they were in a situation to do nothing with impunity which could displease us; but that we might depend upon it they were more afraid of their own people than they were even of us, and that they never dare present themselves to their public in an unbecoming and unsuitable manner. He is to send immediately to Paris, and will recommend attention to all the points alluded to. He trusts to give us, in the course of the week, such a written communication as will be entirely satisfactory.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

India Board, 19th April, 1830.

I send you several letters I have just received from Lord W. Bentinck.

The Bill for consolidating the laws which regulate the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts is now before the Chancellor; but of course we cannot proceed until we receive the important communications from the Supreme Court at Calcutta, which we may expect in a few weeks.

When they arrive they will contain matter requiring so much con-

sideration that I can hardly look forward to the preparation of any measure during this session.

I send you likewise a statement of the prices of tea on the Continent and here. This statement will have more effect against the continuance of the monopoly than all the evidence before the Commons. It is wonderful that the Court of Directors should not have obtained some information upon the subject before they consented to make this trial, which has proved so unfavourable to them.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.

[1630.]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 19th April, 1830.

I have received your note respecting the bulletin since I wrote to you this morning, and sent you that which I had just received. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to interfere in the bulletins, excepting to have them published. The purport of them is the affair of the physicians.

When I was there yesterday I thought it absolutely necessary that there should be another, in consequence of the foolish paragraph in the 'Courier' of Saturday; and I begged that the physicians would ask the King to allow one to be published daily and communicated to the public in the usual manner at St. James's by the Lord in Waiting. They could scarcely, however, prevail upon him to have that published which I have sent you.

The disorder is exactly what is stated—occasional embarrassment in breathing. They are certain that it is not produced by water. The King's secretions are good, his digestion is excellent. They suspect it to be produced by a load of fat on the chest. They are giving him laudanum and sudorifics, in order to tranquillize him and, if possible, to lower him. They cannot venture to bleed him, because his pulse has long—I believe as long as twenty years—been deranged, and that this derangement attends the occasional embarrassment of breathing; and it is not supposed that he requires bleeding.

The truth is, that he is neither better nor worse. Yesterday, I happen to know that he ate a quantity of roast beef before twelve o'clock. He had not long before taken medicine. At twelve he fell asleep, and he was still asleep when I came away at half-past five.

I intend to go down again on Thursday, and will endeavour

to prevail upon him to allow a daily bulletin to be published, if only announcing how he has slept. It is impossible to say more upon such a case till he shall be quite well or the disorder should prove fatal.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[1631.] MEMORANDUM UPON THE PERSON TO BE EMPLOYED ON
THE MISSION TO EGYPT.

19th April, 1830.

The person to be employed on the mission in Egypt is an important question for consideration.

Our object is a permanent one, viz., to keep the Pasha in a state of obedience and subordination to the Sultan. We must attain this object by conciliating his confidence; by showing him that his real interests consist in the performance of his duty to his Sovereign; and by promising him our support and protection as long as he continues to perform it with zeal and fidelity. We ought to watch over the fulfilment of the promises which he will make to us.

For this reason the person to be employed to communicate with the Pasha should be the officer of the government permanently stationed in Egypt, whether the consul, or resident, or a chargé d'affaires; and he should be put in communication with the ambassador at the Porte, who should be informed of all he does; and who should be directed to protect Mahomed Ali, if he should cordially enter into our views and serve the Porte efficiently.

Lord Aberdeen will know best whether the present consul is a fit person; or another, or a resident, or a chargé d'affaires ought to be appointed. It must be observed that whoever goes there should stay.

WELLINGTON.

END OF VOL. VI.

ALBEMARLE STREET,

October, 1876.

MR. MURRAY'S
List of Announcements.

A DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN BIOGRAPHY, LITERATURE,
SECTS, AND DOCTRINES.

FROM THE TIME OF THE APOSTLES TO THE
AGE OF CHARLEMAGNE.

BY VARIOUS WRITERS.

Edited by WM. SMITH, D.C.L., and REV. PROFESSOR WACE, M.A.

Vol. I. (To be completed in 3 vols.) Medium 8vo.

This Work is designed to give a comprehensive account of the Personal, the Literary, the Dogmatic, and the Ecclesiastical Life of the Church during the first eight centuries of Christianity, and, in combination with the Dictionary of Christian Antiquities recently published, it will afford, it is believed, the most complete collection of materials for the Church History of that period which has yet been published, either in England or abroad. It is mainly Biographical; and without claiming to afford a complete onomasticon of the Christian world, an endeavour has been made to render available for practical use all the materials furnished in the great standard books of reference on this subject, such as Tillemont, Baronius, and Ceiller. The writings of the Fathers have, at the same time, been independently studied; the original authorities have been investigated apart, and the latest results of modern inquiry taken into consideration. Among the writers, in addition to other well-known divines and historians, are some of the most distinguished authorities at our Universities, such as Professors Lightfoot, Westcott, Swainson, and Cowell of Cambridge, Professors Bright and Stubbs of Oxford, and Professor Salmon of Dublin, while Foreign and American scholars have also co-operated in the work. Special and minute attention has also been paid to the Church History of England, Scotland, and Ireland; and this branch of the subject has, it is hoped, been worked out with a thoroughness never before attempted.

THE BAMPTON LECTURES, 1876.

THE
WITNESS OF THE PSALMS TO CHRIST & CHRISTIANITY.

By WILLIAM ALEXANDER, D.D.,
LORD BISHOP OF DERRY.

8vo.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF TITIAN.

WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF HIS FAMILY, CHIEFLY FROM NEW
AND UNPUBLISHED RECORDS.

By J. A. CROWE, and G. B. CAVALCASELLE,

Authors of the "History of Painting in North Italy."

With Portrait and Illustrations. 2 vols. 8vo.

THE FRENCH RETREAT FROM MOSCOW.

AND OTHER HISTORICAL ESSAYS.

Contributed to the *Quarterly Review*, *Fraser's Magazine*, &c.

By the late EARL STANHOPE.

CONTENTS.

LEGENDS OF CHARLEMAGNE.

FRENCH RETREAT FROM MOSCOW.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GOSPELS.

THE YEAR OF THE PASSION.

HAROLD OF NORWAY.

THE COUNTESS OF NITHSDALE.

Post 8vo.

BETWEEN THE DANUBE AND THE BLACK SEA.

Or, FIVE YEARS AMONG THE BULGARIANS AND TURKS.

By H. C. BARKLEY,

Civil Engineer.

Post 8vo.

RESIDENCE IN BULGARIA;

OR, NOTES ON THE RESOURCES AND ADMINISTRATION OF TURKEY.

THE CONDITION AND CHARACTER, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, AND LANGUAGE OF THE
CHRISTIAN AND MUSSULMAN POPULATIONS, WITH REFERENCE TO
THE EASTERN QUESTION.

By S. G. B. ST. CLAIR and CHARLES A. BROPHY, F.R.G.S.

Popular Edition. With New Preface. Post 8vo.

THE ANCIENT EGYPTIANS.

THEIR MANNERS, CUSTOMS, PRIVATE LIFE, GOVERNMENT, LAWS, ARTS,
MANUFACTURES, RELIGION, AGRICULTURE, AND EARLY HISTORY.

Derived from a comparison of the Paintings, Sculptures, and Monuments still existing,
with the accounts of Ancient Authors.

By the late **SIR J. GARDNER WILKINSON, F.R.S.**

A New Edition. With Additions by the Author.

Edited and brought down to the present state of knowledge,

By **SAMUEL BIRCH, LL.D.**

With many new Illustrations. 3 vols. Medium 8vo.

THE SPEAKER'S COMMENTARY.

THE NEW TESTAMENT.

WITH AN EXPLANATORY AND CRITICAL COMMENTARY, AND A
REVISION OF THE TRANSLATION.

By **BISHOPS and CLERGY of the ANGLICAN CHURCH.**

Edited by **F. C. COOK, M.A.,**

Canon of Exeter, Preacher at Lincoln's Inn, and Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen.

Vols. I. and II.—Gospels and Acts.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION—The ARCHBISHOP OF YORK.

ST. MATTHEW and ST. MARK — Dean Mansel and Canon Cook.	ST. LUKE—Bishop of St. David's. ST. JOHN—Canon Westcott. THE ACTS—Bishop of Chester.
---	--

Vol. III.—Epistles of St. Paul.

ROMANS—Rev. Dr. Gifford.	EPHESIANS, COLOSSIANS, THESSALONIANS, and PHILEMON—Canon Westcott and Chancellor Benson.
CORINTHIANS—Canon Evans and Rev. J. Waite.	PASTORAL EPISTLES—Bishop of London.
GALATIANS—Dean of Chester.	HEBREWS—Rev. Dr. Kay.
PHILIPPIANS—Rev. Dr. Jeremie.	

Vol. IV.—Catholic Epistles and Revelation.

EPISTLE OF ST. JAMES—Dean of Rochester.	EPISTLES OF ST. JOHN—Bishop of Derry.
ST. PETER and ST. JUDE—Canon Lightfoot and Rev. T. R. Lumby.	REVELATION OF ST. JOHN—Archdeacon Lee.

Medium 8vo

* * * The OLD TESTAMENT is now completed in 6 vols., see page 14.

SECOND SERIES.

COMPANIONS FOR THE DEVOUT LIFE.

LECTURES ON WELL KNOWN DEVOTIONAL WORKS DELIVERED AT
ST. JAMES'S CHURCH, LONDON, IN 1876.

THEOLOGIA GERMANICA. *A. R. ASHWELL, M.A., Canon of Chichester.*

FÉNELON'S ŒUVRES SPIRITUELLES. *T. T. CARTER, M.A., Rector of Clewer.*

ANDREWES' DEVOTIONS. *J. R. WOODFORD, D.D., Bishop of Ely.*

THE CHRISTIAN YEAR. *ALFRED BARRY, D.D., Canon of Worcester.*

PARADISE LOST. *E. H. BICKERSTETH, M.A., Vicar of Christ Church, Hampstead.*

PILGRIM'S PROGRESS. *J. S. HOWSON, D.D., Dean of Chester.*

THE PRAYER BOOK. *J. W. BURGON, B.D., Dean of Chichester.*

8vo.

* * For contents of the *First Series*, see page 16.

LEAVES FROM AN ARTIST'S PORTFOLIO.

BEING

A SELECTION FROM SKETCHES MADE DURING MANY TOURS IN
HOLLAND, GERMANY, ITALY, EGYPT, &c.

By **E. W. COOKE, R.A.**

Small folio.

LIFE OF A SCOTCH NATURALIST.

[THOMAS EDWARD, ASSOCIATE OF THE LINNEAN SOCIETY.]

By **SAMUEL SMILES,**

Author of "Lives of the Engineers." "Self-Help," "Thrift," &c.

With Illustrations by **GEORGE REID, A.R.S.A.**, and a Portrait etched by **RAJON.**

Crown 8vo.

HANDBOOK TO THE ENVIRONS OF LONDON.

WITHIN A CIRCLE OF TWENTY MILES ROUND THE METROPOLIS.

ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED, WITH AN INDEX OF NAMES.

By **JAMES THORNE, F.S.A.**

2 vols. Crown 8vo.

A NEW LIFE OF ALBERT DÜRER.

WITH A HISTORY OF HIS ART.

By **MORITZ THAUSING,**

Keeper of Archduke Albert's Art Collections at Vienna.

With Portrait and Illustrations. Medium 8vo.

THE EFFECTS OF CROSS AND SELF FERTILIZATION IN THE VEGETABLE KINGDOM.

By CHARLES DARWIN, F.R.S.

Crown 8vo.

Uniform with Darwin's "Insectivorous and Climbing Plants."

HISTORY OF ANCIENT EGYPT.

DERIVED FROM MONUMENTS AND INSCRIPTIONS.

By PROFESSOR BRUGSCH, of Gottingen.

Translated by H. DANBY SEYMOUR, F.R.G.S.

8vo.

THE JESUITS.

THEIR CONSTITUTION AND TEACHING: AN HISTORICAL SKETCH.

By W. C. CARTWRIGHT, M.P.

8vo.

A MEMOIR OF FRANCES, LADY CREWE.

FORMING

A SECOND VOLUME OF MONOGRAPHS SOCIAL AND LITERARY.

By LORD HOUGHTON.

Portraits. Post 8vo.

THE CITIES AND CEMETERIES OF ETRURIA.

An entirely New Edition.

WITH MANY ADDITIONS DERIVED FROM RECENT VISITS TO THE ETRUSCAN SITES,
A NEW CHAPTER ON ETRURIAN BOLOGNA.

By GEORGE DENNIS,

H.B.M. Consul-General at Palermo.

With a Hundred Illustrations, Plans, &c., many of them new. 2 vols. Medium 8vo.

HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE.

FROM THE TAKING OF CONSTANTINOPLE BY THE TURKS TO
THE CLOSE OF THE CRIMEAN WAR, 1453-1857.

By THOS. H. DYER, LL.D.,

Author of the "History of the City of Rome," "Pompeii," "Athens," &c.

New and Revised Edition. 4 vols. 8vo.

LONDON ; PAST AND PRESENT.

ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED.

By the late PETER CUNNINGHAM, F.S.A.

In this work will be found much antiquarian, historical, and entertaining information ; together with ample descriptions of all the streets and buildings of note now to be seen, as well as those no longer existing ; and every place endeared to Englishmen by *Interesting* and *Historical* associations ; such as

REMARKABLE OLD INNS, COFFEE HOUSES,
AND TAVERNS.

TOWN HOUSES OF THE OLD NOBILITY.

PLACES OF PUBLIC ENTERTAINMENT.

ANCIENT THEATRES, AND OLD LONDON
SIGHTS.

ANCIENT CROSSES, AND CITY GATES.

HOSTELS OF CHURCH DIGNITARIES.

PRIVILEGED PLACES FOR DEBTORS.

OLD LONDON PRISONS.

PLACES REFERRED TO BY OLD WRITERS.
WARDS OF LONDON.

CITY COMPANIES.

CLUBS.

CHURCHES AND CATHEDRALS.

RESIDENCES OF MEMORABLE MEN.

STREETS REMARKABLE FOR SOME EVENT.

BIRTH PLACES AND BURIAL PLACES OF

EMINENT INDIVIDUALS.

&c. &c.

New Library Edition, most thoroughly Revised. 8vo.

STUDENT'S MANUAL OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY.

THE ANNALS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH FROM ITS FOUNDATION
TO THE EVE OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION.

By PHILIP SMITH, B.A.,

Author of "The Student's Old and New Testament Histories."

With Illustrations. Post 8vo.

HISTORICAL MEMORIALS OF WESTMINSTER ABBEY.

FROM ITS FOUNDATION TO THE PRESENT TIME.

By ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY, D.D.,

Dean of Westminster.

Fourth Edition. With 40 Illustrations. 8vo.

BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON.

By JOHN WILSON CROKER.

WITH NOTES BY LORD STOWELL, SIR WALTER SCOTT, SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH,
DISRAELI, MARKLAND, LOCKHART, &c.

Seventh Edition. With Portraits. One Volume. Medium 8vo.

“Notwithstanding Macaulay's slashing criticism in the *Blue and Yellow*, the book has steadily maintained its ground as by far the best edition of Boswell. Upwards of 40,000 copies have been sold, and such is still the demand for it that a *new library edition* is even now in preparation.”—*Quarterly Review*.

NOTES ON THE CHURCHES OF KENT.

By the late SIR STEPHEN GLYNNE, Bart.

With Illustrations. 8vo.

THE HUGUENOTS.

THEIR SETTLEMENTS, CHURCHES, AND INDUSTRIES IN ENGLAND
AND IRELAND.

By SAMUEL SMILES,

Author of “Self-Help,” “Character,” “Thrift,” &c.

New and Enlarged Edition. Crown 8vo.

POETICAL WORKS OF ALEXANDER POPE.

Edited by WHITWELL ELWIN, B.A.

VOL. III., THE SATIRES, &c.

8vo.

THE ART OF DOG-BREAKING.

WITH ODDS AND ENDS FOR THOSE WHO LOVE THE DOG AND THE GUN.

By GENERAL HUTCHINSON.

Fifth Edition. With Illustrations by F. W. KEYL. Crown 8vo.

HANDBOOK TO THE ENGLISH CATHEDRALS.

[SOUTHERN DIVISION.]

WINCHESTER, SALISBURY, EXETER, WELLS, ROCHESTER, CANTERBURY,
CHICHESTER, AND ST. ALBANS.

By **RICHARD J. KING, B.A.** Exeter College, Oxford.

Revised Edition. With 120 Illustrations. 2 vols. Crown 8vo. 36s.

* * In this edition, a detailed account of St. Alban's is given, with Illustrations.

THE STUDENT'S FRENCH GRAMMAR.

A PRACTICAL AND HISTORICAL GRAMMAR OF THE FRENCH
LANGUAGE.

By **CHARLES HERON-WALL,**

Late Assistant-Master of Brighton College.

With an Introduction by **M. LITTRÉ,**

Member of the French Academy and Author of a "Dictionary of the French Language."

Post 8vo.

This Grammar is the work of a practical and experienced teacher. It has been his special aim to produce a book which would work well in schools where Latin and Greek form the principal subjects of study. In its preparation all the latest books in French philology have been carefully studied.

SECOND AND CONCLUDING VOLUME OF PRINCIPLES OF GREEK ETYMOLOGY.

By **PROFESSOR GEORG CURTIUS,** of Leipzig.

Translated from the German by **A. S. WILKINS, M.A.,** Professor of Latin and Comparative Philology, and **E. B. ENGLAND, M.A.,** Assistant Lecturer in Classics, Owens College, Manchester.

8vo.

MEDIAEVAL LATIN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY.

Based on the Great Work of **DUCANGE.**

Re-arranged and Edited, with many Additions and Corrections,

By **E. A. DAYMAN, B.D.,**

Prebendary of Sarum, formerly Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College, Oxford,

Assisted by **J. H. HESSELS.**

Small 4to.

KIRKES' HANDBOOK OF PHYSIOLOGY.

By W. MORRANT BAKER, F.R.C.S.,

Lecturer on Physiology and Assistant Surgeon to St. Bartholomew's Hospital, and Surgeon to the Evelina Hospital for Sick Children.

Ninth Edition. With 350 Illustrations. Post 8vo.

The Chapters on the STRUCTURAL AND CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF THE HUMAN BODY, the ELEMENTARY TISSUES, the RELATION OF LIFE TO OTHER FORCES, and on GENERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, have been wholly or in great part re-written; and the text has been much altered in many other Chapters, especially those on the BLOOD, CIRCULATION, RESPIRATION, DIGESTION, and the NERVOUS SYSTEM.

About 160 new Illustrations have been added.

METALLURGY.

THE ART OF EXTRACTING METALS FROM THEIR ORES, AND ADAPTING THEM TO VARIOUS PURPOSES OF MANUFACTURE.

5th Division.—SILVER.

By JOHN PERCY, M.D., F.R.S.,

Lecturer on Metallurgy at the Government School of Mines.

With numerous Illustrations. 8vo.

DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

FOR PRACTICAL REFERENCE, METHODICALLY ARRANGED, AND BASED UPON THE BEST PHILOLOGIC AUTHORITIES.

Medium 8vo.

PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY.

By MARY SOMERVILLE.

Seventh Edition, Revised. With Portrait. Post 8vo.

CONNEXION OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES.

By MARY SOMERVILLE.

Tenth Edition, Revised. With Illustrations. Post 8vo.

MURRAY'S CONDENSED HANDBOOK FOR TRAVELLERS IN ENGLAND AND WALES.

ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED IN ONE VOLUME.

Post 8vo.

HANDBOOK OF FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS

FROM ENGLISH AUTHORS.

Fourth Edition, revised and enlarged. Fcap. 8vo.

INDUSTRIAL BIOGRAPHY;

OR, IRON WORKERS AND TOOL MAKERS.

By SAMUEL SMILES.

New Edition. Post 8vo. 6s.

Printed uniform with "SELF HELP," "CHARACTER," and "THRIFT."

HANDBOOK FOR KENT AND SUSSEX.

CANTERBURY, DOVER, RAMSGATE, ROCHESTER, CHATHAM, BRIGHTON, CHICHESTER,
WORTHING, HASTINGS, LEWES, ARUNDEL.

New and Revised Edition. Map. Post 8vo.

THE ILIAD OF HOMER.

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BLANK VERSE.

By EDWARD, EARL OF DERBY.

Fourth Edition. With Portrait. 2 vols. Crown 8vo. 12s.

A PRACTICAL GRAMMAR OF THE GERMAN LANGUAGE.

FOR ADVANCED STUDENTS.

WITH A SKETCH OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LANGUAGE
AND ITS PRINCIPAL DIALECTS.

By Dr. LEONHARD SCHMITZ, F.R.S.E.,

Classical Examiner in the University of London.

Post 8vo.

THE GERMAN PRINCIPIA, PART II.

A READING BOOK;

CONTAINING FABLES, STORIES, AND ANECDOTES, NATURAL HISTORY, AND SCENES
FROM THE HISTORY OF GERMANY.

WITH GRAMMATICAL QUESTIONS AND NOTES.

12mo. 3s. 6d.

ALBEMARLE STREET,
October, 1876.

MR. MURRAY'S LIST OF NEW WORKS.

THIRD SERIES.

LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF THE JEWISH CHURCH.

FROM THE CAPTIVITY TO THE CHRISTIAN ERA.

By **A. P. STANLEY, D.D.**, Dean of Westminster.

With Plans. 8vo. 14s.

BULGARIAN HORRORS, AND THE QUESTION OF THE EAST.

By the **RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.**

80th Thousand. Large type, 8vo, 1s. 6d. CHEAP EDITION, 6d.

Also, MR. GLADSTONE'S SPEECH AT GREENWICH. 8vo. 1s.

DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ANTIQUITIES.

COMPRISING THE HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND ANTIQUITIES OF THE
CHRISTIAN CHURCH,

FROM THE TIME OF THE APOSTLES TO THE AGE OF CHARLEMAGNE.

By VARIOUS WRITERS.

Edited by **DR. WM. SMITH** and **REV. PROF. CHEETHAM, M.A.**

Vol. I. To be completed in 2 Vols. With Illustrations. Medium 8vo. 31s. 6d.

* * This work forms a continuation of SMITH'S DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE.

THE LIFE OF MICHAEL ANGELO.

SCULPTOR, PAINTER, AND ARCHITECT ;

Including inedited Documents from the Buonarroti Archives, illustrative of his Life and Works, *now for the first time published.*

By **CHARLES HEATH WILSON.** .

With Portrait and Illustrations. Royal 8vo. 26s.

MEMOIR OF CAROLINE HERSCHEL,

SISTER OF SIR WILLIAM AND AUNT OF SIR JOHN HERSCHEL.

By **MRS. JOHN HERSCHEL.**

2nd Thousand. With Portraits. Crown 8vo, 12s.

LAST JOURNALS OF DR. LIVINGSTONE IN CENTRAL AFRICA, 1865—73.

Continued by a Narrative of his last moments and sufferings.

By **REV. HORACE WALLER, M.A., F.R.G.S.**

With Portrait, Maps, and Illustrations. 2 Vols. 8vo. 28s.

LIFE OF BISHOP SUMNER, D.D.

DURING AN EPISCOPATE OF FORTY YEARS.

WITH EXTRACTS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE.

By his Son, **GEORGE HENRY SUMNER, M.A.**

Honorary Canon of Winchester, and Rector of Old Alresford, Hants.

With Portrait. 8vo. 14s.

NEW GUINEA AND POLYNESIA.

DISCOVERIES & SURVEYS IN NEW GUINEA AND THE ADJACENT ISLANDS.

A CRUISE IN POLYNESIA AND VISITS TO THE PEARL SHELL STATIONS
IN TORRES STRAIT OF H.M.S. BASILISK.

By **CAPTAIN MORESBY, R.N.**

With Map and Illustrations. 8vo. 15s.

LESSONS FROM NATURE AS MANIFESTED IN MIND AND MATTER.

By **ST. GEORGE MIVART, F.R.S., Ph.D.,**

Professor of Biology at University College, Kensington, and Lecturer on Zoology and Comparative Anatomy at St. Mary's Hospital.

8vo. 15s.

THRIFT.

A BOOK OF DOMESTIC COUNSEL.

By **SAMUEL SMILES,**

Author of "Lives of the Engineers."

CONTENTS:

INDUSTRY.
HABITS OF THRIFT.
IMPROVIDENCE.
MEANS OF SAVING.
EXAMPLES OF THRIFT.
METHODS OF ECONOMY.

LIFE ASSURANCE.
SAVINGS BANKS.
LITTLE THINGS.
MASTERS AND MEN.
THE CROSSLEYS.

LIVING ABOVE THE MEANS.
GREAT DEBTORS.
RICHES AND CHARITY.
HEALTHY HOMES.
ART OF LIVING.

20th Thousand. Post 8vo. 6s.

A Companion Volume to "Self-Help," "Character," and "Industrial Biography."

SECRET HISTORY OF THE VATICAN COUNCIL.

OR, EIGHT MONTHS AT ROME DURING ITS SITTINGS.

By **POMPONIO LETO.**

Translated from the Italian, with the Original Documents.

8vo. 12s.

ROME AND THE NEWEST FASHIONS IN RELIGION.

THREE TRACTS.

By **RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.**

Collected Edition. With a New Preface. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Contents.—THE VATICAN DECREES.—VATICANISM.—THE POPE'S SPEECHES.

NARRATIVE OF SPORT IN ABYSSINIA ON THE MAREB AND TACKAZZEE.

By **THE EARL OF MAYO.**

With Illustrations. Post 8vo. 12s.

THE EARLY LIFE OF DEAN SWIFT, 1667—1711.

By the late **JOHN FORSTER, LL.D.**

With Portrait and Facsimiles. 8vo. 15s.

HISTORY OF INDIAN AND EASTERN ARCHITECTURE.

By **JAMES FERGUSSON, F.R.S.**

With 400 Illustrations. Medium 8vo. 42s.

THE SPEAKER'S COMMENTARY ON THE OLD TESTAMENT,

EXPLANATORY AND CRITICAL, WITH A REVISION OF THE
TRANSLATION.

By **BISHOPS and CLERGY** of the **ANGLICAN CHURCH.**

Edited by **F. C. COOK, M.A.,**

Canon of Exeter, Preacher at Lincoln's Inn, and Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen.

VOL. I.—GENESIS, EXODUS, LEVITICUS, NUMBERS, DEUTERONOMY. 30s.

VOLS. II. and III.—JOSHUA, JUDGES, RUTH, SAMUEL, KINGS, CHRONICLES, EZRA,
NEHEMIAH, ESTHER. 36s.

VOL. IV.—JOB, PSALMS, PROVERBS, ECCLESIASTES, SONG OF SOLOMON. 24s.

VOL. V.—ISAIAH, JEREMIAH, LAMENTATIONS. 20s.

VOL. VI.—EZEKIEL, DANIEL, THE MINOR PROPHETS. 25s.

Complete in 6 Vols. Medium 8vo.

METALLURGY;

THE ART OF EXTRACTING METALS FROM THEIR ORE.

By **JOHN PERCY, M.D., F.R.S.,**

Lecturer on Metallurgy at the Government School of Mines, Honorary Member the Institution of
Civil Engineers, &c.

FIRST DIVISION.—FUEL.

REFRACTORY METALS,
FIRE CLAYS,
CRUCIBLES,

FIRE BRICKS,
WOOD,
PEAT,

COAL,
CHARCOAL,
COKE, &c.

New and Revised Edition. With Illustrations. 8vo. 30s.

SPORT AND WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA,

WITH INCIDENTS OF THE CAFFRE WAR,

By **MAJOR-GENERAL BISSET, C.B.**

With Map and Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 14s.

ARGO;

OR, THE QUEST OF THE GOLDEN FLEECE.

A METRICAL TALE.

By the **EARL OF CRAWFORD AND BALCARRES.**

8vo. 10s. 6d.

TROY AND ITS REMAINS.

A NARRATIVE OF DISCOVERIES AND RESEARCHES MADE ON
THE SITE OF ILIUM, AND IN THE TROJAN PLAIN.

By **DR. HENRY SCHLIEMANN.**

2nd Thousand. With 500 Illustrations. Royal 8vo. 42s.

POETICAL WORKS OF LORD HOUGHTON.

New Edition. With Portrait. 2 vols. Fcap. 8vo. 12s.

SHORT HISTORY OF NATURAL SCIENCE;

AND OF THE PROGRESS OF DISCOVERY FROM THE TIME
OF THE GREEKS TO THE PRESENT DAY.

By **ARABELLA B. BUCKLEY.**

With Illustrations. Post 8vo. 9s.

BIBLE LANDS AND BIBLE CUSTOMS.

ILLUSTRATIVE OF SCRIPTURE.

By **HENRY VAN LENNEP, D.D.,**

Author of "Travels in Asia Minor."

With Maps and 350 Illustrations. 2 vols. 8vo. 21s.

THE
CAUCASUS, PERSIA, AND TURKEY IN ASIA.

INCLUDING A JOURNEY TO NINEVEH AND BABYLON, AND
ACROSS THE DESERT TO PALMYRA.

By **BARON MAX VON THIELMANN.**

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY CHAS. HENEAGE, F.R.G.S.

With Map and Illustrations. 2 Vols. Post 8vo. 18s.

FOUNDATIONS OF RELIGION IN THE
MIND AND HEART OF MAN.

By **SIR JOHN BYLES,**
Late Judge of the Court of Common Pleas.

Post 8vo. 6s.

COMPANIONS FOR THE DEVOUT LIFE;

LECTURES ON WELL-KNOWN DEVOTIONAL WORKS DELIVERED
IN ST. JAMES'S CHURCH, LONDON, 1875.

CONTENTS :

THE 'DE IMITATIONE CHRISTI.' *Canon FARRAR, D.D.*

THE 'PENSÉES' OF BLAISE PASCAL. *Dean CHURCH, M.A.*

ST. FRANCIS OF SALES' 'INTRODUCTION TO THE DEVOUT LIFE.' *Dean GOULBURN, D.D.*

BAXTER AND 'THE SAINTS' REST.' *Archbishop TRENCH, D.D.*

ST. AUGUSTINE'S 'CONFESSIONS.' *Bishop ALEXANDER, D.D.*

JEREMY TAYLOR'S 'HOLY LIVING AND DYING.' *Rev. W. G. HUMPHRY, B.D.*

First Series. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

MEMOIR OF SIR RODERICK MURCHISON.

INCLUDING EXTRACTS FROM HIS JOURNALS AND LETTERS.

WITH NOTICES OF HIS SCIENTIFIC CONTEMPORARIES, ETC.

By **ARCHIBALD GEIKIE, LL.D., F.R.S.**

Murchison-Professor of Geology and Mineralogy in the University of Edinburgh, and
Director of the Geological Survey of Scotland.

With Portraits, &c. 2 vols. 8vo. 30s.

THE SLAVONIC PROVINCES, SOUTH OF
THE DANUBE.

THEIR HISTORY AND PRESENT STATE IN RELATION
TO THE OTTOMAN PORTE.

By **WILLIAM FORSYTH, Q.C., LL.D., M.P.**

With Map. Post 8vo. 5s.

THE COAST OF RUSSIAN TARTARY, EASTERN
SIBERIA, JAPAN, AND FORMOSA.

FROM THE COREA TO THE RIVER AMUR.

By **CAPT. B. W. BAX, R.N., of H.M.S. DWARF.**

With Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 12s.

THE VAUX-DE-VIRE OF MAISTRE JEAN
LE HOUX, ADVOCATE, OF VIRE.

Translated and Edited by **JAMES PATRICK MUIRHEAD, M.A.**

With Portrait and Illustrations. 8vo. 21s.

THE MOON;

CONSIDERED AS A PLANET, A WORLD, AND A SATELLITE.

By **JAMES NASMYTH, C.E., and JAMES CARPENTER, F.R.A.S.**

With Illustrations of Lunar Objects, Phenomena, and Scenery.

Second Edition. 4to. 30s.

THE TRAVELS OF MARCO POLO,
DESCRIBING THE KINGDOMS AND MARVELS OF THE EAST.

A NEW ENGLISH VERSION.

By **COL. HENRY YULE, C.B.**

Late Royal Engineers (Bengal).

Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged.

With 19 Maps and 130 Illustrations. 2 Vols. Medium 8vo. 63s.

FRAGMENTS ON ETHICAL SUBJECTS,
AND
LETTERS ON THE POLITICS OF
SWITZERLAND.

By the late **GEORGE GROTE, F.R.S.**

2 vols. 8vo. 13s. 6d.

A
SCHOOL MANUAL OF MODERN GEOGRAPHY,
PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL.

By **JOHN RICHARDSON, M.A.,**

Vicar of St. Mary's Hospital, and Diocesan Inspector of Schools.

Post 8vo. 5s.

VILLAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST
AND WEST.

By **SIR HENRY MAINE, LL.D.**

Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of Oxford, and Member of the Indian Council.

Third Edition. WITH ADDITIONAL ESSAYS. 8vo. 12s.

THE HAWAIIAN ARCHIPELAGO.

OR, SIX MONTHS IN THE SANDWICH ISLANDS.

By **ISABELLA BIRD,**

Author of the "Englishwoman in America."

New and Cheaper Edition. With Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.

THE LAND OF THE NORTH WIND,

OR TRAVELS AMONG THE LAPLANDERS AND SAMOYEDES,
AND ALONG THE SHORES OF THE WHITE SEA.

By **EDWARD RAE.**

With Map and Woodcuts. Post 8vo. 10s. 6d.

HISTORY OF HERODOTUS;

A NEW ENGLISH VERSION.

Edited, with copious *Notes* and *Essays*, from the most recent sources of information, Historical and Ethnographical, which have been obtained in the progress of Cuneiform and Hieroglyphical Discovery.

By **GEORGE RAWLINSON, M.A.**,

Canon of Canterbury, and Camden Professor of Ancient History at Oxford.

Assisted by **SIR HENRY RAWLINSON** and **SIR J. GARDNER WILKINSON**.

Third Edition, Revised. With Maps and 350 Woodcuts. 4 vols. 8vo. 48s.

POETICAL REMAINS OF EDWARD CHURTON, M.A.

LATE ARCHDEACON OF CLEVELAND.

INCLUDING TRANSLATIONS AND IMITATIONS.

With Portrait. Post 8vo. 7s. 6d.

AN ATLAS OF ANCIENT GEOGRAPHY.

BIBLICAL AND CLASSICAL.

INTENDED TO ILLUSTRATE SMITH'S CLASSICAL AND BIBLICAL DICTIONARIES,
AND THE "SPEAKER'S COMMENTARY ON THE BIBLE."

Compiled under the superintendence of

DR. WM. SMITH and **MR. GEORGE GROVE**.

With Descriptive Text, giving the Sources and Authorities, Indices, &c.

With 43 Maps. Folio, half-bound. £6 6s.

THE NICENE AND APOSTLES' CREEDS.

THEIR LITERARY HISTORY;

TOGETHER WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE GROWTH AND RECEPTION
OF "*THE CREED OF ST. ATHANASIUS*."

By **C. A. SWAINSON, D.D.**,

Canon of Chichester and Norrisian Professor of Divinity at Cambridge.

With Facsimile. 8vo. 16s.

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND OF SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE.

ADAPTED TO THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW.

By **R. MALCOLM KERR, LL.D.**,

Judge of the City of London Court, and one of the Commissioners of the Central Criminal Court.

Fourth Edition, incorporating all the Recent Changes in the Law. 4 vols. 8vo. 60s.

ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN THE EAST.

A SERIES OF

PAPERS ON THE POLITICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITION
OF CENTRAL ASIA.

By **MAJOR-GEN. SIR HENRY RAWLINSON, K.C.B., F.R.S.**,

Member of the Council of India.

Second Edition. With Map. 8vo. 12s.

VIE DE SEINT AUBAN.

A POEM IN NORMAN-FRENCH, ASCRIBED TO MATTHEW PARIS.

NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME EDITED FROM A MS. IN THE LIBRARY OF TRINITY COLLEGE,
DUBLIN. WITH CONCORDANCE, GLOSSARY, AND NOTES.

By **ROBERT ATKINSON, M.A., LL.D.**

Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology in the University of Trinity College, Dublin.

Small 4to. 10s. 6d.

THE PRINCIPLES OF GEOLOGY;

OR, THE MODERN CHANGES OF THE EARTH AND ITS INHABITANTS,
CONSIDERED AS ILLUSTRATIVE OF GEOLOGY.

By **SIR CHARLES LYELL.**

Twelfth Edition, with Illustrations, 2 vols. 8vo. 32s.

Obermeier

Bucherbände nach RAL PG 405

Neufahrnerstr. 8 Tel. 0878 00883

8303 Rottenbrunn

3030383

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley

Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington Edited by his Son, The Duke of Wellington. [In Continuation of the former Series]

Bd.: 6

London 1872

Brit. 551 ub-6

urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10282300-3